Accounting Research Seminar with Christoph Feichter (VU Vienna)
"Slowing the Rat Race: The Effects of Competitive Incentive Systems and Work-life Balance Communication on Unproductive Overwork"
Event details from: Accounting Research Seminar with Christoph Feichter (VU Vienna)
- Date
- 3 February 2026
- Time
- 10:30 – 12:00
Abstract:
Firms often face the challenge of motivating employee productivity without encouraging unproductive overwork that is costly for both employees and firms. This study examines how two common incentive systems—tournaments and bonus allocations—influence employees’ extent of unproductive overwork, and whether managers’ non-binding work-life balance (WLB) communication can mitigate such behavior. Using an interactive laboratory experiment, we find that a tournament system in which managers assign only a single reward causes significantly more unproductive overwork than a bonus allocation system in which managers can split the reward among employees. However, when managers actively employ WLB messaging that highlights their vested interest and intent not to reward unproductive overwork, it mitigates this negative effect, even though such communication is non-binding and managers observe imperfect signals of employees’ overwork. Our results suggest that managerial WLB communication facilitates coordination among employees to not engage in a costly rat race of unproductive overwork.
*Co-authored with E. Cardinals (Tilburg University and KU Leuven), E.W. Chan (The University of Texas at Austin)
General information:
Attendance to this seminar is possible by invitation only. Please send an e-mail to secbs-abs@uva.nl if your are interested in attending this seminar.
