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Maarten de Haas **Up or Out?**

Archetypes and person-organization fit in Dutch law firms


Maarten de Haas
Up or Out?



This study investigates the conditions and mechanisms of fit between lawyers' values and ambitions, on the one hand, and law firms' values and other characteristics on the other hand. The big law firms in The Netherlands are distinguished according to their configuration as a professional partnership or managed professional business. The relationship between these configurations and different HRM practices – especially career and reward systems - is analyzed.

Fit between lawyer and law firm is an important factor in promoting commitment, retention and wellbeing of the lawyers as well as the performance of the firm.

The author of this thesis has been a manager and management consultant for law firms since 1989. He started the research in 2008. The results may contribute to the quality of recruitment and staffing, training and career planning, reward and appraisal in law firms and other professional service firms.



Up or Out?

Archetypes and person-organization fit
in Dutch law firms

Maarten de Haas

Academisch proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit op woensdag 27 maart 2013, te 11.00 uur

door

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Geboren te Tilburg

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Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde

Preface

In 1989, I entered the world of law firms as a manager at Boekel Van Empel & Drilling (nowadays Boekel De Nerée). With 35 lawyers, the firm ranked among the five biggest in The Netherlands. When I left in 1996, the firm had grown to more than 120 lawyers but had dropped out of the top 10 biggest law firms. In these years, law firm management – including HRM – developed simultaneously with the size of the law profession and of law firms. I was privileged to participate in these developments from the early days on.

From the start, one of the issues that kept attracting my interest was the difference between young lawyers in their development to autonomous professionals. In general, law firms are successful in recruiting talented and ambitious young men and women. Some of them flourish and rise to associate or even partner positions, while others leave after years of toiling. Sometimes, this difference can be attributed to capabilities or personality, but often the causes are unclear. One of the possible explanations might be found in the character of the firm – its culture, organization, support. But how this character affected the chances of different lawyers was unknown and never thoroughly explored. Meanwhile, valuable talent was wasted and years that should have unfolded the potential of young professionals were spoiled. My motivation for the research that resulted in this dissertation originated in these observations. I hope that my research may contribute to improve the choices and success of firms and young professionals.

There might be some truth in the horror stories about Ph.D. projects and writing a thesis while having a full time job, but I found them mostly false. Of course, it is a journey with unexpected turns and setbacks, but these were outweighed by far by the pleasure of discovery and progress. Having a supporting family and work environment helped a lot. I started my research for this thesis in 2008; in the same year I ran my first marathon, in Berlin. As

with a marathon, to complete a Ph.D. thesis you have to keep on running, to keep on track and hope to avoid serious injuries. Contrary to a marathon, you cannot do it without help.

I would like to express my thankfulness to the law firms, their managing partners, HRM directors and the young lawyers that made my research possible through the interviews and responses to the surveys. The Dutch Bar Association supported the project from the beginning. Without the inspiration of working among Dutch lawyers, this project never would have been possible. Incidentally, individual lawyers are exposed in the media as greedy, pompous and/or unreliable. Through the years, I probably have met a few thousand Dutch lawyers. With very few exceptions I have found them intelligent and dependable, committed to the cause of the client and to the ethics of the profession, as well as agreeable and challenging company.

I thank my colleagues at RaymakersvdBruggen for their support and help, especially Marchelle van Bon who spent indispensable time and efforts in analyzing my results and amply compensated my initial lack of statistical know how.

I am very grateful to my supervisors professor Deanne den Hartog and professor Rob van Otterlo for their support and guiding, their sound advices and their confidence. In 2008, professor Jan Wesseling introduced me to dr. Wendelien van Eerde as a possible (co-)supervisor of my thesis project. He could not have done me a bigger favour. Wendelien introduced me in theories, methodologies and scientific communities that were relatively new for me, guided me through or around probable pitfalls and corrected my drafts with tremendous patience and precision. Every discussion we had gave me fresh insights and strengthened my belief that it could be done. Without you, Wendelien, this thesis would have been utterly impossible. Thank you.

Eighty-seven years ago, my grandfather Martinus de Haas successfully upheld his doctoral thesis in the Aula of the University of Amsterdam. He dedicated his dissertation to the memory of his mother. I would like to follow his example in both respects.

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Introduction

1. Aim, object and content of the research

Professional service firms constitute a growing part of global economy, in size and importance (e.g. Greenwood, Lie, Prakash and Deephouse, 2005; Lorsch and Tierney, 2002; Lowendahl, 2001). Law firms are exemplary of this development. Law firms have been growing in size, at least between 1970 and 2008; the legal industry and the total number of lawyers are growing still. Besides growing, the legal industry is diversifying rapidly. To meet the demands of growth and diversity, law firms have to recruit an increasing portion of law graduates (KSU-SDU, 1999-2012).

In addition, the ageing of the western population is causing an increasing outflow of experienced lawyers. Legal talent is scarce and will be scarcer. The number of graduates tends to stabilize or even to decrease slightly. Already in the late 1990s a friction between demand and supply could be discerned, not only in numbers but also in quality (KSU-SDU, 1999-2012). It can be argued that this friction leads to more frequent mismatches between the ambition and capabilities of young lawyers and the demands of the firms that employ them, causing stress, attrition, turnover, and a waste of talent (De Haas & Birnbaum, 2002). Lawyers may find themselves in the wrong firm or the wrong profession, sometimes only after several years. The personal damage to career and wellbeing can be considerable.

Law firms are diversifying, but so is the legal workforce: in education, gender, social and ethnic background, ambition and abilities. It is arguable that the (legal) professions have not yet succeeded to adapt to the needs of a diversified workforce. The disappointing career development of female lawyers (nowadays 60% of all lawyers entering the profession but less than 20% of lawyers with more than 7 years experience) is perhaps the best

illustration. (Boon, Duff, & Shiner, 2001; Dinovitzer & Garth, 2007; Hagan & Kay, 2007).

It is of vital importance that the legal profession succeeds in attracting and retaining capable and ambitious professionals. This is a condition for a sustainable profession, but also for securing the accessibility of the legal system. Apart from their contribution to economic and business processes, lawyers and law firms have an important societal role in securing the access to justice.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the conditions and mechanisms of fit between lawyers' values and ambitions, on the one hand, and the law firms' characteristics, values, and career opportunities on the other hand. The assumption is that fit between lawyer and law firm is an important factor in promoting performance, retention and wellbeing of the lawyers as well as in the performance of the firm. In my experience, not many firms or lawyers recognize the importance of this kind of fit in the choice of employer or in their selection, development and career decisions. This research may contribute to improving the quality of these decisions.

In this introduction, I will first describe in Section 2 the research context: professional service firms, law firms, and the legal profession in the Netherlands. Some notions of management and economics of law firms that will be used in the research will be explained. This Section is intended as an introduction for those readers who are not acquainted with the legal profession and industry in the Netherlands. In Section 3, I will conclude this chapter with the questions and research model that underlie this thesis.

2. Lawyers and Law Firms in The Netherlands

2.1. Professionals and professional service firms

2.1.1. Professionals

Many pages have been written on the subject of defining and describing what a professional is. Summarizing existing theory (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002; Lowendahl, Revang, & Fosstenlokken, 2001; Luijk, 2007; Maister, 1997; Sherer & Lee, 2002; Van Delden, 1996; Wanrooy, 2007; Weggeman, 1997) a professional is defined by:

- academic or comparable higher education,
- specialist knowledge and skills,
- autonomy in and responsibility for the way the client is serviced,
- adherence to, identification with the professional group,
- professional norms, standards and ethics.

Whatever the definition, there is no discussion that the law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Historically, the classical professions are theology, law, and medicine. Some authors (Empson & Popham, 2007; Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990; Maister, 1993) describe the law, accountancy and consultancy as the classical commercial professional services. In every division, the law is included in the professional services.

Besides the defining properties, certain characteristics are attributed to professionals such as a preference to work individually, an aversion from management and control, a tendency to neglect other than their professional norms and standards, and the identification with colleague professionals outside the organization rather than with the own organization (Angel, 2007; Gabarro, 2007; Maister, 1997; Poucke & van Wijk, 1996; Wanrooy, 2007). Of course, all these characteristics may vary widely between individuals, but are nevertheless factors to take into account in studying professionals and their organizations.

2.1.2. Professional service firms

Many definitions and typologies of the professional organization have been proposed over the years. Recent literature frequently uses a practical definition that also fits the aim of this study: an organization primarily sustaining professionalized occupations (Brock, 2006; Weggeman, 1997). This does not necessarily imply that the majority of employees are professionals. In hospitals, for instance, doctors are a minority within the total workforce and even in some law firms the lawyers are outnumbered by the non professional support staff. It does imply that the primary processes, the key servicing of clients – patients, students – are defined and dominated by the input, actions and know how of the professionals. Most authors assume that organizations with a majority of professionals are professional organizations (see Wanrooy, 2007).

In 1979 Mintzberg described the professional bureaucracy as the model for the organization of professionals. In this type of organization, the dominant part is the operational level (the professionals); quality is defined by standardization of inputs (human capital, education) and management and staff are relatively weak (Mintzberg, 1979).

The commercial professional organization (as opposed to education, health, or civil service), in which professionals provide services directly to clients, is commonly known as the professional service firm (PSF). This term was used by David Maister in his first book on this type of professional organization (Maister, 1993) and has since been generally adopted to describe law, accountancy and consultancy firms, architects, advertisement,

communication and PR firms (Lorsch et al., 2002; Maister, 1993, 1997). In PSFs, professionals dominate strategy and management. The know-how and capabilities of the professionals is the “product” of the firm. Clients are serviced by the professionals directly, often personally. Professionals develop their know-how and client relations during many years of learning on the job. Apart from these general features PSFs may differ among each other in many aspects of their business, operations, governance and management, as I will discuss in the following chapters.

2.2. The legal profession

The literature on professional service firms is focused mainly on law, accountancy and consultancy. Law firms are a preferred subject; the law is a relatively homogeneous, well organized and documented profession. Organizational and HRM theory on professional service firms is well applicable to law firms.

A law graduate in the Netherlands, wishing to devote her career to the law, can choose to become a judge or a prosecutor, a civil-law-notary or company lawyer, or try to find her way into legal consultancy and representation.

Judiciary and prosecution are both governmental organizations, with a constitutional and legal autonomy as in every modern democracy. They are run and paid completely by the State, the Department of Justice. Most candidates aspiring to become a judge or a prosecutor are recruited shortly after graduating to start a six years training period. Part of judiciary vacancies are filled with experienced lawyers who follow a shortened training program.

The civil-law-notaries in the Netherlands function in a notarial system that exists in most continental European countries (the ‘Notariat Latin’). Under the rule of the Notary Law, the notary is both a public officer and entrepreneur on her own account. She is responsible for the drafting and passing of deeds concerning real estate, incorporation and family law and other contracts. (In Great Britain, most responsibilities of the continental notaries rest with the solicitors.) Notaries have their own professional association with regulatory powers, disciplinary rules and procedures, quality control and professional training obligations.

About one third of the law graduates enter employment in organizations in the public and private sectors that do not have legal services as their primary concern. They may become an in-house legal counsel, or start a management, commercial or civil career. In house company lawyers also have formed a professional association, with regulations and training programs for members; but membership is voluntary, the association has no

binding regulatory powers nor is ruled by law.

More than one third of all law graduates are employed by organizations that supply legal consultancy and representation. These can be labour unions or similar associations, consultancy firms, legal aid desks and the like, but the majority are law firms ('advocatenkantoren' in the Netherlands) that provide clients with the legal assistance of 'advocaten' (Vogels, 2003).

2.1.1. Dutch Bar Association, history and institutions.

The profession of 'advocaten' can be traced back to the Middle Ages, but the outlines of the contemporary profession and professional institutions have been defined in the 19th century. The formal separation between legal representation in court and legal consultancy and assistance (a separation that still exists in Great Britain) was lifted, allowing both to be practiced by the advocaten (Henssen, 1998; Jansen, 2007). The Advocaten Law of 1952 defined the profession, its rights and responsibilities and its institutions. The Dutch Bar Association ("Orde van Advocaten") was given binding regulatory and disciplinary powers. The independence of advocaten, their secrecy obligations and the right to refuse to witness were embedded in the law, as was their monopoly of legal representation in court (with exception of the cantonal courts and cases with small financial interests). Dutch advocaten are obligatory members of the Dutch Bar Association and subjected to its rules and its disciplinary jurisdiction.

The Dutch Bar Association has used its regulatory powers to adapt the profession to developments of modern society. Quality control and regulations concerning financial management reporting, involvement in possible illegal transactions, safeguarding clients' deposits and others were introduced to secure the integrity and the constitutional position of the profession (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2007).

2.3. Growth of the legal industry

Before 1979, the number of 'advocaten' never exceeded 2.000, but between 1987 and 2010, it almost tripled from 5.400 to 16.000. Before 1970, law firms of more than one lawyer were exceptional. Only a few firms had more than five lawyers. The 1970s saw a first wave of mergers and expansion of firms, but the development of the big Dutch law firms started with the mergers of 1990. Now, the top-10 firms count 130 to 280 'advocaten' and most of them also employ civil law notaries and tax advisors. The number of firms with more than 20 lawyers almost doubled in the last decade, from 53 to 100. Smaller firms also grew in number but less spectacularly. Nevertheless, the average size of a law firm, 3,6 lawyers in 1997, was still under six lawyers in 2010 (Henssen, 1998; KSU-SDU, 1999-

2012; Voert & Peters, 2006).

The last decade of the 20th century was also a period of internationalization of law firms and the development of full service firms through the association or merger of ‘advocaten’ with notarial, tax, and accountancy firms. Mergers of ‘advocaten’ with notaries and tax advisors are permitted, but full mergers with accountants or consultants are not allowed by the rules of the Bar Association. Around 2001 however, all “Big Five” international accountancy firms de facto had their Dutch law offices on their own account or by association with existing firms. Almost all big and several middle sized law firms had formed an international association or were seriously studying it. International full service – offering all legal services and specialisations to clients – was the dominant strategy.

The economic recession that followed 9/11 and the burst of the Dotcom bubble put an end to the growth of the international professional service firm including the legal sector. In the aftermath of the Enron affair, the restrictions on associations of accountancy, consultancy and law were tightened. Some multidisciplinary firms were dissolved. Andersen Accountants disappeared. The growth of the big law firms slowed down or came to an end. Trainees, associates and partners were dismissed due to a lack of work in the international transactions sector. Some lawyers started their own niche firms; these years brought the breakthrough of boutique firms, specialising in certain industries or areas of the law, such as Intellectual property law, family law, labour law, real estate, transport law and others (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2007). Full service was abandoned as a leading strategic concept. Firms concentrated on the type of clients and the market segments they could serve best and at the highest profits. They strengthened the specializations that these clients needed and let go of the rest. Some firms tightened their international alliance, others did the opposite. Some international firms still saw advantages in entering the European market through a Dutch foothold and opened relatively small offices (e.g. Howrey, Greenberg Traurig, Norton Rose) or took over middle sized firms (Bird & Bird, Lovells). In general, internationalization has slowed down. Instead of ongoing integration, the law industry is characterized by diversification and specialization (KSU-SDU, 1999-2012; Sherr, 2000; Voert et al., 2006)

In the following Sections and Chapters I will mostly refer to ‘advocaten’ and ‘advocatenkantoren’ with the less accurate, but more readable terms Lawyers and Law Firms.

2.4. *Management of Law Firms*

Along with these developments, middle sized and big law firms in the Netherlands developed into organizations that had to be managed and organized. Twenty years ago, the largest law firms had 30 to 40 lawyers, who were supported by their secretaries, an office manager, a small finance department and perhaps one or two paralegals. Nowadays, the big law firms are fully developed organizations with professionally managed HRM, finance, IT and marketing operations. Knowledge and quality management are organized and supported by staff and systems. Even many smaller to middle sized firms have hired professional managers to look after support facilities and HRM and to support the managing partners (KSU-SDU, 1999-2012).

All law firms are owned as well as governed by the partners. The majority of the top 50 law firms are now incorporated (NV or BV), but this has not altered the governance and management structure significantly (KSU-SDU 2006, also noticed by Greenwood & Empson, 2007 and Wanrooy, 2007). Shares in the corporation are owned only by the senior professionals (the former partners); the shareholders themselves govern the firm¹. In every firm with more than approximately 10 partners, the partners appoint a managing board that consists of one or more partners. They are sometimes supported by one or more 'external' (i.e. non-partner) managers. The Bar Association has recently allowed non-advocaten to act on the board of an incorporated law firm, as long as this board is chaired by one of the partners. The board manages the daily operations, the support staff and facilities and coordinates policy making processes. Apart from these basic tasks, there are many differences in the authority and composition of the board, the remaining powers of the partners, the position of external managers (De Haas, 2006; Van Otterlo & Dijkstra, 2011; Wanrooy, 2007). Also there are many different forms of structuring and managing the support organization and the law practice groups. In line with the findings of Wanrooy (2007), every law firm nowadays seems to develop an organizational structure that suits its interests best.

This research focuses on the top 20 law firms in The Netherlands. In ranking the firms by size, I only take into account their operations in the Netherlands. Law firms in the Netherlands are annually ranked by SDU publishers (until 2010: KSU). I follow the ranking according to the combined numbers of advocaten and notaries. Tax advisors are not included in this ranking. As the number of tax advisors in these law firms is relatively

¹Hereafter the term 'partners' includes the shareholders in these incorporated firms.

small, this does not affect the ranking, except for the firm of Loyens Loeff. This firm has a major international tax practice; while it is only 4th in size in the SDU ranking, including tax advisors it is by far the biggest law firm, employing over 600 lawyers, whereas the number one in the SDU list, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, employed 328 lawyers in 2012.

2.5. The economy of the law firm

Lawyers – just like many other professionals – register the time spent on client matters and bill the client accordingly. Client and lawyer can agree on fixed fees, contingency fees or other price arrangements, but billable hours x hourly rate still is the most common billing method. It also serves to calculate other price arrangements. Budgeting and control systems of law firms focus on hours x rate as well (De Haas, 2006). Productivity, rate level and leverage are crucial profitability factors. Productivity varies according to experience, skills and capabilities of the lawyer, the type of practice and clients (De Haas, 2006; Leblebici, 2007; Mowbray, 1997; Sherer et al., 2002). Lawyers' rates vary with market segments, intensity of competition, seniority of the lawyer, reputation of the firm, and the degree of specialisation.

The third profitability factor, leverage, consists of the contribution of employed fee earners to the profits of a firm. The fee revenues generated by associate lawyers in the employment of the firm are expected to exceed their costs (compensation and benefits, education, facilities etc.). Leverage is a powerful profit driver (Sherer, 1995), but leverage can only be achieved by dedicating time to educating juniors, and by delegating and supervising work by senior professionals. To most professionals, this does not come naturally; they are driven by the direct challenge of a new assignment (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Leblebici, 2007; Mowbray, 1997). Leverage may be supported by standardization of work (Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 2005). In law firms in the Netherlands, the professional attitude of the lawyer and the predominantly customized nature of the legal work limit the possibilities to standardize and delegate work and to create leverage this way. A leverage of two to three associates pro partner is high and four is exceptional; compared to accounting and consulting firms, where leverage can reach up to 20 or more, this is very modest (De Haas, 2006; KSU-SDU, 1999-2012; Van Otterlo et al., 2011).

Managing profitability, especially productivity and leverage in a law firm, is therefore as much a matter of human resource management as of financial management and demands a profound understanding of the professional mentality. Cost management and administrative processes are important for good financial practices, in law firms just like others. But they are rarely of

strategic importance. The cost structure of a law firm is simple. There are no major fixed assets or other capital goods that need investments and close control, nor complicated commercial transactions. The majority of costs are human resource related: staffing, compensation, education, and expenses. Given the strategic choices of market segments, practice areas or level of expertise, the margins for managing costs are small. When cost-cutting exceeds these margins, it may endanger the motivation, commitment and productivity of professionals, as it implies lowering their compensation or reducing organizational support (De Haas, 2006; Mowbray, 1997).

2.6. The legal workforce

Traditionally, the lawyer ('advocaat') belonged to the notable persons in the local, regional and national communities. Women lawyers were an exception even until the 1960s and lawyers from ethnic minorities still are (Henssen, 1998). The typical lawyer came from an upper or upper middle class family, studied law in Leiden or at the University of Amsterdam, perhaps Utrecht or Groningen, was member of the students' fraternity and played field hockey and tennis. His family and family network extended in business and civil service circles that were useful for his law practice.

Following the general democratization movements of the 1960s, the student population and legal workforce democratized and differentiated, starting with the 1970s legal aid movement (Henssen, 1998). From the 1980s on, the expanding law industry could not restrict its recruitment to the traditional circles. The law faculties grew and, at the end of the 20th century, delivered around 3000 graduated lawyers annually.

The rapidly increasing demand for (young) professionals in the 1990s resulted in what was called the "War for Talent" (Chambers, Foulon, Handfield-Jones, Hanking and Michaels 1998). While formerly 20 to 25% of law graduates used to enter law firms, in the years 1999-2002, law firms absorbed more than one third of all law graduates. In the coming decades more lawyers will retire due to the ageing of the population, which also stimulates the demand for young lawyers. The number of graduated masters-in-law from the Dutch universities is predicted to remain at the current level at most. Economic recessions in 2002-2004 and since 2008 cause a temporary slow-down of growth, but the demand from law firms and other employers even shows a steady increase during recession (De Haas, 2005; KSU-SDU, 1999-2012; Voert et al., 2006).

The development of the legal profession and education have resulted in a professional workforce that has become much larger – relative to all law graduates – and more diverse: in gender, ethnic background, educational

history, probably also in ambitions, values and abilities (KSU-SDU, 1999-2012). The number of female lawyers grew from 10% in 1967 to 30% in 1997 and to more than 40% in 2011. Women are now the majority of law students and of law firm trainees. Immigrated and ethnic minorities have found their way to the study of law, but not yet into the established law firms (Dinovitzer et al., 2007; Groenendijk & Hahn, 2006; Henssen, 1998; KSU-SDU, 1999-2012).

Since 2004, the diversification has also involved the study of law itself. The uniform university curriculum has been broken up by the bachelor/master structure and the start of non-academic vocation law schools ('HBO'). Students from these schools are – comparable to university bachelors - not yet admissible to the legal profession but work as paraprofessionals or support lawyers in law firms. They support the work of the lawyers by desk research and documentation, drafting memos and handling routine matters (Van Otterlo, 2004).

2.7. The legal career


One of the first regulations of the Bar Association (the "stageverordening") concerned the supervision, coaching and training of young lawyers (Henssen, 1998; Jansen, 2007). With a master's degree in Law, obtained at one of the Dutch universities, a lawyer is qualified to become 'advocaat', provided that the curriculum includes the most important law practice areas. She can be admitted to the Bar, but has to practise under the supervision of an experienced lawyer, the 'patroon' (principal). During the three years of the traineeship, she has to follow professional education courses. The obligatory courses in the first years are concluded by exams, that most trainees pass; the exams do not have a selection purpose. Furthermore, trainees have to gain experience in a variety of legal practices. If they fulfill all requirements, they receive a testimony and are allowed to practice independently (Van Otterlo, 2004, 2007). It is possible to start an independent practice, with supervision of an experienced lawyer of another firm, but most trainees are recruited by law firms. After a successful traineeship, they may be invited by their firm to stay on as associate lawyer. The associate period can be divided in several different steps and titles, such as junior, medior and senior or manager. After four to six years as an associate, the possibilities of becoming partner are assessed. If positive, the associate lawyers at the big law firms are admitted to a partnership procedure that involves business planning, training and assessments. The final partnership decision follows one to two years after the start of this procedure. Associates who do not have the ambition or the capabilities

to become partner leave the firm or stay on as senior associate or salary partner, depending on the career policy of the firm. These positions are commonly marked by a (further) increase in compensation level, often with a larger performance related part, and some other perks. The salary partner may receive a moderate profit share and some of the privileges of the partner, but remains employed by the firm. The different career options and policies will be discussed extensively in following chapters, together with the other aspects of human resource management in law firms.

3. *Research model*

The development of the legal industry and of law firms reflects an increasing diversification. This is not only related to size, but also to legal specializations and market orientation, affecting the strategy and business models of the firms (Advocaten, 2007; Empson et al., 2007; Gabarro, 2007; Morris & Pinnington, 1998b). Another development is the diversification of the educational and social composition of the legal workforce (Dinovitzer et al., 2007; Wilkins, 2007). Because of the growing demand for legal talent, effective recruitment and development is of strategic importance to law firms. Achieving alignment or fit (Lorsch et al., 2002) between the needs of the firm and the backgrounds, talents and ambitions of lawyers is a condition for success, and requires more and more attention. The main theme of my research is, how this Person-Organization Fit (P-O fit) can be achieved and what the effects of fit are. The central question of this research is, whether and how fit or misfit between the character of the law firm and the values and ambitions of the lawyer affects the attitudes of the lawyers; their satisfaction, commitment and their intention to stay. This question is represented by the following diagram.

Figure 1




As argued, law firms differ increasingly in size, services, structure and operations. The character of the firm can be determined by the values that are expressed by its configuration, strategy and culture. The assumption is that lawyers with different values and ambitions fit into firms with different characters. I will use archetype theory of professional service firms, to be discussed in Chapter 2, to differentiate between law firms. HRM practices – such as career and compensation systems - are assumed to have a distinctive contribution to the archetypical character of a firm.

The effects of P-O fit on the satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay may vary according to different characteristics and capabilities of the lawyers that can be relevant for the purposes of this research. Researchers have identified core self-evaluations (including self-confidence and self-esteem) and individual human capital as factors that influence fit and fit effects. I will include the moderating effects of these factors in my study.

The research question and the diagram can therefore be completed as follows.

Figure 2



3.1. Research questions and chapters

The first part of my research concerns the differentiation of Dutch law firms. Is it possible to distinguish the different archetypes, as developed in the theory on PSFs, among Dutch law firms? What are the defining differences between the Dutch law firms, how are they expressed in

elements of strategy, governance, management and HRM? These questions are answered in Chapter 2.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are dedicated to the issues of P-O fit. Chapter 3 describes the results of two surveys among young Dutch lawyers, assessing their values and ambitions and the fit with their firms. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the moderating effects of core self-evaluations and human capital on the relation between fit and attitudinal outcomes. Chapter 5 describes the changes between both surveys over time. These changes are illustrated by interviews with young lawyers also described in Chapter 5. Final discussions and conclusions are the subject of Chapter 6.

Archetypes and HRM practices in Dutch law firms

1. Introduction

For the purpose of investigating P-O fit between law firms and lawyers, it is necessary to measure the properties of firm and lawyer that are presumed to determine fit. Research on P-O fit focuses on the congruency of values and goals, and so does this study. Fit research has developed and used different value measures such as the Organizational Cultural Profile (Cable & Judge, 1996; O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). However, these measures are applicable to all kind of organizations and do not distinguish value elements that might be essential for a specific industry or organization. As the purpose of this research is to study the mechanisms of fit in professional service firms, especially law firms, I needed to develop specific methods to measure the most relevant and distinguishing values in this environment. The archetype theory of professional service firms offers a classification that may be used as a basis for measuring value differences between firms. Archetype theory describes configurations of professional service firms that are determined by distinctive 'interpretative schemes' (Greenwood et al., 1990). HRM practices such as career and reward systems are presumed to be clearly distinguishing elements within the archetypical configurations. HRM practices express the values and goals of a firm and contribute to attracting and retaining employees with similar values and goals. These employees are satisfied, committed and perform better. To express the firm's values and goals, HRM practices need to be aligned mutually (internal alignment²) and with the other characteristics of the organization (external or vertical alignment). The purpose of the

² HRM studies frequently use the term "fit" to describe the alignment of HRM practices. I choose to use the term alignment to avoid confusion with fit in P-O fit.

research described in this chapter is threefold: first, to establish whether the archetypes of PSFs are recognizable among big Dutch law firms; second, to investigate whether HRM practices are different in firms with different archetypal characters and third, to investigate whether HRM practices are internally and externally aligned. I will start with discussing the theory on the alignment of HRM practices in general and then follow with archetype theory, which can be seen as a specific theory of alignment in PSFs, to continue with the HRM practices of the archetypes. I will then describe the method and measures used to investigate the research questions among the big Dutch law firms and the results of this study.

2. *HRM and firm performance*

2.1. *Human Resource Management.*

In this study, I will use the term Human Resource Management (HRM) as the approach of personnel management that aims at developing and using policies and practices that support the (strategic) goals of the firm. Since HRM appeared in management and academic literature in the 1980's, many definitions have been proposed but none has gained universal support. Nowadays, the use of the term HRM ranges from a synonym for personnel management to a specific academic discipline (Boon, 2008; Paauwe, 2009). Nevertheless, there is agreement that selection, compensation, motivation and development of personnel belong to the HRM practices and are objects of HRM research (Guest, 1987; Huselid, 1995; Paauwe, 2009; Van Otterlo, 1999). The proposed definition fits best the subject of this study, the use and effects of HRM practices. In my definition, HRM is personnel management with a strategic intention.

2.1.1. *Resource based view.*

The strategic character of HRM – as opposed to the traditional, mainly administrative employment management - reflects the resource based view of the firm (Barney, 1991). The resource based view asserts that firms derive sustainable competitive advantages from resources (human, technical, organizational, financial and other) that are valuable, rare and inimitable. The resource based view can be understood as the paradigm of strategic HRM research (Becker & Huselid, 1999). In the domain of this thesis, the professional service organizations, human resources are the dominant source of distinctiveness and competitive advantage. The resource based view therefore underlies the theoretical framework and the hypotheses that will be developed in this thesis.

2.2. HRM and performance.

A main objective of HRM research has been to establish the relationship between HRM and firm performance (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Huselid, 1995; Paauwe, 2009; Van Otterlo, 1999; Wright, Gardner, & Moynihan, 2003). As HRM provides instruments that are supposed to contribute to the firm's strategic goals, it is important to know if these instruments are effective. As Paauwe (2009) and others (Huselid, 1995; Wright et al., 2003) have argued, results of this research to establish effectiveness have been mixed, but HRM and performance appear to be at least weakly related. Research has found direct links between HRM and employee attitudes (Delery, 1998; Huselid, 1995; Subramony, 2009; Wright et al., 2003); employee attitudes also have been found to moderate the effects of HRM on other outcomes. Some authors observe that, by nature, HRM practices can only effect employee attitudes directly, and have only indirect effects on other aspects of firm performance (Delery, 1998; Rogg, Schmidt, Shull, & Schmitt, 2001). By effectively selecting and training employees and by assessing and rewarding the proper behavior, HRM practices contribute to the fit between employees, the job and the organization (Boon, 2008; Werbel & DeMarie, 2005). Better fit results in better performance. HRM practices also express the culture of the organization and influence a climate that can improve or hinder the firm's effectiveness (Ferris, Arthur, Berkson, & Kaplan, 1998; Rogg et al., 2001; Werbel et al., 2005). Among mixed results of HRM-performance studies, the effect of HRM on employee attitudes and behavior – directly and through the organizational climate - stands out as well established.

2.3. Alignment of HRM practices.

The relationship between HRM and firm performance implies that the better HRM practices are mutually aligned and congruent with the goals and other characteristics of a firm, the stronger their effectiveness (Bowen et al., 2004; Paauwe, 2009). In recent HRM studies, strength of HRM has been related to the alignment of HRM practices rather than to the quality of these practices as such (Subramony, 2009; Werbel et al., 2005). Two types of alignment have been distinguished: internal or horizontal and external, organizational or vertical alignment. Horizontal alignment refers to the common goals and rationales and the mutually reinforcing character of HRM practices. Vertical alignment is the congruency with the values and goals of a firm's strategy and other management practices, such as the governance structure, procurement and control systems. (Chênevert & Tremblay, 2009; Guest, 2001). For instance, HRM practices that focus on efficiency can be assumed to fit in a cost leadership strategy. Support for

the effects of alignment of HRM practices is growing, but studies on the character, mechanisms and effect of vertical and organizational alignment of HRM are still rare (Boon, 2008; Chênevert et al., 2009; Verburg, Hartog, & P., 2007). Several authors have noticed and regretted the lack of a theoretical framework to study this alignment of HRM practices (Delery, 1998; Guest, 2001; Huselid, 1995; Paauwe, 2009). By combining HRM theory with configuration models in PSF business studies, this study will try to contribute to filling this gap.

2.3.1. HRM alignment and P-O fit.

A major aim of this thesis is to investigate the fit between the employee and the culture or strategy of a firm, as expressed by the HRM practices of this firm. Several authors have pointed at this function of HRM practices (Boon, 2008; Bowen et al., 2004; Ferris et al., 1998). Some authors have linked this function to the study of P-O fit (Boon, 2008; Ferris et al., 1998). One of the assumptions is, that HRM practices effect the P-O fit through the processes of attraction, selection and attrition, as proposed by the ASA (attraction-selection-attrition) theory (Schneider, Goldstein, & Brent Smith, 1995). If so, we wish to understand why and how HRM practices by expressing a certain culture or strategy, attract some employees and repel or drive away others.

The configurational theory of the archetypes of professional services firms may serve as a model to investigate and analyze the internal and external fit of HRM-practices. In the next paragraphs, I will describe the archetype theory and investigate its relevance and its usefulness for this purpose.

3. Archetypes of Professional Services Firms

3.1. Professional partnership and managed professional business

In PSF research and literature the archetype theory, proposed by Greenwood, Hinings and Brown (1990), has made an important contribution in describing and analyzing the development of PSF's (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996; Greenwood et al., 1990). An archetype has been defined as a combination of values, strategies, processes, structure and systems in an organization that reflect a single "interpretive scheme" (Brock, 2006; Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood et al., 1990; Kil, 2010). Some would perhaps prefer the Weberian concept "Idealtyp", but to avoid further terminological confusion I will keep to the terms that are most commonly used in PSF-research. Basically, two archetypes have been identified and extensively described: the traditional *professional partnership (PP)* and

the more recently developing *managed professional firm (MPB)*. Later, some authors (Brock, 2006; Kil, 2010) have tried to distinguish additional archetypes, but most literature on PSF archetypes focuses on the first two.

The professional partnership. In their study on big accountancy firms in the US and Canada, Greenwood et al. (1990) described the 'professional partnership' (PP) as the archetypical model of the PSF. In the professional partnership, the partners own, govern *and* manage the firm and provide the professional services. Providing professional services means that professionals apply expertise to complex problems that require a significant degree of discretion, in direct relationship with their clients. This nature of the work makes it difficult to manage or control. Autonomy, equality and collegiality are important values. Most professionals aspire to partnership.

Greenwood et al. (1990) found a central focus on professional standards, training and work methods and a bottom up, consensus seeking process of financial target setting. Enforcement of targets and budgets was characterized by broad margins of discretion. Profit shares were equal and not related to individual revenues or annual performance evaluations.

The managed professional business. The 1990 study noted some signs of more substantive controls and of performance based profit sharing. Also, some firms were developing more rational, centralized and focused marketing policies and operations. A few years after the publication of the study of Greenwood et al., the "managerial" elements that they noticed had become widespread in professional services, also in accountancy and law (Brock, 2006; Morris et al., 1998b; Pinnington & Morris, 2003). As PSFs grew, merged and globalized, they increasingly developed the methods, systems and style that are needed to manage large organizations. This led to the identification of a (archetypical) configuration with a more 'managerial', corporate, character (Brock, 2006; Greenwood & Empson, 2003; Pinnington et al., 2003). For Law, Accountancy and other 'classical' PSFs the model was first described in the 1990s and is commonly referred to as the 'managed professional business' (Brock, 2006; Cooper et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1998b; Pinnington et al., 2003).

The managed professional business (MPB) is a more centralized and consciously coordinated business than the professional partnership. The involvement of the partners in operational or even strategic decision making is reduced. Other managers than the professionals themselves have a bigger part in management, at a higher level. The performance of the professionals, including the partners, is controlled and assessed and the equal profit sharing is replaced by performance based systems. More

value is attributed to work process management, cost efficiency and quality control. Business development, marketing strategies and sales methods become more important. (Pinnington et al., 2003). New technologies and techniques facilitate the commoditization and standardization of some professional services. Brock (2006) links these characteristics to the scale and diversity of multinational and multidisciplinary firms that he calls the Global Professional Networks (GPN). The observations on a more corporate type of firm are in line with marketing theory that defines different commercial strategies dependent on the “product” (commodity) vs. “practice” (custom)-like type of services (Empson, 2007; Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999; Maister, 1997; Mayson, 2007); more “product-like” type of services fitting better with the MPB. Comparable distinctions have been put forward by Lowendahl and Mayson (Lowendahl et al., 2001; Mayson, 2007). Lowendahl (2001) sees commoditization as opposed to professionalization but makes no clear distinction between more or less customizing or commoditizing firms. Hansen et al. (Hansen et al., 1999) studied knowledge management in PSFs with customization vs. commodification strategies; whereas the first emphasized collegial interaction, the latter invested more in standardization and process management. Greenwood and Empson (2003) link this difference with the PP archetype for the customizing PSFs and the MPB archetype for the commodifying firms. Commodification is connected with the recruitment of paraprofessionals that Pinnington and Morris (1998b) observed in firms that do not use a formal up-or-out-policy. These observations describe a different type of PSF with more corporate features, in which ownership, management and professional responsibility are separated or at least become clearly distinguished functions.

3.2. Archetype shift or differentiation?

Some researchers have described the changes in professional services firms as a shift of archetypes (Brock, 2006; Pinnington et al., 2003), be it in a slow and gradual transition (Cooper et al., 1996). Although some studies outline new leading archetypal models for PSFs, evidence for the shift away from the partnership model is at most partial. Morris and Pinnington (1998b) found that profit sharing systems in British law firms were very diverse. Partner appraisal was used by a few firms only, but more likely in firms with performance based profit sharing. Equal shares and lockstep (meaning annually increasing shares for newly admitted partners) persisted, sometimes as part of a firm’s strategy, sometimes because of the obstacles in changing the system. Some firms combine performance appraisal with lock step. Overall, Morris & Pinnington (1998b) found only modest evidence

for a general innovation of profit sharing systems.

In 2003, Pinnington and Morris studied the possible archetype change in professional services – from PP to MPB – in a broader perspective. They found MPB-type changes such as quality and management control policies, marketing methods, more partner appraisal and performance monitoring alongside PP-type continuity of consensus seeking practices and peer control. The adoption of more ‘managerial’ practices could imply a shift away from the partnership model, but many firms seemed to combine elements of both models. Greenwood & Empson (2003) also argued that the PP firm is all but extinct. The professional partnership (or private corporation) still has major advantages in some types of professional services, especially the avoidance of agency costs. Agency theory, formulated (among others) by Jensen and Meckling (1976) poses that the interests of owners and employees differ. By designing and using control and incentive systems, owners have to align employees’ interests and motives with their own. These systems can bring about considerable costs. By combining ownership, management and professional workforce, professional service firms can minimize these costs. The advantages of commitment of partners/owners have been amply demonstrated (Wallace & Kay, 2008).

The partnership model provides professional incentives and collegial controls that are hard to replace by formalized, bureaucratic systems – taking into account the nature of the work and professionals’ desire for autonomy. Greenwood et al. (2007) confirmed these assumptions in their study among management consultancy firms. The combination of ownership, management and profession may stimulate productivity and profit. On the other hand, growth, geographic scope and diversification of services limit the advantages of the PP and enhance the need for more bureaucratic and corporate structures, as Segal-Horn and Dean describe for the big global firms (Segal-Horn & Dean, 2009). The costs of these systems are added to those of collegial control, which persists also in large firms. Lowendahl (2000), Kor and Leblebici (Kor & Leblebici, 2005) and Greenwood and Empson (2003) observed the tendency for *diseconomy* of scale in professional services firms. Cost levels– e.g. of information, control and appraisal systems, performance incentives – increase with the size of the firm. However, these disadvantages of the MPB are diminished when a firm adopts a strategy of commodifying its services. In these firms, efficient processes, standardization and division of tasks are necessary to optimize profits; this requires control systems and close management of costs and margins. These systems replace the (costs of) close involvement of the

senior professionals in management. (Greenwood et al., 2003; Greenwood et al., 2005; Stumpf, Doh, & Clark, 2002).

Brock (2006) recognizes that a diversification of archetypes for PSFs seems to be prevailing over the development from one type to another. He proposes a division of PSFs along two dimensions, size and strategy. He positions the professional partnership in the segment of smaller, local and generalist firms. The opposite is the global professional network. In between these opposites Brock places the 'Star', a mid-sized highly specialized firm. Ackroyd and Muzio (Ackroyd & Muzio, 2007) analysed the changing staffing ratios in UK law firms and concluded that access to senior positions, especially partnership, had become more limited in larger firms. Instead of a change of archetype, they propose the rise of a 'reconstructed professional service firm'. They observe a differentiation of HRM-systems and policies but not a clear development towards more solid and elaborated management practices.

In conclusion, the results of the archetype approach of PSFs have been mixed. The approach has been helpful in detecting and describing the diversification in the recent development of PSFs as well as the systematic, interrelated character of the elements of policies, structures and systems in each type. The diversity in the development of PSFs has led some authors (Brock, 2006; Kil, 2010) to try to redefine or complement the original archetypes. In this process, the original clarity of the concept of the archetype has gone somewhat lost. However, the difference between the PP and MPB archetypes remains the best described and investigated and therefore offers the most comprehensive research proposition. Different HRM systems and the way that professional careers are structured form an essential part of the differences between PP and MPB. I will therefore use the systematic distinction developed in the archetype theory to describe and analyse the horizontal and vertical alignment of HRM practices.

3.3. HRM in professional service firms' archetypes

In management studies on the development of PSF's (Greenwood, Deephouse, & Li, 2007; Morris & Pinnington, 1998a; Pinnington et al., 2003) HRM practices such as the up-or-out career policy or the senior associate positions have been included; besides this, literature about HRM in professional firms is scarce.

In PSFs, the career policy for professionals is the central and most distinguishing element of HRM, because the career determines the development and retention of the professional workforce. Other HRM practices are closely connected to the career policy. Therefore I will first

discuss the career policies and systems and their significance for HRM in PSFs.

3.3.1. The up-or-out career model.

Traditionally, the career system in professional services firms is “up-or-out”: a professional is either promoted or leaves the firm (Greenwood et al., 2003; Greenwood et al., 2005; Malhotra, Morris, & Smets, 2010; Malos & Campion, 1995; Morris et al., 1998a, 1998b; Pinnington et al., 2003). Professionals enter the firm with the aspiration to achieve the status of partner. In most professional services, this status can be reached in two career steps: the trainee period followed by the associate period. The associate period may be subdivided in a junior, a mediator and/or a senior part.

The up-or-out model is said to have its origins in the academic world; in American literature, these origins are attributed to universities in the 19th century, notably Harvard. At the end of the 19th century Paul Cravath of Cravath, Swaine & Moore declared it the system for his law firm; it became also known as the Cravath Model (Sherer et al., 2002). European studies point to the early professional training and associations of lawyers, doctors and scientists or even the Medieval craftsman’s guild (Henssen, 1998). It is very well conceivable that the system has multiple origins; it even can be argued that in a trade or profession that demands a considerable amount of on-the-job training and is practised in non complex, undifferentiated organizations, up-or-out is the ‘natural’ system. This is in line with the findings of Morris & Pinnington in their 1998 study, that up-or-out is regarded as part of the professional ideology, as a norm of professionalism (Morris et al., 1998a; Van Otterlo, 2007).

The up-or-out career system aims at retaining professionals as long as they have the chance and ambition to become partner (i.e. owner). It can be regarded as an extension of the solution to the agency problem. Up-or-out provides strong motivation and performance incentives at relatively low direct costs (Greenwood et al., 2003; Greenwood et al., 2005). The downside is that talented professionals in due course have to be admitted to the partnership; the system otherwise would lose its appeal. Admitting more partners reduces the profits pro partner, unless the growth of the partnership is matched by the growth of returns and profits of the firm. Up-or-out therefore leads to growth at a rate that is dependent on the leverage ratio (Morris et al., 1998a; Sherer, 1995; Sherer et al., 2002). Every new partner in a firm with a leverage ratio of, for instance, 1 : 5, requires 5 more non partner professionals to maintain leverage ratio and profitability. In addition, up-or-out causes high turnover as professionals that do not qualify for partner have

to leave; recruitment, training and outplacement costs are comparatively high. Professionals who leave the firm are well trained, experienced and often continue their career elsewhere with considerable success. A large supply of suitably talented starters and/or a very high recruitment attractiveness are supposed to be conditions for a successful up-or-out policy (Malos & Campion, 2000; Sherer et al., 2002). Also a firm needs excellent outplacement opportunities.

The up-or-out system has been compared to a tournament (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Malhotra et al., 2010). The strongest are promoted and the others remain at the original level. However, as Morris and Pinnington (1998a) point out, in up-or-out the losers leave the firm and the tournament has a delayed nature: up-or-out becomes critical only at the point of partner selection. Moreover, up-or-out can be applied to an individual professional who is evaluated against fixed standards, while the tournament results depend on the relative strengths of the competitors. Of course, comparative evaluation of the human capital and performance of a professional will always play some role in (up-or-out) promotion decisions, but rarely as the only or even the most determining factor. The tournament theory nevertheless stresses and explains the – perception of – competitiveness among younger professionals that is found in career research (Dikkers & Jansen, 2007; Wilkins, 2007).

3.3.2. Alternative career models.

The up-or-out system has probably never been the only system in professional services; since long some firms or industries have used more individualized and differentiated career policies. Also, most firms that use up-or-out policy have mitigated some aspects of the systems, for instance by allowing senior associates who have no aspiration or chance to make partner to stay. Nevertheless, up-or-out is assumed to have been the dominant career policy in professional services at least until the last decade of the 20th century. Since then, pressures to look for alternatives have become stronger.

Several authors have paid attention to the shift away from the up-or-out model or the search for alternatives. Sherer and Lee (2002) describe how the scarcity of talented lawyers was followed by HRM policies that created new associate positions, aimed at retaining senior lawyers without having to promote them all to partner: the permanent senior associates or salaried partners. The latter are senior associates with special status and benefits. Another innovation was the hiring of (staff) lawyers for work of a routine or investigative nature that did not involve sensitive client contact; professionals that are nowadays known as professional support lawyers. Morris and

Pinnington (1998a) investigated the supposed shift away from the up-or-out policy to more differentiated career structures in British law firms. Their assumption was that adoption by PSFs of a structure with more corporate elements led to this change. However, contrary to their expectations they found only 28% of British firms reporting the use of a formal up-or-out policy. Furthermore, a clear (negative) relationship between the up-or-out policy and aspects of the MPB model was only found for the substitution of professional staff by paraprofessionals. Sherer and Lee (2002) observed that the senior and staff lawyer tracks were often combined in some form with the up-or-out system and that the HRM innovations led to a diversification of career policies throughout the industry (Sherer et al., 2002).

Morris and Pinnington (1998a) observed that the reporting of a formal up-or-out policy by a minority of the investigated firms did not imply that up-or-out as a norm for the professional career is restricted to these firms. On the contrary, interviews with (managing) partners indicated that “up-or-out has a resonance as a professional norm”. Up-or-out as a professional standard is reinforced because the largest firms, “the citadels of the profession” are expressly using it. This observation is repeated in other environments. For instance, the results of a compensation & benefits survey among Dutch accountants in 2007 (Nierop, 2007) indicated that, although almost no big accountancy firm in the Netherlands reported to use up-or-out as the dominant career policy, a major part of participating accountants report that their firms are using up-or-out or similar practices.

Malhotra et al. (2010) found that in elite UK law firms, up-or-out is only rarely a formal policy, but nevertheless in most firms enacted by the attitudes and behaviors of partners and associates, who often leave the firms after a negative promotion decision. At the same time, up-or-out is combined with alternative career tracks and permanent positions such as counsel, senior associate or salaried partner.

Many law firms (and other PSFs) seem to have mitigated or abandoned the up-or-out system, but others have resumed the policy (KSU, 2003-2004). The transformation and diversification of careers did not necessarily imply a movement away from the up-or-out career model. Thus, in line with different types of PSFs, the career policies in law firms diversified (Morris et al., 1998a; Sherr, 2000). Yet the assumption is still that in a professional partnership, up-or-out is the typical career system, while in the managed professional business career paths can and perhaps should be more diverse. Meanwhile one has to take into account the possible divergence of officially espoused policies and the policies as perceived by the professionals.

3.3.3. *Other HRM practices; incentives and training.*

Other HRM practices can be assumed to be related to the choice of career policy and to express the archetypical character of the firm. Among these practices, different compensation systems and training programs can be distinguished and have been included in PSF studies.

Incentives. The up-or-out career system provides strong performance and development incentives through the perspective of promotion to partner. Firms with an up-or-out policy therefore typically do not need performance-related compensation systems. Most likely, in these firms the annual increases in fixed salary are linked to tenure and market levels but less to performance assessment. These firms are supposed to use no or only modest variable, performance related compensation elements such as bonuses (Boon et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2001; Malos et al., 1995, 2000). On the other hand, firms with a more differentiated, individualized career policy need more extensive and formal assessment systems to support performance related salary development; they are likely as well to offer substantive (i.e. up or above average market level) variable income to compensate for the promotion to partner incentive in up-or-out (Brickley & Zimmermann, 2001; Leblebici, 2007).

Training. Furthermore, the up-or-out policy implies an intensive, but uniform education and training program for young lawyers (Greenwood et al., 1990; Malos et al., 1995). A more differentiated career policy could be expected to offer more diverse, individually measured training opportunities.

Malos and Campion (1995, 2000) described the up-or-out policy as an options-based model of career mobility in professional services firms: the career and other HRM systems are based on the options that the firm and the professional have on future results and rewards. In their 2000 study among 117 US law firms, Malos and Campion found internally consistent relationships among career-related practices and other HRM elements – e.g. a uniform career structure matches with uniform training programs and compensation systems. This internal consistency of HRM practices resembles closely the concept of internal and strategic alignment of HRM practices as discussed in paragraph 2.3.

3.4. *HRM and other elements of the archetypes*

Conceptually, different bundles of HRM practices can be ascribed to the PP and MPB. These practices are presumed to be aligned internally and externally with the other archetypical elements of a PSF. Table 1 summarizes how the HRM practices and other elements are attributed to the archetypes in literature. I choose the term “elements” to include all features – culture

and values, strategy, structure, systems and other- that define an organization by their mutual, interdependent relations, similar to the elements of McKinsey's 7 S-model (Waterman Jr., Peters, & Phillips, 1980). Taken together, these elements form the single 'interpretive scheme' of the archetype theory (Greenwood et al., 1990). For the purpose of this study, I divide the elements into two main sections, HRM and governance. In each section I describe the characteristics of these elements within the PP and MPB.

Table 1: The Archetype Elements

Note: some elements can be allocated to a. as well as b. E.g., partner appraisal and compensation systems are elements of the partnership structure but also of management and control systems. In table 1, they appear under the first applicable heading, but in the review of results, these elements may be discussed under more than one heading.

a. Partnership and Human Resource Management Policies and Systems

Partnership

Professional Partnership

Personality and intellectual, analytical skills are essential conditions to be eligible to partnership. Performance, practice building and entrepreneurship are based on these factors. Timing and process of the admission to partnership are standardized; timing is earlier than average, the process shorter than average.

The partnership is an association of equals. Full equity is acquired through annual ('lock step') increases of profit shares. Besides lock step, profits are shared equally without differentiation. The goodwill of the firm is primarily connected to the human capital of individual partners. No goodwill

Managed professional business

On the basis of good personal and technical skills and performance, management and commercial qualities are decisive in the partner criteria. As admission depends on the assessment of these qualities that normally are developed later on in the career, the timing of the admission process is individualized. Timing is later than average, the process longer than average and involves elaborate business planning.

Partners have different skills and performance levels and accordingly different profit shares. Profits are attributed according to individual performance, (annual) assessment

payment on entrance is required apart from lock step. Goodwill payment on departure is at most basic (= 1 extra profit share maximum).

Partner performance is monitored and evaluated by the partnership and/or the board, but this is primarily aimed at improvement and development. Tolerance for temporary and incidental underperformance is large. When performance remains structurally under partnerships' standards, the poorly performing partner is dismissed. Partners meet frequently, in formal and informal meetings. There is intensive collegial support and consultation that also serves as an informal quality control system.

and/or previous ranking of partners. New partners pay substantial goodwill compensation on entrance (in whatever form). On departure, partners receive more than basic goodwill payment.

Partner performance is extensively monitored and assessed, with a focus on the performance in developing and managing a practice. There are formal quality control systems, also for partners' performances. Underperformance is followed by diminished profit shares and only in the long run by dismissal.

Sources: (Brock, 2006; De Haas, 2006; Empson, 2007; Gabarro, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2003; Greenwood et al., 1990; Greenwood et al., 2005; Malos et al., 2000; Mayson, 2007; Morris et al., 1998a, 1998b)

Human Resource Management

Professional Partnership

The professional staff consists of trainees, associates and partners. There is no job differentiation within these professional levels. Trainee and associate positions are temporary, until the next promotion decision. Permanent senior associate or salary partner positions are exceptions for technical/academic experts and similar. The configuration of the professional groups resembles a column more

Managed professional business

The professional staff consists of paralegals, trainees, associates and partners. Within each group, especially the paralegals and associates, different functional and hierarchical positions exist. Associate positions can be permanent, as counsel, senior associate and/or salary partner. These positions may offer a career line separate from partner. The configuration is pyramid shaped: the

than a pyramid: the number of junior and senior associates is equal or only slightly higher than the number of partners. Leverage is low, does not exceed 1 : 3. Staffing policy is focused on recruitment and development of starting young professionals. Lateral hiring is exceptional, restricted to specific needs and opportunities. Paralegal staff has a general practice support role, is not part of the professional staffing policy.

Recruitment is targeted at top legal talents; this is supported by the firm's reputation. Selection and promotion criteria focus on intellectual qualities, so do the education and development programs. These programs are standard to all professionals in the first years; individual development is derived from training on the job and mostly informal mentorships. Recruitment and training are well-staffed departments in the firm; costs are comparably high.

Personal fit within the firm is essential for promotion. Personal, management and commercial skills are not neglected and of gradually increasing importance during the career, but remain secondary.

Compensation and benefits are uniform, promotion to (senior) associate is only moderately expressed in compensation increases. The

trainees and associates each clearly outnumber the partners. Leverage is relatively high, may exceed 1 : 4. Paralegal staffing and lateral hiring are structural parts of practice development policy. Paralegals have an expanding role in client service.

Recruitment policy and programs are broad and diverse. Selection and promotion criteria comprise a wide range of intellectual, social and personal qualities; selection and promotion can be job specific. Education and development programs after the first introduction courses (first year) are individualized and aimed at legal expertise but also at management and social skills. Formal mentorship may be part of these programs.

Compensation is based on individual performance and development evaluation. Personal planning and evaluation systems are detailed and elaborate to supporting a differentiated personal, career and compensation development. Promotion to a higher rank is rewarded with a substantial salary increase. Variable pay is an important compensation element, above average, increasing with tenure.

Professionals may choose between different career options, such as entrepreneurship (partnership perspective), specialist legal work

salary scheme is linked to tenure, performance is relevant only in extreme cases. Variable pay is not or moderately used (clearly below market average). Performance and development motivation is mainly derived from the attractiveness of the partner position.

The firm uses a formal up-or-out-policy. Promotion standards are applied strictly at the end of career phases, but evaluation otherwise has the character of general performance and development feedback.

About 10-20% of professionals reach partnership, others leave voluntarily or are dismissed; turnover peaks in the years preceding partnership decisions. A majority of the professionals that depart find a job through the firm's network.

Sources: (Brock, 2006; De Haas, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2003; Greenwood et al., 1990; Kor et al., 2005; Malhotra et al., 2010; Malos et al., 2000; Morris et al., 1998a, 1998b; Sherer, 1995; Sherer et al., 2002)

(senior associate or counsel position) and /or practice management positions. The partner in charge has an integral responsibility for the professional performance and career of his associates.

The firms do not use a formal up-or-out policy; professionals stay even when promotion opportunities are exhausted. Turnover peaks in the 3d year (end of traineeship) but remains fairly stable and moderate after that. Less than 10% reaches partnership, but a much larger part (more than 25%) stays on after the first 10 year.

b. Strategy, governance and management

Strategy

Professional Partnership

Reputation is crucial, is based on the in depth, specialized legal know how of the partners. Reputation and personal skills of the partners are also

Managed professional business

Reputation is very important but a top 5 or 10 reputation is not necessarily a strategic priority. Reputation will be based primarily on excellent

the most important marketing assets. Marketing and client relations focus on these qualities. Business development and marketing policies are primarily intended to support the partners. The firm's policy aims at customization of services for complicated, new legal problems and fields. Economic success depends more on rate level than leverage. Strategy and policy making is a partially informal, reciprocal process of interaction between board and partners. Opinions and preferences of the partners are as important in strategy making as business analyses and planning.

client services, efficiency and the (business-like) style of the lawyer, thus depending more on institutional, corporate than personal qualities. Business development, marketing and sales are essential management activities, requiring a relatively large support department. The business development department targets potential objectives (markets and clients) for the partners and develops marketing policies and projects. They may support partners by pre-sales and network-building activities. The firm welcomes possibilities for commoditization of legal "products", partners look for opportunities to leverage their experience and know how by standardizing and delegating work. Leverage is the central profit driver. Rational business analyses and planning are dominant in strategy making.

Sources: (Angel, 2007; Brock, 2006; De Haas, 2006; Empson, 2007; Gabarro, 2007; Greenwood et al., 1990; Greenwood et al., 2005; Leblebici, 2007; Lorsch et al., 2002; Maister, 1993, 1997; Morris et al., 1998a; Pinnington et al., 2003; Stumpf et al., 2002)

Governance and management

Professional Partnership

The authority of the partnership is delegated to the board, but the partnership still has frequent formal and informal meetings where strategy and policy issues are discussed but also operational matters that arouse

Managed professional business

The board has an autonomous management responsibility as in a corporation; the authority of the partnership is limited to strategic decisions, the approval of annual budgets and reports and the election

the interest of individual partners. Some categories of operational decisions remain reserved for the partnership; these may concern staffing and HRM matters (lateral hires, senior associate promotions, compensation issues), practice development and marketing and issues concerning the firm's reputation. Policy making is a reciprocal process. The board consists of (managing) partners; only partners have formal governing authority, although the board may delegate a wide range of operational responsibilities to general and/or staff managers. There are few management levels in practice and support, not more than one or at most two. Practice group or location management is a responsibility of one of the partners. These management tasks consist mainly of coordinating the actions of partners, support departments and the communication to and from the board and are not regarded as too burdensome.

of board members. Partner meetings are limited to approximately 4 regular annual meetings. The board may consist of partner and non-partner members. The latter are general (C.O.O.) or staff managers with responsibilities on the highest management level, not limited to operational matters. They may have authority in partner matters. Strategy and policy making is a process that is strictly managed by the board; the preparation involves the partners, practice groups and support departments in a coordinated way. Practice and support departments may have two or more management levels. The management of practice groups and offices is a substantial task of a partner who has the authority to direct the actions of group members and support departments.

Sources: (Brock, 2006; Empson, 2007; Greenwood et al., 1990; Morris et al., 1998b; Pinnington et al., 2003; Stumpf et al., 2002)

4. *HRM and archetypes in Dutch law firms*

4.1. *HRM in Dutch law firms, introduction*

Literature on the development of human resource management in Dutch Law firms is limited to a few opinion articles in professional magazines. The following paragraphs are mostly based on the observations and experience of the author.

Until about 1990, HRM in Dutch law firms resembled the traditional PSF systems as described by Sherer and Lee (2002) for the USA. Law firms were small – until the 1990's, the largest firms had 50 lawyers at most, only very few firms had more than 10 lawyers. Partnership was the dominant structure. The partners owned, governed and managed the firm. They adopted the dominant HRM practices in the industry. HRM departments did not yet exist or had limited administrative tasks. The professional norms and culture resulted in an informal, moderately strict up-or-out career system. In most firms, lawyers who were not promoted to partner were allowed to stay, but most of them preferred to leave, similar to the UK lawyers described by Malhotra et al. (2010); often, lawyers left before their partnership admission was formally evaluated. Permanent senior associates were rare. Salary systems were tenure based; yearly appraisals (if any) were often informal and focused on development. Incentive pay like bonuses still was exceptional. Formal training and educational programs were limited to specialist courses and the obligatory education for trainees.

Growth of Dutch law firms in the 1990's, autonomously and by national and international mergers, was accompanied by a professionalization of HRM; the larger law firms attracted HR professionals and developed HR departments and policies. Career systems were more consciously designed and managed. The traditional systems were discussed, mitigated and sometimes abandoned. In line with different types of PSFs, career policies in law firms diversified also in The Netherlands (De Haas, 2005).

4.2. Research proposition

Combining theory on HRM bundles and alignment with PSF archetype theory and the observations on the development of Dutch law firms as discussed, my proposition is that a differentiation of HRM practices is discernible among Dutch law firm. These HRM practices are internally aligned and form different HRM bundles that correspond with the PP and MPB archetypes. Also, I propose that these HRM bundles are aligned externally with the strategy, governance and management elements of the archetypes.

I do not propose a link between archetype, size and geographical structure, but since some authors have suggested such a link (Brock, 2006) I will include these characteristics in my analysis.

4.3. Method

4.3.1. Interviews managing partners.

To test my proposition, I used interviews with managing partners of the top 20 law firms in The Netherlands about HRM, partnership, reputational,

economic, commercial, governance and organizational items. Structured interviews are better suited for investigating and analyzing complex, multidimensional concepts like the archetypes of law firms than is possible by general quantitative surveys (Wanrooy, 2007; Yin, 2003). Further, my experience as a consultant in this field helped formulating the questions and interpreting and analyzing the answers.

The interviews consisted of open questions about 43 items that corresponded with the elements of the HRM practices and the other archetype elements as summarized earlier. The items are listed in Appendix I. I expected that an open interview would result in more information. Examples of the questions are: How do you assess the reputation of your firm? What range of authority is reserved for the partners? How do you assess the partnership culture in terms of mutual informal contacts, openness, loyalty of the partners, and stability of the group? Does your firm use variable pay systems, if so, what criteria are decisive and what is the average level?

I approached the managing partners of the 20 largest law firms in the Netherlands, according to the listing of KSU (KSU 2007; the ranking of the big Dutch law firms is stable over the years; with two exceptions, the 2012 listing of the top 20 contains the same firms). These Firms employ 75 to 552 lawyers, together with support staff approximately 150 to 1100 employees. Four firms are Dutch offices of UK and USA based global firms. Of the other firms, five have one single office, three firms have two offices, and seven have three or more offices.

I chose not to include smaller sized firms, below 75 lawyers, because in many of these firms it is difficult or impossible to distinguish the features of the archetypes in HRM practices. For instance, in smaller firms the staffing and leverage ratios, the position of permanent associates and the governance model are often dependent on incidental and opportunistic factors. Policies and structures of smaller firms are less explicit and may be less stable due to fast changes in size and composition. Further, results from smaller firms will be more difficult to compare to international research on PSFs. Even the smaller PSFs that are object of research in the international context are big firms compared to the Dutch top 20. Therefore, I chose to limit the interviews to the largest 20.

Managing partners were approached because I assumed they have the most complete insight and inside knowledge of the firms' strategy, structure and culture. They combine the viewpoint of managers and professionals. Furthermore, managing partners of different firms share the same position,

educational and professional background, whereas the positions, background and education of managers/non-professionals may vary considerably.

One managing partner did not reply to my request – followed by two reminders - for an interview³. In two firms, the managing partner was not available, but the general manager and the HRM manager could be interviewed instead. I found these interviews consistent with the others, so I included them in the research. Of all other 17 firms, I could interview the managing partner; four of them were accompanied by the HR-manager and one by the general manager; the (HR) managers provided factual information about the systems in use, staffing ratios and turnover.

4.3.2. *Reports and rating*

After each interview I wrote out the answers in summary and the resulting report was sent to be checked by the interviewees. When necessary, I sent two reminders over time. Eleven reports were returned with some adjustments or additions, but in general these were marginal. On the other eight reports I received no comments.

The contrast between the archetypes offers the opportunity to range every interview item on a range between two opposites, described in Appendix I. The answers were interpreted and coded by the author and an independent coder (a colleague organizational psychologist, who is acquainted with the professional environment and with law firms in the Netherlands but was not involved in this study) on a standardized form with a 5 point Likert scale (1 = completely in agreement with the professional partnership, 5 = completely in agreement with the managed professional business). On eleven of the original 43 items, the information was too scarce, vague and/or non distinguishing to rate and analyze properly and I discarded these from our analysis. The remaining 32 items provided sufficient information to identify and analyze the HRM bundles and archetype elements.

We compared our ratings and resolved differences by discussion; on a few items, where adjacent scale positions were equally plausible, I chose for a midpoint rating (e.g. 1 and 2 became 1.5). The range of Spearman's correlations was deemed sufficient. This procedure demonstrated that our scores were reliable and could be used to analyze the results.

4.3.3. *Triangulation*

Compensation and Benefits Data. I subsequently checked the information from the interviews about compensation and benefits systems with the

³ In the 2010 ranking, this firm had dropped out of the top 20

data on salary levels and systems of Dutch law firms that have been systematically collected by my firm since 2001 for benchmark purposes. This database comprises data of more than 100 middle sized and big law firms, including 14 of the 19 law firms in the sample. On only three positions these data showed deviations from the interview rating; two of these could be attributed to HR-system changes that were implemented just before or at the time of the interview. Overall, the information from the database confirmed the interview results on salary systems, variable pay, compensation related performance criteria and senior associate positions.

Leverage, profit level and profit sharing. KSU/SDU (2001-2011) annually publishes an overview of developments, performances and ratios in the bigger law firms. The leverage overviews confirmed our information. Published information on profitability in the Netherlands is still scarce and mostly indirect, but I found no apparent contradictions with our interviews. Information on profit sharing systems could be compared with data I collected for other purposes in 2006.

These independent sources with data from a majority of the law firms in the sample confirmed, or at least did not contradict, our findings. This triangulation (Miles & Huberman, 1994) strengthened our trust in the reliability of the interviews on the other items as well.

To analyze the interview results and test my proposition, I first ranked the 19 firms according to their overall score on all HRM items. Dividing the firms in two groups according to this overall score produced a group of nine firms with a lower than median score, indicating a similarity to HRM bundle of the PP (mean score of these firms: 2,37) and a group of ten firms with higher than average mean scores, indicating a MPB bundle of HRM practices (group mean 3.51). I will refer to them as the PP and MPB group. To support our analysis of the external alignment of HRM to other elements, I calculated the mean score of each firm on the economic, commercial strategy, management and governance elements (hereafter: governance elements).

The group division is helpful in analyzing the results, but the overall scores represent a continuum between extremes rather than a clustering; firms with lower average overall scores in the higher group may have more in common with the higher scoring firms in the lower group than with the more extreme firms in the same group. This has to be taken into account in the analyses.

5. Results

5.1. Internal alignment of HRM practices

According to the scores on the interview items, the elements I distinguished for the PP and MPB (Table 1) are distributed between both groups as follows.

Career policy and practices; up-or-out. Seven firms have a strict or moderate up-or-out policy (scores 1-2); six of them are within the PP group. In the MPB group, only one firm has a (moderate) up-or-out system. In five firms in the PP group, lawyers who are not promoted to partner are asked or expected to leave the firm; the four other firms do not have an outspoken policy on this point. Only in two firms, departure is discussed immediately after the non-promotion decision. In the MPB group, one firm expects the non promoted to leave, the others are neutral (five firms) or encourage staying on by offering other permanent associate positions.

Permanent (non-partner) senior positions. Most firms have at least one permanent senior position, also in the PP group. Only four firms reported to have no, or only incidental, positions for permanent senior associates; three of these four belong to the PP group. Seven out of eight firms with two or more different, permanent senior associate positions belong to the MPB group. These permanent positions have titles such as senior associate, salaried partner, local partner, counsel, legal director etc.

Promotion criteria and processes. In firms in the PP group, some degree of partnership perspective is an important argument for all promotion decisions, also in the earlier associate career stages. However, this also regards most (seven) firms in the MPB group. In the three other firms, partnership perspective is irrelevant for the earlier associate stages, each promotion is based on criteria that are specific for the related career step. The difference between the groups is relatively small (2.4 vs. 3.0), smaller than the difference of the average scores on all items together. PP group firms apply their promotion criteria somewhat more strictly, but the difference on this item is even smaller (2.4 vs. 2.7).

Six firms in the PP group have a relatively early and short partner admission process. In the MPB group, only one firm has an early *and* short admission process. In the other firms in this group the admission processes start later and/or last longer; longer than one or even two years.

Of all firms, only two have an explicit outplacement policy for non promoted associates; both firms belong to the PP group.

Performance management. All firms use appraisal systems for the

associate lawyers covering all relevant aspects of performance; the interviews did not provide information that justified distinguishing firms according to the content and effect of these systems, besides the promotion criteria as discussed before.

In the big Dutch law firms, equal profit sharing is the dominant system. In all PP group firms, profits are shared equally among the partners with lock step for new partners. In the MPB group, six firms use partially or completely differentiated, performance based profit sharing systems. On average, the tolerance for underperformance is somewhat higher in the PP group (2 vs. 2.7). In all but one firm in the PP group, underperformance is sooner or later followed by dismissal, as these firms do not use differentiated systems to compensate for underperformance (being straight with underperformance in equal share firms was called "managed equal sharing" by one of the managing partners.) In all firms in the MPB group but one, underperformance is compensated by reduced profit shares (systematically through the profit sharing system in six firms, by incidental board decision in the others).

Compensation. All PP group firms use strictly tenure based salary systems. Fixed salaries are raised yearly, regardless of performance. Underperformers are eventually dismissed. In the MPB group also, three firms have strict tenure based systems. Seven firms apply more flexible, performance related systems. None of these seven firms has an up-or-out policy.

In the PP group, four firms have none or very modest performance based variable pay; the five others pay moderate bonuses. In the MPB group, all firms have average to high variable pay levels. The groups are clearly distinctive in this respect (2.3 vs. 4.2). The majority of all firms, but particularly in the MPB group, link variable pay to a broad range of qualitative and quantitative performance criteria such as commercial, scientific, organizational and other performances besides billable hours. In the PP group, the firms that use bonuses are inclined towards more quantitative criteria.

Training and development. Unlike the other HRM elements, the development and training programs were not distinctive between the groups. Only three firms in all have organized their own programs as an alternative to the obligatory programs that are organized by the Bar Association; two in the MPB and one in the PP group. In both groups, most firms (six and seven) take part in the "Law Firm School", a program for trainees in the big, internationally operating, Amsterdam firms, organized by these firms and the Free University of Amsterdam. More firms in the MPB

group have formal mentoring programs (eight versus four in the PP group).

Staffing policies (including leverage ratio and turnover). Only one firm in the PP group applies lateral hiring at the more senior levels as a structural staffing policy, against eight firms in the MPB group.

The results for leverage ratios are mixed; averages are lower in the PP group, but only four firms in the PP group have a lower than middle (3) score, while two firms (both UK firms) have higher scores; in the MPB group one firm has a low leverage ratio, five firms have a middle score.

In six firms in the PP group, turnover peaks in the years directly before and after the partnership decisions. In the MPB group, this is only the case with two firms; with the others, turnover is more or less spread equally over the years. However, as none of the firms had records of turnover data or ratios, the reliability of this outcome is probably not very high.

Summary. The group analysis of the interview results supports the internal alignment and differentiation of HRM practices in the big Dutch law firms as proposed. Career practices, partnership and compensation are aligned. Differences between staffing policies and performance management are smaller; training and development practices are non distinctive, except for the formal mentoring practices.

5.2. External alignment: relating the HRM practices to other archetype elements

To study the external fit, I analysed the correspondence of the scores on HRM practices with those on the other archetypical elements (referred to as 'governance'). To acquire a general impression of external fit, I related the average score of every firm on the governance items to the score on the HRM items, lower scores indicating a similarity with PP elements. This relation is expressed in Figure 1. The scores of the individual firms are represented by the black quadrangles.

Figure 1




Figure 1 demonstrates that firms that combine PP HRM practices with MPB governance (quadrant I) are relatively rare, as are firms with PP governance and MPB HRM (quadrant IV). In 14 firms, a PP or MPB score on HRM corresponded with a similar score on the governance items (quadrants II and III).

The difference between the average overall scores of the groups on the governance elements (2.18 and 2.93) corresponds with the difference on the HRM elements, although the governance difference is smaller. Some firms in the PP group have a higher (more MPB-like) score on the governance elements and vice versa; however, there is a major overlap. Seven firms in the PP group have a lower than average score on the governance items. Seven firms the MPB group have a higher than average governance score.

Reputation and economics. Both PP and MPB groups consist of firms from the upper as well as the lower reputation categories (this difference is, off course, relative: all 19 firms have a good to excellent reputation), of bigger and smaller firms, of more or less profitable firms. There are more firms with a focus on a reputation of (scientific) expertise in the PP group, but this difference is small.

Following archetype characteristics, I had assumed that the rate level

would be the critical factor in the economic performance of the professional partnership, while leverage would be essential in the managed professional business. The distinction between the rate levels was not confirmed by the results. As discussed, the difference between the leverage ratios was not conclusive either. Leverage and rate level appear clearly interconnected and linked to the location (Amsterdam) and/or the international character of the firm. Both are indications of a dominant international transaction practice. Management control, profit and rate level are neither distinctive between the PP and MPB groups nor related to the HRM practices. Firms with rate and leverage levels that are higher than average also have a more than average intensity of management control and apply their appraisal and promotion criteria more strictly.

Commercial strategy. There is a notable difference in commercial strategy of the firms in both groups. Firms in the PP group rely on the commercial abilities and initiatives of the partners (eight firms) while in the MPB group five firms have a more corporate marketing approach, with a more autonomous, active role of the marketing department. Also, there are more firms in the PP group with an explicit policy of customization. None of the big law firms focuses on commoditization of its services, but seven of them have a mixed strategy, combining customization with commoditization. Of these firms, six are in the MPB group. Not all managing partners seemed to be fully aware of the implications of this item, so conclusions about this element are not solid.

Partnership culture, authority and meetings. The partnership culture (mutual and group involvement, intensity and scope of contacts, position and distinctiveness as a group, as reported by managing partners) is stronger in the PP group. All firms in the PP group have low to mean scores; only three firms in the MPB group have a lower than mean score. On the items regarding the governance position of partners, six firms in the PP group have a moderately high involvement of partners in strategy and management issues. Seven firms in the MPB group have a mean to high score, indicating more authority for board and management. The frequency of partner meetings is somewhat higher in the PP group, corresponding with a stronger partnership culture and partner involvement.

Management structure. Four firms in the MPB group have board positions and strategic involvement for managers (non professionals); only one firm in the PP group. However, the firms with strictly operational management positions were equally divided between both groups (both two firms). As for practice group management, four firms in the PP group have a more than

moderately developed management structure; two firms have hardly any practice group management positions. In the MPB group, all firms have at least some formal practice group management structure, five of them with more than moderate elaborateness.

Single or multi office. In the PP group, two firms have more than two offices; six firms in the MPB group. Of the eight multi-office firms, seven firms have less than average partners' involvement and frequency of partner meetings. Within these seven firms, the strength of partnership culture is moderate at most. A majority of the firms with a high degree of partnership culture are one-office and/or regional firms. Partners meet more frequently in one-office firms. The connection with a decentralized structure is apparent. There are nine firms with a more than average intensity of practice group management; five of those are firms with more than one office in The Netherlands. Multi office firms use differentiated career policies, permanent associate position, lateral hiring, performance based rewards and profit shares; partnership culture and involvement are weaker and management structures more intensive.

In multi-office firms, management and control systems are on average more developed, as is marketing support. This control intensity also characterizes the Dutch firms that are part of global firms. Among the three firms in the PP group that use a relatively elaborate partner admission procedure are both UK based international firms in this group. Apart from that, the international firms are among both PP and MPB groups.

6. Discussion

6.1. Alignment of HRM practices.

I proposed that a differentiation of HRM practices would be discernible among Dutch law firms; that this differentiation could be described in terms of different HRM bundles that correspond with the PP and MPB configurations. This proposition is confirmed by the analyses of the interviews, demonstrating a clustering of HRM practices in the firms that can be characterized as internal alignment. Career policy and partnership culture are characterizing features of the HRM-bundle in each firm. These findings support the contingency approach of HRM (Chênevert et al., 2009; Paauwe, 2009; Verburg et al., 2007).

The bundle of HRM practices that fits the PP archetype consists of an up-or-out career system with non promoted lawyers leaving the firm, an absence of permanent senior associate positions with the exception

of positions for academic experts, an appraisal of partnership potential in every promotion decision and a relatively early and short partner admission process. Profits are shared equally by the partners; underperformance is followed in due course by dismissal. Salary systems are tenure based; variable pay is moderate at most. Firms of this archetype use lateral hiring for senior positions only incidentally. Turnover peaks in the years just before and following the partner admission decision. Other practices could not be linked to this bundle, especially the – strictness and elaborateness of – performance management systems. The difference in leverage ratios was relatively small; leverage appeared more strongly related to profitability. Educational programs other than formal mentoring were not distinctive. An active outplacement practice was found with two firms only – both with predominantly PP-like HRM practices.

The MPB-related bundle includes a differentiated, individualized career policy, two or more permanent senior associate positions, intensive use of lateral hiring and a postponed and lengthy partnership admission process. Profit shares are more frequently performance based; underperformance is managed and compensated by this differentiation. Salary systems are performance based; variable pay is a substantial part of annual income. Turnover is spread equally over the associates' years. The firms make intensive use of lateral hiring and of formal mentoring programs.

I also proposed that the HRM practices would be aligned with the strategy, governance and management elements of the archetype. The results supported this partially. More firms with PP-like HRM practices focus on a reputation of scientific expertise and on a strategy of customization. Partnership culture, partner's involvement in management and frequency of partner meetings are higher in the PP group, relating partnership culture and partner governance to PP-like HRM practices. There is some distinction in non-partner management and in practice group management structure, but less convincing.

Analyses also indicated refinements of the presumed distinction between PP and MPB. The management structure appears only weakly related to other elements. Opportunistic and incidental factors probably are dominant in the choice of management structure and the set up of management positions by professional firms, confirming the findings of Wanrooy (2007) and of Ackroyd and Muzio (2007) for the UK.

No firm has a perfect and complete PP or MPB bundle of HRM practices. The overall scores on all HRM elements (2.37 in the PP, 3.45 in the MPB group) indicate that extreme consequences are mitigated by most firms

(e.g. the consequences of up-or-out or underperformance); almost every firm combines practices that are associated with different bundles. The group division is an instrument for analysis; in reality, every firm has its own position between the extreme PP and MPB types. The findings support the clustering that Malos & Campion (2000) found in US firms, using the options theory as a framework. They show a considerable variation of HRM policies and systems. As was found by Morris and Pinnington (1998a) in the UK, relatively few firms explicitly apply a formal up-or-out policy. The results also support the assumption (Morris et al., 1998a; Sherr, 2000) that a moderate form of up-or-out is not giving way to a more differentiated system; up-or-out and differentiated systems are alternative (strategic) choices for a PSF. As Malhotra et al. (2010) have found for the elite UK law firms, mostly informal up-or-out practices coexist with other career possibilities. My analysis demonstrated that career practices such as up-or-out are not isolated, but part of the HRM bundle and of the broader configuration of a firm.

6.2. Reputation and economic factors.

The proposed differences in reputation, rate level and leverage were not supported; these items appeared interconnected, as might have been expected. Although it seems that firms with the highest reputation in their segment have a preference for up-or-out and related PP-like HRM systems, the results do not clearly distinguish between top and modest reputation firms. Nevertheless, the two firms that are ranked in the top 3 by all colleague firms both belong to the PP group. The lower reputational PP-firms are regional firms that may be seen as high reputational firms in their region. Firms that apply an up-or-out career policy need a strong labour market position to support their career and staffing structure, and a more than average reputation – at least among possible recruits – appears to be conditional for up-or-out. These observations suggest the PP-like HRM practices are related to reputation, but the evidence from the data is not conclusive.

The most reputed firms are also the firms with the more substantial international finance and transactions practices, some of them Dutch offices of international (UK) firms. Reputation, rate level and leverage are interconnected, but not or only weakly linked to the archetypes. Leverage ratios in Dutch firms probably may be too modest -at most 1 : 5.5 with an average of 1 : 4 in Top 10 firms (KSU-SDU, 1999-2012) - to be really distinctive for the archetypes; factors like (labour-) market position, quality of practice and size are probably (still) more significant. A general tendency towards a 'reconstructed law firm' (Ackroyd et al., 2007) where partnership

closes the ranks and a growing salaried workforce labours in deteriorating conditions is hard to recognize among Dutch law firms.

The firms with the highest rate and leverage levels have the more intensive management control processes. Strictness of selection and promotion, intolerance for underperformance relate more clearly to financial performance than to other HRM practices. In these firms, the partner admission process starts later and often, especially in the big international firms, it takes more than one year. This relation can be interpreted both ways: financial performance can be the result of this selectivity, but can also create the conditions to be selective. Strict promotion procedures do not keep these firms from maintaining a high leverage. The relationship with the size and quality of a marketing department can also be explained both ways: marketing contributes to success, or profits enable a firm to employ a larger and better support staff. Dutch law firms just begin to get acquainted with strategic marketing options such as customization and commoditization. Managing partners certainly recognize the choices and opportunities, but implementation of these strategies, for instance by standardizing processes and recruiting paralegal staff, is as yet barely visible.

6.3. Single office and multi-office firms.

The interview results indicate that single office firms more frequently have the partnership and HRM systems of the PP. Multi-office firms (and among them the firms that are part of multidisciplinary organizations) predominantly have the governance and HRM characteristics of the MPB. It is understandable that in firms where all partners work together in one office, partnership culture, mutual commitment and loyalty, peer control and support are more easily maintained than in geographically dispersed partnerships. Social coherence and informal peer control appear to be the dominant management system in one-office firms, as well as in the smaller regional firms. In general, big multi-office firms apply more formal management tools such as differentiated appraisal and compensation systems and marketing methods in order to keep partners and other professionals aligned with firm's strategy and performance goals.

The internal alignment of HRM practices ascribed to the professional partnership and the managed professional business is recognizable in Dutch law firms. Results indicate a differentiation of HRM according to strategy and culture of a firm. HRM practices are (externally) aligned to the governance and management practices that reflect the position of partnership in the firm, such as the management involvement of partners. Other elements of governance and management are not clearly different between firms of

different archetypes. These elements, such as intensity of management control or strictness of appraisals, appear to be more closely related to factors of economic performance than with archetypical differences.

Multi-office and/or multidisciplinary firms (firms with more than only legal disciplines) probably have more differentiated, individualized career policies and more developed governance, management and control systems, also in HRM, as Segal-Horn and Dean (2009) have argued; the MPB archetype is prevalent in this type of firms, as the single office firm resembles more probably the PP.

Also, the Dutch law firms that are part of global firms can be found in both groups. Elements of the Global Professional Network described by Brock (2006) can be recognized in these multinational and multidisciplinary firms. There may be a few firms that approach the “Star” type PSF (specialized, supreme expertise, national operation) that Brock proposes as a third (arche-) type. However, these firms fit the description of the professional partnership especially well. In the Dutch context, the Star is a successful PP more than a separate type. Some big firms that are part of global networks remain professional partnerships and others resemble a franchise, while some national practices have the governance or HRM character of a GPN. Size, geography and market strategy apparently are not, at least not sufficiently decisive to predict HRM and governance choices of Dutch law firms, nor are reputation and profitability. The findings support the observation that the PP archetype is not giving away to the MPB, but that firms choose between – elements of – both archetypes the configuration that fits them best (Greenwood et al., 2003; Pinnington et al., 2003).

This study has demonstrated how a configurational approach of the firm can be helpful in analyzing HRM bundles of policies and practices. In the professional service firms, the archetype theory offered such a configurational approach. The differences between the professional partnership and the managed professional business are mirrored in the different HRM bundles in the big Dutch law firms. These differences go beyond those in size, reputation, profitability or managerial development and connect to the firm’s culture and strategy, sometimes explicitly, but probably often tacitly. Especially the position of partners and partnership is (still) distinctive for big professional firms. The differences may be expected to have a profound influence on the climate in the firm and on the fit with the values and goals of recruited lawyers.

6.4. Limitations

The interview method I used to investigate the position of big law firms

in the Netherlands offers insight into a broad range of aspects, but also has its limitations. With few exceptions I only interviewed the managing partners, whose opinions may not always be representative for the partners and other professionals of the firm. Further, they might be suspected of emphasizing the positive features and obscuring the negative. I was able to check the information with factual data from other sources (size, leverage, compensation levels and systems) but on other items such as profitability and rate levels such sources do not exist. All controls indicated that there is no reason to believe that the information from the interviews is severely biased, but there is nevertheless some reason for cautiousness.

The study includes 19 firms only. This is 95% of the targeted group, but the absolute number is small. Conclusions therefore have to be drawn carefully and with recognition of this limited scope.

6.5. Follow up

By distinguishing different types of law firms with regard to partnership and HRM, this study offers a framework to investigate the connection between the different types of professional organizations and the attraction, selection and retention of lawyers with different values, ambitions and personalities. Given the characteristics of the HRM bundles and archetypes, the professional partnership can be regarded as an attractive organization for the determined, intellectually ambitious young lawyer, whereas the managed professional business is more attractive for the lawyer who prefers a conscientiously managed organization with individualized career and development programs and who might be more business-oriented. The study on the archetypes of the law firms precedes the research of the values, expectations and ambitions of young lawyers, the fit with their law firms and the effects of fit.

*P-O fit lawyers – law firms
Objective and subjective fit
Effects on satisfaction, commitment
and intention to stay*

1. *Introduction*

In the preceding Chapter I investigated the HRM practices in relation to the archetypes of the largest law firms in the Netherlands. I found that the HRM practices reveal the archetypical character of the firm. It is reasonable to presume that firms recruit and select lawyers who fit into their archetypical character, because these lawyers are attracted by the values and goals that are reflected in and communicated by the firms' recruitment and other HRM practices.

On the other hand, professional service firms such as law firms appear to find it difficult to distinguish themselves from competitor firms, also in their communication with potential recruits (De Haas, 2005). Traditionally, professionals tend to identify themselves with their profession rather than with their organization (Wanrooy, 2007; Weggeman, 1997). A marketing survey in 2008 (Advocatie November 18, 2008) concluded that the positioning and market communication of law firms in the Netherlands is hardly distinctive. Recently, two very different law firms, Lexence and Houthoff, chose by coincidence exactly the same words for their marketing campaign slogan (Advocatie January 20, 2009). The chances that a prospective lawyer will find a firm that fits her values and expectations do not always seem to be improved by pre-entry information and communication. This has been confirmed in the interviews with young lawyers that will be discussed later in this study.

Do law firms succeed in attracting and selecting lawyers who fit with their organization? What are the effects of fit or misfit? Can the effects of Attraction, Selection and Attrition, proposed by the ASA-theory, be observed? This part of the study is dedicated to answering these questions.

This and the following Chapter discuss the results of two consecutive surveys of the values of young lawyers at the big law firms, their perceptions of the values of their firms, the fit between personal and firm values and the effects of fit on their satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. I will discuss the development of fit and fit effects over time in Chapter 5.

2. *Person – organization fit*

Fit between a person and his or her work environment (P-E fit) occurs when their characteristics are well matched (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). Persons who fit better into their environment perform better, are more satisfied and more committed to their job and organization (Bretz & Judge, 1994; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007). Bretz and Judge (1994) even state that "... individuals should be very concerned about the degree to which they fit into their organization. Since... the consequences of not fitting may be quite serious" (p. 49). These consequences range from dissatisfaction, underperformance and lack of development to departure. The work environment in the concept of P-E Fit has different elements. The most frequently investigated elements are the fit between person and job and between person and organization, but also person-group and person-supervisor fit have been studied (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005).

Most law graduates probably first choose the law (i.e., the law practice at a law firm) as a profession or even, for some, as a vocation. For the legal profession and its institutes, even for society as a whole, the fit between the profession and the lawyer is certainly of vital importance. Does the law attract a sufficient number of young lawyers who appear to fit into the profession? Lawyers' jobs have many common characteristics. In the research on careers, the law is characterized as an "investigative" career that attracts conscientious, academically oriented, not very extraverted persons (Holland, 1985, cited by Schaubroeck, Ganster & Jones, 1998). On the other hand, law firms and law practices have been diversifying rapidly; a family law practice requires quite different abilities, values and attitudes than corporate work.

However interesting the lawyer-profession fit may be, the subject of this study is the fit between lawyer and law *firm*, therefore between person and organization (P-O fit). Insofar as the characteristics of lawyers' jobs can be separated from the characteristics of the law firms, these job characteristics are only marginally different in different firms. At least one study, testing the attraction-selection-attrition theory, has demonstrated that

even within single-occupation organizations such as law firms (Schneider et al. 1995), firms were clearly different in relation to P-O fit. Next to person-job fit, P-O fit has been extensively described and investigated (Chatman, 1991; Cooper-Thomas, Van Vianen, & Anderson, 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Moynihan et al., 2007). P-O fit has predominantly been defined as a congruence of values of the employee and the organization. Values can be understood as stable beliefs about what is important, desirable, just or proper (Cable et al., 1996; O'Reilly et al., 1991). The value dimension of P-O fit is extensively studied and the effects of value congruence are well established.

Fit also has been studied as a similarity of personality, goals and attitudes. Fit on the personality dimension is defined as congruence of personality traits of employees in the same organization (Chatman, 1991; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Research on the effects of personality congruence appears to have rendered mainly weak results (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Schaubroeck, Ganster, & Jones, 1998; Schneider et al., 1995). It is not expected that, in addition to the values dimension, the personality dimension of P-O-fit will offer substantially more or other insights in the subject matter of this study.

Goals are less stable than values, they may change over time, but the congruence between the goals of the employee and those of the organization is nevertheless an important factor in P-O fit (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). As with values, the more important a goal is to an employee, the more consequential the fit with the goals of the organization is. The influence of values normally will be stronger than that of goals, but adding goals will enlarge the possibilities to analyze the character and effects of P-O fit. This addition is welcome and necessary, because some elements of the archetypes can be related to values – especially the elements that are part of the organizational culture, as used by O'Reilly et al. (1991) – but others correspond better with goals – such as pay or promotion for performance. The importance of occupational goals for the motivation of an employee has been extensively demonstrated (Abele & Spurk, 2009).

2.1. Fit and archetype elements

The HRM practices and the related archetypical elements of the law firms that I distinguished in chapter 2 are summarized in Table 1, with a description of the difference between the professional partnership and the managed professional business. I selected the elements that were clearly distinctive for the archetypes and that I could assume relevant and meaningful to starting young lawyers.

These elements can be related to five categories of values and goals of

starting lawyers, as follows:

- a. their ambition to develop profound legal expertise (expertise ambition), hereafter abbreviated as Exp.;
- b. their appreciation of a thorough and detailed management style, abbreviated as Mgmt.
- c. their need for short time reward (Short),
- d. their long term career perspective and ambition, especially partnership, (Long) and
- e. their appreciation of the partnership position itself (Part).

Hereafter I will refer to the personal values and goals of the lawyers and the firm by adding 'lawyer' or 'firm' to the value abbreviation. (Values lawyers meaning: all values and goals of the lawyers, Exp. lawyers = expertise values lawyers, likewise values firm, Exp. firm, Short firm etc. In the figures, the values are abbreviated by the first letters, EL = expertise values lawyers, LF = long term perspective values of the firm etc.).

Table 1 Differentiating archetype elements ⁴

Expertise value elements	PP	MPB
Focus of reputation: what is the essential perception of quality in the firm's services?	Scientific, creative solutions, judged by law community.	Client service and satisfaction, judged by clients and general public.
Management value elements		
What range of authority is reserved for the partners vs. the board?	Broad range of subjects discussed by partners, strategic but also several operations issues e.g. lateral staffing, HR-policies, budgets, communication. Frequent informal consultation of partners on board issues.	Narrow. Partner involvement is limited to only the most crucial strategic matters, annual budget en reports, selection of board and admission of partners.

⁴ Some elements are relevant for more than one value set and included in Table 1 under more than one value.

Frequency and character of partner meetings.	Frequent, monthly plus frequent informal occasions.	Infrequent, formal meetings (< 4/year), content restricted to formal range of authority.
Practice group management.	Subsidiary responsibility of a partner, < 10% of time, mostly facilitating and coordinating partner (inter)action; communication channel with board.	Extensive, integral responsibility of a partner; financial, commercial, HRM. Formal delegation of management authority. Practice group managers have formal dispensation for management tasks. Possibly several management levels.
Tolerance for (marginal, temporary) underperformance.	Tolerant. Efforts directed at improvement, consequences only after several years.	Intolerant, directly followed by dismissal or share reduction through differentiated profit shares.
Formal, separate mentoring structure.	No.	Yes.
Short term reward elements		
Salary systems.	Fixed tenure based, no performance link.	Performance based.
Performance related variable pay, bonuses.	No	High (>20% annual income).
Partner profit sharing.	Equal shares/lock step.	Differentiated shares, performance or merit based.
Consequences of underperformance.	Dismissal.	Share reduction.
Long term perspective values		
Importance of partnership perspective for associate promotion.	At least some perspective is conditional.	None.

Up-or-out career system.	Yes.	No.
Permanent senior associate positions.	No (only opportunistic and incidental).	Two or more different end-of-career senior positions, part of staffing strategy, several different roles.
Perspective for non-promoted.	Departure.	Other career paths.
Partnership elements		
Tolerance for (marginal, temporary) underperformance.	Tolerant. Efforts directed at improvement, consequences only after several years.	Intolerant, directly followed by dismissal or share reduction through differentiated profit shares.
Consequences of underperformance.	Dismissal.	Share reduction.
What range of authority is reserved for the partners vs. the board? Partnership culture.	Broad range of subjects discussed by partners, strategic but also several operations issues, among which lateral staffing, HR-policies, budgets, communication. Frequent informal consultation of partners on board issues.	Narrow. Partner involvement is limited to only the most crucial strategic matters, annual budget en reports, selection of board and admission of partners.
	Partner contacts and solidarity stand out. Frequent informal contacts, partners seek mutual advice on personal and professional matters clearly more than others. Partnership dominates firm culture.	Partnership is highest status, but significance is limited to business related issues. Is a choice between different career options. Partner contacts do not stand out amidst all internal contacts.

The manifestations of the values of the firm, such as organizational structure, career and HR systems render rewards and opportunities that may be or may not be congruent with the values and goals of the lawyer. This study investigates fit as the congruence of these five sets of values and goals of person and organization.

2.2. Actual, objective fit versus subjective fit.

The use of the archetype elements enables measuring actual, objective fit (Cooper-Thomas et al. 2004, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). I will follow the distinction made by Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) between direct, perceived fit measures, indirect subjective and indirect objective measures. Direct, perceived fit measures investigate employees' perceptions of their fit with their organization. Subjective, indirect measures of fit compare the employee's own values with his perceptions of the values of the organization. Objective fit is measured by comparing the values of the employee with the values of the organization that are assessed independently from the employee's perceptions. Cooper-Thomas et al. (2004) found that objective fit and subjective fit become more congruent as time passes and newcomers gain more insight in the organization. Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) found measures of subjective fit to have stronger effects on outcome variables than objective measures. However, objective fit measures avoid the problem of unrealistic perceptions of entrants (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Scholarios, Lockyer, & Johnson, 2003).

Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) assume that subjective and objective fit represent different concepts. They are joined by other authors in their desire for more research that compares both kinds of measures (Cable & Judge, 1996); they suggest that the strength of the effects of subjective fit on employee's attitudes compared with the effects of objective fit may be partly due to the reduction of cognitive dissonance; this means that they will downplay perceived differences. By investigating objective and subjective fit, I will be able to compare the results of both measures.

Both the objective and subjective fit measures as discussed here are indirect measures; they indicate respondents' perceptions of values and goals, rather than their perception of fit with the organization. Direct measures of perceived fit presume that respondents have a good insight into the character of the firm which normally comes with longer tenure and experience than those of the lawyers in the current study.

One of the problems of investigating objective fit is the difference between the sources and measures of employees' values and the values of the organization. Some studies have tried to solve this problem by

making different measures and scales commensurate (Ambrose, Arnaud, & Schminke, 2007; Wessel, Ryan, & Oswald, 2008). The difference of sources may contribute to the weaker results of objective fit studies; nevertheless, there is consensus among researchers that investigating objective fit is an important goal of fit research (Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Wessel et al., 2008).

2.3. Effects of P-O fit.

Better fit between employee and organization leads to higher satisfaction, more commitment and reduces the intention to leave the organization. Satisfaction with the job, the organization and the career are well established outcomes in the Person-Environment fit research (Bretz & Judge 1994, Chatman 1991, Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). The effects of P-O fit on these outcomes are independent from the effects of Person-Job fit; the effects of P-O fit are found to be stronger than those of Person-Job fit (O'Reilly et al. 1991, Cable & Judge 1996). Organizational commitment and turnover intention are comparable but separate variables (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). Organizational commitment can be defined as the motivation to act in the interest of the organization. Kristof-Brown et al. found in their 2005 meta-analysis a stronger relation between fit and attitudinal outcomes (like satisfaction and intention) than with behavior. Actual turnover was not included in any of the studies that they analyzed. Individuals may experience practical barriers to act upon their intentions, especially when consequences are severe or unknown (Solinger, Olffen, & Roe, 2008). This applies particularly to lawyers in their first three year traineeship period. Many will choose to stay and complete their traineeship, even when they are less than satisfied with their jobs or with the organization. For the motives of starting lawyers, attitudes will be more indicative than actual behavior. Also, actual turnover will be difficult to investigate within a limited time span. Nevertheless, when people indicate an intention to leave, they generally do, sooner or later (Hay Group, 2001, O'Reilly et al. 1991).

The strong incentives to stay during traineeship imply that intention to leave before the end of this traineeship would not be a useful indicator of P-O-fit. More relevant is the intention to leave after the traineeship. Intentions to leave therefore have to be specified according to the time of the intended departure.

3. Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Objective fit between lawyers' values and goals concerning

expertise ambition, management, short term reward, long term perspective and partnership and the archetypical character of their law firm is positively related to their satisfaction with the organization, their organizational commitment and their intention to stay after the traineeship period. Misfit between lawyers' values and goals and the character of the firm will lead to reduced satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay.

Hypothesis 2. Fit between lawyers' values and goals concerning expertise ambition, management, short term reward, long term perspective and partnership and the perceived values and goals of their firm is positively related to their satisfaction with the organization, their organizational commitment and their intention to stay after the traineeship period. Misfit between lawyers' values and goals and the perceived values of the firm will lead to reduced satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay.

Following the findings of Kristof-Brown et al. (2005), I expect that objective fit based upon the archetype characteristics of the firm will have weaker effects than subjective fit. Measuring objective fit involves matching data from different sources, in this study the archetype measures and the lawyers' response on the personal value items. Both were measured using the same Likert scale, but results of this comparison, if any, will probably be weak. Nevertheless, the relations between objective and subjective fit are of interest, as discussed, and will be explored.

4. *Development of fit over time*

Studies of fit, socialization and its consequences applied and advised different timings. In the first few months after entering a "new and relatively unstructured psychological field" (Allen, 2006), newcomers discover the realities of their jobs, their colleagues and the organizational environment (Bauer, Erdogan, Liden, & Wayne, 2006; Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004). Cooper-Thomas et al. (2004) note that "organizational socialization research has consistently shown that the first 3 to 4 months following entry are critical for newcomers' long term adjustment". The same time span is seen as crucial for newcomers to acquire more realistic perceptions of the values and goals of the organization (Cable et al., 1996). Cooper-Thomas & Anderson (2002) also observe that in the early months, adjustment to the organization has the biggest impact on newcomers. Entrants are still regarded as newcomers in the first year of employment; Bauer et al. (2005) see entrants as newcomers during the first 13 months of employment. This certainly applies to lawyers who follow an intensive professional training

program in the first year.

Nevertheless it might be expected that views, insights and perceptions of newcomers continue developing also after the initial year. Some longitudinal studies have followed P-O fit and socialization during several years after entry and found a continuing change of fit and attitudes such as satisfaction, intention to leave or career ambitions (Cooman et al., 2009; Sturges, Guest, Conway, & Davey, 2002). Although investigating a time span of four months only, Cooper-Thomas and Anderson (2005) noted that newcomers learn about the organization only later on; in the early months, learning about the job is most critical. Learning and socialization programs affect newcomers' attitudes (Chatman, 1991; Cooper-Thomas & Anderson, 2005; Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004; Sturges et al., 2002). Also, entrants gradually get acquainted with colleagues and supervisors and form their organizational networks (Moynihan et al., 2007). For newcomers, several manifestations of the organization occur or become meaningful only later on; examples are the first serious performance appraisals, pay decisions, work changes or career advises.

These experiences may influence the values and goals of the newcomers themselves (Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Authors have pointed out the lack of realistic perceptions of newcomers before entry (Boon et al., 2001; Cable et al., 1996). Values that they had on entry might change as they adapt their expectancies and ambitions to the reality of the firm. Together with their socialization and the increase of their experience, they come to understand the character and values of their firms (Allen, 2006; Bretz et al., 1994; Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004). In this process, also objective and subjective fit is expected to develop. Objective and subjective fit are presumed to converge (Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Some authors have found a diminishing P-O fit, poorer attitudes, less satisfaction and intention to stay during the first year after entry (Cooper-Thomas et al., 2005). This appears to be contrary to the Attraction-Selection-Attrition (ASA) theory, that predicts an increase of P-O fit over time (Cooman et al., 2009; Schneider et al., 1995). However, the ASA-effect depends on turnover of non-fitting employees. It may take some time before employees decide to leave and act upon their decision. During this period, perceived P-O fit will probably diminish as entrants develop more realistic perceptions but do not yet leave the firm. Bretz and Judge (1994) observed that fit effects probably lead to increasing differences between fitting and non-fitting employees. Fitting employees receive more attention, challenging assignments and mentoring relationships, leading to stronger perceptions

of fit and positive attitudes; the opposite applies to employees that do not experience fit with their firms.

Changes in fit through the adjustment of values and of perceptions predict changes of the outcomes of fit, of satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay (Chatman, 1991).

In order to investigate the changes of values and of value fit during the first years and the effects of these changes on satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay, longitudinal research is necessary, as many researchers have pointed out (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Schneider et al., 1995). Most research has chosen a time interval of about one year (Allen, 2006; Sturges et al., 2002), but also shorter intervals have been advised and applied (Bauer et al. 2005). Chatman (1991) advises 10 to 12 months. O'Reilly et al. (1991) have found that P-O fit predicts job satisfaction and organizational commitment one year after fit was measured and actual turnover after two years. Effects of changes in values and value fit after entry have also been found two years after entry (Cooman et al., 2009). To study the changes of values and fit and the effects of value fit over times, I used two consecutive surveys among young lawyers, employed by the big Dutch law firms. In this Chapter and in Chapter 4, I will discuss the results of both surveys. The analysis of the changes over time will follow in Chapter 5.

5. *Methods*

I will refer to the two consecutive surveys among young, starting lawyers as survey T1 and survey T2.

5.1. *Sample and procedure, survey T1*

In survey T1 I included starting lawyers with 3 to 13 months of employment, following Cooper-Thomas et al. (2005) and Bauer et al. (2005). I approached 305 lawyers who had started their traineeship with one of the 19 big law firms that participated in the first part of the study, described in Chapter 2. Email addresses were provided by the Dutch Bar Association. I also found most managing partners and HRM departments of the 19 firms prepared to recommend participation. After several reminders, 95 lawyers completed the survey (31%), but 18 of them did not fill in their firms' name. I could therefore analyze the objective fit for the remaining 77 lawyers (25%).

The age of the respondents varied from 23 to 35, with an average of 26.2 years (men 27.0, women 25.6). Of the 77 respondents, 33 were male and 44 female (57%). These demographics closely resemble those of all starting lawyers in The Netherlands (Ned. Orde van Advocaten, Annual Report 2009;

m/f = 47/53%).

5.2. *Sample and procedure, survey T2*

I repeated the survey ten months later; at this time, the lawyers in the target population had between one and two years of working experience at their firms. The survey was distributed by e-mail to the same lawyers of survey T1. Five of them had requested not to be approached for the follow up survey, four lawyers had left their firms, nine others could not be reached by e-mail – possibly some of them had left as well. 66 lawyers completed the survey (23% of the remaining 287). Even with support of most firms and with several reminders, this number could not be increased. Probably, lawyers have become a bit weary of the many survey requests for research, marketing or professional purposes. Of these respondents, 39 could be matched with the respondents of survey T1 (12.8% of 305). One of these 39 could not be linked to a firm. So only a small group remained that had replied to both surveys, too small for longitudinal statistical analyses. In Chapter 5, I will look further into the cases of the 38 lawyers who responded to both surveys.

The age of the respondents again varied from 23 to 35, with an average of 27.0 years (men 28.1, women 26.5). Of the respondents, 35% were male and 65% female, so there was a small female overrepresentation.

5.3. *Measures.*

With the exception of intention to stay, I measured all items on a five point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = totally disagree, very unimportant, completely inapplicable to 5 = totally agree, very important or completely applicable. For intention to stay, I used a four point scale related to the expected time of departure.

Values and goals lawyers. I developed a questionnaire to investigate the values and goals of the lawyers, inferred from the HRM practices and related archetype elements. To measure the values and goals of the lawyers, I formulated four items for each of the following five categories of personal values and goals:

- *expertise development*; an example of the items is “I want to contribute to the development of the law and the legal system”,
- *management*, e.g.: “I prefer to work in an environment with very clear rules and division of tasks”,
- *short term reward*, e.g. “I prefer to work for a firm that rewards different performances differently”,
- *long term perspective*, e.g. “I prefer to work for I firm that offers me the perspective of becoming partner” and

- *partnership*, e.g. “It is my ambition to belong to the top of my organization”.

Pilot. To test the meaningfulness, relevancy and clarity of the value and goals items to young lawyers, I asked 96 young lawyers at middle sized firms (not included in the final survey population) to complete the questionnaire. I interviewed six of them by telephone, asking directly their opinion on the items. These interviews led to some improvements in the wording of the items, but none of the items had to be deleted due to a lack of clarity or relevancy. The pilot survey results showed a sufficient reliability of the scales: perceived organization values Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.76$, lawyers’ values, satisfaction and commitment all above 0.80. I used factor analysis to evaluate the consistency of the four items of each of the five value and goal elements and rewrote some items that were insufficiently linked to the others. Appendix II contains the resulting final survey items.

In survey T1, the reliability of the value items could be improved by dropping one item for each value, resulting in $\alpha = 0.60$ for Exp. Lawyers, 0.58 Mgmt lawyers, 0.57 Short lawyers and $\alpha = 0.89$ Long lawyers. Deleting the corresponding items on firm values resulted in firm $\alpha = 0.70$, Mgmt firm $\alpha = 0.60$, Short firm $\alpha = 0.69$ and Long firm $\alpha = 0.71$. It was not feasible to improve the reliability of the partnership values to a sufficient level, so I had to leave out this scale altogether from my further analyses.

In survey T2, the reliability of most of the value scales was sufficient to good. As in survey T1, the reliability of the partnership value scales was too low and could not be improved sufficiently by deleting an item. Many lawyers will probably consider the desirability of a partnership position only after the first three traineeship years (Boon et al., 2001). The reliability of the other value scales improved after deleting the same items as in survey T1, the resulting Cronbach’s α ’s were: Exp. lawyers 0.82, Mgmt lawyers 0.62, Short lawyers 0.59, Long lawyers 0.85; Exp. firm 0.79, Mgmt firm 0.60, Short firm 0.73 and Long firm 0.66.

Objective fit. The score on each personal value item indicated if a value or goal is more in line with the PP or the MPB. For instance, a high score on short term reward items indicated a preference for a MPB-like firm, as variable, performance related pay is a feature of this archetype. Objective fit was measured by comparing the values and goals of the lawyers as measured by the survey with the archetype elements of their firms: the average score on all archetype elements as established in Chapter 2.

Perceived values firms. I measured firm values as perceived by the lawyers by reformulating the survey items on the lawyers’ values and

goals into organizational values and goals and asking, to what degree the respondents recognized a value or goal in their firm. (E.g., for expertise values, "The firm aims at contributing to the development of the law and the legal system" and for short term reward "The firm rewards according to performance"). A comparable approach was followed by Bretz & Judge (1994).

Satisfaction. I translated the general work satisfaction scale of Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins & Klesh (1983); this scale consists of three items and has been widely applied and has the advantage of brevity. An example is: "I like working with this firm" ($\alpha = 0.84$, survey T2 0.82).

Commitment. Following the advice of Solinger et al. (2008), I used the affective commitment items from the three-component model of Meyer and Allen (1990) with a small adjustment for the legal environment: "I am proud working at this firm", "I don't feel that I really belong in this firm", "I like to work hard for this firm and to contribute more than normally is expected" ($\alpha = 0.72$, survey T2 0.65).

Intention to stay was measured by one item: how long do you expect to stay with your firm? This item could be answered in four categories: less than 3 years, 3-5 years, 5-8 years and more than 8 years. In the perspective of starting lawyers, as confirmed by the pilot survey, these categories can be assumed to represent a continuum from leaving very shortly to staying very long. I treated the scale as a four point Likert scale.

The survey items are listed in Appendix II.

6. Results

6.1. Surveys T1 and T2.

Survey T1 had a better response and produced more significant results than survey T2. I will therefore start each Subsection with describing the results of survey T1 completely and then follow with the results of survey T2 insofar as these differed from or added to the results of the first.

6.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations

Tables A and B in Appendix III contain the mean scores, standard deviations and correlations of all variables of survey T1 and survey T2. In survey T1, the Exp. lawyer ($r = 0.30$), Short lawyer (0.23), Exp. firm (0.26) and Short firm values (0.26) showed significant correlations with the firms' archetype (PP-MPB) scores. These correlations were found again in survey T2: Exp. lawyer ($r = 0.39$), Short lawyer (0.23), Exp. firm (0.39) and Short firm values (0.43).

The correlation between Mgmt lawyer and Short lawyer (both MPB-like values) was as expected, but the significant positive correlation between Short lawyers and Long lawyers was not. The Exp. firm values were positively correlated to all other firm value elements and Mgmt firm also to Long firm. There appeared a tendency to evaluate one's firm more or less positively on all aspects. The only significant correlation between lawyers' values and firm values appeared between firms' and lawyers' long term perspective values. So lawyers with high long term ambitions found themselves at firms with higher long term perspectives, but tend to appreciate short term rewards as well.

There was a significant negative correlation between both Mgmt and Short lawyers and satisfaction: lawyers who value management quality and short term rewards were less satisfied with their firms. All firm values elements except Short related positively with commitment and satisfaction. Intention to stay had similar correlations with the values. The correlation between satisfaction and commitment was very strong (0.80), the correlation with intention to stay was lower. However, satisfaction had a significant negative correlation with the lawyers' management and short term reward values, commitment had not. Female lawyers were less ambitious (correlation gender and long term perspective values $r = -0.25$).

In survey T2, all lawyers' values scales appeared positively intercorrelated except Mgmt and Long, with the highest correlation between Mgmt and Short lawyers. Exp. lawyers was positively correlated to satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay; this was not found in survey T1. The only significant correlation between lawyers' and firm values appeared for the Mgmt values in stead of the Long values in survey T1. Contrary to survey T1 I found no significant correlations with application success. The negative correlation of Mgmt Lawyers and Short Lawyers with satisfaction was not repeated neither was the correlation between Long lawyers and gender. Instead, a correlation between gender and lawyers management values appeared: female lawyers reported higher management values. Career studies indicate a (negative) relationship between female gender and intention to stay (Dikkers et al., 2007; Dinovitzer et al., 2007; Hagan et al., 2007), but this was not supported by the correlations in the surveys.

I analyzed the differences between the means and correlations of survey T1 and survey T2. The means showed some decline in commitment, satisfaction and intention to stay in survey T2. All perceived firm value levels showed a tendency to decline somewhat, except for Short values. Expertise firm values decreased the most. However neither of these differences was

significant. Only the increase of the lawyers long term values (from 2.77 to 3.7, $p = 0.01$) and the increase of the correlation between management and short term reward firm values (survey T1 $r = 0.14$, T2 0.42; $p = 0.03$) were significant.

To explore possible effects of the value variables proposed in the hypotheses, regression analysis was conducted for all firm values and lawyers' values scales together, after controlling for age and gender. The regression of neither age nor gender on the outcome variables was significant. All value scales together had a considerable explanatory effect on commitment ($R^2 = 0.245$, survey T2 0.404), on satisfaction (0.194 and 0.218) and on intention to stay ($R^2 = 0.173$, survey T2 0.234). However, the contribution of the lawyers values on commitment is small (R^2 of lawyers values is 0.048; survey T2 0.094). Within the firm values, the Mgmt and Long scales (survey T2: Exp. and Long) have the greatest explanatory potential – but, as we will see, Mgmt and Long values each in a different direction. These regression outcomes justified the detailed analyses of the proposed effects.

6.3. Polynomial regression analysis

I applied polynomial regression and response surface analysis to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. Polynomial regression analysis has been proposed by Edwards (1993, 1994) to avoid methodological problems in congruence (e.g. fit) studies. These problems arise from collapsing different variables (personal and organizational values) into a single index (Edwards, 1993, 1994; Shanock, Baran, Gentry, Pattison, & Heggstad, 2010). Polynomial regression analysis has been increasingly accepted as the standard analytical instrument in fit studies (Hecht & Allen, 2005; Shanock et al., 2010; Vuuren, Veldkamp, Jong, & Seydel, 2007).

The three-dimensional surfaces of the regression equations were calculated and plotted using Excel and analyzed visually and by slope analysis, as proposed by Hecht & Allen (2005) and Shanock et al. (2010). I used the Excel format made available by Shanock et al. (2010).

6.4. Hypothesis 1, Objective fit

Besides the correlations analysis including the actual PP-MPB scores of the firms that I found in the first part of this study, I used regression analysis to study the effect of objective fit on satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. Objective fit in this study is the fit between the values and goals of the lawyers and the values and goals of their firms, as expressed by the archetypical PP-MPB character of the firm. The regression equation was $VL + PPMPB + VL^2 + VL * PPMPB + PPMPB^2$. Of all regressions of lawyers'

values and PPMPB on satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay, only one outcome was significant: the regression of lawyers' expertise values and the PPMPB score on intention to stay ($R^2 = 0.216$, $p = 0.00$) in the first survey. In the second survey, this regression came closest to significance ($R^2 = 0.201$, $p = 0.07$). R^2 and p of all regression equations are included in Appendix IV. The significance of the expertise values regression gives some support to the congruence of perceived and actual values and to the relation between lawyers' expertise values and intention to stay, as will be discussed hereafter. However, since almost no regression outcomes were significant, hypothesis 1 was not supported.

6.5. Hypothesis 2, Subjective fit

The variance explained (R^2) of the polynomial regression analyses is shown in Tables 4 (survey T1) and 5 (survey T2).

Table 3.1. R^2 and p 's of the regressions of personal values and perceived firm's values, survey T1

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R^2	p .	R^2	p .	R^2	p .
Expertise	0.140	0.03	0.119	0.06	0.146	0.02
Management	0.294	0.00	0.279	0.00	0.090	0.17
Short term reward	0.201	0.00	0.118	0.07	0.134	0.04
Long term perspective	0.289	0.00	0.321	0.00	0.119	0.06

Table 3.2. R^2 and p 's of the regressions of personal values and perceived firm's values, survey T2

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R^2	p .	R^2	p .	R^2	p .
Expertise	0.201	0.03	0.272	0.00	0.226	0.01
Management	0.195	0.03	0.117	0.22	0.042	0.78
Short term reward	0.073	0.51	0.048	0.74	0.021	0.95
Long term perspective	0.145	0.13	0.250	0.01	0.109	0.28

For all regression equations ($VL+VF+VL^2+VL*VF+VF^2$), I calculated the slopes and curvatures of the regression lines. Following the hypotheses, I expected a "straight saddle" shape of the graphs of the polynomial regression equation. The highest level of the outcome variables is supposed to be reached when lawyers values (VL) and firm values (VF)

are in agreement. This “fit” line $VL = VF$ is supposed to be straight and horizontal, as there is no reason to assume a different level of the outcomes according to different levels of value agreement. On both sides of this line, as incongruence of values increases, the level of the outcome variable drops and the graph is expected to show two downward wings. The line of disagreement (misfit) $VL = -VF$ can be expected to have an inverted U shape, the outcome variable dropping more sharply as the divergence of VL and VF increases.

Appendix V contains the Tables (A and B) with the coefficients, standard errors and significance tests.

6.5.1. Expertise values

The expertise values resulted in significant regression results on satisfaction and intention to stay, but the explanation of variance was weak on all outcome variables, see Table 3.1. Only the slope of the fit line of the regression of intention to stay was significant. The graph of this regression is shown in Figure 3a.




Figure 3a. Intention to stay as predicted by lawyers’ expertise values (EL) and perceived expertise values of the firm (EF)

The graph shows the expected saddle shape, but the fit line (visualized from front to back of the plot) – with a significant slope - rises as the level of fitting values is higher. Intention to stay decreased more sharply at the left hand side, where lawyers’ values are low and firm values high

In survey T2, the regression explained a moderate amount of variance of satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. Neither slopes nor curvatures of the regression for satisfaction are significant. I plotted the regression equations for commitment and intention to stay, Figures 3b and 3c.




Figure 3b. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' expertise values and perceived expertise values of the firm, survey T2




Figure 3c. Intention to stay as predicted by lawyers' expertise values and perceived expertise values of the firm, survey T2

The slope of the $EL = EF$ fit line in Figure 3b is significant, indicating a straight line of fit. As is visible in the graph this line rises gradually as the fitting value level is higher. In Figure 3c, the line of misfit is significant. The surface pattern shows a steep increase of intention to stay as lawyer's values are higher. Firm values appeared to have hardly any impact on this outcome, as can be seen by the small differences in height along the EF axis.

6.5.2. Management values

Management values explained a significant amount of the variance of satisfaction ($R^2 = 0.294$) and commitment (0.279) but not of intention to stay. The graphs of the regression equations are shown in Figures 3d and 3e.




Figure 3d. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' management values (ML) and perceived management values of the firm (MF)




Figure 3e. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' management values and perceived management values of the firm

The curvature of the line of misfit $ML = -MF$ is significant in both graphs, resulting in an inverted U-shape as presumed. The satisfaction graph shows a steeper decrease at both sides of the fit line, more pronounced at the right side where ML are high and MF low. On the $ML = MF$ line of fit, the graph resembles the proposed shape, but the coefficients are not significant.

Survey T2 resulted in similar surface patterns for satisfaction and commitment. Figure 3f shows the satisfaction pattern.




Figure 3f. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' management values (ML) and perceived management values of the firm (MF), survey T2

6.5.3. Short term reward values

Short term reward values explained a reasonable amount of variance of satisfaction and intention to stay. The satisfaction graph has a similar shape

as Figure 3d, but more pronounced. The regression of intention to stay produced a significant slope of the line of misfit and a surface pattern similar to Figure 3g.




Figure 3g. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' short term reward values (SL) and perceived short term reward values of the firm (SF)

The slope as well as the curvature of the line of misfit in the regression of satisfaction is significant. This confirms the proposed inverted u-shape. The specific direction of the inclines, especially the steeper incline at the right hand side, where Short values of the lawyers are high and firm values are low, is in line with the negative correlation between Short lawyers values and satisfaction. The negative effect of higher lawyers values at low or medium firm value levels is clear in the slope along the SF = -2 line.

Survey T2 did not produce significant results for the short term reward values.

6.5.4. Long term perspective values

Long term perspective values explained a considerable part of variance of satisfaction ($R^2 = 0.289$, $p < 0.00$) and commitment ($R^2 = 0.321$, $p < 0.00$). The graphs of the regression equations are shown in Figures 3h and 3i.




Figure 3h. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values (LL) and perceived long term perspective values of the firm (LF)




Figure 3i. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived long term perspective values of the firm

The graphs show irregular saddle shapes. For satisfaction, the slope and curvature of the $LL = LF$ axis are not significant. The line of misfit $LL = -LF$ has a significant slope and curvature. Satisfaction decreases sharply at the right side of the 'saddle': when lawyer's long term ambitions are high, they seem to be out of place – clearly less satisfied - in firms with lower long term values. The decline in satisfaction is less pronounced at the low lawyer/high firm value side.

For commitment, the plot shows a similar and significant slope and curvature of the line of misfit, a little less pronounced than on satisfaction. For the $LL = LF$ axis, the slope is significant, indicating an incline that rises slightly to the high $LL = LF$ end. Lawyers with higher Long values are more committed to firms with similar high values than low value lawyers to low value firms

Survey T2 produced significant curvatures of the lines of misfit in the surface patterns of satisfaction and commitment that closely resembled the misfit line in Figure 3i.

6.5.5. Summary; hypothesis 2.

The regression analyses supported Hypothesis 2, insofar as the fit between lawyers' and firm values concerning expertise, management, short term reward (survey T1) and long term perspective has an effect on satisfaction and commitment. The proposed effect on intention to stay is supported only for expertise value fit and in survey T1 for short term reward

value fit. The graphs of the regression lines show the expected saddle shape. However, except for expertise values, the misfit between high personal values and low firm values have stronger negative effects than the opposite misfit of low personal values and high firm values. Further, the lines of fit are not completely level; the fit lines of management and short term reward values rise as the value level declines and the fit lines of long term perspective values rise as the value level increases. Coefficients indicate that lawyers' short term reward values have stronger effects than firm values. On long term perspective, the opposite patterns appeared. The effect of long term perspective value fit on commitment comes closest to the expected pattern. The negative effects of misfit on satisfaction appeared stronger than the effects on commitment.

In survey T2, only the Mgmt values produced a saddle shaped surface pattern as expected, the surfaces of the Exp. and Long values being more irregular. The surface pattern of the regression for Exp. values shows a positive relation between lawyer values and outcomes, as was indicated by the correlations. Similar to survey T1, the misfit of Mgmt and Long values had stronger effects at the right, low VF/high VL side. Even within this smaller sample the proposed fit and misfit effects are visible.

7. Discussion

The purpose of this study, consisting of two consecutive surveys, was to investigate the effects of fit between the values and goals of young lawyers and the values of their firms. Firm values were studied as perceived by the lawyers and as deduced from the archetypical character of their firms. From the results of the first part of the study described in Chapter 2, I identified four sets of values or goals that could be linked to the firm's archetype: the level of expertise ambition (Exp.), the appreciation of a well organized and regulated firm (Mgmt), the need for short term reward (Short) and for long term career perspective (Long).

The correlations indicated an interrelation between lawyers' short en long term perspective values. However, contrary to the Short values of the firm, the perceived Long firm values were positively correlated to intention to stay, while personal Short values were negatively related to satisfaction and intention to stay.

The only significant correlation with gender was found for lawyers' long term perspective values in survey T1. Male lawyers seem to have stronger long term career ambitions. Similar gender differences were reported in

other studies in the legal as well as other professional industries (Dijkers et al., 2007; Groeneveld, Tijdens, & Kleef, 2009).

I studied the effects of fit of each of the values using the polynomial regression analysis as described by Edwards (1994), Hecht & Allen (2007) and Shanock (2010). I hypothesized that fit between lawyers' values and firms' archetypical characteristics (objective fit), as well as between lawyers' values and perceived firm values would be positively related to satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. Analyses of the objective fit effects did not result in significant outcomes in either survey, with the exception of the regression of the effects of expertise value fit on intention to stay. The expectation that subjective fit measures would show stronger effects than objective fit was confirmed. I also expected that perceived and objective fit would be positively related, as should be visible in the correlation between perceived firm values and the objective fit measures. In both surveys I found significant positive correlations of expertise firm values and short term reward firm values with the PP-MPB position of the firms, as was expected. Expertise and Short values as defined in the survey items appeared to approach the actual archetypical characteristics of the firm; regarding expertise values, the significant regression outcome supported this finding. These values are possibly the most apparent and perceivable for starting lawyers. There were no significant correlations between the other perceived firm values and the PP-MPB scores. The evaluation of the management values of the firm might be more difficult without work experience elsewhere. As for long term perspective, uncertainty about the continuation of employment after the trainee period may have contorted the evaluation of these values. In the economic insecure years 2008-2009, this uncertainty probably was even stronger than otherwise. Especially firms 1, 6 and 9, that have big corporate finance and banking practice areas, may have suffered in the first year of the financial crisis. Evidence for a relationship between the perception of firms' values and the interview outcomes was partial and weak.

The measuring of the PP-MPB archetype of the firms was derived from the interviews with managing partners, a source quite different from the surveys that measure the lawyers' values. The difference between these sources might preclude a combined analysis. The way that young lawyers perceive their firms might deviate from the reality or the perceptions of managing partners. Probably there are several archetypical elements that are still relatively obscure to entrants.

Analyses of the fit effect between lawyers' and perceived firm values

resulted in significant and meaningful outcomes. In general, the surface patterns that resulted from the regression analyses exhibited the expected saddle shapes with a high level line of fit and downward ‘wings’ at both sides of this line. In survey T2, probably due to the smaller sample size, the number of significant and meaningful results was smaller.

7.1. Expertise values.

Fit of expertise values (values, ambitions of distinguishing oneself professionally) only accounted for a substantial part of variance of intention to stay, in the regression analysis of survey T1. Also, objective fit of expertise values appeared to have a significant effect on intention to stay. Young lawyers who applied with the big law firms all had high expertise ambitions and perceived the expertise values of their firms generally as very high; however, the fit between their level of ambition and the expertise level of their firms made a difference for their staying intentions. In survey T2 the regression for expertise values showed a relationship between value fit, satisfaction and commitment. Fit at a higher value level was related to higher outcomes; lawyers’ values were dominant in producing this effect. The significant correlation between lawyers’ expertise values and the PP archetype of the firm indicated that lawyers with the highest expertise values seem to be more attracted to the PP.

7.2. Management values.

Misfit of lawyers’ and firm management values (values attributed to an orderly, well structured, transparent and predictable organization) is related to a decrease of satisfaction and commitment. Misfit effects appeared strongest when lawyers’ values are high and firm values low; low lawyers’ values appeared to dominate the fit effect. Fit at lower value levels appeared to be related with somewhat higher outcomes. Effects on satisfaction were more pronounced than on commitment. Surface patterns of the regression results showed the expected saddle shape, in survey T1 and survey T2.

7.3. Short term reward values.

The surface patterns of the regression of short term reward values (appreciation of direct, differential rewards –tangible or not- for performance) on satisfaction and intention to stay resemble the saddle shape, with a steeper incline at the right, low firm values/high lawyer values side. High lawyers’ values appear to have the strongest negative effect, as supported by the significant slopes of the misfit lines. Satisfaction is highest when the level of fitting values is low. Survey T2 produced no significant results.

7.4. Long term perspective.

Long term perspective values (value of career, especially partnership

perspective) have clear and significant effects on all outcome variables in survey T1. All surfaces of the regression equations show the expected saddle pattern, with a shallow U-shaped curvature of the line of fit. All misfit lines have a steeper decline at the right, low firm values/high lawyer value side. Here, low firm values are the dominant factor. Satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay reach the highest levels on the line of fit; this line is slightly higher – for intention to stay more pronounced – at a high level of value fit (in contrast with Mgmt and Short values).

In survey T2, regression results were significant on commitment. Firm values appeared to dominate the effects. Misfit lines showed the inverted U-shape with a steeper decline at the low firm value/high lawyer value side.

So, in survey T1, expertise values show some fit effects but are probably (still) hardly distinctive for law graduates. For management values and short term reward misfit effects are dominant, especially high expectations and low firm standards. For long term perspective values, fit as well as misfit effects are evident. This may be contrary to the belief that is expressed more and more frequently in professional literature (Vodeb, 2011) that partnership ambitions are of diminishing importance for starting as well as more experienced lawyers. Probably due to a smaller sample size, survey T2 produced less or weaker results than the first. In general, results affirmed the findings in survey T1. Effects of expertise value fit appeared stronger in survey T2, effects of Long value fit weaker. Long values produced the clearest results in survey T1, Mgmt values did so in survey T2.

Following the fit and socialization literature as discussed, I had expected that the outcome variables would be lower in survey T2, diminishing with tenure (Cooper-Thomas et al., 2005). Satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay had diminished, however not significantly. I also expected the fit as well as misfit effects to be more pronounced in survey T2. However, a general increase of differentiation of the effects of fit and misfit could not be discerned. Standard deviations of the outcome variables had not increased in survey T2. Comparing the surface patterns, some fit effects were more and others less pronounced in survey T2; I could not observe a general pattern.

7.5. Satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay.

Satisfaction and commitment appeared strongly correlated but different outcomes. Satisfaction correlated negatively with lawyers' management and short term reward values, commitment did not. In general, the effects of fit and misfit on satisfaction are more pronounced than the effects on commitment. Commitment appeared as a more stable affect of young lawyers who recently joined their firm. Nevertheless the surfaces of the

regression equations on satisfaction and commitment have the same general shape and patterns. Possibly, more pronounced negative effects of misfit on commitment will appear only later in time.

Intention to stay is different from the other outcome variables. Partly, this may be due to the response scale. However, the results of the regression of intention to stay on perceived as well as actual expertise value fit were significant and meaningful. Also, the regression of short term reward value fit produced significant results that were hypothesized and similar to other outcome variables.

7.6. Summary

Fit of management and short term reward values has some effects on satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. However, misfit appears to be more important, particularly between high expectations and lower firm standards, and, for short term rewards, also between high firm values and low personal ambitions. The clearest effects are produced by the fit and misfit of long term perspective values in survey T1, where firm values have an important, possibly dominant role in determining fit. Young lawyers who are already motivated by long term (partnership) perspectives probably are a small group, according to recent surveys among young professionals (Dijkers et al., 2007; Vodeb, 2011), with still a disproportionate share of male lawyers. But law firms will try to attract and retain precisely these 'bright and ambitious'. Partnership focused PP firms might have an advantage in appealing to these long term ambitions, but will also have to match their needs for short term rewards or recognition.

Lawyers who expect a clearly structured, transparent, predictable organization and value a prompt reward and recognition of their performance will be less satisfied and committed than their peers and probably will leave their firms sooner. Lawyers' expertise values and the level of value fit appeared to have a clear positive effect on their intention to stay and, in survey T2, on their other attitudes. The stronger the ambition to develop into a legal expert, the stronger the attachment to a career as a lawyer. Many professionals might share this expertise ambition, but in our sample of lawyers at the big firm it may be even more pronounced.

7.7. Limitations

It can be argued that the (mis-)fit that I analyzed in these surveys only develops gradually and is not subject to sudden and radical change; that therefore the simultaneously measured satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay have followed from the development of (mis-)fit over time. However, one cannot be certain that the time-sequential or causal

relations are as presumed. The sample size of respondents to both surveys was insufficient for longitudinal statistical analysis. In Chapter 5, I will try to discover some patterns of change from the cases of the respondents to both surveys, but the lack of data that support longitudinal analysis data is a serious limitation of this study.

Besides the small number of respondents to both surveys, the sample sizes of the surveys were relatively small. This may have limited the number of significant results.

With one exception, objective fit could not be observed or analyzed, probably due to the difference between the measures. Apart from a few indications from the correlations, this research therefore could not contribute substantially to clarifying the relation between subjective and objective fit. Future studies might invest in developing more comparable measures of organization's characteristics and personal attitudes.

Finally, the measurement of intention to stay that I developed for the purpose of this study produced some significant results, but less so than satisfaction and commitment, both well established measures. The different timing of the intention to stay answering options might, as presumed, be congruent with a regular Likert scale, but might also distort some of the results. Further testing is necessary.

The influence of core self-evaluations and human capital

1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine factors that influence and may predict the success of starting lawyers with their law firms. In Chapter 3, I have studied the fit between values and goals of lawyers and law firms and found that this fit is related to the satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay of the lawyers. P-O fit is not an isolated factor. The effects of value fit on the attitudes of an employee may differ according to personality, capacities, time and other circumstances. In this Chapter I will try to identify, investigate and analyze factors that influence the relationship between fit and fit effects in the environment of the law firms and the attitudes of young professionals. I will focus on two personal attributes that impact the fit effects in general, according to literature and practice: core self-evaluations and human capital. Determining personal attributes might help in designing effective selection and socialization processes; furthermore, analyzing these personal factors may contribute to theory development that may also be relevant for other organizations than law firms.

1.1. Core self-evaluations.

Personality characteristics have been identified as important factors that influence the effectiveness of socialization, performance and turnover (Bauer et al., 2006). Personality influences values, ambitions and career expectations of professionals (Furnham, Petrides, Tsaousis, Pappas & Garrod, 2005; Warr & Pearce 2004). Chatman (1991) has found a positive association between confidence and subjective value fit. Schneider et al. (1995) reported studies that have found a significant difference in the type of organization employees fit in, according to their level of self-esteem. Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) conclude in their meta-analysis that fit "is more influential

if ... the individual has more self-esteem". Abele and Spurk (2009) found a clear longitudinal impact of self-efficacy on career success. Day and Allen (Day & Allen, 2004) showed that self efficacy interacts significantly with career motivation and success. Confident persons are more outspoken in their opinions, in their preparedness to draw positive or negative conclusions from their findings and to act upon them. Presumably, self-esteem, self-efficacy or –confidence of the lawyer strengthens the effects of fit on satisfaction, commitment and turnover intention. It can be argued that this relation works in two directions: for self-confident lawyers, fit leads to more satisfaction, stronger commitment and less turnover intention, non-fit leads to stronger feelings of dissatisfaction and intention to leave.

Research on P-O fit has produced strong indications that self-evaluation factors such as self-confidence have a considerable influence on the effects of fit. Self-esteem, self-confidence and self-efficacy are different yet overlapping notions. The distinction between the terms, and the choices of researchers for one of these are not always clear. The concept of core self-evaluations covers both self-esteem and self-efficacy and includes neuroticism and locus of control as well. "Core self-evaluations are defined as the mental premises that individuals hold about themselves and their functioning in the world." (Judge, Erez & Bono 1998, p. 168). This broader concept is well suited for starting professionals, who may not have a clear vision on their professional, work-related capabilities yet. Judge et al. developed a core self-evaluation scale that has produced significant results in a previous survey among young Dutch lawyers (Birnbbaum, 2002). It was found that core self-evaluations moderated the relation between social and educational capital and career success (Judge & Hurst, 2007). I chose to test whether core self-evaluations moderated the relation between P-O fit and satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. Following Day & Allen (2004), I assumed that lawyers with a high score of core self-evaluations, who have a relatively positive self-image, will report more extreme positive effects of fit and more extreme negative effects of misfit on these outcomes than lawyers with low CSE.

1.2. Human Capital.

Another factor that may influence the expectations and ambitions of the young professionals is their human capital – that is, their individual human capital as opposed to the aggregate human capital of an organization. Human capital is not a very well defined construct but generally includes educational qualifications, work experience, professional and social skills and sometimes also socioeconomic status (Cable et al., 1996; Judge, Higgins,

Thoresen, & Murray, 1999; Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005; Scholarios & Taylor, 2011). Human capital is a broader concept than general mental ability or similar notions. All abilities, skills, experiences, know how and social networks that can be assumed to support one's job performance and career success may be regarded as human capital.

Several studies have demonstrated the relationship between human capital and performance, but also between human capital, expectations and attitudes such as turnover intentions (Cable et al., 1996; Ng et al., 2005). The results of the study of Dinovitzer and Garth (Dinovitzer et al., 2007) implied that human capital might be negatively related to work satisfaction. Lawyers with better grades, better social networks or with relevant work experience may have higher expectations and are more easily disappointed. As for starting lawyers, their human capital mainly consists of their intellectual abilities. They have recently graduated and will only incidentally have relevant work experience or work related social networks.

The relations that Dinovitzer & Garth (2007) and Judge & Hurst (2007) found between social background, career and satisfaction of lawyers in Great Britain and the USA could not be reproduced for the Dutch situation (Stolk 2008). Social stratification of education and career is probably less pronounced in The Netherlands; I therefore decided not to use social and educational background factors in this survey. Lawyers who are employed by the big law firms usually belong to the best law students; this makes it harder to differentiate according to educational performance alone. Dinovitzer and Garth (2007) used the number of job offers as a measure for human capital and found a negative relationship with satisfaction. I will follow this approach and will use the performance of young lawyers in their job applications with law firms as a measure of their human capital. I expect this performance to mirror their educational qualifications and work related experiences as expressed in their resumes, as well as their performance in job interviews. I will refer to this measure of human capital as 'application success'. Similar to core self-evaluations, I expect that a high degree of application success will be related to more extreme effects of fit and misfit.

Since the regressions of objective fit without moderators did not produce significant results, I did not include them in the analysis of moderator effects in this Chapter.

1.3. Hypotheses

Hypothesis 3. Core self-evaluations moderate the relation between subjective P-O fit and misfit and satisfaction with the organization, organizational commitment and intention to stay; lawyers with high core self-

evaluations will report more extreme positive effects of fit and more extreme negative effects of misfit on these outcomes than lawyers with low core self-evaluations.

Hypothesis 4. Application success moderates the relation between subjective P-O fit and misfit and satisfaction with the organization, organizational commitment and intention to stay; lawyers with high application success will report more extreme positive effects of fit and more extreme negative effects of misfit on these outcomes than lawyers with low application success.

2. Methods

Core self-evaluations and application success were measured in the same surveys that I described in Chapter 3, referred to as survey T1 and survey T2. The measurement of lawyers' values, perceived firm values, satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay were described in Chapter 3.

2.1. Measures.

Core self-evaluations (CSE) were measured using the 12-item scale that has been developed and applied by Judge, Erez, Bono & Thoresen (2003). An example item is "I am confident that in my life I will obtain the success that I deserve" (survey T1 $\alpha = 0.81$, survey T2 0.84). The items were measured on a five point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = totally disagree, very unimportant, completely inapplicable to 5 = totally agree, very important or completely applicable. The reliability of the CSE scale proved good, in both surveys $\alpha > 0.800$.

Application success was measured by asking for the number of job applications with law firms that preceded the current employment, the number of invitations for job interviews and the number of actual job offers; then, by dividing invitations by applications (AS1) and by dividing job offers by invitations (AS2). AS1 (ranges 0.25 to 1.0) expressed the interest that recruiters attached to an applicants' resume; AS2 (range 0.2 to 1.0) expressed the applicants selection success ratio. I used AS1 and AS2 separately as measures for application success.

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations

Means, standard deviations and correlations of CSE, AS1 and AS2 are included in Tables A and B in Appendix III. CSE correlated with satisfaction

and commitment in both surveys; lawyers with a more positive self-evaluation tend to be more committed and satisfied. This effect of CSE or similar constructs is frequently found in fit research, recently by Gregory, Albritton and Osombekov (2010). Long term lawyers' values were correlated with application success ($r = 0.23$) in survey T1. In survey T2, female gender correlated negatively with CSE.

3.2. Core self-evaluations as moderator; hypothesis 3.

In order to test hypothesis 3, I added the CSE outcomes to the regression equation, as proposed by Aiken & West (Aiken & West, 1991) and used by Hecht et al. (2005):

$R = VL + VF + VL \cdot VF + VL^2 + VF^2 + CSE + VL * CSE + VF * CSE + VL \cdot VF * CSE + VL^2 * CSE + VF^2 * CSE$. Then, the interactions of VL, VF and the outcomes were analyzed for high and low levels of CSE: one standard deviation above ("CSE high") and below the mean level ("CSE low").

The main results of the moderated regression analyses are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

Table 4.1
Survey T1 Effects of the fit between personal values and perceived firm's values moderated by CSE

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R ²	p.	R ²	p.	R ²	p.
Expertise	0.284	0.01	0.162	0.22	0.207	0.69
Management	0.454	0.00	0.365	0.00	0.135	0.41
Short term reward	0.342	0.00	0.224	0.05	0.208	0.08
Long term perspective	0.485	0.00	0.450	0.00	0.216	0.06

Table 4.2
Survey T2 Effects of the fit between personal values and perceived firm's values moderated by CSE

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R ²	p.	R ²	p.	R ²	p.
Expertise	0.340	0.03	0.366	0.02	0.291	0.10
Management	0.322	0.04	0.232	0.26	0.162	0.60
Short term reward	0.340	0.03	0.163	0.63	0.189	0.46
Long term perspective	0.380	0.01	0.353	0.03	0.235	0.26

The results of the slope and curvature calculations of the moderated regressions are included in Table A and B in Appendix V. I plotted the regression equations that resulted in significant slopes and/or curvatures. The significant results also showed a substantial increase in explanatory power in comparison to the unmoderated regressions, for all values predicting satisfaction and for Mgmt and Long values predicting commitment. In survey T2, significant results were obtained for all values predicting satisfaction, for Exp. and Long values predicting commitment and for Exp. values predicting intention to stay.

3.2.1. Expertise Values

The regression equation of expertise values with CSE as moderator predicting satisfaction was significant, but not the slopes and curvatures.

In survey T2, the moderated regression for Exp. values predicting satisfaction improved R² from 0.2 to 0.34, with similar improvements for the other outcome variables. Calculation of surfaces resulted in significant misfit slopes of the regression of intention to stay and a significant fit slope of commitment at low CSE level.




Figure 4a. Intention to stay as predicted by lawyers' expertise values (EL) and perceived expertise values of the firm (EF) at a high (mean + one SD) level of CSE, survey T2




Figure 4b. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' expertise values and perceived expertise values of the firm at a low (mean - one SD) level of CSE, survey T2

The graph of the regression of intention to stay on expertise value fit at a high level of CSE shows a slightly steeper rise to the right, high EL side, than the unmoderated regression. The overall level of intention to stay is higher. The low level CSE regression is more similar to the unmoderated.

The slope of the fit line of the regression of commitment at a low level of CSE indicates a gradually rising commitment towards the higher value level. The graph is not saddle shaped, the slope and curvature of the misfit line are non significant.

3.2.2. Management Values

Slope analyses resulted in a significant curvature of the $ML = MF$ line of satisfaction and a significant slope of the $ML = -MF$ line of commitment; both at the high CSE level. The moderated regressions at low level CSE proved non significant. I show the graph of the moderated regression of satisfaction; the commitment graph has the same shape, at a slightly higher level.




Figure 4c. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' management values and perceived management values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of CSE

Contrary to the unmoderated equation, where the $ML = MF$ curvature was not significant, the moderated curvature 4c shows a shallow inverted u-shape with a steeper decrease where ML and MF are high. This effect is contrary to all other effects of fitting Mgmt (or other) values. The combined linear coefficient of ML and $CSE * ML$ is -0.16 , while the combined MF coefficient is 0 . This indicates that personal values of lawyers with high CSE are responsible for the drop in satisfaction and commitment at both extremes of the fit line. The graph shows a decrease when firm values are higher or lower than average when CSE is high; an optimum is reached at a medium level of firm values and a low level of lawyer values. The coefficients of the commitment regression show the same pattern for the fit line, although non significant.

In survey T2, the moderated regression on Mgmt value fit explained a considerable amount of variance of satisfaction ($R^2 = 0.322$, $p = 0.04$), but not of commitment and intention to stay.




Figure 4d. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' management values and perceived management values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of CSE, survey T2

The moderated curvatures of the regression of satisfaction on Mgmt value fit are significant at high and low CSE level. Contrary to survey T1, the surfaces have the expected inverted u-shape. At high level CSE the effects are more pronounced than at low level. Both regressions also produced a significant slope of the misfit lines, indicating a steady decline of satisfaction when ML are higher and MF lower. At high level CSE, the fit line has a U-shape; satisfaction appeared higher at high or low levels of fitting values. At low level CSE, the fit line is straight and nearly horizontal.

3.2.3. Short term reward values

Figures 4e and 4f compare the moderated regression of satisfaction at high level and low level of CSE. Slopes and curvatures of the line of misfit $SL = -SF$ are significant for both moderated regression equations.




Figure 4e. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' short term reward values and perceived values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of CSE




Figure 4f. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' short term reward values and perceived values of the firm at a low (mean - one SD) level of CSE

The misfit lines show a sharp decrease of satisfaction to the right side of the line of fit, where Short firm are low and Short lawyers are high. On the left hand side, the high level CSE graph has a different pattern from the unmoderated and low CSE level graphs. When Short values of the firm are high, satisfaction is high, at every level of lawyers' Short values. Lawyers with high CSE appear to appreciate high short term reward values more than lawyers with lower CSE. The graphs show the expected fit and misfit patterns. The differences on the extremes of the lines of misfit in both surface patterns are very small.

In survey T2, contrary to the unmoderated regression, the moderated regression of satisfaction had relevant explanatory power ($R^2 = 0.34$, $p = 0.03$).




Figure 4g. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' short term reward values and perceived values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of CSE, survey T2

The curvature of the line of misfit $SL = -SF$ is significant for the moderated regression equation at a high CSE level, but not significant for low CSE level. The misfit lines show the inverted U with a sharper decrease of satisfaction to the right side of the line of fit, where VF is low and VL are high. The fit line – although non significant – indicates an increase of satisfaction as Short lawyer value levels are lower in combination with moderate firm values. The surface pattern is similar to the CSE moderated Mgmt value fit regression of satisfaction at high level CSE in survey T1, but more pronounced.

3.2.4. Long term perspective values

Slopes and curvatures were significant for the lines of misfit of the moderated regressions of satisfaction, at high and low level of CSE. Of the regressions of commitment, the slope of the line of fit $LL = LF$ was significant as well. I exhibit the graphs of the moderated regressions of satisfaction in Figures 4h and 4i; the shape of the commitment graphs is similar, a little less pronounced at the extremes.




Figure 4h. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of CSE




Figure 4i. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived values of the firm at a low (mean - one SD) level of CSE

The extremes of the line of misfit are clearly more pronounced when CSE is high, indicating that satisfaction drops more steeply when lawyers' Long values are high and Long firm values low. Satisfaction and commitment increase slightly as the level of fitting values is higher.

In survey T2 the moderated regressions for long term perspective values did add substantially to the explanation of the variance of satisfaction and commitment. Of the regressions of commitment on Long value fit, slopes of the lines of misfit were significant. As for satisfaction, the misfit slope and the fit and misfit curvatures proved significant.




Figure 4j. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of CSE, survey T2




Figure 4k. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived values of the firm at a low (mean - one SD) level of CSE, survey T2

The graph of the regression of satisfaction has an unexpected shape. The misfit line shows the inverted U shape with a much steeper decline at the right, high LL/low LF side, but the line of fit has a similar shape, with a summit near the high value end, but a decline between this summit and the high extreme level of fitting values. Towards the low value end, satisfaction declines steeply. At low level CSE, the shape is similar but much less pronounced. Among the regression results, the coefficients of firm values appeared dominant, so Long firm values have more impact than lawyer values. However, there appears a limit to the satisfying effect of firm values and value fit; at the extreme, value increase has a negative effect on satisfaction.

With regard to commitment, the slope of the line of misfit is significant, indicating a steady decline as firm values decrease and lawyers' values rise. The graphs resemble closely the unmoderated regression, the high level CSE graph slightly more pronounced.

3.2.5. Summary, moderating effect of Core self-evaluations; hypothesis 3.

Core self-evaluations have a moderating influence on the relation between value fit and misfit and satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay; positive effects of fit and negative effects of misfits appeared more extreme at a high level of CSE than at low level CSE or in the unmoderated regression. In survey T2, intention to stay increased with Exp. lawyers' values at a high level of CSE, contrary to the effects of Mgmt and Short

values. After moderating for CSE, commitment showed an increase as fitting Exp. values levels were higher. In survey T1 the personal management values appeared to predict satisfaction and commitment of lawyers with high CSE more than value fit; lower expectations mean higher outcomes. The moderated regression produced a rotated pattern of satisfaction, with a summit at the MF = 0 axis; apparently, lawyers with high CSE level preferred a moderate level of Mgmt firm values. Survey T2 produced a more pronounced but regular saddle shaped pattern. Lawyers with high CSE appeared to appreciate the short term rewards of their firm better. In survey T2, a similar rotation appeared as in the moderated regression of Mgmt values in survey T1, but with steeper declines at both sides of the SF = 0 axis; apparently, lawyers with high CSE level preferred a moderate level of Short firm values. For short and long term perspective values, the expected stronger differentiation at high level CSE can be observed. This is expressed by the steeper inverted u-shape of the lines of misfit. The stronger effects of misfit are visible at the right hand (high VL/low VF) side. In survey T2, the pattern of the moderated regression for Long values predicting satisfaction, demonstrated an unexpected inverted U-shape of the fit line. The differences between the high CSE and low CSE levels were as expected.

The effects of CSE as moderator of the relation between value fit and the outcomes are confirmed for some outcomes of the fit of Exp, Mgmt, Short and Long values. In survey T2, the moderated regression produced stronger explanatory potential and more significant results than the unmoderated, especially for the Short and Long values. Apparently, the fit effects of these values strongly interact with the lawyers' CSE.

3.3. Application Success (AS) as moderator, hypothesis 4.

I analyzed the moderation effect of both measures (AS1, number of job interviews : number of applications, and AS2, number of job offers : number of job interviews) following the same methods as used for CSE moderation. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the R²'s and p's of the outcomes of the regression of the personal and firm values on satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay, as moderated by AS1 and AS2.

Table 4.3
Survey T1 Effects of the fit between personal values and
perceived firm's values moderated by Application Success 1

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R ²	p.	R ²	p.	R ²	p.
Expertise	0.221	0.10	0.257	0.04	0.270	0.03
Management	0.488	0.00	0.425	0.00	0.205	0.17
Short term reward	0.261	0.04	0.233	0.09	0.273	0.03
Long term perspective	0.352	0.00	0.423	0.00	0.179	0.25

Effects of the fit between personal values and
perceived firm's values moderated by Application Success 2

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R ²	p.	R ²	p.	R ²	p.
Expertise	0.212	0.08	0.199	0.11	0.281	0.01
Management	0.334	0.00	0.300	0.01	0.120	0.58
Short term reward	0.276	0.01	0.167	0.25	0.274	0.01
Long term perspective	0.411	0.00	0.441	0.00	0.296	0.01

The significant results after moderation by AS showed a substantial increase in explanatory power in comparison to the unmoderated regressions. After moderation by AS1, substantial and significant R²'s were found for satisfaction and commitment on Mgmt and Long value fit and for satisfaction and intention to stay on Short values fit. After moderating for AS2, significant R²'s were found for satisfaction and commitment on Mgmt value fit, for satisfaction and intention to stay on Short value fit and for satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay on Long value fit. The slopes and curvatures of the regression equation with significant outcomes were calculated and are exhibited in Tables A and B of Appendix V.

There were no significant results in survey T2 for the moderation by neither AS1 nor AS2. Calculation of slopes and curvatures of the regression equations rendered some significant outcomes for Exp. values, but the plotting did not result in explainable patterns.

3.3.1. Application Success 1 (job interviews/applications ratio) as moderator

3.3.1.1. Expertise values.

The results of the regression of satisfaction, commitment nor intention did produce sufficient explanatory potential. In survey T2, the slopes of the lines of fit and misfit were significant as well as the curvature of the misfit line. However, the surface, shown in Figure 4l, does not exhibit a meaningful pattern. It might indicate that for lawyers with high AS1 levels, commitment is related to firm values, not to personal values; the pattern indicates that satisfaction and commitment decrease as firm values are lower.




Figure 4l. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' expertise values and perceived expertise values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS1, survey T2

3.3.1.2. Management values

Slope analyses resulted in significant curvatures of the ML = MF line as well as the ML = - MF line of satisfaction, when AS1 is high. For commitment only the slope of the line of misfit is significant, at high AS1 level.




Figure 4m. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' management values and perceived management values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS1




Figure 4n. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' management values and perceived management values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS1

The graph of the moderated regression analysis of satisfaction has a much more pronounced shape than the unmoderated. The curvature of the line of fit is mostly a shallow u-shape, rising slightly at the high value end, but steeply when low lawyers values fit low firm values. The regression coefficient of the combined interaction factor VL*VF was 0,999 is exceptionally high, supporting the strong fit effects in the graph.

In the graph of the regression of commitment, the significant slope of the line of misfit shows a decline towards the low Mgmt firm, high Mgmt lawyer side, a more pronounced drop than the unmoderated regression. Lawyers with high management values and high AS1 reacted more strongly to low Mgmt values of the firm. When firm values were high, they dominate the effect on the commitment of these lawyers; misfit had only a small negative effect on their commitment, as the upper left of Figure 4n shows.

3.3.1.3. Short term reward values

Of the calculated slopes and curvatures only the slope of the line of misfit of the regression of satisfaction proved significant.




Figure 4o. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' short term reward values and perceived values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS1

In comparison with the unmoderated regression, in the moderated regression the line of misfit does not have a significant curvature but a linear slope, rising to the left side where Short firm values were high and Short lawyers low. For lawyers with high AS1, satisfaction was high when lawyer values are low, almost regardless of firm values. The surface pattern indicates that satisfaction was higher as the level of fitting values was lower.

3.3.1.4. Long term perspective values

For satisfaction, the slopes of the line of misfit were significant, for commitment both the slopes and curvatures of the misfit line. The differences between the high level and low level AS1 graphs of satisfaction and commitment are hardly visible; I show the high level graphs.




Figure 4p. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS1




Figure 4q. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS1

The fit lines differ from the unmoderated, but these lines do not have significant slopes or curvatures. Contrary to the unmoderated regression, the moderated regressions on satisfaction and commitment have a significant slope of the misfit line, not a significant curvature. This indicates that after moderation for AS1 firm values had a dominant effect, more than lawyer values; high firm values were related to high outcome levels, almost regardless of personal values. When firm values were low, misfit had a stronger negative effect. The surface pattern of commitment at high level AS1 resembles closely the pattern of commitment at low level CSE.

3.3.1.5. Summary, moderating effect of AS1

Results support a moderating effect of AS1 but this effect appeared modest. Some effects are visible in the curvatures or slopes of the misfit lines, expressed by a steeper decline of the outcome variable at the right hand side of the graphs, where personal values are high and firms' values low. For Mgmt, the effects of fit on satisfaction appeared to be dominant for high AS1 lawyers. High Mgmt, Short and Long values of the firm were related to high commitment levels at high AS1. When the level of firm Mgmt and Short values was low, lawyers' personal values contributed most strongly to the moderated effect on the outcomes, while for Long, the contribution of firm values is the strongest, both on high as well as low levels of AS1. I will first discuss the results of the regressions with AS2 as moderator and then continue with evaluating human capital as a moderating factor.

3.3.2. Application Success 2 as moderator (job offers /interview ratio)

3.3.2.1. Expertise values

The results of the regression of satisfaction, commitment nor intention had sufficient explanatory power.

3.3.2.2. Management values

Slope analyses produced significant curvatures of the lines of misfit of the regressions of satisfaction and commitment, but only at a high level of AS1. I show the moderated regression of satisfaction, the commitment regression has a similar but less pronounced shape.




Figure 4r. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' management values and management values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS2

In comparison to the unmoderated regression results, the curvature of the misfit lines is similar, slightly more pronounced at both sides. The surfaces suggest rising levels of satisfaction and commitment as the level of fitting values decreases.

3.3.2.3. Short term reward values

Calculation of slopes and curvatures resulted in significant slopes and curvatures of the line of misfit $SL = -SF$, both for high and low levels of AS2, both of satisfaction and intention to stay. Exhibited are the high AS2 level graphs; the low level graphs have similar, slightly less pronounced shapes. The unmoderated regression had a middle position.




Figure 4s. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' short term reward values and perceived short term reward values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS2




Figure 4t. Intention to stay as predicted by lawyers' short term reward values and perceived short term reward values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS2

The significant slope of the misfit line indicates a steady decline of satisfaction towards the right side, where Short lawyers are high and Short firm low. When firm values were high, these values produced a high outcome level, contrary to the pattern without moderator, where satisfaction decreased at higher levels of fitting values.

The graph of intention to stay supports the same main and moderating effects as on satisfaction. Here, the line from the lower right to the upper left side is even straighter. The graph shape suggests that when lawyer values are above or below mean level, intention to stay decreases almost regardless of the level of firm values, especially when lawyers have a high AS2.

3.3.2.4. Long term perspective values

Calculations resulted in significant slopes and curvatures of the line of misfit $LL = -LF$ of satisfaction, both for high and low levels of AS2. For commitment, at a high level of AS2, slopes of the lines of fit and misfit were significant as well as the curvature of the misfit line. At a low level of AS2, fit curvature and misfit slope were significant. As for intention to stay, the slopes of both lines of fit and misfit were significant at high and low levels of AS2.

Figure 4u exhibits the surface pattern of the high level AS2 moderated regression of satisfaction. The low level AS2 regression has the same surface pattern but less pronounced especially at the lower right side. The regression of commitment at a high AS2 level is similar to the low level AS2 on satisfaction. I show the graph of the moderated commitment regression at low AS2 level, which has a deviant shape. Figure 4w shows the surface of the regression of intention to stay at a high level AS2. At low level AS2, the surface shape is similar but less pronounced.




Figure 4u. Satisfaction as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived long term perspective values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS2




Figure 4v. Commitment as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived long term perspective values of the firm at a low (mean - one SD) level of AS2




Figure 4w. Intention to stay as predicted by lawyers' long term perspective values and perceived long term perspective values of the firm at a high (mean + one SD) level of AS2

The surface patterns of the regression of satisfaction support the expected moderation effect expressed by more pronounced slopes and curvatures of the line of misfit at high level AS2 than on low level, but also a higher position of the lines of fit. The difference especially regards the negative effect on satisfaction of the high lawyers values/low firm values misfit.

Likewise, the regression of commitment at high level AS2 shows the expected, slightly more pronounced shape. At low level AS2, however, commitment appears to increase when LF are higher or lower than mean level. The significant curvature of the fit line has a U shape. The negative effect on the high lawyer value/low firm value side is clear also and less

strong than at high level AS2.

The slopes of the regression graph of intention to stay are significant, indicating linear slopes of the lines of fit and misfit, the fit line rising to the high value side and the misfit line towards the high firm value side. The surface pattern suggests that lawyers with average long term ambitions had the strongest intentions to stay, similar to the effects of Short values on intention to stay but a different pattern than found for the satisfaction and commitment regressions.

3.3.3. Summary, moderating effect of human capital, hypothesis 4.

Most AS2 moderated regression equations showed the expected more pronounced effects at high level AS2. Especially the misfit of high lawyers' and low firm values resulted in a steeper decline of satisfaction and commitment after moderation. Of the application success measures, AS2 produced more and better understandable results. It can be argued that the AS2 measure includes both résumé quality and job application performance and is probably a more complete measure than AS1 that expresses résumé quality alone. The results supported hypothesis 4. On long term perspective values, both AS moderators showed similar effects. Fitting management and short term reward values were related to high level outcomes, but especially at the lower value level. As for long term perspective values, high level value fit was related to high level outcomes. Only at low AS2 level, outcomes were also higher at low level value fit.

The moderated graphs indicate that lawyers with high AS that were indifferent (0) towards short and long term perspectives had the strongest intention to stay. Lawyers with higher and lower values expected to leave their firms sooner. Higher Long firm values were related to higher intention to stay; in survey T2, a higher level of Exp. values fit also was related to higher outcome levels, while higher or lower Short firm values did not make much difference. These effects are visible for high as well as low level AS2, but the impact of changes in values was stronger at high level AS2.

The effects on satisfaction and on commitment followed similar patterns, satisfaction effects being somewhat more differentiated than commitment.

4. Discussion

4.1. Expertise values

The only significant results after moderation by CSE were produced by survey T2 for intention to stay after moderation by CSE, at a high level CSE, and for commitment at a low CSE level. These results were similar

to the unmoderated regression patterns, showing a steady increase of the outcomes as lawyers' values were higher. The level of intention to stay at the extreme of lawyers' values was slightly higher in the moderated regression than the unmoderated, but the difference was small. The moderated regression predicting commitment confirmed the rising slope of the fit line as fitting values increased. Moderation by AS1 produced significant, but hardly useful results in survey T2.

4.2. Management values

Survey T1 indicated that high CSE-lawyers were most satisfied and committed when firm management values were moderate, but this was not reproduced by survey T2, that showed the expected saddle shape with more extreme downward wings as well as upward turns at both ends of the fit line. The moderation for AS1 also showed this pattern: at high level AS1, satisfaction rises towards both ends of the fit line, extremely so when values are low. This may be attributed to the effect of low lawyers' values. Apparently, lawyers with high application success and low management values are very appreciative of firms with loose management standards. The personal management values of lawyers with high AS have a stronger effect on commitment than value fit. The moderation for AS1 and AS2 in general shows the main effects of value fit.

4.3. Short term reward values

Lawyers with high CSE appeared more satisfied in high short term rewarding firms in survey T1; in survey T2, high CSE lawyers appeared most satisfied when firm values were moderate; satisfaction dropped with higher or lower firm values. Possibly this is related to an increased experience with firm practices in comparison to survey T1. When firm values are low, the satisfaction of lawyers with high AS1 is mainly related to their own Short values (higher personal values is lower satisfaction). When firm values are high, personal values only have a modest effect on the outcomes. AS2 moderation shows the same effects on satisfaction as the unmoderated regression, but with more extreme effects of fit and misfit, similar to the CSE moderation. Intention to stay however decreased when lawyers' values are below or above average, when moderated for AS2; for high AS2 lawyers, firm values are almost indifferent. Possibly, when they perceive firm values as low they find too little acknowledgement for their efforts, but when they perceive firm values are high they may find the wrong efforts rewarded. These results emphasize the need to consider the design of and possible effects of variable pay systems carefully.

4.4. Long term perspective values

Moderated by CSE, the effects on satisfaction of the misfit of low lawyer and high firm values are more extreme than in the unmoderated regression, at a high level of CSE. Survey T2 produced an unexpected double inverted U for the curvatures of fit as well as misfit, at high level CSE. This pattern indicated that firm values determine the satisfaction of high CSE lawyers, higher values resulting in higher outcomes but only up to a certain, moderately high level. AS1 as moderator does not result in a clear differentiation, but the lines of misfit approach a straight line, declining as firm values are lower. At a high level of firm values, outcomes are high, personal values only having a modest effect, similar to the moderated Short value pattern. AS2 as a moderator results in the expected differences between moderator levels. As in the moderated and high level AS2 regressions, commitment of low AS2 lawyers rises as fitting value levels rise, but contrary to the other regressions it also rises as fitting value levels decrease. Intention to stay is strongest when lawyers' values are about average; lawyers with high application success are more attracted to firms with high long term perspective values.

4.5. Core self-evaluations and application success

Core self-evaluations were significantly correlated with satisfaction and commitment, in both surveys, and negatively to female gender in survey T2. Young female lawyers appeared to have lower self-evaluations; this finding is also congruent with results of other studies (De Haas et al., 2002). The only significant correlation with application success is found for lawyers' long term perspective values in survey T1. Lawyers with the best résumés also have the strongest long term ambitions.

Moderation of the fit and misfit effects by core self-evaluations showed the expected more extreme effects at high level CSE. These effects are in accordance with other research results (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Also, it appeared that for lawyers with high CSE, the effects of either their personal values (Expertise, Short values in survey T1) or the perceived firm values (Mgmt in survey T1, Long in survey T2) dominate the fit effects. Possibly, lawyers with high self-efficacy and self-esteem are more outspoken in their reaction to the aspect of value fit that is most transparent to them.

The measures AS1 and AS2 had different effects. The effects of moderation by AS1 are mainly as expected but not very conclusive, except for the sharper misfit effect at the low VF/high VL right side, where lawyers' personal values appeared to dominate the effect, while at the high firm value side personal values had only modest effects. AS2 moderation produced

more significant and expected results. As with CSE, some outcomes showed a dominant effect of either personal or firm values. Moderated Short and Long value fit effects indicated that both low and high personal values are related to weaker intentions to stay. When Long firm values are higher, intention to stay grows at all levels of AS2, but stronger at high level AS2; this is congruent with the observed effects after moderation by AS1 when firm values are high. When Long firm values are low, these low firm values appeared to dominate the fit effect, while high personal values had the greater impact in Short value fit.

4.6. Limitations

The limitations that followed the response of the surveys were discussed in Chapter 3; the impossibility to analyze longitudinal effects also impedes the detection of chronological or causal relations between fit, value levels, CSE and human capital. Presumably, CSE and human capital are existing conditions that influence fit and fit effect, but it is also conceivable that perceived fit influences the self-confidence of young lawyers.

The measurement of application success that I developed and used for this study can be open to debate. The AS measures produces some significant and relevant results, but further testing of these measures is desirable. AS1 appeared less useful; the measure may express other factors besides human capital, such as the insight of the lawyer in labor market conditions. Also, the usefulness of the AS measures appeared to decrease during the first years of employment; possibly due to the fading recollection of their application experiences.

In this study, I only tested two of many possible factors that might influence fit and fit effects. CSE and human capital both are attributes of the lawyers. The relevant attributes of the law firm are comprised in the archetypical character that is the focus of this study. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to study the influence of specific firm attributes on fit and fit effects, such as size, national or international position. Of the lawyers' attributes, I chose CSE and human capital as the most comprehensive and promising factors, but both are aggregate constructs and may hide the effects of specific aspects such as personality factors, mental ability, education or upbringing.

*Changes over time,
qualitative analysis,
interviews*

1. *Introduction*

In Chapter 3, I discussed the development of values and value fit of young lawyers in the first years of their employment. By using two consecutive surveys, I hoped to be able to analyze the time-sequential and causal relations between fit, values and attitudes. I also wanted to investigate whether objective and perceived measures of fit converged and the respondents developed other, perhaps more realistic needs and perceptions of their firms.

The sample of 67 respondents to survey T2 was relatively small but large enough for the intended analysis in Chapter 4. However, only 38 lawyers responded to both surveys. This number was too small to conduct solid statistical, longitudinal analyses, especially polynomial analyses with a large number of variables. To compensate this deficiency, I inspected the individual answers of the 38 respondents and the changes in their answers over time. Section 2 of this Chapter describes the results of this inspection. Furthermore, to support the interpretation of the survey results and the changes over time, the experiences and views of the lawyers themselves could prove helpful. I interviewed 11 young lawyers from the respondent group and used their stories to explain, refine and illustrate the results of the surveys. I report the findings in Section 3 of this chapter.

As discussed in Chapter 3, longitudinal studies have followed P-O fit and socialization during several years after entry and found a continuing change of fit and attitudes such as satisfaction, intention to leave or career ambitions (Cooman et al., 2009; Sturges et al., 2002). Changes in fit through the adjustment of values and of perceptions predict changes of the outcomes of fit, of satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay (Chatman, 1991).

Young lawyers will gradually gain insight in the real character of their work environment and their firm. As their first year of employment is dedicated to intensive training, their involvement in the legal practice of the firm is only partial. Performance appraisals probably become more serious after the first year. In many law firms, trainees are obliged to switch to another practice area after one and a half year. This switch is an event of major concern for many trainees. So the trainee's understanding and perceptions of the firm will probably continue developing in the second year of employment. Further, as the end of the trainee period, the first important stage in the lawyers' career, is coming closer, they will probably develop their ideas about the desirability of a career within their firm. Their own values and goals may still change dependent on their experiences.

Following the discussion of the literature and the results of both surveys separately described in Chapter 3 and 4, I expected that the changes between survey T1 and survey T2 would indicate a relationship of stable or improved fit with higher outcome levels and vice versa (Chambers, Foulon, Handfield-Jones, Hanking, & Michaels III, 1998; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Schneider et al., 1995). In general, the level of satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay is presumed to decrease, as discussed by Cooper-Thomas et al. (2005). ASA theory would suggest an improvement of fit and attitudes, due to the turnover (attrition) of non fitting employees. However, during the lawyers' traineeship period, attrition is postponed. The non fitting lawyers gradually discover the discrepancy between their values and ambitions and those of their firms, leading to a deterioration of their attitudes. Also, as Bretz and Judge (1994) proposed, positive fit and negative misfit effects are expected to become more pronounced.

Further I expected that a lower perception of firm values might be related to lower outcomes (Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004; Ployhart, Weekley, & Baughman, 2006). Growing insights in the nature of law practice and the level of their expertise abilities in the first year of employment might lead to changes in the expertise values of some lawyers. The surveys demonstrated a strong relation between satisfaction and lawyers expertise values. I presumed that changes in lawyers' expertise values would be related to corresponding changes in their satisfaction and commitment. The effects of changes in short term reward value fit probably are ambiguous, as indicated by the literature and by the results of the surveys regarding the effect of short term rewards on attitudes (Trevor, Hausknecht, & Howard, 2007). Changes in lawyers long term perspective values might be linked to changes in their intention to stay (Moynihan et al., 2007). Finally, the outcomes of

objective and subjective fit measures are supposed to converge as time passes. Changes in the perception of the firm's values therefore would lead to more congruency between the values as perceived by the lawyers and the archetypal character of the firm as established by the interview scores objective and subjective fit (Cooper-Thomas et al., 2004).

2. *Method and analysis.*

I selected the data of the 38 lawyers who responded to both surveys and grouped them for each firm. The purpose was to discover patterns in the changes of their responses: their personal values, their perception of firm values, their core self evaluations, satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay.

I inspected first the development of perceived P-O value fit in each respondent's case. When the difference between the scores of personal values and perceived firm values was lower in survey T2 than in survey T1, I noted this as an indication of increasing value fit; when the difference was higher, as an indication of diminished fit. Then I determined the relations between the changes in fit and the changes of the outcome variables. I disregarded small differences (changes of 0.33 or lower). Further, I inspected whether a change of each of the Exp, Mgmt and Short lawyers' and firm value scores was matched by a change of the outcome variables satisfaction and commitment, and whether changes of expertise and Long value scores was matched by a change of intention to stay.

I also analyzed the changes in congruency between the perceived firm values and the archetype scores of the firm. Higher expertise and long term perspective values I noted as indication of growing congruence with the professional partnership, while increasing Management and Short values indicated growing fit with the managed professional business. Finally, I studied possible similarities in the response of lawyers of the same firm.

2.1. *Results.*

The results are summarized in Table 1. The table compares the respondents' cases where the changes of fit or values and the changes of the outcomes have the same direction – that is, both increase or decrease) with the cases with changes in opposite directions (e.g. an increasing value level and a decreasing level of the outcomes). For example, in 17 cases the changes of P-O fit and attitudes had the same upward direction, while in 5 cases an increased fit was found together with decreased outcomes.

Appendix VI shows the responses of the 38 lawyers, grouped per

Table 1
Number of respondents' cases with changes in the scores of fit, values and outcomes

	Same direction		Opposite direction	
P-O FIT AND OUTCOMES				
Stable or increased fit	18		5	
Decreased fit	7		0	
VALUES AND OUTCOMES *		up	down**	
All firm values - outcomes	8	2	6	5
Exp. lawyers values - satisfaction and commitment	7	3	4	5
Exp. firm values - satisfaction and commitment	9	4	5	4
Exp. firm values – intention to stay	7	4	3	4
Long lawyer values - intention to stay	5	3	2	5
Long firm values - intention to stay	7	2	5	2
Mgmt lawyers - satisfaction and commitment	5	1	4	3
Mgmt firm values - satisfaction and commitment	5	1	4	3
Short lawyers values - satisfaction and commitment	0	0	0	1
Short firm values and satisfaction and commitment	4	2	2	5

* only the cases with changes in value and outcome level are represented in the table

**number of upward and downward changes in the same direction

firm (numbered 1-19) with a summary of the changes and most striking aspects in their responses. The level of the outcome variables satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay decreased in 18 of the 38 cases. In 7 cases, the outcome levels rose and in 13 cases they remained more or less stable. These numbers reflect the decrease of satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay in survey T2, as presumed.

Value fit and outcomes. In 7 cases, I found a decrease of the outcome variables together with a decrease in fit, which I marked as 'pattern A' in Appendix VI. In 17 cases, a stable or somewhat increased fit was joined by stable or increased outcomes (indicated as 'pattern B'). There appeared a large minority of 45% demonstrating this pattern. Together, the (mis)fit effects of patterns A and B characterized 25 of the 38 cases. Some lawyers reported a decreasing satisfaction, commitment and/or intention to stay that combined with a stable or slightly increased fit ('pattern C', 5 cases). In some cases I noted the opposite pattern, diminishing fit and increased outcomes,

for some of the values and/or outcomes (pattern D). Eight respondent cases could not be attributed to one of these patterns but had mixed elements of two patterns, due to differences between the value elements or different directions of change of the outcomes.

Perceived firm values and outcomes. As shown in Table 1, positively corresponding changes of perceived values and outcome levels outnumbered the changes in opposite directions, for all values together as well as the separate value scales, except for Short firm values. For all values together, most cases with corresponding outcome changes were downward (6 out of 8). Mostly, the differences between the numbers of corresponding and opposite changes were small; only the interaction of expertise firm values and satisfaction and of Long firm values and intention to stay showed a relatively large majority of positively corresponding changes. This is in line with the results of survey T2: satisfaction levels corresponded clearly to the perceived expertise values of the firm. Downward and upward changes of lawyers' expertise values and outcomes were almost equal in number. A change of perceived long term perspective values of the firm corresponded in 7 cases with a change of intention to stay. In five of these cases, the changes were downwards, the two other upwards. When lawyers perceived the long term perspective in their firm as lower, a simultaneous adjustment of their intention to stay could be observed. In five cases with downward adjustments of the perceived Long value level, three were related also to lower satisfaction and commitment; in the two other cases, these outcomes were stable. Almost all changes of lawyers' and firm management values with corresponding outcome changes were in downward direction. For Short firm values, there were five changes in opposite direction to four in the same direction. The difference and absolute numbers are small, but they support the ambiguous relationship between Short values, satisfaction and commitment that was found in the survey.

Lawyers' expertise values and satisfaction; long term perspective values and intention to stay. The difference between positive and negative relations is small (Exp.) or non-existent (Long); so this part of the analysis does not permit any conclusions.

Congruency of perceived and actual firm values. The development of the congruency of the perceived and actual values proved more or less neutral: there were almost as many cases of increasing as decreasing congruency. In this sample no support for an increasing congruency could be found.

Firm patterns. I studied the firms with more than one responding lawyer to discover common patterns. With some PP-like firms, long term

perspective values and fit were at a relatively low level, corresponding with decreasing outcomes (1, 6, 9). Apparently, lawyers did not perceive the long term perspectives at these firms as they had expected upon entrance. A stable fit of the expertise, management and Short values corresponded with stable or increasing satisfaction and commitment in firms 2, 5, 12, 14 and 17; with some firms, higher level Long value fit was linked to increasing intention to stay (12, 14). In firm 13, decreased firm values and fit corresponded with lower outcomes. Other firms (8, 11) did not exhibit a recognizable common pattern.

2.2. Discussion

The 38 cases of the respondents to both surveys indicated a corresponding change pattern of fit and attitudes and a predominantly negative direction of changes in perceived values, satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. In 50% of the individual cases, the outcome variables decreased. This confirms the presumption of diminishing outcomes that was deduced from the postponed attrition effect. During traineeship, fit and attitudes decrease as some lawyers discover the lack of fit with their firm but do not yet leave the firm. An alternative explanation could be that mainly dissatisfied lawyers responded to both surveys, but there are no results from the surveys and interviews nor from other research that support this explanation.

The case patterns showed a variety of mechanisms behind the decline of the outcomes. Nevertheless, in a large majority of 25 cases, stable to increasing outcomes could be related to stable or increasing value fit or decreasing outcomes to a decrease of fit (patterns A and B). Although the sample size did not allow determining causality, this observation supported the presumed relation between changes of value fit and changes of the outcomes. The case analysis supported the findings that the management values of the firm are primarily a source of dissatisfaction and that an increase of Short firm values might have ambiguous, and sometimes negative effects on satisfaction and commitment.

Changes of intention to stay could be linked to changes of perceived long term firm values. Changes of intention to stay may have a different direction than the changes of satisfaction or commitment. In some firms, a decreasing level of perceived Long values is incongruent with their archetypical character. The analysis of the cases supports the assumption that these firms are not very successful in communicating their long term career policies clearly nor in reducing the uncertainty of their young lawyers.

3. *Looking for explanations: young lawyers speaking*

3.1. *Introduction*

The analyses of the survey data permitted a comparison between lawyers in their first and second years of employment. Although patterns could be discerned, these analyses were less suited to explain the precise mechanisms of P-O fit effects and changes. Qualitative methods offer a helpful addition (Miles et al., 1994; Yin, 2003). To enlarge the explanatory potential of the data, I used interviews with lawyers from the target population.

The purpose of the interviews was to discover explanations for the survey outcomes and to explore the nature of the changes in values and goals that were investigated in the surveys as well as the lawyers' attitudes regarding firm values. How did the lawyers interpret the sets of values that I extracted from the archetype elements? The surveys indicated a slight decrease in expertise ambitions as well as an increasing differentiation of these ambitions between lawyers in the second year of employment. Fit effects of expertise values on intention to stay appeared significant in survey T1 and effects on satisfaction and commitment in survey T2, while the outcomes increased as the fitting value level was higher. Did the lawyers perceive a change of expertise ambitions and how did their perception of the values of their firms develop? Could they link their expertise values to the level of self-esteem, as indicated by the survey results?

The effects of management value fit did not change considerably from survey T1 to survey T2. Significant effects were mainly observed for the misfit of these values. How did the lawyers in their first years of employment experience the management values of their firms? Presumably, young lawyers do not yet have the experience or the insight to evaluate profoundly the management practices of their firms. What aspects of management were relevant for their satisfaction and commitment?

The surveys indicated a delicate balance between short term reward values, value fit and satisfaction and commitment. In survey T1, the highest level of these outcomes was reached at a low or moderate level of fitting values. When moderated by CSE, the outcome level rose at the high and low levels of fitting values for lawyers with high CSE; high fitting value levels were not related to high outcomes for low CSE lawyers. In survey T2, after moderating by CSE, the pattern was quite different: the highest outcome levels appeared at moderate firm value levels. High personal values remained associated with low outcome levels. Self-confident lawyers did not

appear to appreciate low nor high levels of firm values. The interviews might clarify these different findings.

Long term perspective value fit lost some of its explanatory potential in survey T2. Nevertheless, the analysis of the cases of the lawyers who responded to both surveys indicated that firm values affected intention to stay, almost regardless of the level of personal values, especially for lawyers with a high level of CSE. The changes in long term ambitions of the lawyers and the influence of firm values on intention to stay might be explained by the interviewed lawyers.

At last, the correlations between perceived firm values and the actual archetypical character of the firms were found in both surveys, somewhat stronger in the second, for expertise and short term reward values. Did the lawyers recognize the presumed archetypical character of their firms?

3.2. Method

For the interview sample, I aimed at equal shares of lawyers from PP and MPB-like firms. Another purpose was to interview three lawyers from a single PP-like firm and three lawyers from a MPB-like firm. This might have the disadvantage of limiting the number of firms, but the advantage of offering insights in different firm patterns at opposite positions in the PP-MPB range. Further, I approached new interviewees until the last interview provided no more additional information and insights. After informing the law firms involved and obtaining their approval, I approached the lawyers from the target population of 305 lawyers for an interview. Fifteen lawyers responded positively. After 11 interviews, the sample met my purposes; I also observed that the patterns in the answers had become repetitive and the last interview did not add to the information gained by the previous. Therefore I discontinued after 11 interviews.

The lawyers that I interviewed were employed by 6 of the 19 law firms; firms 1, 6, 12, 13, 14 and 17. From firms 1 and 17, I interviewed 3 lawyers each. From firm 14, I interviewed two lawyers. The interviews took place from September 2010 to February 2011. At the time of the interview, the lawyers were employed between 16 and 32 months (on average 24 months). All lawyers within the population had been employed between May 2008 and February 2009. Six interviewed lawyers were female, five male.

I chose a semi-structured interview form, asking the lawyers for their considerations while choosing a firm, their expectations upon entry, general experiences in the first year and later on, and then focusing on the development of their expertise ambitions, their attitudes and experiences regarding management and short term rewards in the firm and on their long

term ambitions and perspective with the firm.

After each interview I made a summary report that I sent to the interviewed for feedback. All interviewed lawyers agreed with the report, sometimes after some minor adjustments.

3.3. Results

The outcomes of the interviews are presented in order of the explanations they provide for the results of the surveys and the change analysis, for each of the four analyzed value sets.

3.3.1. Objective fit

Several interviewed lawyers mentioned the lack of realistic perceptions when choosing the firm(s) they applied for. "Even though I had worked at an employment service agency that worked for law firms, I did not really have any insight in the difference between the firms". This supports a possible explanation for the limited correlations between perceived firm values and the PP-MPB character of the firm, as well as the lack of significant regression results when using the actual firm values. Furthermore, in some of the firms that had more MPB-like characteristics, lawyers emphasized the differences in expertise and management values between different departments or practice areas. These differences may distort the perception of the archetypical character of the firm as a whole.

3.3.2. Expertise values

Almost all interviewed lawyers expressed a high level of expertise ambition as well as a perception of high firm expertise. In many cases, these ambitions and perceptions determined the choice of firm. Seven interviewed lawyers chose their firm because of its reputation on specific expertise areas; three did so because of the general expertise reputation. Examples of specific expertise ambitions were the preference for administrative law at firms 6 and 17, for competition law at firm 1 or real estate law at firm 14. In the first year, these expectations were confronted with reality. Some lawyers were disappointed in the expertise level of their work, for instance because it consisted for a large part in repetitive small parts of big cases, such as compliance or due diligence. One lawyer remarked that lawyers with high expectations about the expertise level of the work and about development opportunities risk disappointment. But also the opposite development appeared: two lawyers expressed that they found the work more intellectually challenging than they had expected. Both these lawyers observed that this had a negative effect on their self-confidence and that they had to readjust their expectations. One of them succeeded to regain her self-efficacy and the expertise level of her work, the other did not and

hoped that a change of practice area would help. Two lawyers reported a lack of work due to economic or incidental factors, a frustrating experience. At the time of the interview, most lawyers had developed mixed feelings – mainly moderately positive – about the expertise level of their work. “My experiences with work quality are mixed, but mainly positive” “Often you handle only a small part of a puzzle, but mostly your parts are interesting enough” “Not all your cases are fun, but taken together the work is interesting and varying.”

Most firms organize an intensive first year training period. Lawyers follow courses in the legal areas that dominate the big law firm practices; some firms have pooled these training efforts in the joint Law Firm School. Some of the largest firms have an arrangement with legal aid insurance companies who refer small cases for the purpose of providing young lawyers with a wide range of legal experience and litigation possibilities. Most interviewed lawyers appreciated the training – for many of them it was an important argument to join their law firm. However, some of them remarked that the intensive training had postponed their involvement in the law practice of their firm and limited their acquaintance with their expertise area in the first year. One lawyer indicated this as the cause of a temporary setback in his wellbeing and performance at the end of this first year; he also had observed this with his colleagues.

A high perception of the firms’ expertise level is not limited to the firms that resemble the professional partnership archetype. The lawyers of firm 1 mentioned the general expertise level of their firm as well as their specific practice area as important arguments for their initial choice but also for their intention to stay. “If I were to become partner, it would be at this firm”. For the lawyers at firm 17, the main consideration was the expertise level of their practice area. Remarkably, the most MPB-like firms had abandoned the obligatory change of practice area halfway the three years traineeship period. In these firms, lawyers who were specifically attracted to a practice area were allowed to remain working in that area. This finding fits with the presumed diversified career and development tracks these firms offer. At most firms however, lawyers would soon change to another practice area or had done so recently at the time of the interviews. Two of them expected an improvement in the level of their work; the other lawyers who changed practice areas were indifferent or still insecure about the effects of this change for the expertise level of their work. But all of those hoped to return to their initial area after completing their traineeship, maintaining the strong preference they had upon entry. Four of them indicated they would leave for

another firm or another legal occupation (e.g. the competition authority or the judiciary) if their firm would not accommodate this preference in the future.

The experiences of the interviewed lawyers offer explanations how lawyers gained realistic insights – positive, negative but most often mixed - in the expertise level of their firm and practice area, as well as in their own expertise level and ambitions. In this process, the general high level of their ambitions and perceptions in the first year after entry became more differentiated. The increase of the explanatory potential of the expertise values in survey T2 is reflected by this differentiation. Nevertheless, the interviews indicated that most lawyers maintained high expertise ambitions and that these ambitions were a major factor in the commitment to their firm, as the analyses of the cases of respondents to both surveys had confirmed. The opportunity to realize these ambitions in their practice area of choice remained a major reason to stay with their firm. Also, the interviews gave some examples of how the lawyers' perceptions of the expertise values of their firms gradually converged with actual firm values.

3.3.3. *Management values*

The interviewed lawyers associated their management values and the perceived firm values with different aspects of the management of the firm and the practice. The support organization of the firm – aspects such as secretarial support, ICT tools, library and documentation – was generally appreciated as good to excellent. The interviews gave only one example of temporary dissatisfaction, caused by a reduction of secretarial staff. The quality of support facilities therefore did not differentiate between firms or between interviewed lawyers. A second and more distinctive aspect was the organization of the lawyers' work unit or practice group, including the division of work, process management, coaching and supervision. Most interviewed lawyers were critical or negative about the structuring and organization of the work processes. "A lot of freedom, no management" ... "No structured division of work, work processes or case evaluation" ... "Apart from the helpful coaching of experienced associates, there was no structured feedback or evaluation process." Only some lawyers reported positive experiences in this matter; all of them were employed by the more MPB-like firms (14 and 17).

Some lawyers regarded the deficiency of work unit management as a serious disadvantage; these lawyers also had other problems such as a shortage of work or a strained relationship with the partner. The others saw it as a fact of law firm life ("I did not have high expectations of lawyers' management capabilities") or even an opportunity. "To promote your own

interests, to lobby ... directly with the partner involved... is the only way to get somewhere”.

The third aspect of firm management that appeared relevant for the interviewed young lawyers was the firms’ formal and informal management structure, especially the distribution of authority between the partner(s) and firm management, including the authority in HRM matters. The lawyers were faced with the effects of the management configuration at critical moments in their employment, such as the transition to another practice area half way the traineeship, formal evaluations or incidental problems. One lawyer experienced some burn-out symptoms; in another case, the departure of several senior lawyers caused unrest and uncertainty. All interviewed lawyers had the perception that, in the end, the partners decided. According to some lawyers, the influence of others on decisions is negligible; firm management or HRM department are unobtrusive (“HRM could not intervene, was only supporting the partner”...). In the more PP-like firms, the perception is that partners can only be corrected by other partners (“They can be addressed only by other partners during partner appraisal” “HRM is OK but has no position in important matters such as practice area transition when partners are involved”). Most interviewed lawyers spoke positively about attitudes and interventions of the partners, but “there also are bastards among them”.

In the more MPB-resembling firms, the partners also had final authority, but the involvement of firm management, notably HRM staff, appeared more intensive. “The performance of HRM is a positive contribution, although ultimately the partner decides”. At the same firm, another lawyer had appreciated the intervention of HRM after several senior lawyers had left the department. HRM in this firm also took the lead in organizing practice group transitions. One of the lawyers at these firms mentioned with positive appreciation the support received from her mentor. Lawyers at firm 17 had different opinions about the elaborate performance appraisal in this firm. They appreciated the feedback but two of them had doubts about the relevancy of the large number of criteria. The third lawyer of this firm thought the performance criteria useful, but was less satisfied by the way these criteria were linked to the bonus system.

The aspects of management structure and processes that most affected the young lawyers appeared to be the organization of and support by the work unit – including the partner – and the counterbalance to the partners’ dominance at critical moments. The interviewed lawyers did not report high expectations of management values at the onset, but several of them were

disappointed by a lack of structure and support in the unit. This especially concerned the lawyers who (temporarily or permanently) suffered from a lack of self-esteem or self-confidence, sometimes due to temporary circumstances such as a shortage of work or health problems. Support of the partner and the direct colleagues in the work unit was reported to be essential in difficult times and uncertainty. Confident lawyers trusted their abilities to deal directly with the partners involved and had less need for management support. "The most important asset is your self-confidence" as a lawyer remarked who suffered from lack of self-confidence in the first year of her traineeship. The interviews illustrate some fit effects of management values that can be attributed to more PP- or more MPB-like firms. Lawyers who were employed by PP-like firms seemed to have modest expectations of management quality and to take the dominance of the partners for granted. At the more MPB-like firms the approach was more balanced; quality of practice management appeared to have a more prominent role in the lawyers' experience. However, even with more countervailing factors, also in the MPB the partners are regarded as the ultimate decisive factor. Self-confidence appeared as an important differentiating factor between the lawyers in regard of their need for management structure and support, explaining the moderating effects of CSE as found in the surveys.

The interviewed lawyers had limited experience with and insight in management structure and issues. The most important aspect, the direct work relations, may differ between partners and practice areas within the same firm. These and similar factors may explain the lack of convergence of perceived and actual firm values. Nevertheless, the degree in which one's needs and expectations are met by the firms' management was an important reason for satisfaction of the lawyers. The interviews suggested that management value fit does not influence commitment and intention to stay as much as expertise values do. The effects of management values on satisfaction appeared stronger than the effects on commitment. Despite negative experiences with his work environment, "the commitment with my firm is not weakened".

3.3.4. Short term reward

Only the interviewed lawyers at firm 17 had some experience with short term, variable pay. This firm linked the variable pay to the appraisal of a large number of performance criteria. One lawyer commented that the system made it very difficult to rise above a medium score. "Good performance should be better rewarded." The other lawyers at this firm only complained about the content and complexity of the appraisal system.

The interviewed lawyers at the other firms did not report any experiences with variable pay at their firm. The data on compensation and benefits in law firms confirm that most firms with bonus systems do not apply these systems during traineeship. For these lawyers, short term reward is represented rather by the informal and formal feedback from the supervising partner and other senior colleagues. Several of them reported to receive hardly any feedback, neither positive nor negative. "No appreciation for my efforts was ever expressed". "Except for the formal appraisal, direct positive or negative feedback was very scarce". Another lawyer remarked that you had to ask for feedback to receive it. One lawyer at a MPB-like firm praised her supervisor for the positive feedback as well as formal and informal feedback in general, but this was exceptional.

The interviews did not produce more helpful information than this to explain the effects of short term reward value fit. It is clear that lawyers with high expectations of short term reward and feedback at the start could be easily disappointed, even when firms applied more or less elaborate appraisal systems. This may explain the negative correlation between lawyers' values and satisfaction in survey T1. Some remarks also shed light on the results of survey T2. Lawyers stated that they needed self-confidence to ask for feedback; confident lawyers apparently are less appreciative of elaborate feedback systems, but nevertheless want to be rewarded and appraised for their performance. A moderate level of short term reward values of lawyer and firm might therefore be linked to the highest level of satisfaction and commitment.

Short term reward and feedback systems apparently are features of the firm that send a relatively clear message about firm values, as was also supported by the significant correlation between actual and perceived firm values. The effects of these values appeared mixed and the balance between too little and too much rather delicate.

3.3.5. Long term perspective

Of the interviewed lawyers, one expressed a clear partnership ambition; some others made their intentions conditional upon other choices or developments. One of them remarked: "If I stay working as a lawyer in a law firm, my ambition is to become partner at my present firm" and another had a similar outlook. Two of them hoped for better work-life balance for partners: "I don't expect to be able to combine family life with partnership, but partnership conditions may develop to make this combination better feasible". They did not recognize partnership as an important topic among their peers; for most of them the invitation to stay at their firms after

traineeship was the only explicit goal, in almost all cases the most important goal. Only a few colleagues were really 'into' partnership. In the two most PP-like firms those were referred to positively ("there are a few; they are ambitious, smart, eager, driven"), at the other firms more critically ("we have one of those; we call him the partner-trainee").

Several lawyers expressed their specialist expertise ambitions as the dominant factor in their career choices. "My long term ambitions depend on the opportunities to develop my expertise (in this specific area)". Another considered that "My ambition might be directed towards the expertise part of partnership", meaning that he would aim at the expertise level of the partners' work, not so much at the commercial or management implications.

A few interviewed lawyers seemed already to have established that partnership did not fit their ambitions. "It dominates your life too much", remarked a male lawyer. Almost all interviewed female lawyers doubted if they would be able or prepared to combine a partnership career with having children. "I do not see many examples of successful and attractive ways to combine these two".

Alternative career tracks such as senior associate and salary partner received mixed reactions. At both PP-like firms, it was not considered a serious proposition. "At our firm, for associates, partnership potential is decisive". "Lawyers join our firm for the training and education programs or to become partner". At the other firms, appraisals ranged from critical to positive. "It is very well possible to stay as senior associate or counsel without partnership ambitions"; "I do not exclude the possibility of staying on as non-partner"; "it is possible to stay without being partner, but this is still looked upon as exceptional"; "although there are alternatives, partnership still is the norm"; "the senior associate position does not seem really attractive"; "at the end, the salary partnership is a phase before partnership". It is clear that the alternative permanent positions are part of the career options at MPB-like firms, but their appeal to young lawyers varies. For some, they are associated with working part-time "which is possible in some practice areas such as labour and litigation but less so in others".

The survey results therefore find some resonance in the interviews. During the traineeship period, some lawyers appeared to develop stronger and more realistic long term ambitions. Especially the female lawyers, but also some men, expressed a growing self-confidence after the first year of introduction and intensive training. "I experienced a dip after half a year – I see that many trainees have similar experiences. After the training period

you get more grip on your cases, your confidence grows". However, it is also clear that for these young lawyers, the major career concern is surviving the traineeship period more than the long term perspectives. As the end of traineeship approaches, this concern grows and probably has a predominant effect on attitudes. This would illustrate the decline of the explaining potential of long term values in survey T2. Only the confident lawyers allow themselves to look beyond the end of traineeship. Although most of them did not yet develop an outspoken ambition, they nevertheless seemed to appreciate it when their firms offered long term perspectives. Lawyers with low long term values are less satisfied than their colleagues, possibly because they find themselves less at home in a law firm that expects a career focus, at least to some degree. But lawyers with *high* long term values appeared less satisfied as well. Probably, they did not find their values matched by their firms, as some interviews illustrated. These observations are in line with the survey results after moderation for application success (survey 1) and CSE (survey 2), that showed a maximum satisfaction level at the combination of high (but not extremely high) firm values and moderate lawyers values.

None of the lawyers was offered personal career advice or counselling by their firms. Probably law firms consider the traineeship to be too early, but several lawyers said they would have welcomed the opportunity.

3.3.6. *Summary*

The interviews have illustrated the (mis)fit effects found in the cases of the respondents to both surveys, but also gave different explanations for different values. Most interviews illustrated the relation between fit, satisfaction and commitment, but some findings illustrated how in specific circumstances an increasing fit could coincide with diminishing outcomes. For instance, a fit of short term reward values might not lead to a high level of satisfaction when the lawyer did not agree with the results of a feedback or bonus system. Also, expertise values might fit, but nevertheless a lawyer could be frustrated in her specific expertise ambitions. So, individual experiences might counter positive or negative fit effects.

The interviews also provided several illustrations of the relations between firm expertise values and satisfaction and between firm long term perspective values and intention to stay, that appeared from the cases of the respondents to both surveys. As discussed, although young lawyers may not have determined their personal long term perspectives, their attitudes were nevertheless influenced by the long term perspectives the firm offered, especially by the uncertainty or lack of perspectives. Also, the interviews

illustrated the multidimensional nature of management values as well as the ambiguous attitudes towards short term rewards.

4. *Discussion*

Using qualitative methods such as interviews may not be the most suitable method to establish and determine the effects of P-O fit. Interviews can nevertheless illustrate why some fit effects occur and other expected effects do not. It is no surprise that the opportunity to become an expert in their profession is vital to young professionals, but the survey results and interviews are revealing about the risk of disappointment of these ambitions in the big law firm practices. This risk is larger in the professional partnership, because this firm type attracts and selects lawyers with the most outspoken ambitions. The abandonment, by the MPB-like firms – that have more differentiated levels of expertise values along different practice areas - of the obligatory change of practice area for trainees is a decision that might help to improve fit opportunities for their lawyers.

The interviews also pointed out the different aspects of law firm management that are relevant for the lawyers during traineeship. Remarkable was the absence of any form of case or process management in almost all firms, at least in the perception the young lawyers. Further, the role of firm and HR management appeared to range from invisible to modest. Young lawyers who are (temporarily) less confident or encounter setbacks in their personal development and performance run a serious risk of losing their perspective at the firm or even in the legal profession by lack of support. Confident lawyers are capable to find their own way and prefer to do so, but they also recognize the dependence on the supervising partner or the support of direct colleagues. In the MPB, this dependence is compensated more or less by management and systems, in the PP the dominance of the partners appeared only restricted by peer feedback. Young lawyers in these firms took this as a fact of life they had to deal with. Fit and misfit of management values probably concern these aspects of law firm management. The interviews illustrated the dissatisfying effect of the lack of management values that also appeared in the surveys and the change analysis of the 38 cases.

At most firms, material short term rewards through incentive pay systems are not yet part of the conditions during traineeship. The survey results demonstrated that the young lawyers' perceptions of their firms' systems and policies nevertheless approached the actual firm values according to

the archetype scores. These systems are probably frequently discussed by more senior lawyers and form a distinctive firm characteristic. In the interviews, lawyers at the more MPB-like firms appeared to be somewhat more concerned about the effects of short term reward and the underlying appraisal systems. A few of them expressed their concern that differences in performance should be treated fairly. The practice areas of these firms are more diversified than the PP and the partnership also is less homogeneous; it is imaginable that these firms attract lawyers with more diverse capabilities and that differences in performances of these firms' lawyers are more noticeable among colleagues. Among the interviewed lawyers of the more PP-like firms, material short term rewards did not appear an issue. This attitude may be influenced by their firms' culture as expressed by its reward systems, but also by a more homogeneous peer group.

The short term reward value scale leaves room to include non material rewards such as positive feedback from the supervisor. In general, the experiences of the interviewed young lawyers with (positive) feedback were scarce. High expectations, high personal values appeared easily disappointed. The interviews illustrated that short term reward value fit is well imaginable when lawyers and firm values are both low, but much less so when lawyers values are high. The surveys and change analysis pointed at possibly negative effects of a perception of high level short term reward values. The balance between too little and too much short term reward and feedback is delicate, as the interviews and survey T2 demonstrated. Even self-confident lawyers preferred a moderate level. According to equity theory (Trevor et al., 2007) it can be argued that confident lawyers in MPB-like firms have a greater need for short term rewards than their peers at PP-like firms. Confident lawyers expect to be rewarded for their performance and abilities, especially when they perceive the performances of their colleagues as varying, as might be expected in the more heterogeneous MPB. This reward is conditional for their commitment and satisfaction. Further, in the MPB partnership perspective is not as strong a motivator as in the PP. Firms would do wise to align their reward and appraisal systems to their archetype and carefully design these systems to express what lawyers themselves find distinctive.

Fit of long term perspective values lost some of its explanatory power in survey T2. According to the interviewed lawyers, only few of their peers have clear long term or partnership ambitions. The approaching expiry of the traineeship period did not lead to a stronger articulation of long term ambitions, as I had expected. On the contrary, uncertainty about their

career wishes, possibilities and perspectives seemed to have reduced the expression of these wishes. While almost all interviewed female lawyers expressed doubts on the possibility of combining partnership career and family life, the survey did not show a gender difference in long term values and intention to stay. Apparently, male lawyers also had doubts about the desirability or feasibility of a law firm career. The interviews gave several examples. Meanwhile, the modest expression of the long term ambitions of young lawyers does not justify the conclusion that long term perspectives are not yet relevant to this group. On the contrary, young lawyers appreciate the long term perspectives their firms offer, even when they did not (yet) decide on their own ambitions. Firms could be advised to offer them more clarity on individual perspectives and support in making career choices. Strong personal long term values reduced satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay, especially for lawyers with high application success (survey T1) and CSE (survey T2), compared to a moderate value level. This indicates a serious risk that the most talented and confident lawyers get dissatisfied and leave the firm when their firms do not explicitly express their career perspectives already in the early years. This risk is mirrored by the predominantly negative direction of the corresponding changes of intention to stay and perceived long term perspective values of the firm. In PP-like firms, these perspectives are linked to partnership; in the MPB, they may also be directed to alternative positions.

4.1. Limitations

In Chapter 3 I discussed the limitations that followed from the limited number of respondents to both surveys and the lack of data for longitudinal analysis. I did not intend the methods and findings presented in this Chapter as a substitute for longitudinal analysis. The cases of the 38 lawyers that responded to both surveys and the eleven interviews mainly served to support the interpretation of the results of the surveys.

Discussion

1. Introduction


In this final chapter, I will summarize briefly the results of this research (Section 2) and then continue with a concluding discussion of the central themes as well as some findings that did not yet receive full attention in the preceding chapters (Section 3). Finally I will indicate the limitations of this research (Section 4), the implications for further research and theory development (Section 5) and the implications for practice (Section 6).

2. Summary of the results

Recruiting and retaining talent is essential for the performance of law firms and the law industry. Talent is scarce and will be more and more difficult to attract and retain, due to changing ambitions, increasing mobility and an ageing population. A diversifying law industry with a diversifying workforce runs an increasing risk of mismatches between law firm and lawyer.

The purpose of this research was to investigate the mechanisms and the effects of fit and misfit between the values and ambitions of lawyers and the values of their law firms. The central question was, whether and how fit or misfit affects the attitudes of the lawyers; their satisfaction, commitment and their intention to stay. I further hypothesized that core self-evaluations and human capital would influence the relationship between P-O fit and fit effects. The research questions are represented by the model in Figure 1.

Figure 1



Central in this model is the fit between person and organization (P-O fit); that is, in this study, between professional organization (law firm) and professional. This P-O fit is expected to be determined by the archetype of the law firm on the one hand and the values and ambitions of the professional on the other. The archetype of a law firm is assumed to be defined by its HRM practices. The degree of fit between organization and professional influences the job satisfaction, commitment and retention of the professional. This relationship is expected to be moderated by the cores self evaluations (CSE) and the human capital of the professional.

2.1. HRM practices and archetypes.

Investigating the fit between firms and lawyers required a method to distinguish relevant differences between the values of law firms. I proposed that different firm values would be expressed by different sets of HRM practices and that these practices could be related to different archetypes of the firms. Archetype theory distinguishes the professional partnership (PP) as the traditional archetype of professional services firms and the more recently arising managed professional business (MPB). I proposed that these archetypes would be discernible among the big Dutch law firms and found this proposition largely confirmed. The internal alignment of HRM practices ascribed to the professional partnership and the managed professional business was recognizable in the outcomes of the interviews with the managing partners. The HRM practices that fit the PP archetype

were, among others, an up-or-out career system, only incidental permanent senior associate positions, tenure based salary systems and, at the utmost, moderate variable pay. The MPB-related practices included a differentiated, individualized career policy, several permanent senior associate positions, performance based salary systems and substantial variable pay levels.

I also proposed the HRM practices to be aligned with the strategy, governance and management elements of the archetype. The results supported this partially. More firms with PP-like HRM practices focused on a reputation of scientific expertise and on a strategy of customization. Partnership culture and partner's involvement in management were more intensive, frequency of partner meetings was higher in the PP firms. There was some difference of non-partner management and of practice group management structures, but less convincing. Other elements, such as intensity of management control or strictness of appraisals, appeared to be more closely linked to factors of economic performance than with archetypal differences.

2.2. P-O value fit.

From the elements that determine the archetypes according to existing research literature as summarized in Chapter 2, I deduced five sets of values and goals: expertise, management, short term reward, long term perspective and partnership. I investigated P-O fit as the fit of these sets of values. I distinguished between objective fit, the fit between lawyers' values and the archetype character of their firms, and subjective fit, the fit between lawyers' values and the firm values as perceived by the lawyers. I measured actual firm values by scoring the interview answers of the managing partners as described in Chapter 2. My hypotheses stated that objective and subjective fit would be related to three types of outcomes: satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. Further, I added as hypotheses that core self-evaluations and human capital moderated the relation between fit and outcomes. "Core self-evaluations are defined as the mental premises that individuals hold about themselves and their functioning in the world." (Judge, Erez & Bono 1998, p. 168). The concept of core self-evaluations (CSE) covers both self-esteem and self-efficacy and includes neuroticism and locus of control as well. The application success of the lawyers (number of job interviews and job offers) was regarded as an expression of their human capital. The moderation hypotheses were based on the idea that employees with higher self-evaluations and more human capital report more extreme positive effects of fit or negative effects of a lack of fit, because they are better prepared to express and act upon their appreciation of the work

environment.

I tested the hypotheses by two consecutive surveys among 305 young, starting lawyers, employed by the 19 firms that participated in the interviews described in Chapter 2. At the time of survey T1, they were employed between 3 and 12 months. Survey T1 received 95 responses. For the purpose of investigating fit and fit effects after the first year of employment and the changes in values and value fit that occurred in this period, the survey was repeated among the same population ten months after the first measurement, with 66 lawyers responding.

I used polynomial regression analysis to test the hypotheses. For objective fit, except for the effects of expertise values on intention to stay, significant regression results were found in neither survey.

Subjective fit between the lawyers' expertise, management, short term reward and long term perspective values with the perceived firm values had significant effects on satisfaction and commitment; expertise and Short value fit were significantly linked to intention to stay. For management, short term reward, and long term perspective, misfit of values showed stronger effects than fit. The outcomes were lowest when lawyers' values were high and firm values low; this has also been found as a general characteristic of misfit (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Following P-O fit theory, I had expected that the outcomes of fit would not differ according to the level of the fitting values; for example, fit of high firm and personal values would be related to an equal level of satisfaction as fit of low firm and personal values. In contrast however, fit of management and short term reward values produced higher outcomes at lower levels of fitting values; as for expertise and long term perspective values, fit outcomes were higher at higher value levels. Regarding the short term reward values, different outcomes of different fitting value levels appeared to be related mainly to differences in lawyers' values, while different outcomes of different long term perspective value fit levels were related dominantly to differences in perceived firm values. Fit effects on satisfaction and commitment were similar, but more pronounced on satisfaction.

Core self-evaluations had the expected moderating effects on the relation between fit and outcomes. The effects of fit and misfit at a high level of CSE appeared more pronounced. In survey T1, lawyers with high CSE appeared to appreciate a fit of high management values less and of high short term reward values more. Survey T2 showed the expected, more pronounced pattern for management value fit for lawyers with high CSE. Short term reward value fit was related to the highest satisfaction of high

CSE lawyers when the levels of fitting values were moderate. Also in survey T2, long term perspective value fit produced a pattern of satisfaction and commitment with high CSE lawyers that reached the highest level when values were moderately high. Application success (AS) showed some of the expected moderating effects. For lawyers with high application success, the short term reward value fit as well as long term perspective fit produced the highest levels of intention to stay at high fitting value levels, while the fit of management values was related to the highest satisfaction at a low fitting value level.

Although the number of significant regression results was smaller, survey T2 repeated the result patterns of the first. Fit and misfit of expertise values explained more variance of the outcome variables in survey T2, fit and misfit of long term perspective values explained less variance. Lawyers' values dominated the differences in fit effects of different levels of expertise value fit, as did firm values for long term perspective value fit. Survey T2 indicated that fit at moderate levels of management and short term reward values was related to the highest outcomes.

The hypotheses of this study were confirmed for subjective fit, not for objective fit. The hypotheses about the effects of the moderation by CSE and application success on the outcomes of subjective value fit were also confirmed.

The lack of significant results for objective fit did not mean that objective and subjective fit were found to be completely disconnected. In both surveys, lawyers' and firms' expertise values were significantly correlated with the PP-MPB measures, as were short term lawyers' and firm values.

2.3. Changes of value fit and fit effects over time.

Only 38 lawyers had responded to both surveys, not enough for longitudinal statistical analysis. I inspected the changes in the fit and outcome variables of these lawyers to see whether any change patterns could be discovered. In 50% of the cases of these respondents, satisfaction, commitment and/or intention to stay had decreased. In a large majority of 25 cases, fit that was stable or had increased over the two measures could be linked to stable or higher outcomes, and decreased fit to decreased outcomes. These observations supported the relation between changes in value fit and changes in attitudes that had been found by the P-O fit research (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Apparently, changes in the personal values of young lawyers or changes in their perceptions of firm values that result in more or less fit are related to improvement or decrease of their satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. I will discuss the nature of these changes

in the next sections of this Chapter.

Interviews young lawyers.

Interviews with 11 young lawyers from the target population provided illustrations of the fit and misfit effects that were found in the analysis of the survey results. Expertise ambitions were vital for almost all lawyers; they were in some cases disappointed by the nature of the work, by changes of practice area or lack of perspective in the preferred expertise area. Management values were associated with practice group and process management and with the performance of firm management at critical moments. Material short term rewards were not an issue for the lawyers in the PP-like firms, though the absence of immaterial feedback was noted; lawyers in more MPB-firms appeared more concerned about a fair reward for different performances. Only one interviewed lawyer expressed a direct long term partnership ambition; with some others, this ambition was more ambiguous, while most interviewed lawyers shrank back from the work-life consequences of partnership. Nevertheless, most lawyers appreciated the long term perspectives that their firms offered. In more MPB-like firms, some lawyers considered permanent non-partner positions such as salaried partner a serious alternative to the partnership position.

3. Discussion

In the following section, four central issues that evolved from the main themes of this study will be discussed in more detail:

- the nature and meaning of the archetypes Professional Partnership and Managed Professional Business among law firms in The Netherlands;
- the HRM practices as elements that distinguish between the archetypes;
- the nature and meaning of the expertise, management, short term reward and long term perspective values;
- the relationships between archetypes, HRM practices, professional values and the attraction of young professionals.

3.1. Do the professional partnership and the managed professional business exist among Dutch law firms?

In recent years, authors have tried to categorize Dutch law firm according to their governance and management set up, but without finding clear distinguishing features other than the intensity of involvement of the partners (Kil, 2010; Wanrooy, 2007). The HRM practices offered a better angle to identify different types of firms, with different values. Especially the distinction between a (moderate) form of up-or-out and a more differentiated, individualized notion of the lawyers' career was found to be related to

fundamental differences between the value sets and configurations of law firms. Some elements of the governance and management of the firm could be linked directly to this difference in HRM practices, especially when the position of the partners was involved. Other elements, such as the position of managers and the strictness of appraisal and control systems appeared to be linked rather to size, profitability or geographic structure, than to different values or strategic goals. The firms with the highest profitability had the more intensive management control processes. The management and governance elements may therefore be regarded as more opportunistic and less fundamental for the firm's intrinsic values.

Of course, the PP and MPB archetypes describe theoretical configurations that do not exist in real life. Every firm has its own position between the extremes of PP and MPB. The more traditional, partner-centred configuration and culture of the professional service firm is recognizable in the PP-like firms, but has still solid remnants in the MPB-like firms, where partners also retain the dominant position. Nevertheless, besides individualized HRM practices, a more elaborate management structure is an inherent part in this configuration.

The partnership culture and HRM practices of the PP archetype appeared more frequently in single office firms where peer feedback and control can be more easily maintained. Although the research offered no solid basis for a differentiation of reputation and expertise, indications can be found in the interviews with managing partners and young lawyers; examples are the high and homogeneous expertise levels and the positive appraisal of partnership ambition in the PP in comparison with a more differentiated expertise level and a more critical attitude towards colleagues with partnership ambitions in the MPB. Firms with the highest professional reputation among their peers seemed to prefer the PP. These firms aim at attracting and retaining the brightest lawyers, who appreciate the partner autonomy that the PP offers.

The findings of this study support the observation that the PP archetype is not disappearing in favour of the MPB (Pinnington et al., 2003), but that firms choose from – elements of – both archetypes the configuration that fits them best. Although elements of the managed professional business are discernible among several of the large Dutch law firms, the interviews with managing partners and young lawyers indicated that the adoption of MPB features is still limited. HRM practices such as differentiated development tracks and performance management are at most modestly developed. The same applies for process management, standardization and quality control,

features that were observed to proliferate in US and UK firms (Cooper et al., 1996; Lowendahl et al., 2001; Malhotra et al., 2010; Malos et al., 2000).

The professional partnership might still be regarded as the dominant paradigm of professional services firms, at least of law firms in The Netherlands, a paradigm that is followed and enforced by partners, managers and by young lawyers themselves as well. Even though the traditional characteristics of the PSF are repudiated in other contexts, such as work/life balance or diversity discussions (Mueller, Carter, & Ross-Smith, 2011; Vodeb, 2011) *Advocatie* May 20, 2008, January 19 and June 1, 2011; *Advocatenblad Special Carriere & Opleiding*, November 25, 2011), these characteristics remain strongly present in the professional mentality. The central position of partnership, the up-or-out career, the aversion to formal management and appraisal systems are elements of the professional partnership that colour the observations of lawyers, even in firms that resemble the MPB.

An archetype has been defined as a set of values, organized into a coherent interpretive scheme (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood et al., 1990). For lawyers in The Netherlands, the professional partnership clearly reflects this definition and remains the dominant interpretive scheme.

Meanwhile, the world is changing. Several recent surveys and discussions (Spangenberg & Lampert, 2010; Vodeb, 2011), indicate that the ambitions and needs of young professionals nowadays are increasingly out of line with the career practices of the professional partnership. Growth and diversification of the professional workforce have brought along different needs, especially a more individualized design of professional development and a better work/life balance. The interviews in this study offer illustrations of these needs. The law firms with more MPB-like features may offer better possibilities to cater to these needs, for instance by opening alternative career tracks.

Not only the needs of young professionals, also the servicing of clients and the changing character of law practice may diverge increasingly from the archetypical professional partnership. The scope of international transactions in some legal practices or the efficient provision in legal commodity services require project and process management techniques (Gardner, Anand, & Morris, 2008). Improvements in the management of law firms and law practices are not difficult to imagine nor necessarily very complicated, but can have a distinctive impact, for instance offering frequent and clear performance feedback. This kind of management improvements might be applied within a professional partnership; as we have seen, some managerial practices are combined with maintaining the partnership values and HRM

practices of the PP. But PP-like firms may also choose to enter the MPB world and leave the partnership dominance and the corresponding HRM practices.

Probably, following labour market and organizational needs and pressures, more firms will adopt elements of the MPB. However, the PP may remain the suitable configuration for high profile firms that offer the opportunity to realize top expertise ambitions to the brightest lawyers and base their market position upon top expertise reputation. Central features of this configuration are a homogeneity of talent, autonomy of professionals, peer control and feedback and partnership ambitions – also described as the option based firm (Malos et al., 1995, 2000). The PP may be characterized as the Peer & Perspective oriented configuration, the MPB as the Management and Performance oriented. This study demonstrated that the PSF archetype theory as originally developed, offers a useful theoretical basis to study PSF configurations, as well as a practical framework for firm management to analyse, align and improve their organizations.

3.2. HRM practices as distinguishing elements

In this study the archetypes of the large law firms in The Netherlands appeared to be best characterized by the HRM practices – partnership included – that these firms apply. What does this conclusion imply for the meaning and influence of HRM practices in PSFs or organizations in general? Clearly, in the observations of managing partners and young lawyers alike, HRM practices are signals of the value system of the firm as defined by the signaling theory (Spence 1973, Murray 1991). This was to be expected. HRM practices are about reward and recognition, appraisal and feedback, elements that are strongly linked to the professional ambitions and identity. Especially, HRM practices answer questions about in- or exclusion that are vital for the young professional, such as “Is this firm prepared to invest in my development? Does the firm foresee a future in a law career at this firm for me? Are my efforts effective and appreciated?” HRM practices therefore are an important factor in P-O fit, as proposed in HRM literature (Werbel et al., 2005). This was confirmed in this study for the short term reward and long term perspective values expressed by the compensation and career practices of the firm.

The expression of the values and goals of the organization by HRM practices is expected to be stronger as these practices are more visible, consistent and consensus based, as Bowen and Ostroff (2004) proposed. Consistency means that HRM practices are vertically and horizontally aligned. Consensus requires that managers explain and enact the HRM practices in

the same manner. Contradictory and inconsistent messages produce a weak climate, wherein behavior of employees is less effectively directed to the goals of the organization.

HRM practices in most big law firms do not appear to meet the criteria of Bowen and Ostroff as supporting a strong organizational climate. The extensive training programs that all law firms offer a professional expertise development but are hardly distinctive for the climate of a specific firm. Compensation practices are transparent and have impact on young lawyers, but the consistency of and consensus on these practices appeared weak in many examples from the interviews. Career practices are frequently implicit or ambiguous; none of the firms appeared to have communicated an explicit up-or-out career policy. Young lawyers deduced the career policy from practices such as permanent senior positions. They implicitly assumed a form of up-or-out as the professional norm, even if the firm did not have this policy. From the effects of long term perspective fit in the surveys as well as from the interviews, this implicit professional norm appears solid and persistent. The up-or-out career as well as other archetypical elements of the professional partnership, such as the dominance of partners over management, is reflected in the interviews. The professional values influence the expectations of the lawyers, their perceptions of the HRM practices of the firm and thus the organizational climate. Other HRM practices that are not congruent with these values are perceived as weak and ambiguous; the permanent senior positions are the obvious example.

The professional values may influence the perception of HRM but also the presumed effectiveness of specific HRM practices. For instance, performance based reward is generally accepted as an effective HRM practice; it is one of the practices included in the High Performance Work systems (Delery, 1998; Huselid, 1995). However, as we have seen, in the more PP-oriented professional services firms, the performance effects of short term reward may be reduced by the long term professional ambitions. In up-or-out, long term ambitions make short term rewards – as incentives – superfluous (although PP law firms use modest bonuses to maintain a competitive compensation level). Similarly, the choice between differentiated or uniform training and development programs is contingent on the character – especially the career orientation and homogeneity – of the professional workforce of a firm.

The research that has tried to establish a direct relationship between specified HRM practices (HWPS, best practices, HRM bundles) and firm performance has not yet produced conclusive evidence (Paauwe, 2009;

Verburg et al., 2007). Among others, Paauwe (2009) even has serious doubts that this is feasible; in reality, firm performance is influenced by so many different factors – such as structural or temporary economic circumstances, employee characteristics and attitudes, firm structure and strategy, internal and external cultural aspects – making it extremely difficult to isolate the effects of HRM practices as one of these factors. However, recent studies have demonstrated that organizations with a persistent HRM strategy that is aligned with their strategy, structure and other characteristics perform better than those that simply adopt best HRM practices without taking this vertical alignment into consideration (Chênevert et al., 2009). Vertical alignment of HRM practices is found to be a stronger determinant of firm performance than the choice of a specific bundle of horizontally aligned practices (Subramony, 2009; Verburg et al., 2007).

The present study adds to these findings by demonstrating that vertical alignment does not only entail the internal elements, but can also be strengthened or weakened by external norms and values that influence the values and expectations of the workforce, such as the ideas within a profession about the professional career and the position of partners. Especially in the professional environment, these external values and norms might be quite influential, shaping the expectations of the professional before she enters a firm. It can be argued that also in other occupations, external norms and values have a similar meaning – one could think of banking, civil services, crafts, or quality and safety related jobs. The strength of the climate that results from HRM practices depends on the internal consistency as well as on the consistency with these external values. These findings support the contingency approach of studying HRM practices in connection – aligned or not – with the other elements of a firms' configuration and of the firms environment. The archetype theory of professional service firms is an example of such an approach.

3.3. What are the values really about?

Lawyer values appeared to matter. The analysis of the changes of values and value fit between both surveys was limited, but illustrated the relationship over time between value fit, satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay that was established by the surveys at separate moments. Objective fit – measured by using the archetypical character of the firms - produced no significant regression results except for the effects of expertise value fit on intention to stay. Several researchers have observed that P-O fit, affecting individual attitudes, is necessarily based on perceived values; after all, employees can only act upon their perceptions. Perceptions of

organizational values may deviate greatly from reality as perceived by others (Dusschooten- De Maat, 2004; Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Nevertheless, congruence with objectively measured values may strengthen the effect of subjective P-O fit. Expertise and short term reward perceptions of the lawyers were related to the information given by the managing partners. Also the significant increase of the correlation between management values and short term reward values in survey T2 was an indication of congruence between actual and perceived values. High management and short term values both are characteristics attributed to the MPB; it was to be expected that young lawyers gradually developed more realistic perceptions of the management and short term reward values of their firm.

Expertise values. Expertise and short term rewards are features that are apparently transparent to starting lawyers as indicated by the correlations between the objective and subjective measures. Expertise is probably also confirmed by their firms' reputation as seen by colleagues from other firms, publications and surveys. As illustrated by the interviews, younger lawyers may direct their expertise ambitions to specific practice areas. Fit of expertise values may be based upon the opportunity to realize these ambitions. But also the general level of expertise in the firm, perceived as well as objective, matters to the lawyers (indicated by the significant correlations between expertise firm values, satisfaction and commitment), as well as the homogeneity – in more PP-like firms – or diversity of this level, as illustrated by the interviews. The lawyers themselves recalled in the interviews that, before and short after entry, they were hardly able to distinguish between firms; they all assessed the expertise level of their firms as high. Yet gradually they come to appraise differences within their firm and between firms. In this process, the effects of expertise value fit on satisfaction and commitment get stronger while the effects on intention to stay remain. The fit of expertise values had more impact on intention to stay than the other values. For lawyers with high expertise ambitions, the expertise level of their firm is clearly a motivator and satisfier. High lawyers' personal expertise values dominate the effects on intention to stay as well as their satisfaction. Possibly, lawyers that do not find their ambitions accommodated by the firm lower their ambitions simultaneously with their staying intentions, while postponing their departure until after the end of their traineeship. Meanwhile, the correlations indicated that their appraisal of their firm's expertise values is not unrealistic; this was supported by the significant effect of objective expertise fit on intention to stay. Expertise firm values appeared in survey T2 as distinct from the other investigated firm

values; expertise firm values did not correlate with short term reward and long term perspective values. The tendency to appraise one's firm more or less positively on all value aspects does not include expertise values.

Expertise values produced the only significant effects of objective fit. In the young lawyers' perceptions, expertise values clearly stand out. This is not greatly surprising; the ambition to develop into an expert professional is closely connected to the professional character. The lawyer who applies with a big law firm might be assumed to have a considerable amount of expertise ambition and this lawyer may presume a profound level of expertise values with the firm. However, there appeared distinctive differences between lawyers as well as between firms, differences that are relevant to the fit between firm and lawyer and for work satisfaction, commitment and retention.

Management values. Management values occupied a less prominent place in the mind of the lawyers. Management value fit had significant misfit effects, but not many significant fit effects. The interviews indicated that practice group management and firm management of critical incidents were the management aspects with the strongest impact on the starting lawyers. However in most firms the most salient feature of law firm management, including HRM, for young lawyers was its absence. In some firms on the MPB-side of the scale, lawyers observed a conscious management of work allocation and individual coaching in the practice group. Survey T1 indicated that, for lawyers with high self confidence, satisfaction was highest at moderate fitting value levels. Also, satisfaction of lawyers with high application success is highest at low value levels. These findings indicate that, for lawyers with high CSE and human capital, a modest management intensity of the firm suffices: they are prepared to find their own way and prefer moderate or no management involvement. The interviews offered several illustrations. However, almost all interviewed lawyers indicated that they would have appreciated more attention to practice group management. Moreover lawyers who are – temporarily or permanently – low on CSE – e.g. who are insecure about their expertise level, their health, their relation with the supervisor, their chances to survive traineeship - appreciate and welcome a more conscious practice group management as well as interventions of firm management.

Management values appeared mainly a dissatisfier in case of misfit: for self confident lawyers that are bothered by management or for insecure lawyers in need of support by their supervisor or by firm management.

In survey T2, women scored lower on CSE and higher on management

values. This is indicative for the different impact of management value fit according to the level of the core self-evaluations.

Short term reward values had a similar dissatisfying effect as the management values. As illustrated by the interviews, the personal experience of young lawyers with material short term rewards or with immaterial feedback was not abundant. However, short term reward values of the firm were transparent to them, as the correlation with actual archetype elements indicated. In survey T1, outcomes of short term reward value fit were highest when lawyers' values were moderate. High personal short term reward values are easily disappointed by low firm standards, as the interviews illustrated. Short term reward values were the only firm values that did not correlate positively with commitment; contrary to the other values, a higher level of short term reward values is not always appreciated. Fit of short term reward values is related to higher satisfaction and intention to stay, but these outcomes are even higher as the level of the fitting short term reward values is lower. For lawyers with high CSE however, in survey T1 higher levels of fitting short term values resulted in higher satisfaction also. The same was visible for the effect on intention to stay for lawyers with high application success. In survey T2, moderate firm values were related to the highest level of satisfaction, for lawyers with high CSE scores. As explained, the results of the firm's short term reward systems may dissatisfy the expectations of self-confident lawyers; one interview offered a clear illustration of the dissatisfying effect of a variable pay system.

The MPB applies more intensive short term reward systems. The interviews indicated that the more heterogeneous capacities and ambitions of the lawyers in this type of firm induce the need for these systems to satisfy and retain the best performing lawyers. The balance between satisfaction and dissatisfaction by short term rewards appeared very delicate, also in these firms. In general, a moderate level of short term rewards offers the best chance to satisfy and commit the employees, but this balance might be different for each lawyer – in this study, differences were found related to CSE and human capital. The interviews illustrated that not only the level of the short term reward, but also the design and criteria of the short term reward system effect the satisfaction of the lawyers in different ways.

Long term perspective values. Short term rewards and long term perspective values of the lawyers were positively correlated, contrary to expectation. This correlation may be based on the common reward element in both value sets. However, fit and misfit of Short and Long values had rather different effects. Long term perspective value fit was related to higher

outcomes when fitting values were higher. Firm values were dominant in these fit effects. The lawyers may not yet have clear long term ambitions, they nevertheless appreciate the long term perspective that their firm offers. They tend to consider other career options when they realize that a career at their firm is improbable or undesirable. Strong career ambitions appeared more accepted among young lawyers at more PP-like firms, as might be expected.

The survey results of long term perspective value fit for lawyers with high CSE implied that Long firm values and value fit only resulted in higher outcomes up to a moderately high level. At extreme levels, outcomes declined again. There appeared a limit to the tolerance of long term ambition; too much emphasis on long term perspectives is not appreciated. For lawyers with high CSE and high Application Success, the effects of Short and Long values appeared similar. Long term ambition and short term recognition are both important for these lawyers. Firm values dominated the effects. When firm values are low, the personal values have strong effects on the outcomes; when firm values are high, the effect of the personal values is modest.

In survey T1, lawyers' long term perspective values were correlated to gender: male lawyers had higher long term ambitions. This correlation had disappeared in survey T2, possibly due to the smaller sample and an overrepresentation of female lawyers. Another possible explanation is that the long term perspective of many young lawyers does not reach farther than the end of the traineeship period, as was illustrated by the interviews.

Values and reward. Research on reward has pointed out that reward may address different needs of employees; besides material compensation, it includes recognition and distributive fairness (Gagné & Forest, 2008). Reward affects feelings of competence and self evaluation. Reward systems may have incentive and sorting effects – the latter meaning that employees who do not meet or appreciate the standards of the compensation system are motivated to leave the firm. Incentive pay systems aim at strengthening performance motivation, based on agency theory, thus aligning the interests of the firm and employees. Research has indicated however that incentive effects of reward systems in professional service firms are modest at most (Gagné et al., 2008; Subramony, 2009). Material incentives may even distract from internal motives and reduce intrinsic motivation. The risk involved in short term reward is considerable; the employee may regard appraisal and reward as subjective and unjust, resulting in reduced satisfaction and commitment.

Distributive fairness may address external as well as internal comparisons; internally, a bonus or positive appraisal affirms the self-evaluation of a lawyer versus her colleagues at the same firm; externally, the level of compensation is felt as a measure of the firm's relative position in the industry. The interviews confirmed that the incentive effects of short term rewards are weak or even negative, but that short term reward may meet the needs for recognition and distributive justice. This might explain why modest short term reward values were related with the highest level of satisfaction and commitment. The intrinsic professional motivation of the lawyers appeared dominant and is hardly impacted by additional extrinsic incentives, negatively nor positively.

The lawyer appreciates the possibility of a long term commitment with the firm as a reward for performance. However, long term perspective appears to be better aligned with the intrinsic professional motivation than short term rewards and therefore to have a stronger effect on commitment and intention to stay. Similar to expertise firm values, long term perspective values share this motivating potential through the alignment with professional ambitions. This motivating potential is confirmed by the analysis of changes, indicating a direct relationship between expertise and long term perspective firm values with satisfaction, commitment and intention to stay. Change analyses further confirmed the expected effects of increasing or diminishing value fit. In combination with the increasing congruence of objective and subjective firm values, it can be assumed that the impact of the archetypical character of the firm on the fit perceptions of the lawyers grows with their tenure at their firms.

Core self-evaluations and human capital. Core self-evaluations and human capital had the expected moderating effects; at high moderator levels, the effects of fit and misfit appeared more extreme than at low moderator levels. Moderation had some other effects as well. Several patterns of the outcome variables at high levels of CSE and human capital showed a preference for moderate levels of lawyers' and/or firm values: outcomes were highest at moderate value levels (management values: low to moderate; short term reward and long term perspective: moderately high). Also, the effects on the outcomes after moderation appeared to shift from value fit to a dominant effect of either lawyers' or firm values. It is imaginable that lawyers with a high level of CSE or human capital focus on the specific values – personal of firm's – that are most transparent and important to them. Piasentin et al. (2006) complained that fit studies did not yet really clarify the relationship between self-esteem and fit effect. By analysing the moderating role of CSE

– including self-esteem – this study may have reduced this gap.

Different fit effects of different values. Different values had different effects on the lawyers' attitudes. Although the impact of value fit on satisfaction is somewhat more pronounced over all, expertise value fit had a stronger effect on intention to stay and long term perspective fit on organizational commitment. These values are most closely connected to professional values and ambitions. It can be argued that these differences between the values are related to the professional character of the organizations and the employees in this study. In other organizations and occupations, similar values might have other effects; for instance, short term rewards for sales professionals probably have more effects on organizational commitment and intention to stay, while in more bureaucratic occupations the commitment effect of management values might be greater than in professional service firms.

The fit of some of the values, particularly the short term reward and management values, might be overlapping the construct of Perceived Organizational Support (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). Rhoades et al. found that the antecedents of organizational support, fairness, supervisor support, rewards and favourable job conditions were related to satisfaction and commitment. These antecedents resemble the management and short term reward values, as the interviews indicated.

Although many studies maintained a single construct of person-organization fit (Ambrose et al., 2007; Piasentin & Chapman, 2006), some authors have distinguished P-O fit from "needs-supplies" fit (Cable & DeRue, 2002). Needs-supplies fit is defined as the congruence between employees' needs and the rewards they receive for their service and contribution on a job; it is not determined by matching values and goals, as is P-O fit. Needs-supply fit is found to be related primarily to job satisfaction, while P-O fit is supposed to have the strongest effects on commitment and intention to stay. Short term reward value fit as well as some elements of long term perspective and management value fit share the reward character and the effects of needs-supplies fit. The separate assessment of fit based upon different types of values demonstrates the composed character of the P-O fit construct through the relationships of the different values with different outcomes. Specific values within of the P-O fit construct overlap with other constructs such as needs-supplies fit or perceived organizational support. Many studies have applied a single measure to establish P-O fit, mainly asking employees directly about their perception of fit. As Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) observed, a single measure of P-O fit permits respondents to

pick the criteria they themselves find most relevant, leaving the researcher without clues about the specific values that determine the effects on different attitudes. For developing the research on P-O fit as well as HRM practices that may improve attitudes such as satisfaction and commitment, the usefulness of an undifferentiated construct of P-O fit has its limitations.

This is not to say that P-O fit could or should not be measured as a single construct. Results of the surveys in this study were in line with P-O fit research. Examples are the expected saddle shape of most of the surfaces as well as the asymmetrical effect of value misfit: high personal values along with low firm values had a strong negative impact on attitudes, while the reverse - high organizational values and low personal values - was much less pronounced (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Apparently, an excess of values that the employee does not appreciate is less harmful than a lack of values that are important to the employee. Further, the change analysis in Chapter 5 illustrated the underlying pattern of a central value system in the organization (Chatman, 1991; O'Reilly et al., 1991). In my study, the archetypical character of the firm represented this central value system.

More detailed analyses of the surfaces complement P-O fit theory but do not contradict it. Also, the analysis of different effects of different values is a refinement that is not incongruent with existing theory. Nevertheless, these additions and refinements may be important for theoretical progress and practical use of P-O fit theory. As also recommended by other researchers, future P-O researchers might consider specifying the different values and analysing the effect of each value, the importance to employees and to the organizational value system and possible overlaps with other constructs such as perceived organizational support.

Archetypes, HRM, professional values and the attraction of young lawyers

The managed professional business will probably be better suited than the traditional firm to accommodate a growing part of the legal workforce, lawyers who are talented and ambitious but also value alternative, individualized development tracks and a good work-life balance. The diversification of the human capital, ambitions and self-confidence of professionals will continue (De Haas, 2005; Spangenberg et al., 2010; Stolk, 2008; Van Otterlo, 2004; Vodeb, 2011). A firm with a more heterogeneous professional workforce needs to be more consciously managed to treat differences fairly, as the interviews indicated.

Meanwhile, the influence of tacit professional norms and values poses a problem to the law firm that aims at another set of values than those of the professional partnership and the up-or-out system. Pinnington and

Morris (1998) observed that up-or-out persists as a professional norm also in firms that do not use it as a formal career policy; recently Malhotra et al. (2010) noted that associate lawyers themselves enact up-or-out by leaving the firm when partnership appeared out of reach. These observations are supported by the results of the present study. Most interviewed lawyers see no appealing alternative for partnership but departure; even at more MPB firms, alternative career tracks are not often considered attractive. The long term possibility to become partner is still a major motivator, even when partnership ambitions are not yet explicitly expressed. Young lawyers relate partnership perspective with their ambition to reach the highest expertise level in their profession. The results of this study have outlined the conflict between the professional values (such as reaching the top of the profession as partner of a law firm) and personal preferences (such as an intensive social or family life) that appears difficult to handle for young professionals.

To develop or maintain the HRM practices of a managed professional business may require a far more fundamental change than often depicted in the professional press in The Netherlands (e.g. *Intermediair* October 2007, p. 28, *Special Advocatenblad* November 2011) as well as abroad (e.g. *The Lawyer*, UK web based magazine, January 18 2007). Law firms may have underestimated the fundamental character of this change, as was illustrated by the uneasy acceptance of MPB-like HRM practices, notably the alternative career position. The mental obstacles to leave the partnership paradigm are still considerable. It will be a tough job to move a firm away from this paradigm, but it offers a world to win, especially by improving performance and efficiency and by providing development, mentoring and career tracks that may suit the needs of a large part of this - and possibly future - generations of professionals.

The choice between PP and MPB is also a choice between developing homogeneity and managing heterogeneity. This is not to say that the PP can afford to neglect management quality; the survey results and interviews pointed at risks of dissatisfaction and attrition as well as of loss of service quality. Although the PP may aim at a less ambitious level of management values, this level apparently still lets room for substantial improvements in order to stay the employer of choice for the most ambitious. The MPB may be better suited to facilitate different work-life balance preferences, however no firm can afford the liberty to neglect these preferences altogether, in danger of losing too much – especially, but certainly not exclusively female – talent.

3.4. Methodological issues

This research has demonstrated that combining theory and methods from the business and behavioral sciences may be fruitful in investigating the interaction of organizations and individuals. Organizational sciences provided the archetype theory on professional service firms, HRM research the theory of alignment of HRM practices; taken together, these offered a framework for the study of person-organization fit in law firms that was specific for the industry. Different bundles of HRM practices were found to be aligned with different archetypes of professional services firms. The values that were deduced from these HRM practices and archetypes appeared relevant for the fit between lawyers and firms and for the satisfaction, commitment and retention of the lawyers.

A direct link between the measurement of the organizational characteristics and the self report survey measures was not predictive of the outcomes. I measured the properties of the firms by rating the outcomes of the interviews with managing partners on scales that were deduced from the theoretical constructs of the PSF archetypes. I then selected the archetypes elements that were presumably relevant for starting lawyers and developed a survey scale of four items for each value. Possibly, these ratings of organizational properties and of the perceptions of young lawyers were entities too different to combine in one measurement. An alternative would have been to let the managing partners (and preferably, other partners and managers as well) answer the same value scales and then analyse objective fit as the congruence of the personal values of young lawyers with the scores of managing partners. On the other hand, this would have introduced an additional element of subjective perceptions. Another alternative measurement approach might have been to interview a large sample of young lawyers and asking them about the properties of the firm and their appraisal of these properties. This would not have been feasible in this study, but might be so in others. It remains a challenge for future researchers to develop measurements of objective organizational properties that can be matched with the perceptions of the employees. The only significant effect of objective fit in this study, the effect of expertise value fit on intention to stay, might indicate that constructing such a link is not altogether impossible.

The study confirmed the advantages of the polynomial regression analysis of P-O fit. The three dimensional visualisation and analyses of the regression patterns enables the researcher to distinguish the contributions to the fit effects of both fit ingredients, lawyer and firm values. Also, the possibility to differentiate between different levels of fitting values, that in some instances

appeared related to different outcome levels, was an important asset in this research.

Application success as a measure of human capital produced some significant and meaningful results in survey T1, not survey T2. Possibly, asking employees about their application experiences only results in reliable answers within a relatively short period after recruitment, when memories are still vivid. The job offer/job interview measure may be regarded as the most effective measure, because it includes the quality of the recruit's resume as well as the quality of her presentation. All large law firms employ a professional recruitment staff. Selection criteria emphasize intellectual abilities that are demonstrated by educational performance, next to relevant side jobs or social positions and international experience. Also, communication skills shown during job interviews may have some influence on application success. In general, application success of young lawyers mainly expresses intellectual abilities, educational curriculum and some social skills.

The intention to stay scale was defined specifically for the outlook of the trainee lawyer, but in doing so the normal intervals of a Likert scale were translated in different time perspectives, which may be open to discussion. The surveys produced some significant fit effects on intention to stay, thus measured, but less so than on satisfaction and commitment; however, some of these results were as predicted, as for instance the effects of the fit of expertise and long term values on intention to stay.

4. Limitations

The sample of 19 large law firms and the number of interviews for the research on archetypes and HRM practices were rather small. A larger sample of law firms however would have had other disadvantages, since the archetypes and HRM-practices in smaller law firms would probably have been less clear and distinctive. Further, the interview outcomes could be compared with other data on the HRM practices. Nevertheless, a more extensive data collection in the 19 law firms through interviews and other methods could have made the analyses of archetypes and HRM practices even more robust.

The response samples of starting young lawyers (95 in survey T1 and 66 in survey T2) were relatively small for the purpose of polynomial regression analyses and the power might have been too low to provide support for the hypotheses. Larger samples would possibly have provided more reliable

outcomes. Especially, larger samples could have clarified, what results of the moderated regressions should be considered as the 'normal' patterns and what results as exceptional. For instance, survey T1 indicated that moderate *personal* short term reward values were related to high levels of satisfaction of high CSE lawyers, while in survey T2 this effect was related to moderate *firm* values. For the purpose of both surveys, I had direct access to the e-mail addresses of the lawyers and the support of the Dutch Bar association as well as firm management. It appeared hardly feasible to enlarge the response ratio within the same population. Enlarging the population by involving more law firms and lawyers with longer tenure would have diminished the homogeneity of the sample and brought about other limitations.

The most serious limitation was the number of lawyers that responded to both surveys. This number was too small for longitudinal statistical analysis. It was not possible to establish longitudinal relationships between (changes in) perceived values, value fit and the attitudinal outcomes.

I developed some measures (values, application success, and intention to stay) specifically for this research. The reliability (Cronbach's α) of some of the value scales was rather low. Although these measures produced useful results, they will have to be repeated and tested in other studies to gain solid validity.

The research covered a specific time span, 2008-2010. These years were characterized by an economic recession. Some outcomes might have been different in more prosperous times (Diloff, 2011).

The research is about trainee lawyers. It is arguable that values, perceptions and fit effects will be different among more senior lawyers and that results may not be applied to lawyers with longer tenure. Values and ambitions continue developing after traineeship (Cooman et al., 2009; Sturges et al., 2002); especially, short term reward and long term perspective values may be expected to gain importance after the traineeship period. However, it can also be argued that when significant results are obtained from a group with limited experience and insights, these results may be accepted as solid and relevant for a larger group of professionals. Archetype theory describes the configurations of PSFs, besides law firms mainly consultancy and accountancy firms (Mueller et al., 2011). As in law firms, the differences between up-or-out and other career policies also exist among these firms (Greenwood et al., 2007; Greenwood et al., 1990; Nierop, 2007). The results of this research may be relevant for these firms as well.

5. *Implications for theory development and further research*

5.1. *Archetypes; configurational approach; specific measures of P-O value fit.*

This study builds on archetype theory as developed in the late 1980s by Greenwood, Hinings, Brown and Cooper. It acknowledges the strength of the original concept of partnership versus more corporate configurations of professional services firms. The character of the archetype as an interpretive scheme or central value system, expressed in the different elements of strategy, structure, systems and especially in HRM practices, is reflected in the results of this study, notably in the meaning and effects of the different values to firm and lawyers. Of course, differences in size and profitability matter but they do not determine the archetypical character.

As far as I can tell from my overview of the relevant literature, this is the first empirical study applying the theory of archetypes of professional service firms outside the Anglo-Saxon countries. It has demonstrated that archetype theory offers a useful framework to analyze differences between law firms in The Netherlands and probably to study other PSFs in similar countries as well. The combination of archetype and HRM theory proved fruitful. HRM practices, especially career policy, appeared as distinguishing elements between the PSF archetypes and offered a useful point of view to study different organizational configurations. The opposite is also possible: analyzing the differences between organizational configurations also offers a framework to study the internal and external alignment of HRM. This study supports the contingency approach in HRM studies in describing how the strength and effects of different (bundles of practices) depend upon the vertical alignment with the other elements of the firms' configuration and values, but also upon the alignment with implicit professional norms that influence the perceptions of the professionals. HRM theory may profit from including the values and properties of a profession or occupation in studying the effects of alignment of HRM practices.

Critics of the archetype theory have tried to add other archetypes or to replace the original archetypes of the PP and MPB by others (Brock, 2006; Kil, 2010). In my view and the context of this study, this has not improved the usefulness of the theory. The opposing pair of the PP, the "peer and perspective" type of firm and the MPB, the "management and performance" type, offers in my view a clear and understandable analytical tool, as my study demonstrated. This is not to say that refining the theory to adapt it to a specific industry or geographic environment is without

purpose. Archetypes are theoretical constructs; to describe real organizations always requires fitting the theory to a specific environment. For law firms in the Netherlands for instance, HRM practices appeared to offer a better distinction than management or marketing practices, but this may be different in other industries or countries.

From the analysis of differences between organizations in the same industry, especially between HRM practices, followed the definition of specific values and goals that were closely connected to these differences. Using these values and goals to investigate P-O fit between organizations and employees - law firms and lawyers – offers the opportunity to detect mechanisms and effects of fit that are specifically relevant for an industry, a profession or an occupational group. This study showed that this approach may be a promising addition to more generic measures of value fit that are commonly used in P-O fit studies; an addition that may also further promote the use of the results of P-O fit research in actual practice. The approach requires the combination of business sciences, providing methods of identifying distinctive organizational configurations, and organizational behavioral sciences, providing the methods of P-O fit research. In future research, the identification of specific values and the measuring of P-O fit using these values could be expanded to and tested in other industries or similar environments.

5.2. Differentiation of values and value fit effects

Polynomial regression and surface pattern analysis make it possible to identify different effect patterns related to different values and to assess the relative contribution of both ingredients of fit, personal values and firm values. The results of this study made clear that P-O value fit is a multifaceted construct. The four value sets that I investigated had distinct effects on P-O fit, as discussed in Section 3.3. Aggregate measures of value fit, based on sets of different values, might hide these differences. P-O fit research as well as organizational practices can benefit from the understanding of the effect of fit of specific values. Polynomial analyses also expose the contribution of both fit ingredients, personal and firm values. Identifying the dominant value element and level may further contribute to the understanding of P-O fit. Also, analyzing the properties of values included in P-O value fit may reveal similarities with other constructs, such as needs-supply fit or perceived organizational support.

5.3. Attraction-selection-attrition; human capital.

The results of the studies among young lawyers in this thesis seemed to contradict the assumptions of the Attraction-Selection-Attrition theory and

the findings of ASA studies (Schneider et al., 1995). ASA theory proposes that P-O fit and the effects of fit – satisfaction, commitment, intention to stay – improve over time, as non fitting employees leave the firm (e.g. De Cooman et al. 2008). This proposition was not confirmed by the survey results or by the interviews. However, the ASA effects depend on the departure of non fitting employees. During the traineeship period, the barriers to leave the firm obstruct this attrition effect. While investigating ASA, researchers should beware of other than the usual obstacles to leave. These obstacles diminish attrition effects and postpone the predicted development of homogeneity of employees. In such a case, ASA theory would predict that attrition will increase only when the obstacles to departure will have disappeared. It would therefore be of interest to study the development of P-O fit in law firms or similar organizations during the first years after traineeship. Investigating the changes and effects of fit in later career stages could also establish the links between fit and actual retention and attrition, as well as the occurrence and effects of congruence between objective and subjective fit measures. It would be interesting to continue following the lawyers in the sample of the present study. Follow up studies also might include measuring the actual performance of the lawyers, so that the relations between value, value fit, attitudes, actual attrition and performance could be investigated. As demonstrated in this study, ASA might have different effects in different career phases.

Application success as a measure for human capital has been used in preceding studies. Although the measurement of application performance in this study was new and requires further testing and developing, it offers a promising measure of human capital in P-O-fit studies, especially when a highly educated, professional workforce is involved. The use of application success measurement might be improved by repeating or adapting these measures in similar environments.

6. Implications for practice

P-O value fit between law firm and lawyer matters. Better fit is related to satisfaction, commitment and talent retention. Probably, P-O fit is also advantageous for performance (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Firm values are expressed by the expertise ambitions, by HRM and other management practices that are part of the archetypical character of the firm. The results of this research may motivate law firms (and other PSFs) to inspect and clearly establish their – aspired - archetypical character and to align their HRM practices according to this character. Aligned HRM practices – especially

recruitment, development and compensation – may promote the attraction and retention of fitting lawyers. Including distinctive firm values, especially concerning expertise and career ambitions, in employer branding and labor market communication might discourage some recruits to apply but may attract others that have a better chance to fit and contribute to the firm's success. By identifying the values that influence P-O fit and the different effects of the fit of different values, a firm might analyze the urgency, direction and character of organizational improvements; for instance, it can discover what values to address to reduce turnover or to improve satisfaction.

Firms that aspire to maintain or develop management and HRM practices that belong to the MPB configuration should be aware of the implicit tenacious professional values of the PP. These values probably have to be very explicitly and consistently countered, for instance to position alternative career tracks as attractive perspectives.

Starting lawyers (and other professionals) may conclude from the results of this research that they are advised to consider their work and career ambitions carefully – especially concerning their expertise development, the quality of the work environment they expect, their need for reward and feedback and their long term perspective; to investigate the values of prospective employers and to include the congruence between their own and the employer's values in their job search strategy.

Law firms are probably well aware that specific expertise ambitions of young lawyers can be very strong motivators; if not, this research may promote this awareness. Expertise ambitions may regard the specialist area, the level and the challenging nature of the work. There is a substantial risk of diminishing commitment and intentions to stay when firms cannot accommodate these ambitions. It appears vital for talent retention that these ambitions are expressed and that the firm can offer a genuine perspective of realizing them.

Lawyers with a high degree of self-confidence and human capital – as expressed in the quality of their resumes - prefer a moderate intensity of management and reward systems and a high level of expertise challenge and long term perspective. To satisfy and retain them, it appears advisable to let them discover their own ways of getting things done. They need feedback just like the others do, but rather by the direct appreciation for their performance than through elaborated appraisal or reward systems. Self-confidence defines the reaction of young lawyers to their work environment and their ambitions to a major degree. Fit and misfit of expertise, reward and career values have stronger effects among confident lawyers. To retain them,

it is vital that their expectations are recognized.

On the other hand, firms should be aware of the need for feedback and support at critical moments during traineeship. HR management for young lawyers is balancing between too much and too little involvement. In the PP, HRM may choose a position at a greater distance than in the MPB, but involvement nevertheless should be close enough to observe changes in wellbeing or development.

The lack of practice group and process management in the big law firms that I found confirmed in the interviews with young lawyers is remarkable. Firms that resemble the MPB showed some signs of practice group management, but these were exceptions. One would expect that the development of practice areas that need teamwork and coordination would have promoted a more conscientious style of case management at these firms. Specialization of legal services and complexity of legal issues increase. As in other professional services, more assignments have to be handled by multidisciplinary teams. But the individualistic, short term orientation of the law professional appears to have prevailed. Besides loss of effectiveness, of quality control and problem solving capacity, this deficiency may hinder the development and satisfaction of young lawyers. Although part of the law practice will always require an improvising, direct problem solving approach, big law firms – and their clients - might profit from applying some project and process management methods for handling (larger) cases. The MPB may be better suited for this management approach. In the PP, teamwork may remain more reliant on the informal mutual exchange by peers. Both type of firms however might consider a more coordinated and effective approach to practice and project management. Also, firms and law schools in The Netherlands could consider including practice and project management in their traineeship programs and curricula (Diloff, 2011).

My research has confirmed that variable pay systems should be designed with the utmost care, to avoid that demotivating effects outweigh the motivating. PP firms with a homogeneous professional workforce might do (almost) without. Performance related pay for professionals is not likely to have an incentive effect additional to the intrinsic motivation of professionals, but it might answer the need for distributive justice. Most firms may prefer moderate bonuses, linked to performance outcomes that lawyers themselves consider relevant and distinguishing. The more heterogeneous, MPB-like firms may need more extensive short term rewards and reward systems, but they also should consider the relevancy and distinctiveness of these systems to the lawyers. Formal reward and appraisals however do not substitute the

direct feedback by supervisors that young lawyers appreciate but often have to do without.

The apparent indifference of trainee lawyers towards partnership and a long term career perspective does not imply that advising and coaching them on their career possibilities is irrelevant. The surveys as well as the interviews demonstrated that the long term perspectives that firms could offer mattered to the lawyers even in the early career stages. Long term perspective values of the firm had stronger effects on attitudes than lawyers' personal values. Young lawyers seem inclined to a restrictive assessment of possibilities, for instance about the combination of work and family life, even before discussing their ideas with their firm. At least an unambiguous and early communication of possibilities, impossibilities and alternatives for career development would assist the lawyers to develop realistic ambitions; in line, of course, with the archetypical character of the firm.

Some outcomes of the surveys and interviews might suggest that within this generation of young professionals, group norms promote individual growth and work-life balance and limit the expression of strong career ambitions. This could imply the risk that such ambitions would go unnoticed and that the most ambitious lawyers leave for one of the few – possibly international – firms that recognize them.

Up-or-out in the professional service firm is not an outdated career policy. The relative occurrence in a growing service industry may decrease, as up-or-out will be less appropriate for the needs of an increasing part of the professionals who prefer an interesting job in a well organized firm with good opportunities to accommodate individual choices regarding career and work-life balance. However for the partner-centered firm that aims at the highest expert reputation and abilities, it remains the appropriate career policy. Firms that apply up-or-out may mitigate the consequences, the dismissal of non promoted lawyers; they may retain good lawyers who do not aspire or qualify for partnership without obscuring the nature of the system. Up-or-out also includes taking good care of lawyers that have to leave the firm.

More fundamentally, up-or-out and the partner-centered career still reflect the values and ambitions that are inherent to the professional tradition. Young professionals in the big law firms – and probably in the big international accountancy and consultancy firms as well – seem to be hovering between this tradition and the desire for a more balanced, perhaps more flexible personal development. Firms might be advised to address both needs, make clear what the possibilities are and support young professionals in their choices.

Nederlandse samenvatting

Inleiding

Het aantrekken en vasthouden van goede advocaten is essentieel voor de kwaliteit en de prestaties van advocatenkantoren en van de advocatuur als geheel. Door de verandering van de ambities, de grotere mobiliteit van jonge professionals en door de vergrijzing van de beroepsbevolking wordt dat een steeds grotere opgave. Het vinden van advocaten die goed passen bij het kantoor (een goede “fit” vormen) wordt lastiger naarmate de verschillen tussen advocaten en advocatenkantoren toenemen. Mijn onderzoek richtte zich op de factoren die deze fit bepalen, in het bijzonder de waarden en ambities van advocaten en kantoren.

P-O fit in dit onderzoek wordt gedefinieerd als de aansluiting tussen enerzijds het karakter van het advocatenkantoor en anderzijds de waarden en ambities van de advocaat. Het karakter van een advocatenkantoor kan worden getypeerd aan de hand van de archetypes van professional service firms. Ik verwachtte dat de HRM praktijken van een kantoor een goede indicatie zouden zijn voor het ‘archetypische’ karakter. Mijn hypothese was dat de tevredenheid en het commitment van de jonge advocaat en de intentie om bij kantoor te blijven zouden samenhangen met de mate van P-O fit. Verder veronderstelde ik dat deze relatie tussen fit en de effecten van fit weer beïnvloed (gemodereerd) zou worden door de core self-evaluations (zelfvertrouwen, zelfwaardering, afgekort als CSE) en door het human capital van de advocaat. De onderzoeksvragen worden weergegeven in het model van figuur 2 in de inleiding (Chapter 1).

HRM praktijken en archetypes

In hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik de methode om een onderscheid te maken tussen advocatenkantoren en het onderzoek naar de relevante verschillen. Dit onderscheid is nodig om de fit tussen kantoor en advocaat te kunnen

onderzoeken. De theorie van de archetypen van professional service firms beschrijft de meer traditionele professional partnership (PP) en de - meer recent ontstane - managed professional business (MPB). Door middel van interviews met de managing partners heb ik onderzocht, of deze archetypes herkenbaar zouden zijn onder de grote Nederlandse advocatenkantoren. Dit bleek inderdaad het geval. Uit de interviews en aanvullende gegevens kwam een duidelijke samenhang tussen HRM en het archetype van het kantoor naar voren. De PP heeft onder meer een up-or-out loopbaansysteem, geen of slechts incidentele permanente senior medewerkersposities, een vast salarisschema naar ervaringsjaren en hooguit een bescheiden variabele beloning. Bij de MPB horen een meer gedifferentieerde, geïndividualiseerde loopbaan, verschillende permanente senior medewerkersposities, prestatieafhankelijke salarisontwikkeling en substantiële variabele beloning.

De verwachte relatie tussen HRM enerzijds en de strategie en de inrichting van bestuur en organisatie anderzijds werd gedeeltelijk door het onderzoek bevestigd. PP-kantoren hebben eerder een focus op wetenschappelijke, vakinhoudelijke diepgang en een strategie van customisatie. Het partnerschap staat er centraal en de betrokkenheid van partners bij bestuur en organisatie is er intensiever; de partners komen vaker bijeen. Verder is er wel enig verschil in de mate waarin niet-partners in het management worden ingeschakeld en in de managementstructuur van de praktijkgroepen, maar deze verschillen waren minder overtuigend. Andere elementen, zoals management control en beoordelingssystemen leken eerder samen te hangen met de economische prestaties van het kantoor dan met archetypische kenmerken.

P-O fit

De hoofdstukken 3 en 4 beschrijven de opzet en uitkomsten van het kwantitatieve onderzoek. Met een tussenpoos van tien maanden werd tweemaal een vragenlijst aan jonge advocaten voorgelegd. Op de kenmerken van de archetypen baseerde ik de vragen over de waarden met betrekking tot expertise, management, korte termijn beloning en lange termijn perspectief. Ik onderzocht de P-O fit als de fit tussen de waarden van kantoor en advocaat met betrekking tot deze onderwerpen. Ik maakte daarbij onderscheid tussen objectieve fit en subjectieve fit. Objectieve fit is de overeenstemming tussen de feitelijke archetypische kenmerken van een kantoor en de waarden van de advocaat; subjectieve fit is de overeenkomst tussen de waarden van het kantoor volgens de perceptie van de advocaat en de waarden van de advocaat. Mijn hypothesen waren, dat objectieve en subjectieve fit zouden samenhangen met drie verschillende uitkomsten:

tevredenheid, commitment en de intentie om bij het kantoor te blijven. CSE en human capital zouden deze relatie tussen fit en uitkomsten modereren. Als maat voor human capital heb ik het sollicitatiesucces van de advocaten genomen, het relatieve aantal uitnodigingen voor een gesprek en het aantal aanbiedingen van een baan. De hypothesen waren, dat advocaten met hogere CSE en meer human capital meer extreme gevolgen van fit of misfit zouden aangeven, omdat zij eerder bereid zijn om af te gaan op de eigen waarden en de perceptie van het kantoor.

Objectieve fit bleek nauwelijks significante effecten te hebben. De subjectieve fit tussen de waarden van kantoor en advocaat met betrekking tot expertise, management, korte termijn beloning en lange termijn perspectief had significante effecten op de tevredenheid en het commitment van de advocaten. Fit van de waarden betreffende expertise en korte termijn beloning had eveneens effect op de intentie om bij het kantoor te blijven. Voor management, korte termijn beloning en lange termijn perspectief had misfit een sterker effect dan fit. De uitkomsten waren het laagst bij een combinatie van hoge waarden van de advocaat en lage waarden van het kantoor. Dit laatste komt overeen met eerdere observaties in fit onderzoek. In tegenstelling tot de verwachting bleek fit tot verschillende effecten te leiden naargelang het niveau van de waarden. De fit tussen lage waarden van kantoor en lage waarden van de advocaat met betrekking tot management en korte termijn beloning hing samen met hogere uitkomsten dan de fit tussen hoge waarden. Voor de waarden met betrekking tot expertise en lange termijn perspectief lag dit andersom: fit van hoge waarden leidde tot hogere uitkomsten. Bij de korte termijn beloning bepaalden vooral de waarden van de advocaat de hogere of lagere uitkomsten, terwijl bij lange termijn perspectief juist de waarden van kantoor de meest bepalende factor bleken. De effecten van fit op tevredenheid en commitment waren vergelijkbaar, waarbij de verschillen in tevredenheid iets groter waren.

CSE hadden het verwachte modererende effect; als de CSE hoog waren, hadden fit en misfit een sterker effect op de uitkomsten. Advocaten met hoge CSE bleken het meest tevreden bij een gemiddelde korte termijn beloning en een gematigd hoog lange termijn perspectief. Ook sollicitatiesucces bleek samen te hangen met meer extreme effecten van de P-O fit van sommige waarden. Advocaten met veel sollicitatiesucces hadden de sterkste intentie om te blijven als er een fit was tussen hoge waarden met betrekking tot korte termijn beloning en lange termijn perspectief. Het sterkste effect van de fit van management waarden lag daarentegen juist bij een laag niveau van de waarden.

Het onderzoek bevestigde de hypothesen over subjectieve P-O fit, niet die over objectieve fit. De hypothesen over de effecten van CSE en sollicitatiesucces op subjectieve fit werden eveneens bevestigd. Het ontbreken van significante resultaten voor objectieve fit betekent niet dat er geen enkel verband was tussen objectieve en subjectieve fit. De perceptie van de waarden op het gebied van expertise en korte termijn beloning bleken samen te hangen met het feitelijke archetypische karakter van het kantoor.

Veranderingen in fit en fit effecten

In hoofdstuk 5 analyseer ik de verschillen tussen de beide vragenlijstonderzoeken en beschrijf ik de uitkomsten van interviews met jonge advocaten. Slechts 38 advocaten hadden beide vragenlijsten ingevuld, onvoldoende voor solide statistische analyses van de veranderingen. Ik heb in de antwoorden van deze 38 advocaten gezocht naar patronen in de veranderingen. In de helft van de gevallen was er een daling van de tevredenheid, het commitment en de intentie om bij kantoor te blijven. In 25 gevallen correspondeerde de toename of afname van fit met een toename of afname van de uitkomsten. Deze waarnemingen ondersteunen de verwachte relatie tussen veranderingen van fit en verandering van attitudes uit het P-O fit onderzoek. Veranderingen in de persoonlijke waarden van de jonge advocaten, of in hun perceptie van de waarden van hun kantoor, kunnen leiden tot meer of minder fit. Deze veranderingen hangen dan weer samen met de verandering van tevredenheid, commitment en de intentie om te blijven.

Interviews jonge advocaten

Interviews met 11 jonge advocaten uit de onderzoeksgroep illustreerden de effecten van fit en misfit die uit de vragenlijsten naar voren kwamen. Voor bijna alle advocaten is het kunnen ontwikkelen van hun vakinhoudelijke expertise essentieel. Deze ambities worden soms teleurgesteld door de aard van het werk, door verandering van praktijkgebied of omdat het niet mogelijk blijkt om te werken op het rechtsgebied van voorkeur. Belangrijke aspecten van het management waren voor jonge advocaten het management van de eigen praktijkgroep, het management van de werkprocessen en projecten en het optreden van het kantoormanagement op kritieke momenten. Materiële korte termijn beloning bleek nauwelijks relevant voor de advocaten bij kantoren die op de PP lijken, maar wel werd het gebrek aan immateriële feedback als gemis ervaren. Advocaten bij de MPB hechten meer belang aan een gedifferentieerde beloning. Slechts één geïnterviewde advocaat uitte een uitdrukkelijke ambitie om partner te worden. Bij enkele anderen stond deze ambitie meer op de achtergrond; de meesten schrokken terug

van de consequenties van het partnerschap voor het werk-privé evenwicht. Niettemin stelden de meeste advocaten het op prijs wanneer het kantoor hen duidelijke lange termijn perspectieven biedt. In de MPB zijn voor sommige advocaten de alternatieve posities zoals salaried partner een serieus alternatief voor het partnerschap.

Discussie

In hoofdstuk zes bespreek ik na de samenvatting van de uitkomsten vier centrale thema's die uit het onderzoek naar voren kwamen: de aard en betekenis van de archetypes PP en MPB, het onderscheidende karakter van de HRM praktijken, de betekenis van de waarden met betrekking tot expertise, management, korte termijn beloning en lange termijn perspectief en de relaties tussen archetypen, HRM, professionele waarden en de aantrekkingskracht op jonge professionals. Ik schets de beperkingen en de implicaties van het onderzoek voor de theorie en de praktijk.

Appendices

Appendix I. Interview items managing partners and opposite responses		
General	PP	MPB
1 Reputation within top 20 law firms – among corporate business environment.	Top 1-3.	Outside top 20.
2 Focus of reputation: what is the essential perception of quality in the firm’s services?	Scientific, creative solutions, judged by law community.	Client service and satisfaction, judged by clients and general public.
3 Annual management (policy and control) cycle.	Planning and budgeting by staff and board, roughly, concise documents.	Detailed processes and documents, extensive involvement of board, staff and practice group managers; sharply managed follow up.
4 Rate level.	Top 1-5.	Average to bottom
5 Profits pro partner.	Top (800+) is essential to retain talent.	Relatively low, < 300k.
6 Commercial strategy and operations.	Focused on reputation and commercial abilities of partners with modest support of marketing department (smaller than average), mainly supportive.	Strategic commercial planning and operations, centrally executed or coordinated, large marketing department pro actively involved in business development. Managed business development and sales, planning and targeting.
7 Customization vs Commoditization.	Focus on customization (knowledge management focuses on supporting innovation, new solutions).	Focus on commoditization (Standards and models, best practices, leveraging of methods).

Partnership		
8 Timing partner admission process.	Early (6th-9th year).	Late, 8th – 12th year.
9 Length partner admission process.	Short, 1 year.	Long, > 2 years.
10 Profit sharing.	Equal shares/lock step.	Differentiated shares, performance or merit based.
11 Tolerance for (marginal, temporary) underperformance.	Tolerant. Efforts directed at improvement, consequences only after several years.	Intolerant, directly followed by dismissal or share reduction through differentiated profit shares.
12 Consequences of underperformance.	Dismissal.	Share reduction.
13 Partnership culture.	Partner-culture. Close group, loyal, solidary, stable; frequent informal contacts, work related and private. Partnership is dominant in culture and systems of the firm.	Partnership is the highest position, but only as a specific position within the firm with business responsibility. Partnership is one of possible career choices. Relationships among partners do not stand out from others. Partner group is less stable, more frequent changes.
Governance		
14 What range of authority is reserved for the partners vs. the board?	Broad range of subjects discussed by partners, strategic but also several operations issues e.g. lateral staffing, HR-policies, budgets, communication. Frequent informal consultation of partners on board issues.	Narrow. Partner involvement is limited to only the most crucial strategic matters, annual budget en reports, selection of board and admission of partners.

15 Frequency and character of partner meetings.	Frequent, monthly plus frequent informal occasions.	Infrequent, formal meetings (< 4/year), content restricted to formal range of authority.
16 What is the highest level of managers/non-professionals?	Operational management and assistance to board members, no or limited authority in partner issues.	Board position and authority, strategic involvement, also in partner matters.
17 Practice group management.	Subsidiary responsibility of a partner, < 10% of time, mostly facilitating and coordinating partner (inter)action; communication channel with board.	Extensive, integral responsibility of a partner; Financial, commercial, Hr Formal delegation of management authority. Practice group managers have formal dispensation for management tasks. Possibly several management levels.
Staffing		
18 Leverage ratio.	Low < 2,5.	High > 4.
19 Permanent senior associate positions.	No (only opportunistic and incidental).	Two or more different end-of-career senior positions, part of staffing strategy, several different roles.
20 Lateral hiring.	Incidental, in case of urgency; to fill in gaps; from outside law firms.	Structural (> 25% of senior staffing), frequent, part of policy; from other law firms as well.
Human Resources		
21 Importance of partnership perspective for associate promotion.	At least some perspective is conditional.	None.
22 Turnover.	High in 7-9th year, connected to partnership wishes/decision.	Average turnover rates, no specific peaks, until after 10/11 years.

23 Salary systems.	Fixed tenure based, no performance link.	Performance based.
24 Performance related variable pay, bonuses.	No.	High (>20% annual income).
25 Criteria variable pay system.	If so, financial results.	Multiple qualitative and financial criteria.
26 Strictness of evaluation for promotion to (senior) associate.	Strict, especially intellectual and technical skills, broad margin for other competencies.	Flexible, related to competencies that are relevant for position.
27 Up-or-out career system.	Yes.	No.
28 Perspective for non-promoted.	departure.	other career paths.
29 Outplacement opportunities.	Extensive and successful use of firms network (>80%).	Incidental use of firms network.
<i>Mentoring en Development:</i>		
30 In house trainee program replaces standard programs bar association.	Yes.	No.
31 Participant Law Academy.	No.	No.
32 Formal, separate mentoring structure.	No.	Yes.

Items that were non distinguishing and excluded from analysis

- 1** Goodwill
- 2** Critical partnership criteria
- 3** Performance monitoring and evaluation
- 4** Number of management levels in practice organization structure
- 5** Number of management levels support departments
- 6** Paralegal staffing
- 7** Critical selection criteria trainees/new entrants
- 8** Critical promotion criteria to associate position
- 9** General vs. job specific selection and promotion criteria
- 10** Performance monitoring and evaluation
- 11** Promotion ratios

Appendix II. Survey items

Lawyers' values

- Exp** Een bijdrage leveren aan de ontwikkeling van het recht en het rechtssysteem
- Mgmt** Precies weten wat de organisatie van mij verwacht
- Short** Extra beloond worden wanneer mijn prestaties en inzet bovengemiddeld zijn
- Long** Weten dat mijn kansen om partner te worden toenemen wanneer ik goed presteer
- Partner** Een bekende en gerenommeerde advocaat worden
- Exp** Mij van andere advocaten onderscheiden door mijn vakkennis
MGMT In een kantoor werken met duidelijke regels en taakverdelingen
- Short** Werken bij een kantoor dat verschillende prestaties van advocaten verschillend beloont
- Long** Bij een kantoor werken waar ik partner kan worden
- Partner** Tot de top van mijn organisatie behoren
- Exp** Ingewikkelde juridische vraagstukken goed en tot in detail oplossen
- Mgmt** Bij een kantoor werken dat mij de keuze biedt uit verschillende loopbaanmogelijkheden na de stage
- Short** Direct de waardering krijgen van de organisatie voor goede prestaties
- Long** Weten of ik partner kan worden
- Partner** Een positie verwerven waarin ik de koers van de organisatie mede kan bepalen
- Exp** Door collega's gerespecteerd worden als een toonaangevend specialist
- Mgmt** Bij een organisatie werken die mij inkomenszekerheid biedt
- Short** Bij een kantoor werken waar je voor langere termijn advocaat-medewerker kunt blijven als je dat wilt
- Long** Bij een kantoor werken waar alleen de allerbeste advocaten partner kunnen worden
- Partner** Zelf kunnen beslissen voor welke cliënten ik werk en op welke manier

Firm Values

- Exp** Het kantoor wil een bijdrage leveren aan de ontwikkeling van het recht en het rechtssysteem
- Mgmt** De organisatie laat mij precies weten wat er van mij wordt verwacht
- Short** Dit kantoor betaalt extra voor bijzondere inzet en prestaties
- Long** Dit kantoor maakt duidelijk dat mijn kansen om partner te worden toenemen wanneer ik goed presteer

Partner	Om succes te hebben bij dit kantoor moet je een bekende en gerenommeerde advocaat worden
Exp	Dit kantoor waardeert het als ingewikkelde juridische vraagstukken goed en tot in detail worden opgelost
Mgmt	Dit kantoor heeft duidelijke regels en taakverdelingen
Short	Dit kantoor beloont de advocaten verschillend naar gelang ieders prestaties
Long	Als ik wil en de capaciteiten laat zien kan ik bij dit kantoor partner worden
Partner	De partners van dit kantoor vormen een duidelijk aparte groep
Exp	De partners van dit kantoor worden door collega's gerespecteerd als toonaangevende specialisten
Mgmt	Dit kantoor biedt advocaat-medewerkers keuze uit verschillende loopbaantrajecten
Short	Deze organisatie zorgt dat goede prestaties direct waardering krijgen
Long	Dit kantoor laat mij zo snel mogelijk weten of ik partner kan worden
Partner	De koers van dit kantoor wordt bepaald door alle partners gezamenlijk
Exp	Ervaren advocaten van dit kantoor dienen zich van andere advocaten te onderscheiden door hun vakkennis
Mgmt	Dit kantoor biedt mij inkomenszekerheid
Short	Het is mogelijk voor lange termijn als advocaat-medewerker bij dit kantoor te blijven werken
Long	Alleen de allerbeste advocaten kunnen bij dit kantoor partner worden
Partner	Een partner bij dit kantoor beslist autonoom voor welke cliënten hij of zij werkt en op welke manier
Satis	Alles bij elkaar genomen bevalt mijn huidige werk als advocaat mij goed
Commit	Ik ben er trots op bij dit kantoor te werken
Satis	Alles overziend ben ik niet tevreden met mijn baan
Commit	Ik heb niet het gevoel dat ik er echt bij hoor in dit kantoor
Satis	Ik werk met plezier bij dit kantoor
Commit	Ik zet me graag in voor kantoor ook buiten wat normaal van mij wordt verwacht
Int to Stay	Hoe lang verwacht u bij uw huidige kantoor te blijven werken als u dat zelf kunt bepalen? Kies de mogelijkheid die u op dit moment het meest waarschijnlijk vindt.
Int to Stay	Als u uw huidige kantoor zou verlaten wilt u dan advocaat blijven bij een ander kantoor of denkt u de advocatuur te verlaten?

- CSE** Ik heb er vertrouwen in dat ik in mijn leven het succes zal hebben dat ik verdien
- CSE** Soms voel ik mij depressief
- CSE** Als ik mijn best doe lukken de dingen die ik onderneem meestal
- CSE** Soms voel ik me waardeloos als iets mislukt
- CSE** Ik breng mijn taken tot een goed einde
- CSE** Soms heb ik het gevoel dat ik geen controle heb over mijn werk
- CSE** Alles bij elkaar genomen ben ik tevreden over mezelf
- CSE** Ik ben vol twijfel over mijn capaciteiten
- CSE** Ik bepaal zelf wat er in mijn leven gebeurt
- CSE** Ik heb het gevoel dat ik succes in mijn werk niet in eigen hand heb
- CSE** Ik ben in staat om goed om te gaan met de meeste problemen
- CSE** Er zijn momenten waarop alles me nogal grauw en hopeloos lijkt
- AS** Hoeveel sollicitatiebrieven hebt u gestuurd aan advocatenkantoren (maak zonodig een schatting)?
- AS** Door hoeveel kantoren bent u uitgenodigd voor een gesprek?
- AS** Van hoeveel kantoren heeft u een aanbieding gehad om te komen werken?
- Gender** Wat is uw geslacht?
- Age** Wat is uw leeftijd?
- Firm** Bij welk kantoor bent u werkzaam? (Uiteraard behandelen wij ook deze informatie strikt vertrouwelijk)

Appendix III. Means, Standard Deviations And Correlations

Table A: Survey 1

	Mean	SD	EL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Exp lawyers	4.10	0.55																
2. Mgmt lawyers	3.62	0.63	0.159															
3. Short lawyers	3.44	0.61	0.168	0.364(**)														
4. Long lawyers	3.23	0.89	0.131	-0.147	0.410(**)													
5. Exp firm	4.06	0.64	0.187	-0.065	0.082	-0.155												
6. Mgmt firm	3.51	0.60	0.094	-0.024	-0.123	0.026-	0.294(**)											
7. Short firm	2.87	0.85	0.027	0.178	0.081	0.116-	0.309(**)	0.136										
8. Long firm	2.97	0.76	0.136	0.061	0.077	0.214(*)	0.219(*)	0.219(*)	0.163									
9. Commitment	4.03	0.78	0.114	-0.113	-0.06	0.043	0.372(**)	0.372(**)	0.064	0.364(**)								
10. Satisfaction	3.99	0.95	0.105	0.215-(*)	-0.205(*)	0.083-	0.302(**)	0.348(**)	0.108	0.250(*)	0.891(**)							
11. CSE	3.77	0.51	0.09	-0.071	-0.155	0.065	0.188	0.059-	0.003	0.025	0.161	0.366(**)						
12. Appl succes 2:1	0.93	0.16	0.105-	-0.204	0.101	0.234(*)	0.135	0.001-	-0.107	0.017	0.032	0.101	0.099	0.017	0.152			
13. Appl succes 3:2	0.77	0.28	0.069	0.056	0.104	0.104	0.135	0.001-	0.107	-0.142	0.15	0.218(*)	-0.002	-0.022	-0.014			
14. Intention to stay	2.29	0.88	0.254(*)	-0.11	-0.230(*)	0.123	0.177	0.254(*)	0.058	0.058	0.237(*)	0.431(**)	0.478(**)	0.129	-0.014	-0.008		
15. PPMFB all	2.51	0.62	0.297-(**)	-0.057	0.227(*)	0.176	0.260-(*)	-0.015	0.262(*)	0.012-	0.012-	-0.012	0.039	-0.06	0.189	-0.134	-0.069	
16. Gender	1.58	0.50	0.063	0.167	-0.003	0.247-(*)	0.103-	0.103-	0.032	0.208	0.063-	-0.004	0.057	-0.115	-0.017	-0.095	-0.034	0.163
17. Age	26.22	2.30	0.014-	0.119	0.052	0.023	0.146	-0.098	0.141	0.141	0.101	-0.047	-0.069	0.134	-0.11	-0.124	-0.093	-0.041

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

- Exp Expertise values
- Mgmt Management values
- Short Short term reward values
- Long Long term perspective values
- CSE Core self evaluations
- PPMFB all Firm scores on all archetype elements together

Gender is coded as 1 = male, 2 = female

Table A: Survey 2

	Mean	SD	EL	ML	SL	LL	EF	MF	SF	LF	Commit	Satis	CSE	AS 2-1	AS 3-2	IRS	PPMPBot	Gender
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	17	18
1. Exp lawyers	4.04	0.71																
2. Mgmt lawyers	3.45	0.60	0.394**															
3. Short lawyers	3.49	0.64	0.464**	0.534**														
4. Long lawyers	3.07	0.80	0.360**	0.223	0.546**													
5. Exp firm	3.93	0.71	0.215	0.090	0.036-	0.123-	0.496**											
6. Mgmt firm	3.44	0.61	0.070-	0.368**	0.126	0.120	0.114	0.415**										
7. Short firm	2.96	0.83	0.190-	0.079	0.010	0.012-	0.114	0.415**										
8. Long firm	2.92	0.72	0.108-	0.062-	0.110-	0.200	0.172	0.362**	0.419**									
9. Commitment	3.66	0.67	0.270*	0.042	0.005	0.005	0.413**	0.221	0.094	0.381**								
10. Satisfaction	3.89	0.75	0.293*	0.020-	0.003-	0.148	0.236*	0.133	0.011	0.217	0.709**							
11. CSE	3.76	0.51	0.181	0.096-	0.206	0.154	0.183	0.155	0.134	0.171	0.349**	0.438**						
12. Appli succes 2-1	0.99	0.35	0.210-	0.149-	0.106-	0.015-	0.127-	0.056-	0.106-	0.053-	0.045-	0.024	0.072					
13. Appli succes 3-2	0.74	0.32	0.060	0.216-	0.232-	0.072-	0.173	0.027	0.096-	0.177	0.149	0.218	0.000	0.139				
14. Intention to stay	2.16	0.78	0.280*	0.098	0.085-	0.103	0.229	0.134	0.008-	0.197	0.538**	0.528**	0.143	0.015-	0.173			
17. PPMPB all	2.50	0.60	0.044-	0.040	0.247	0.056	0.387-	0.033-	0.430**	0.106	0.111-	0.095-	0.218	0.044	0.128-	0.111	0.181	
18. Gender	1.66	0.48	0.071-	0.225	0.107	0.169-	0.014-	0.009-	0.003	0.066-	0.032	0.056	0.260**	0.001-	0.064-	0.009-	0.079	0.363**
19. Age	27.02	2.17	0.137	0.072-	0.155	0.134	0.063	0.001-	0.040	0.127	0.029	0.025-	0.150	0.054-	0.186-	0.086	0.079	

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

- Exp Expertise values
- Mgmt Management values
- Short Short term reward values
- Long Long term perspective values
- CSE Core self evaluations
- PPMPB all Firm scores on all archetype elements together

Appendix IV

Variance explained (R^2) of the polynomial regression analyses of objective fit between lawyers' values and the archetype (PP-MPB) scores of their firms.

Table A. R^2 and p.'s of the regressions, survey T1

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R^2	p.	R^2	p.	R^2	p.
Expertise	0.081	0.292	0.037	0.737	0.216	0.003
Management	0.060	0.488	0.032	0.806	0.083	0.287
Short term reward	0.088	0.254	0.073	0.370	0.117	0.113
Long term perspective	0.100	0.192	0.055	0.557	0.137	0.066

Table B. R^2 and p.'s of the regressions, survey T2

Values	Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay	
	R^2	p.	R^2	p.	R^2	p.
Expertise	0.107	0.383	0.176	0.118	0.201	0.065
Management	0.068	0.644	0.024	0.950	0.058	0.727
Short term reward	0.055	0.752	0.036	0.890	0.062	0.691
Long term perspective	0.058	0.735	0.041	0.862	0.060	0.716

Appendix V. Coefficients of slopes and curvatures

Table A: Survey 1

Expertise Values	Satisfaction			Commitment			Intention to stay					
	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ
Fit slope	-0,25	0,13	-1,85	0,07	-0,21	0,11	-1,89	0,06	-0,34	0,12	-2,70	0,01
Fit curvature	0,23	0,16	1,48	0,14	0,17	0,14	1,21	0,23	0,21	0,15	1,34	0,18
Misfit slope	0,21	0,16	1,28	0,20	0,18	0,14	1,28	0,20	-0,10	0,15	-0,64	0,52
Misfit curvature	-0,15	0,18	-0,85	0,40	-0,12	0,16	-0,75	0,46	-0,27	0,17	-1,61	0,11
Moderated by CSE	0,19	0,16	1,19	0,24	0,05	0,14	0,32	0,75				
Fit slope	0,20	0,19	1,06	0,29	0,28	0,17	1,63	0,11				
Fit curvature	-0,26	0,16	-1,63	0,11	0,25	0,14	1,76	0,08				
Misfit slope	-0,29	0,19	-1,53	0,13	-0,19	0,17	-1,09	0,28				
Misfit curvature	-0,11	0,16	-0,69	0,49	-0,11	0,16	-0,69	0,49				
Moderated by CSE	0,17	0,20	0,83	0,41	0,17	0,20	0,83	0,41				
Fit slope	0,02	0,16	0,15	0,88	0,02	0,16	0,15	0,88				
Fit curvature	-0,17	0,20	-0,85	0,40	-0,17	0,20	-0,85	0,40				
Misfit slope												
Misfit curvature												

Management Values		Satisfaction		Commitment		Intention to stay		
	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ
	0,04	0,14	0,29	0,77	0,15	0,12	1,32	0,19
Fit slope	0,13	0,15	0,88	0,38	0,07	0,13	0,51	0,61
Fit curvature	-0,21	0,14	-1,56	0,12	-0,11	0,12	-0,91	0,37
Misfit slope	-0,36	0,13	-2,70	0,01	-0,23	0,12	-2,00	0,05
Misfit curvature	-0,16	0,14	-1,09	0,28	-0,11	0,13	-0,83	0,41
Moderated by CSE	-0,40	0,16	-2,42	0,02	-0,23	0,15	-1,53	0,13
Fit slope	-0,16	0,14	-1,09	0,28	-0,34	0,13	-2,62	0,01
Misfit slope	-0,21	0,16	-1,26	0,21	-0,14	0,15	-0,94	0,35
Misfit curvature	-0,02	0,14	-0,13	0,90	0,10	0,12	0,81	0,42
Moderated by AS1	-0,09	0,14	-0,61	0,55	-0,03	0,13	-0,25	0,81
Fit slope	-0,12	0,14	-0,91	0,37	-0,12	0,12	-0,97	0,34
Misfit slope	-0,24	0,14	-1,67	0,10	-0,15	0,13	-1,16	0,25
Misfit curvature	-0,52	0,33	-1,60	0,11	0,09	0,17	0,53	0,60
Moderated by AS2	0,83	0,39	2,15	0,03	0,11	0,42	0,26	0,79
Fit slope	-0,16	0,33	-0,48	0,63	-0,52	0,17	-3,16	0,00
Misfit slope	-1,17	0,39	-3,04	0,00	-0,37	0,42	-0,88	0,38
Misfit curvature	-0,29	0,44	-0,65	0,52	0,126	0,40	0,32	0,75
Moderated by AS1	0,56	0,54	1,04	0,30	0,083	0,48	0,17	0,86
Fit slope	-0,21	0,44	-0,48	0,63	-0,364	0,40	-0,91	0,37
Misfit slope	-0,86	0,54	-1,60	0,11	-0,331	0,48	-0,69	0,49
Misfit curvature	-0,08	0,16	-0,49	0,62	0,019	0,14	0,14	0,89
Moderated by AS2	0,12	0,17	0,69	0,49	0,106	0,14	0,74	0,46
Fit slope	-0,29	0,16	-1,84	0,07	-0,101	0,14	-0,74	0,46
Misfit slope	-0,52	0,17	-3,14	0,00	-0,31	0,14	-2,17	0,03
Misfit curvature	-0,03	0,17	-0,20	0,84	0,07	0,15	0,49	0,63
Moderated by AS2	0,16	0,19	0,81	0,42	0,11	0,17	0,68	0,50
Fit slope	-0,27	0,17	-1,59	0,11	-0,11	0,15	-0,77	0,44
Misfit slope	-0,35	0,19	-1,82	0,07	-0,24	0,17	-1,45	0,15
Misfit curvature								

Short term reward Values		Satisfaction			Commitment			Intention to stay					
		B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ
	Fit slope	-0,16	0,14	-1,20	0,23	-0,04	0,12	-0,35	0,73	-0,15	0,13	-1,18	0,24
	Fit curvature	0,16	0,14	1,14	0,26	0,06	0,13	0,47	0,64	0,05	0,14	0,38	0,71
	Misfit slope	-0,33	0,14	-2,40	0,02	-0,13	0,12	-1,09	0,28	-0,34	0,14	-2,34	0,02
	Misfit curvature	-0,47	0,16	-2,97	0,00	-0,23	0,13	-1,76	0,08	-0,17	0,16	-1,10	0,27
Moderated	Fit slope	0,00	0,14	0,03	0,98								
by CSE	Fit curvature	0,05	0,16	0,30	0,76								
high level	Misfit slope	-0,39	0,14	-2,71	0,01								
	Misfit curvature	-0,43	0,16	-2,77	0,01								
Moderated	Fit slope	-0,12	0,15	-0,77	0,45								
by CSE	Fit curvature	0,12	0,16	0,72	0,48								
low level	Misfit slope	-0,35	0,15	-2,31	0,02								
	Misfit curvature	-0,42	0,16	-2,56	0,01								
Moderated	Fit slope	-0,38	0,26	-1,45	0,15					-0,52	0,53	-0,99	0,33
by AS1	Fit curvature	0,12	0,30	0,40	0,69					0,76	0,61	1,23	0,22
high level	Misfit slope	-0,58	0,26	-2,23	0,03					-0,41	0,53	-0,78	0,44
	Misfit curvature	-0,19	0,30	-0,62	0,54					0,01	0,61	0,01	0,99
Moderated	Fit slope	-0,36	0,32	-1,14	0,26					-0,45	0,61	-0,74	0,46
by AS1	Fit curvature	0,19	0,37	0,52	0,61					0,58	0,70	0,82	0,41
low level	Misfit slope	-0,53	0,32	-1,68	0,10					-0,41	0,61	-0,67	0,50
	Misfit curvature	-0,22	0,37	-0,60	0,55					0,04	0,70	0,06	0,96
Moderated	Fit slope	-0,17	0,15	-1,13	0,26					0,02	0,14	0,12	0,90
by AS2	Fit curvature	0,17	0,17	0,99	0,32					-0,08	0,15	-0,52	0,61
high level	Misfit slope	-0,59	0,15	-3,87	0,00					-0,46	0,14	-3,28	0,00
	Misfit curvature	-0,62	0,17	-3,66	0,00					-0,30	0,15	-1,97	0,05
Moderated	Fit slope	-0,15	0,15	-0,97	0,33					-0,04	0,14	-0,30	0,76
by AS2	Fit curvature	0,18	0,18	1,00	0,32					0,03	0,16	0,16	0,87
low level	Misfit slope	-0,46	0,15	-2,95	0,00					-0,47	0,14	-3,29	0,00
	Misfit curvature	-0,47	0,18	-2,61	0,01					-0,19	0,16	-1,18	0,24

Long term perspective values	Satisfaction			Commitment			Intention to stay					
	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ
Fit slope	-0,05	0,11	-0,49	0,62	-0,20	0,09	-2,20	0,03	-0,24	0,12	-2,02	0,05
Fit curvature	0,16	0,10	1,56	0,12	0,16	0,10	1,63	0,11	0,13	0,11	1,14	0,26
Misfit slope	0,58	0,16	3,71	0,00	0,40	0,13	3,11	0,00	0,10	0,16	0,59	0,56
Misfit curvature	-0,50	0,15	-3,30	0,00	-0,41	0,12	-3,57	0,00	-0,22	0,16	-1,38	0,17
Moderated by CSE	-0,25	0,13	-1,92	0,06	-0,33	0,11	-2,89	0,00				
Fit slope	-0,14	0,13	-1,05	0,30	-0,16	0,11	-1,38	0,17				
Misfit slope	0,26	0,13	1,98	0,05	0,47	0,11	4,15	0,00				
Misfit curvature	-0,86	0,13	-6,67	0,00	-0,69	0,11	-6,09	0,00				
Moderated by AS1	-0,11	0,13	-0,84	0,40	-0,31	0,12	-2,64	0,01				
Fit slope	0,03	0,14	0,19	0,85	0,02	0,12	0,16	0,88				
Misfit slope	0,44	0,13	3,29	0,00	0,35	0,12	3,00	0,00				
Misfit curvature	-0,52	0,14	-3,74	0,00	-0,43	0,12	-3,53	0,00				
Moderated by AS1	-0,29	0,20	-1,45	0,15	-0,31	0,16	-1,88	0,06				
Fit slope	0,18	0,18	0,96	0,34	-0,04	0,15	-0,26	0,80				
Misfit slope	0,50	0,20	2,47	0,02	0,54	0,16	3,33	0,00				
Misfit curvature	-0,36	0,18	-1,93	0,06	-0,38	0,15	-2,54	0,01				
Moderated by AS1	-0,24	0,22	-1,08	0,28	-0,293	0,18	-1,64	0,11				
Fit slope	0,18	0,20	0,93	0,35	0,022	0,16	0,14	0,89				
Misfit slope	0,51	0,22	2,29	0,02	0,505	0,18	2,82	0,01				
Misfit curvature	-0,37	0,20	-1,86	0,07	-0,37	0,16	-2,34	0,02				
Moderated by AS2	-0,16	0,15	-1,10	0,27	-0,31	0,12	-2,54	0,01	-0,59	0,15	-4,00	0,00
Fit slope	0,02	0,16	0,11	0,91	0,13	0,13	1,01	0,32	-0,28	2,72	-0,10	0,92
Misfit slope	1,13	0,15	7,68	0,00	0,84	0,12	6,94	0,00	0,56	0,15	3,79	0,00
Misfit curvature	-0,77	0,16	-4,76	0,00	-0,57	0,13	-4,27	0,00	-0,29	2,72	-0,11	0,91
Moderated by AS2	-0,13	0,15	-0,86	0,41	-0,25	0,13	-1,97	0,05	-0,47	0,15	-3,08	0,00
Fit slope	0,08	0,18	0,42	0,68	0,53	0,15	3,55	0,00	-0,14	0,18	-0,77	0,44
Misfit slope	0,87	0,15	5,69	0,00	0,62	0,13	4,92	0,00	0,33	0,15	2,18	0,03
Misfit curvature	-0,58	0,18	-3,22	0,00	-0,09	0,15	-0,64	0,53	-0,27	0,18	-1,49	0,14

Table B: Survey 2

Expertise Values	Satisfaction			Commitment			Intention to stay					
	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ
Fit slope	0,31	0,18	1,68	0,10	0,39	0,16	2,45	0,02	0,34	0,18	1,86	0,07
Fit curvature	0,07	0,13	0,56	0,57	0,05	0,11	0,46	0,65	0,02	0,13	0,17	0,87
Misfit slope	0,20	0,18	1,10	0,28	0,10	0,16	0,64	0,52	0,44	0,18	2,40	0,02
Misfit curvature	-0,16	0,13	-1,21	0,23	-0,05	0,11	-0,44	0,66	-0,06	0,13	-0,46	0,64
Moderated	0,07	0,21	0,33	0,75	0,32	0,19	1,70	0,09	0,30	0,21	1,42	0,16
by CSE	0,12	0,17	0,68	0,50	-0,02	0,15	-0,11	0,91	0,29	0,17	1,72	0,09
high level	-0,38	0,21	-1,75	0,08	-0,15	0,19	-0,81	0,42	0,57	0,21	2,71	0,01
Misfit curvature	-0,20	0,17	-1,18	0,24	0,16	0,15	1,10	0,27	0,18	0,17	1,10	0,27
Moderated	0,19	0,20	0,97	0,34	0,35	0,17	2,02	0,05	0,27	0,19	1,42	0,16
by CSE	0,05	0,17	0,27	0,78	0,11	0,15	0,69	0,49	0,09	0,17	0,50	0,62
low level	-0,07	0,20	-0,35	0,72	0,01	0,17	0,03	0,97	0,49	0,19	2,56	0,01
Misfit curvature	0,05	0,17	0,31	0,76	0,13	0,15	0,85	0,40	0,05	0,17	0,29	0,77
Moderated	2,27	0,49	4,58	0,00	1,71	0,42	4,04	0,00	1,27	0,49	2,58	0,01
Fit slope	0,30	0,53	0,57	0,57	0,63	0,45	1,39	0,17	-0,56	0,53	-1,07	0,29
Fit curvature	-1,56	0,49	-3,15	0,00	-2,19	0,42	-5,19	0,00	-1,81	0,49	-3,68	0,00
Misfit slope	-0,02	0,53	-0,03	0,97	0,48	0,45	1,06	0,29	-1,13	0,53	-2,15	0,04
Misfit curvature	0,89	0,54	1,66	0,10	0,99	0,46	2,16	0,03	0,80	0,53	1,49	0,14
Moderated	0,17	0,56	0,30	0,76	0,43	0,48	0,89	0,38	-0,32	0,56	-0,56	0,58
by AS1	-1,00	0,54	-1,87	0,07	-0,98	0,46	-2,13	0,04	-0,72	0,53	-1,35	0,18
low level	-0,34	0,56	-0,61	0,55	0,15	0,48	0,30	0,77	-0,78	0,56	-1,38	0,17
Misfit curvature	0,61	0,53	1,15	0,26	0,612	0,53	1,15	0,26	0,32	0,53	0,60	0,55
Moderated	-0,11	0,45	-0,24	0,81	-0,107	0,45	-0,24	0,81	-0,49	0,44	-1,10	0,28
by AS2	0,17	0,53	0,32	0,75	0,168	0,53	0,32	0,75	0,53	0,53	1,00	0,32
high level	-0,27	0,45	-0,61	0,54	-0,273	0,45	-0,61	0,54	-0,31	0,44	-0,70	0,49
Misfit curvature	0,33	0,77	0,43	0,67	0,38	0,67	0,57	0,57	0,39	0,77	0,50	0,62
Moderated	-0,05	0,64	-0,08	0,93	0,09	0,67	0,16	0,88	0,02	0,65	0,03	0,98
by AS2	0,19	0,77	0,24	0,81	0,12	0,67	0,18	0,85	0,36	0,77	0,47	0,64
low level	-0,66	0,64	-1,03	0,31	-0,07	0,57	-0,13	0,90	-0,15	0,65	-0,24	0,81
Misfit curvature												

Management Values		Satisfaction		(T) test		Commitment		(T) test		ρ
		B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	
	Fit slope	0,10	0,15	0,15	0,52	0,12	0,15	0,84	0,40	
	Fit curvature	0,24	0,14	1,69	0,10	0,10	0,14	0,70	0,49	
	Misfit slope	-0,32	0,15	-2,07	0,04	-0,31	0,15	-2,12	0,04	
	Misfit curvature	-0,44	0,14	-3,06	0,00	-0,27	0,14	-1,99	0,05	
Moderated by CSE	Fit slope	0,15	0,20	0,76	0,45					
	Fit curvature	0,33	0,23	1,46	0,15					
high level	Misfit slope	-0,77	0,20	-3,93	0,00					
	Misfit curvature	-0,67	0,23	-2,96	0,00					
Moderated by CSE	Fit slope	0,16	0,20	0,79	0,43					
	Fit curvature	0,06	0,21	0,29	0,77					
low level	Misfit slope	-0,43	0,20	-2,19	0,03					
	Misfit curvature	-0,52	0,21	-2,44	0,02					
Moderated by AS1	Fit slope	-0,01	0,74	-0,01	0,99					
	Fit curvature	0,39	0,57	0,68	0,50					
high level	Misfit slope	-0,09	0,74	-0,12	0,90					
	Misfit curvature	-0,86	0,57	-1,52	0,13					
Moderated by AS1	Fit slope	0,00	0,72	0,01	0,99					
	Fit curvature	0,36	0,46	0,79	0,43					
low level	Misfit slope	-0,17	0,72	-0,24	0,81					
	Misfit curvature	-0,71	0,46	-1,57	0,12					
Moderated by AS2	Fit slope	-0,14	0,46	-0,30	0,77					
	Fit curvature	0,39	0,62	0,62	0,54					
high level	Misfit slope	-0,20	0,46	-0,44	0,66					
	Misfit curvature	-0,85	0,62	-1,38	0,17					
Moderated by AS2	Fit slope	0,15	0,67	0,22	0,83					
	Fit curvature	0,19	0,97	0,19	0,85					
low level	Misfit slope	-0,28	0,67	-0,41	0,68					
	Misfit curvature	-0,47	0,97	-0,49	0,63					

	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ
Fit slope	-0,01	0,15	-0,03	0,97	0,09	0,14	0,66	0,51
Fit curvature	0,17	0,15	1,16	0,25	0,19	0,14	1,43	0,16
Misfit slope	-0,10	0,15	-0,65	0,52	-0,07	0,14	-0,52	0,60
Misfit curvature	-0,14	0,15	-0,92	0,36	-0,07	0,14	-0,49	0,63
Moderated by CSE	-0,07	0,18	-0,39	0,70				
Fit slope	-0,24	0,17	-1,45	0,15				
Fit curvature	-0,27	0,18	-1,55	0,13				
Misfit slope	-0,48	0,17	-2,87	0,01				
Misfit curvature	-0,10	0,20	-0,50	0,62				
Moderated by AS1	0,00	0,18	-0,02	0,98				
Fit slope	-0,15	0,20	-0,74	0,46				
Fit curvature	-0,24	0,18	-1,36	0,18				
Misfit slope								
Misfit curvature								
Moderated by AS2								
Fit slope								
Fit curvature								
Misfit slope								
Misfit curvature								
Moderated by AS1								
Fit slope								
Fit curvature								
Misfit slope								
Misfit curvature								
Moderated by AS2								
Fit slope								
Fit curvature								
Misfit slope								
Misfit curvature								

Long term perspective values	Satisfaction			Commitment				
	B	SE	(T) test	ρ	B	SE	(T) test	ρ
Fit slope	0,20	0,15	1,38	0,17	0,17	0,13	1,37	0,18
Fit curvature	-0,12	0,14	-0,81	0,42	-0,06	0,12	-0,46	0,65
Misfit slope	-0,19	0,15	-1,30	0,20	-0,41	0,13	-3,25	0,00
Misfit curvature	-0,29	0,14	-2,02	0,05	-0,29	0,12	-2,42	0,02
Moderated	0,16	0,17	0,93	0,36	0,23	0,15	1,52	0,13
by CSE	-0,64	0,20	-3,21	0,00	-0,23	0,18	-1,25	0,22
high level	-0,60	0,17	-3,57	0,00	-0,34	0,15	-2,20	0,03
Moderated	-0,73	0,20	-3,66	0,00	-0,19	0,18	-1,04	0,30
by AS1	0,16	0,17	0,90	0,37	0,18	0,16	1,11	0,27
high level	-0,25	0,19	-1,33	0,19	-0,11	0,18	-0,61	0,54
Moderated	-0,33	0,17	-1,87	0,07	-0,37	0,16	-2,32	0,02
by AS2	-0,44	0,19	-2,32	0,02	-0,21	0,18	-1,19	0,24
high level					0,06	0,24	0,27	0,79
Moderated					-0,48	0,31	-1,53	0,13
by AS1					0,05	0,24	0,22	0,83
high level					-0,31	0,31	-1,00	0,32
Moderated					0,08	0,22	0,39	0,70
by AS1					-0,26	0,25	-1,05	0,30
low level					-0,15	0,22	-0,69	0,49
Moderated					-0,32	0,25	-1,29	0,20
by AS2					0,19	0,39	0,49	0,63
high level					-0,17	0,33	-0,52	0,61
Moderated					-0,43	0,39	-1,11	0,27
by AS2					-0,51	0,33	-1,54	0,13
low level					-0,10	0,48	-0,20	0,84
Moderated					-0,44	0,56	-0,79	0,43
by AS2					-0,29	0,48	-0,60	0,55
low level								
Misfit curvature								

Appendix VI, Change Patterns

- Pattern A: decrease of the outcome variables together with a decrease in fit.
 Pattern B: stable or increased fit together with stable or increased outcomes.
 Pattern C: stable or increased fit with a decline of the outcomes.
 Pattern D: diminishing fit and increased outcomes.
 Combined patterns (e.g. B/C) indicate different patterns for different values and/or outcomes.

Firm/

Lawyers Pattern Remarks

1a	A	Long value misfit, lower personal expertise values.
1b	A	Long lawyer decreased, intention to stay decreased, other outcomes stable.
1c	B	Congruent and stable fit.
1d	B	Exp. and Long firm values decreased but fit remained stable. Moderate values lawyer.
1e	B/C	Fit remained stable, but Mgmt and Short firm decreased. Satisfaction and commitment stable, intention to stay decreased.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 1.74, most PP-like firm. Perceived firm long term perspective values moderate and/or decreased, apparently not communicated very well.

2a	B	Stable or improved fit, except for Long values: low personal, high firm values.
2b	B	Improved perceived fit, moderate but stable outcomes. Low actual fit.
2c	A/B	High expertise and Long lawyer values. High fit except Long value misfit. High outcomes decreased slightly.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 2.21. Expertise fit, congruent with actual firm values. Mgmt and Short stable. Decreasing Long firm values.

3a	A/B	Fit, except decreased Long fit through lower lawyer values. Outcomes stable, intention to stay decreased.
4a	B	Stable fit at lower level, improved Long fit. Stable outcomes.
5a	B	Stable fit, moderate level stable outcomes.
5b	B	Values stable, perceived fit. Actual fit decreased, outcomes increased.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 2.38. Moderate outcomes improved somewhat

6a	C	Mgmt somewhat less, Long somewhat better, overall stable.
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- Low Long personal values and fit.
- 6b B Improved fit except Long values. High/increased outcomes. High expertise level, low Long.
- 6c B Improved Mgmt and Short, Long fit. Stable outcomes.
- 6d C Firm values rose, fit improved somewhat. Sharp decrease commitment. Satisfaction remained very high. Also sharp decrease personal Exp. values.
- 6e B Reasonable fit except for expertise, high personal values. Stable outcomes.
- 6f A/B Misfit Mgmt and Short (low lawyers values), Exp. and Long fit, Long at low level. Stable high outcomes except for decrease of intention to stay.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 2.43. Stable perceptions and perceived fit. Low perceived Long values, decreased in survey T2. High perceived expertise values.

- 7a A/C Slightly improved but weak fit except for Short values, especially expertise and Long. All outcomes decreased sharply.
- 8a C Stability, good fit. Satisfaction and commitment decrease somewhat but remained high, intention to stay decreased sharply. (Low CSE).
- 8b A Better expertise fit, decreased fit on other values. Some decrease in satisfaction and commitment.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 2.55. No clear explanation or pattern. Low CSE.

- 9a A Lower perceived Exp. and Long values, lower fit. Sharp decrease of high outcomes.
- 9b A Perceived Exp. and Mgmt decreased, fit decreased. Higher Long personal values. Commitment and intention to stay fell.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 2.92. Lower perceived expertise and Long firm values.

- 10a B Exp. fit improved, Mgmt and Long fit, short misfit. High outcomes even improved.
- 11a C Mixed picture of fit, improved somewhat, satisfaction decreased.
- 11b B/D Fit improved but somewhat weak for Mgmt and Long. Perceived firm values increased. Satisfaction improved sharply, commitment decreased somewhat.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 3.05. No distinctive pattern. Low to moderate perceived values.

- 12a B/C Moderate fit improved. Sharp increase personal values, expertise VL higher than VF. Decreased but high satisfaction and

commitment, higher intention to stay.

12b B Stable fit, stable high outcomes.

12c B Fit of and Mgmt; perceived Short and Long firm values somewhat higher. Higher personal Long values. Rise of all outcomes.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 3.08. Stability in perceptions and fit. Higher firm expertise and values.

13a C/D Stable perceptions and fit. Substantially lower satisfaction and commitment, but intention to stay rose.

13b A Perceived values and fit lower, lower outcomes.

13c A Misfit did not improve. Lower outcomes.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 3.3. Moderate perceived firm values except for decreasing expertise. Mgmt firm values decreased with all respondents. Outcomes dropped.

14a B Higher personal Exp. values, lower Long values. Fit improved somewhat overall, mixed picture. Commitment rose somewhat.

14b B Overall fit improved. High personal Exp. values increased. Outcomes rose.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 3.38. Inspired higher personal expertise values. Moderate value levels.

17a B Fit stable or improved. Outcomes high and stable.

17b B Fit improved except for Long values. Actual fit. Personal Long values decreased. All outcomes rose somewhat at low level.

17c C Fit stable or improved. Satisfaction fell sharply. Stable moderate commitment and low intention to stay.

17d B Stable fit, stable outcomes, moderate value levels.

Firm pattern: PP-MPB score 3.68. Stable fit at moderate levels, different individual change directions.

List of Abbreviations

AS	Application Success
AS1	number of job interviews : number of job applications
AS1	number of job offers : number of job interviews
ASA	Attraction, Selection, Attrition
CSE	Core Self-evaluations
Exp. values	Expertise values
EF	Expertise values of the firm
EL	Expertise values of the lawyers
HR(M)	Human Resources (Management)
Long values	Long term perspective values
LF	Long term perspective values of the firm
LL	Long term perspective values of the lawyers
Mgmt values	Management values
MF	Management values of the firm
ML	Management values of the lawyers
MPB	Managed Professional Business
P-O fit	Person – Organization Fit
PP	Professional Partnership
PSF	Professional Service Firm
SD	Standard deviation
Short values	Short term reward values
SF	Short term reward values of the firm
SL	Short term reward values of the lawyers
VF	Values firm
VL	Values lawyers

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