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Marcel Vorage

The politics of entry


Entry is an underresearched topic in economics. In this thesis we investigate how politics, defined as political preferences and executive constraints, shape the level and composition of entry. The number and identity of entrepreneurs is influenced by political choices over licenses, subsidies or the distribution of loans. This capability to direct market access puts politicians at the heart of a struggle between citizens for preferential market access to a protected market. Interest groups form to enable citizens to jointly o er political contributions in exchange for preferential access. The effectiveness of these o ers depends on the political influence of consumers who suffer from reduced production. Their political influence is determined by the level of political accountability, reflecting the ability of citizens to question and challenge government policy. This thesis studies three distinct cases of this struggle using a single political economy framework. Before summarising the three main chapters, we shortly review evidence showing that politicians influence market access to their