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"Effects of incentivizing novelty vs. usefulness and idea sharing policies on idea sharing and subsequent collaboration"
Event details of Accounting Research Seminar with Xinyu Zhang (Cornell University)
Date
24 June 2025
Time
10:30 -12:00
Room
REC M4.02

Abstract:

Using two experiments, we examine how incentivizing the novelty versus usefulness dimension of creativity affects (1) employees’ willingness to share ideas, and (2) their subsequent collaboration. In Experiment 1, participants first generate three creative ideas under incentives emphasizing either novelty or usefulness and either voluntarily share their ideas or are required to share at least one idea. We find that incentivizing novelty reduces voluntary idea sharing due to heightened evaluation apprehension, but mandating a minimum level of sharing mitigates this effect. However, in a subsequent group-based creative task, mandatory sharing under novelty incentives unexpectedly decreases subsequent collaboration compared to voluntary sharing. Experiment 2 explores this finding by manipulating whether individuals see their peers’ shared ideas and whether sharing is perceived as voluntary or not. Results suggest that idea sharing signals peers’ willingness to collaborate when sharing is voluntary. Our findings offer practical implications for designing incentives and policies that balance idea sharing and long-term collaboration.

General information:

Attendance to this seminar is possible by invitation only. Please send an e-mail to secbs-abs@uva.nl if your are interested in attending this seminar.

Roeterseilandcampus - building M

Room REC M4.02
Plantage Muidergracht 12
1018 TV Amsterdam