This thesis contributes to the literature of industrial organization and competition policy. The main focus of this research is how competition policy and competition policy enforcement can be improved using insights both from theoretical as well as experimental methods in industrial organization. To the field of merger theory and policy this thesis contributes by developing an index to quantify merger efficiencies. The index can be used as a complementary tool in the assessment of merger cases. In the field of cartel research this thesis offers novel results both for theory and policy. First, it gives new insights into the effect of entry on cartel stability. Moreover, it sheds light on how cartels can be 'grown' through sequential entry. Thirdly, the findings presented in this thesis raise doubt about the purported success of leniency program by examining the type of cartels that are broken up by these schemes. Using a theoretical model, it is shown that mainly collapsed cartel may have an incentive to use such self-reporting schemes.