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This dissertation explores business interaction with peace and conflict in Central Africa. It looks at how different types of international companies perceive the opportunities and the challenges of doing business in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Angola and Rwanda. It also examines companies' participation in multistakeholder partnerships to help further peace and reconciliation.

FRANÇOIS LENFANT

ON BUSINESS, CONFLICT AND PEACE:
INTERACTION AND COLLABORATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA

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Interaction and Collaboration in Central Africa

François Lenfant

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aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BoP	Bottom of the Pyramid
CSBP	Conflict Sensitive Business Practices
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CEP	Corporate Engagement Project
DDI	Diamond Development Initiative
DFID	Department for International Development
DGIS	Directoraat-generaal Internationale Samenwerking
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FT	Financial Times
GC	Global Compact
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDPS	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MNE	Multinational Enterprise
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
PEARL	Partnership for Enhancing Agriculture in Rwanda through Linkages
PSG	Peace and Statebuilding Goal
SCG	Search for Common Ground
SPREAD	Sustaining Partnership to Enhance Rural Enterprises and Agribusiness Development
UGEAFI	Union des Groupes d'Étude et d'Action pour le développement de Fizi-Itombwe
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USAID	Unites States Agency for International Development
VP	Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, considerable attention has been paid to conflict and peace processes in relation to the activities of firms. Studies have examined the role of business in fueling conflict (e.g. Reno, 1998; Ross, 2004; Sachs and Warner, 1995) and, to a lesser extent, how firms may help reduce conflict and further peace (e.g. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Fort and Schipani, 2004; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Oetzel and Getz, 2007). Interest has come from different academic (sub-)fields, ranging from international business and management (Fort, 2007; Fort and Schipani, 2004; Oetzel and Getz, 2007, 2010, Jamali and Mirshak, 2010), to political science (Bennett, 2002; Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010; Haufler, 2004, 2015; Wolf et al., 2007), development studies (Junne and Verkoren, 2005; Verkoren and Junne, 2012), peace and conflict studies (e.g. Arnson and Zartman 2005; Berdal and Malone 2000; Pugh and Cooper, 2004), and economics (Collier, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). The business-conflict nexus attracted most of the attention until the turn of the century, as illustrated by campaigns waged by non-governmental organizations, especially on a few well publicized cases in the extractive sector in Africa (e.g. Shell in Nigeria, Total-Elf in the Republic of the Congo, AngloGoldAshanti in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Literature on the resource curse has examined the role played by companies involved in the extractive sector in sustaining conflict through providing revenues to corrupt and human rights violating governments and/or rebel groups (Frynas and Wood, 2001; Keen, 2003; Orogun, 2010).

Compared to 'business and conflict', 'business for peace' has emerged more recently as a multidisciplinary body of knowledge involving academics but also practitioners (Anderson and Zandvliet, 2001; International Alert, 2005; Lavine, 2009; Zandvliet, 2005). Business for peace, which some scholars view as a "new paradigm for international development" (Miklian and Schouten, 2014, p. 2), is also a platform for discussion between different constituents ranging from managers to NGOs and government officials with the "normative aim of producing knowledge and contributing to practice that harnesses the mechanisms of commerce to achieve greater peace" (Lavine, 2009, p. 603). Its purpose is to explore and understand the linkages between business and peace as well as to provide tools and guidance for business when operating in conflict areas. A few journals in the business realm have published special issues (Journal of Business Ethics, 2010; Academy of Management Perspectives, 2015; Business Horizons, 2016) and, together with a dedicated journal, entitled Business, Peace and Sustainable Development, which started in 2013, generated insights while also identifying many areas for further investigation.

Interestingly, this confluence of debates and of different audiences matches the trajectory of the dissertation, and helps explain its origins and evolution. With a background in the 'practice' of international development, especially in relation to conflict-affected regions in Central Africa, I had long been interested in backing up this NGO experience with more solid academic insights as to the why and how of the role of business, sometimes in interaction with other parties, in relation to peace promotion. Having first expressed my interest in pursuing a PhD in early 2007, I embarked on an almost decade-long journey in which I combined my busy agenda in practice with doing research and writing articles, one by one. This risk-averse approach was highly recommended by my supervisor who had seen so many 'part-time' PhD projects by 'practitioners' fail before. It explains the series of co-authored articles included as chapters in this dissertation, which have been published after often intensive review processes, and which span the publication years 2010 up to and including 2015, with one still forthcoming at the time of writing. The decade in which I worked on my PhD has seen growing interest in the theme of this dissertation, and the overall debate has evolved somewhat from "good versus bad" (inter alia regarding the role of business in conflict/peace) towards attempts at understanding if, how, and under which conditions business can be involved in peace promotion.

Still, many traces of a polarized discussion remain, with concomitant publication streams, and sometimes with variation across disciplines. International business and political science scholars look at business interactions with peace from different analytical levels (Oetzel et al., 2009, Haufler, 2015). International business is most interested in individual firms while political science focuses on the macro, governance level (Haufler, 2015). In addition, their perspectives are also rather different. As Haufler (2015, p. 462) aptly put it, in a recent exchange article part of the AMP special issue on business and peace that included the work reprinted in chapter 8 of this dissertation: "While the international business studies literature often displays an optimistic perspective on the impact of business, international relations scholars are much more skeptical".

Similarly, the academic discussion on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in developing countries (one of the other themes underlying this dissertation) also shows traces of polarization (Jamali, 2010; Idemudia, 2011), which may be partially due to the difficulty of obtaining systematic data of companies' direct and indirect impacts in such settings (Kolk, 2016; Kolk and Van Tulder, 2010). Some studies point to the potential of CSR to reduce poverty (Boyle and Boguslaw, 2007; Osuji and Obibuaku, 2015), or to companies' contribution to promoting economic development (Oetzel and Doh, 2009), while other question CSR's contribution to alleviating poverty or solving developmental problems (see e.g. a special issue in International

Affairs, 2005; Khan and Lund-Thomsen, 2011; Newell and Frynas, 2007). In the past decade, a body of work has emerged on multistakeholder partnerships, in which business collaborates with governmental and/or non-governmental actors to address social and environmental problems; some studies have focused on the implications for development from different sub-disciplinary perspectives, sometimes exposing divergent normative views.

Within these debates, this dissertation does not favor one position over the other but rather aims to provide a better understanding of the role of business in conflict-affected regions in Central Africa. It is located at the intersection of bodies of knowledge from various academic (sub-)disciplines covering business and conflict, business for peace, and CSR (see chapter 2 which provides an overview of different debates and key research gaps). It should be noted that much of the CSR literature has not addressed the topic of this dissertation directly, with a traditional underexposure of the African continent and relatively limited attention to (post-)conflict countries. However, its insights on the role of business in society have implications for the fundamental question of the societal responsibility of business when operating in complex environments marked by conflicts where the rule of law is not upheld (Dobers and Halme, 2009). Furthermore, in recent years interest for business in Africa has grown, as evidenced by several special Africa issues in management journals (Academy of Management Perspectives, 2015; and Business & Society and Global Strategy Journal, forthcoming).

1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FOCUS OF THE DISSERTATION

The main question this dissertation seeks to answer is:

How do international companies perceive the challenges of doing business in conflict-affected areas and how do they help address peace and reconciliation issues?


In order to answer this question, I divided it into two sub-questions:

a) How do different types of international companies perceive the opportunities and the challenges of doing business in conflict-affected areas in Central Africa, as part of their corporate social responsibility and peace and reconciliation activities?

b) In what ways do international companies participate in multistakeholder partnerships to help further peace and reconciliation?

The first sub-question receives specific attention in chapters 3 and 4, while chapters 5 to 8 contain studies focused on the second (see Figure 1, which gives an overview of the chapters included in this dissertation, and which will be further explained in the last subsection of this first chapter).

Figure 1: Overview of chapters included in this dissertation



The first sub-question explores the ways in which international companies, large and small, perceive the opportunities and the challenges that they face, and how they publicly communicate about their social responsibility and their views and activities concerning conflict-related issues often found in Central Africa. The literature has thus far paid most attention to the socio-economic impact of large companies and how they organize their social responsibility in more stable developing countries, mostly in Asia and Latin America. When covering Africa, studies usually focus on Nigeria and South Africa (Baskin, 2006, Visser, 2006a). Despite the presence of large companies in Central Africa, there is scant research on how they address the challenges that they face and whether they help alleviate problems commonly found in such settings. Companies with sales that are sometimes larger than countries' GDP (Adler, 2008; Gerson, 2001; Koerber and

Fort, 2008) are considered powerful actors (Andriof and McIntosh, 2001) with great potential to solve major problems, and often expected to publicly take that responsibility. At the same time, however, a myriad of other, smaller organizations also operate in a context of rising societal expectations, characterized by demands from various stakeholders to address issues related to human rights violations, poverty and inequality. Although they may be less visible in the public eye and/or less actively reporting, studies have found that smaller companies are often responsive to the local environment as they are anchored in the communities where they operate and have developed strong ties with their employees and local constituents (Jamali et al., 2009; Jamali et al., 2015). Conflict contexts also seem to expose the existence of a wide range of organizations concerned with social goals, in addition to economic ones, and that are characterized by different degrees of hybridity, reflecting sometimes 'blurring boundaries' between profit and non-profit oriented organizations (Crane, 2010; Doherty et al., 2014; Haigh et al., 2015).

The fact that different types of organizations are active in, and seen to be needed for helping address complex societal issues, is subsequently explored through the second sub-question. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 focus on companies' collaborative activities in conflict-affected areas and the ways in which they seek to contribute to peace and reconciliation. While a sizeable literature on multistakeholder collaboration has emerged in the past decade, few studies have looked at partnerships in conflict-affected areas and their specific challenges which require consideration of all stakeholders' organizational as well as contextual factors. Thus far, business research has most often concentrated on the company perspective, much less on the macro-societal perspective (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012b). Although the macro-societal level has received attention from scholars in political science, international relations and development studies, the focus has been on partnerships for sustainable development involving international organizations, typically Northern-based NGOs and donor countries, but rarely business actors. Answering this sub-question will add to the literature by showing different types of multistakeholder partnerships involving business, NGOs, cooperatives and/or governments in conflict-affected environments while exploring their peace and reconciliation potential considering external dimensions and the characteristics and relevance of the specific institutional setting. These insights from field-based, qualitative work may help set the stage for further examinations of impact, especially building on conceptualizations recently made in the more generic partnership literature (Stadtler, 2015, Van Tulder and Maas, 2012; Van Tulder et al., 2015).

1.2. GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY

The geographical setting of this thesis is Central Africa, comprised of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Angola. These four countries have similarities in terms of geography (DRC shares borders with all three) and history, as they all faced (violent) conflicts in the 1990s. Although Angola, Rwanda and the Republic of the Congo have been in the (post-)conflict phase for more than a decade, DRC has faced regular occurrences of violence throughout the mid-1990s until present time. The DRC conflict, which is currently mostly located in the Eastern provinces, has regional dimensions as rebel troops often cross the border to neighboring Rwanda, which creates tensions between the governments of the two countries. While those four countries have commonalities, differences in size, geology and government type also exist. Angola, DRC and the Republic of the Congo are well endowed with natural resources (diamond and oil in Angola, oil in the Republic of the Congo, diamond, coltan, gold, timber, copper, cobalt in the DRC), while Rwanda is essentially a landlocked agricultural country. Furthermore, Rwanda is a rather small country, while the DRC and Angola are considered regional giants. In addition, Rwanda, Angola and the Republic of the Congo have strong governments whose authority covers the whole country, while in the DRC, the Eastern regions are governed by a mix of formal and informal authorities and the army does not control the whole territory (Vlassenroot, 2008). These differences, combined with the great variety of companies that operate in the region in terms of type, size and sector of intervention (extractives, agricultural, services) can generate insights into whether and/how these differences influence companies' perceptions of their social responsibilities and their engagement in peace promotion and reconciliation activities.

The choice of the countries was informed by my knowledge of the region and the opportunities I had to approach contact persons and networks built up over the years. Lack of publicly available information and of access to local stakeholders, also due to insecurity in these areas marked by persistent hostilities and violence, is a key factor complicating research in conflict-affected areas. I have been working in the region in various capacities (NGO policy officer and independent researcher) since 2001 and developed relationships with many stakeholders, including with (former) staff of NGOs, (provincial) government agencies and, to a lesser extent, private sector organizations. This knowledge of the region and the prior relationships with NGO leaders in particular helped to obtain access communities and gain their confidence as NGOs are trusted by the communities with which they work closely (Ingenbleek et al., 2013; Viswanathan et al., 2008). Contact was made in person and was sustained regularly through email. Doing so, I

answered calls made by business scholars for a better understanding of 'context' (Bamberger, 2008), for providing insight into phenomena in unusual situations (Bamberger and Pratt, 2010), and for doing research based on "immersion in the phenomenon of interest" (MacInnis, 2011, p. 152).

As indicated above, five of the six empirically-based chapters have been published in academic journals, with one forthcoming at the time of writing (but available as online first, and to be included in the Fall 2016 issue). In line with the specifics and traditions of the journal and, in some cases (i.e. chapters 4, 7, and 8), special issues, the articles explain the methodology used, as well as the theoretical embeddedness, framing and contributions. Overall, the research was qualitative in nature, although data has also been sought via databases and by sending out a survey with questions to relatively limited numbers of actors involved. Desk research was combined with in-depth case studies, entailing semi-structured interviews, observation and engagement with stakeholders, including group discussions with local communities. This methodology mix is well suited in complex settings given the challenges identified by previous research, such as the difficulty of generalization as well as applicability and validity issues (Ingenbleek et al., 2013). I also drew inspiration from Shultz et al. (2012) who called for new research methodologies that should entail, among others, looking at relationships between groups and other actors, as well as learning from past trajectories. One field trip was organized in 2011 to specifically gather data related to the coffee partnerships. The local dimension of these partnerships, their location in communities whose access was difficult and the fact that those partnerships involved many stakeholders in various settings (European cities, Rwandan capital city, Rwandan and DRC country side) motivated the choice for fieldwork dedicated to these particular partnerships. It provided the empirical foundation for chapter 7, but also proved helpful for insights more broadly in the theme of this dissertation which come to the fore in other chapters.

1.3. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

As shown in Figure 1, this dissertation consists of three parts and nine chapters. The first part concerns the (current) introductory chapter and the overview of the relevant literature streams linked to the various themes addressed in this dissertation (chapter 2). The second part presents the six articles, divided into two sections, each answering one sub-question as indicated above. The third part, chapter 9, presents the conclusions and implications, reflects on the limitations

and discusses areas for further research. Below the six chapters included in the second part will be introduced in some more detail.

Chapter 3 represents the empirical start of this PhD trajectory, which began with exploring how relatively large international companies operating in Central Africa report on CSR and conflict, thereby answering calls from the literature to explore themes and countries not yet covered in current research (Visser, 2006a). After locating the chapter in the CSR in Africa literature, it specifically looks at how these companies perceive the opportunities, challenges and dilemmas of doing business in three countries in Central Africa and gives insights on how they report on their socio-economic impacts and on conflict-related issues. Concerning companies' socio-economic impacts, the chapter distinguishes, in line with existing literature (Fortanier and Kolk, 2007a, 2007b), between tax and royalties, procurement, employment, and community development projects. Regarding the latter, it also provides insights into the type of community development projects that companies fund, and whether the projects are implemented with other actors, a topic which will be investigated in more depth in following chapters (5, 6, 7, 8). Concerning conflict, the chapter examines whether companies disclose information on conflict-related issues, such as the resource curse, and whether and, if so, how they respond to these issues. The findings indicate that companies are more inclined to report on their economic and social impacts than on conflict-related issues and that CSR activities in Central Africa are rather generic, i.e. do not take into account the specific contextual characteristics.

At the intersection of the business for peace and the hybrid organization literature, which relates to the debate on CSR, chapter 4 explores how 53 organizations, mostly small companies, involved in the coffee sector in Rwanda and Eastern DRC, combine economic and social goals in their business models. Drawing from the literature (Haigh and Hoffman, 2012), three dimensions have been identified along which the degree of hybridity of the companies are analyzed. These three dimensions are the role of social change in the companies' objective, the degree to which the companies engage in mutually beneficial relationships with other stakeholders, and the way in which companies interact with markets and institutions. Regarding the first dimension, the importance of the human element and of positive leadership in translating the company's social purpose into practice has also been considered. Regarding the second dimension, attention has been paid to the scope and the intensity of the relationships in which companies engage with coffee farmers and cooperatives. Concerning the last dimension, this chapter also looks at the different ways in which companies carry out development work, how they perceive and attempt to change market requirements, and whether they contribute to peace and reconciliation. The

chapter not only sheds light on the various degrees of hybridity adopted by the 53 organizations, but also suggests the existence of a hybridization continuum, which is similar to "a common space" identified by Battilana et al. (2012, p. 55). The study also suggests that (semi-)hybrid forms of organizations seem well suited to tackle issues found in (post-)conflict settings.

The next four articles cover the ways in which companies' collaborative activities may contribute to peace and reconciliation. Chapter 5 explores four cases of innovative multistakeholder partnerships found in Angola and in the DRC, their main characteristics as well as their potential to solve issues commonly found in such settings. Drawing from the business and conflict, and the CSR in Africa literatures, the chapter illustrates how international companies might help further peace and reconciliation through participating in a multistakeholder partnership, i.e. by promoting trust, dialogue and capacity building. Furthermore, inspired by existing NGO classifications from the literature (Bendell, 2000; Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007; Winston, 2002), it also looks at NGO-company interactions considering an NGO engagement type which takes into account NGOs' thematic focus, and their presence on the ground, funding policies and strategies. In line with other research, the study suggests that there is a shift in engagement pattern between companies and NGOs, from confrontation to collaboration (Yaziji and Doh, 2009). In areas marked by antagonism, absence of functioning government and lack of trust, collaborative activities, although not common, seem to have the potential to promote peace and further reconciliation when they take into consideration issues directly related to the conflict such as broader governance issues, ethnic divides, community-government relations, artisanal mining, and transparency.

Different from chapter 5, chapter 6 looks at a larger number (59) of international companies and of their collaborative activities with NGOs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It starts with classifying companies into three categories identified in the business for peace literature, namely 'avoidant,' 'business as usual,' and 'conflict resolution' (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007). It then examines 39 partnerships of these companies with NGOs considering the type of NGOs participating in the partnership, whether conflict issues were addressed, the level of community involvement, and the domain/focus of the activities implemented within the partnerships. Subsequently, drawing from Austin (2000) and Muthuri et al. (2009), chapter 6 classifies the partnerships into four types (philanthropic, engagement with funds, engagement without funds, and transformative), and explores their peace promotion potential. Findings show that most of the reported partnerships are philanthropic, in that they tackle traditional issues, follow a donor-recipient model and have limited community

involvement. Although limited in number, transformative partnerships are more focused on tackling root causes of conflict, have a high level of community involvement and seem more suitable to further peace and reconciliation. The chapter adds to the business for peace literature by shedding some light on the role of business in helping solve conflicts, and in contributing to community development beyond philanthropy (e.g. Bowen et al., 2008; Muthuri, 2008; Muthuri et al., 2009)..

Subsequently, chapter 7 investigates the characteristics of three partnership involving companies, NGOs, cooperatives and Northern governments in the coffee sector in Eastern DRC. Published in a marketing journal, it builds on insights from this field, especially concerning subsistence markets and marketing systems, in combination with the partnership literature, thus answering calls for cross-fertilization (Ingenbleek, 2014). In addition, and as will be elaborated upon in chapter 8, most research on partnerships from business disciplines have focused on value for and within companies. The chapter adds to the literature by looking at external, societal consequences of partnerships and potential effects at different levels, inspired by assessment and evaluation frameworks in the international development field (Bamberger and White, 2007; OECD-DAC, 2002; Ravaillon, 2009). To this end, a distinction is made between output (the immediate result of an activity, mostly at organizational level), outcome (changes in capacities, and/or living conditions mostly at the level of the stakeholder targeted by the activities within the partnership), and impact, which aims at bringing structural solutions to the issues at stake (i.e. broader peace and governance climate, mostly at community level). This chapter explores multistakeholder partnerships in a fragile region characterized by institutional gaps, looks at the ways in which they seem to help address those gaps, and illuminates the different roles that all actors within the partnerships take, sometimes outside of their core business.

Finally, chapter 8 takes a different approach by bringing different debates together while exploring the contribution of partnerships to peace and reconciliation in conflict countries. Building on the typology presented in chapter 6, and inspired by Austin (2000), Bowen et al. (2008) and Muthuri et al. (2009), chapter 8 introduces a new partnership typology, adding geographical levels at which partnerships take place (local, national, and international) to different partnership types (philanthropic, transactional, engagement, and transformative). An exploration of partnerships at various levels, using African and international examples, indicates that government authorities tend to be absent in local partnerships while companies do not participate in a recent international, multilaterally-driven collaboration specifically aimed at addressing fragility and conflict issues. Chapter 8 observes that linkages between partners and

geographical levels are often missing. In this way, it adds to the literature on partnerships and on business for peace, but also offers suggestions for management scholars and thought leaders.

CHAPTER 2. BUSINESS AND CONFLICT, BUSINESS FOR PEACE AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an overview of relevant literature streams linked to the various themes addressed in this dissertation, namely business and conflict (section 2.2), business for peace (section 2.4), and corporate social responsibility (CSR) (section 2.5). As indicated in the first chapter, debates have moved from the company-conflict link to 'business for peace' (also known as peace through commerce). Furthermore, scholars have started to push for the inclusion of peace and conflict matters in CSR (Bennett, 2002; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Wolf et al., 2007), concurrent with the emergence of multistakeholder collaborations to help solve societal issues. This chapter discusses insights from different academic (sub-)fields and the practitioner literature to cover the three main themes related to this dissertation, considering their relevance and the evolution of the debates, i.e. from a rather negative perception of companies' involvement in conflict-affected areas to their potential contribution to peace (see section 2.3), in the context of increasing societal expectations vis-à-vis companies.

This chapter starts with the literature on companies' interactions with conflicts. Given the presence of natural resources in Central Africa (mostly in the DRC and Angola), special attention is paid to the literature on the resource curse, as it has established linkages between business and conflict. Then, in line with the evolution in the debates, the chapter discusses the different motivations and factors that influence why and how companies can be part of peace and reconciliation activities. It then presents the framework introduced by Oetzel et al. (2007), and expanded by Getz and Oetzel (2009), which points at the positive contribution that companies can make while operating in conflict areas, given the costs of conflict and corporate social responsibility demands. It distinguishes between unilateral or collaborative activities by companies, and which may have a direct or indirect effect on the conflict. The chapter then explores the five main channels identified in the literature through which companies can contribute to peace. Finally, and following the rationale of the framework, the chapter links business for peace to the broader literature on CSR, including on partnerships, considering companies' collaborative activities to further peace and reconciliation.

2.2. BUSINESS AND CONFLICT

In the past three decades, more studies have explored topics related to the "economics of war" (e.g. Arnson and Zartman, 2005; Berdal and Malone, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler,1998; Pugh and Cooper 2004) than to the "economics of peace" (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005; Junne and Verkoren, 2005; Verkoren and Junne 2012). Academic research as well as practitioner studies have looked at the destabilizing impact of business, sometimes even by being involved in selling or smuggling arms, or funding rebel movements as to gain security over future deals (Berdal and Malone 2000; Montague, 2002). Special attention has been given to large companies and the negative impact of their operations on local economies and communities (Boele et al., 2001), through inadequate working conditions (Sluiter, 2009), environmental degradation (Human Rights Watch, 1999), and involvement or complicity in human rights abuses such as forced relocation of communities (Idahosa, 2002; Wheeler et al., 2002). Negative impacts related to high-profile companies were documented, such as ITT's contribution to overthrowing Allende's democratic government in Chile (Meyer, 1998), and the complicity of extractive companies in prolonging the war in the DRC through exploitative practices (Papaioannou, 2006). Research has also focused on business operating at the brink of legality, such as private security and military companies (Chesterman and Lehnhardt, 2007; Singer, 2003) whose involvement in conflicts symbolized the absence of well-functioning states in many African countries (Leander, 2005; Muthien and Taylor, 2002). Other studies have pointed at the linkages between globalization, the undermining of state authority, and the emergence of new intrastate conflicts (Duffield, 2000; Kaldor, 1999), especially in the African context (Cilliers and Mason, 1999; Musah, 2002). In a globalized context said to exacerbate state failures and the subsequent emergence of intra-state, resource-based conflicts, business operations are often caught in the crossfire of conflict, and can become negatively involved by "financing conflict parties, trading conflict relevant goods and exploiting regulatory gaps" (Wolf et al., 2007, p. 295).

Attempts at establishing typologies of business and conflict linkages have been made (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004, Wolf et al., 2007). When facing conflict situations, companies can proactively engage, withdraw, conduct business as usual or take advantage of the conflict and consequent public or regulatory failure (Wolf et al., 2007). Business reaction to conflict is influenced by a variety of factors, among which company-specific characteristics (Oetzel et al., 2007), conflict characteristics (Getz and Oetzel, 2009), or stakeholder pressure (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). Although there is a lack of exact knowledge of the specific drivers accounting for companies' reaction, a substantial difference exists "between companies whose legitimate

business activities have negative but unintended effects on conflict dynamics, and those commercial actors (such as arms traders, diamond smugglers, and private security firms) who deliberatively seek to profit from war by conducting the – often illicit and always predatory – business of war" (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2004, p. 38). Illegal activities comprise money laundering, arms, drugs and human trafficking, or activities that benefit from a conflict context. Companies deliberately benefiting from violent conflicts are typically small and "use conflict as a cover for their operations, or profit from supplying the combatants" (Taylor, 2002, p. 23). Larger, so-called 'legitimate' companies often favor stable settings where they can thrive (Bais and Huijser, 2005; Zandvliet, 2005) and are therefore less frequently linked to those illegal activities. Nevertheless, cases of legitimate companies, defined by Haufler (2001b, p. 660) as entities that "are not criminal enterprises and that generally operate within the bounds of law", directly or indirectly involved in a conflict have been reported (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2004). For instance, the assets of Talisman, a Canadian oil company operating in Sudan, and of Anvil, a mining company operating in the DRC, were seized by government forces which subsequently committed human rights abuses (Humphreys, 2003).

The interaction between business and conflict, especially in the African context, has mainly been investigated from the resource curse perspective. The resource curse, or paradox of plenty, refers to a pattern whereby countries or regions rich in natural resources display poor economic growth (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001). Reasons accounting for the poor economic performance of resource-rich countries range from overreliance on non-productive sectors and lack of diversification (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009), low investments in human capital (Gylfason, 2001), and low savings and investment rates (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2006). The resource curse is highly relevant in the African context where broader governance implications and the specific role of business have come to the fore, especially in Nigeria, Angola and the DRC (Berdal and Keen, 1997; Le Billon, 2001; Reno, 1998, 2000). Within that body of literature, the resource curse is not only an economic phenomenon but is also associated with conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and institutional failures (James, 2015). The resource curse has clear political and governance dimensions as studies have observed that mineral rents and other revenues derived from the extractive industry tend to "hinder a transition to democracy" (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015, pp. 384-385). Revenues derived from minerals decrease state reliance on tax levied from citizens which reduces public accountability (McFerson, 2010; Ross, 2001), and may result in increased military and security expenses to maintain authoritarian rule (Ross, 2001).

The extractive sector seems prone to the emergence of rentier economies (Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Bulte et al., 2005; Isham et al., 2005; Torvik, 2002), is not a major source of employment as it tends to be capital intensive (Lall and Narula, 2004) and creates "few linkages to domestic firms and few spillover opportunities" (Morrissey, 2012, p. 29). Companies in the extractive sector operate in isolation and make little effort to engage positively with surrounding communities (Blanton and Blanton, 2009), partially because of the nature of the industry with a focus on short-term gains and "pressure to deliver financial return quickly" (Shankleman, 2007, p. 72). There is abundant academic and practitioner literature highlighting how corrupt government leaders attracted foreign investments and collided with companies to the detriment of their population (Frynas and Wood, 2001, on Angola; Reno, 1998, on Nigeria; Soares de Oliveira, 2007, on Gabon and Equatorial Guinea; Keen, 2003, on Sierra Leone). Investments in the extractive sector are said to rarely benefit citizens and undermine social cohesion (Nitzschke and Studdard 2005).

The role that poor governance plays in the resource curse, both as a cause and a consequence of the phenomenon has also been analyzed (Andersen and Ross, 2014; Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015). Poor governance and regulatory gaps have been associated with the resource curse and concomitant negative patterns (e.g. rent-seeking behavior, uneven redistribution of revenues, patron-client relationships). In a context of government's inability to turn revenues derived from resources into the provision of public services, resource abundance is likely to trigger grievances and violence (Mehlum et al., 2006). Conversely, studies have also emphasized the crucial role that sound institutions play in avoiding the resource curse (Boschini et al., 2007; Kolstad, 2009; Sarmidi et al., 2014). Well-enforced property laws, low corruption levels and a good functioning justice system can prevent rent-seeking behavior (Tornell and Lane, 1999) or even "turn the 'resource curse' into a 'resource blessing' (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015, p. 354)".

Regarding the link between resource dependence and conflict, Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p. 580) have argued that a nation state depending heavily on the export of oil and minerals faces a risk of civil war of 22% for any given five-year period; an identical country with no natural resource exports has a civil war risk of just 0.5%. Renner (2002) adds that the high number of conflicts in the 1990s was also related to the end of the Cold War whereby super powers curtailed financing to warring parties while the conflicts were not solved, which forced warring parties to use natural resources to compensate for missed revenues. According to that line of reasoning, resource dependence resulted in competition over control of resources (Bannon and Collier,

2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon, 2004; Ross, 2004, 2006). Nevertheless, the causality between natural resources and conflicts has been questioned as conflicts can increase resource dependence, rather than the opposite (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). In addition, within the natural resources–conflict debate, early research has pointed at a correlation between resource scarcity (and not resource abundance) and the emergence of conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kaplan, 2004). However, the link resource scarcity–conflict has also been contested as resource scarcity may, in some cases, trigger cooperation (Buhaug et al., 2008; Adano, et al., 2012).

In the African context, the resource curse literature linking companies' activities to conflict has focused on the role that some companies have played in sustaining conflicts. Cases of oil companies in Nigeria colliding with government authorities, sharing high revenues while local communities are marginalized and suffer from environmental degradation have been reported (Frynas, 1998; Idemudia, 2009; Orogun, 2010). In the Republic of the Congo, fighting for control over the capital has been equated with accessing and controlling oil revenues that governments negotiated with companies (Verschave, 2000). Reno's (2000) study on the interaction between companies involved in the oil sector in Angola and the government at the time (MPLA) has highlighted that oil was more significant for the MPLA than merely providing export earnings or signing bonuses. According to Reno (2000, p. 219), oil revenues have enabled the MPLA to "gain access to political and material resources, beyond Angola's borders, not just to markets but also diplomatic channels and commercial networks". In the DRC, Montague (2002) has documented the role played by a few foreign mining companies negotiating future lucrative deals with the Kabila-led AFDL rebel group in 1996 before the latter gained power over the DRC. Clearly, in the African context, the oil and gas industry has been associated with conflict rather than peace, as evidenced by the numerous NGO studies and campaigns focused on Angola's oil and diamonds, or on DRC's gold, copper and coltan (Global Witness, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 2004, 2005).

The literature on resource dependence and conflict has also looked at other variables such as the type of resources (Lujala, 2010 for oil, Le Billon, 2008, and Ross, 2006 for alluvial diamonds), or ethnic homogeneity in the region/country. For instance, resource-rich ethnically homogenous countries are less likely to experience conflict (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 2011; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Esteban et al., 2012). Concerning the type of resources, oil is usually unlootable, linked to government revenues and is often managed by large companies because its extraction depends upon high levels of capital and skilled labour. On the other hand, lootable resources (such as diamonds and coltan) are easily extractable and do not need major capital investments or an educated, skilled workforce (Ross, 2002; Smillie, 2002). Oil has

benefited governments (MLPA, government of the Republic of the Congo) while diamonds and other easily lootable resources have benefited rebels (UNITA, rebel groups in the DRC). Although Angola has extensive diamond reserves, a relatively large share of its diamonds can be found in so-called Kimberlite mines which require technology that only foreign companies possess (Partnership Africa Canada, 2007). This may explain large companies' investments in Angola's diamond sector, in contrast to the DRC, where alluvial diamonds prevail which can be extracted without technology (Smillie, 2002). In the DRC, diamonds, as well as coltan and gold, are mostly mined by artisanal miners often under rebel groups' strict control. The mineral exploitation pattern characteristic of the DRC has been documented, and, while it can be a source of livelihood, it is often a source of unrest (Vlassenroot, 2004). In the DRC, the geographical dispersion of natural resources has been associated with the creation of a warlord phenomenon whereby small, sometimes unorganised rebel units fought to take control of an area rich in easily lootable resources (coltan or diamond). The emergence of conflicts has led to the creation of new commercial networks, changed the power dynamics within communities and resulted in the 'criminalization' of the local economy, which contributed to the protracted nature of the DRC conflict (Vlassenroot, 2004).

2.3. FROM BUSINESS AND CONFLICT TO BUSINESS FOR PEACE

Over the years, the debate on the role of business in conflict has broadened to include attention for, firstly, the costs of conflicts for companies; secondly, the various ways in which they may react to violent conflicts in particular; and, relatedly and more recently, help reduce conflict and contribute to peace. The latter was initially discussed from the perspective of 'peace through commerce' and later 'business for peace' (see section 2.4), especially in the management literature, which also includes streams focused on corporate social responsibility, ethics and the role of business in society (see 2.5). Regarding the costs of conflict, they have been measured in terms of security services, material loss, insurance costs and high personnel turnover, as documented, for example, by Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003) and Humphreys (2003). A reduction of conflicts alleviates the burden for business in terms of reputational damages, chances of kidnapping and exposure to political risks, while enabling proper transportation opportunities and promoting economic activity and the opening of new markets (Wenger and Mockli, 2003; Wolf et al., 2007). This understanding has led to increased attention in the literature for business engagement, also and even in situations of violent conflict (Getz and

Oetzel, 2009; Jamali and Mirshak 2010; Oetzel and Getz, 2012; Oetzel et al., 2007) including for the peace-making potential of the extractive industry (Lujala et al., 2016; Ralph, 2015).

The shift in the debate led to attention for reasons for companies to take part in conflict reduction activities. These factors include the high number of conflicts around the world, increasing stakeholder expectations, the fact that peace and stability are good for business (Oetzel et al., 2009), and the "inability of some governments to solve" conflicts (Getz and Oetzel, 2009, p. 375). Some of these motivations are related to the evolving societal responsibility of companies to tackle global problems in view of dysfunctioning governments (see section 2.5). In addition, not all companies can leave the country when a conflict breaks out because of the large investments made, especially in the oil industry. All these reasons influence companies' decision to engage, or not, in conflict reduction activities, which, in turn, may improve relations with local communities, help with employee retention or even strengthen legitimacy and competitive advantage (Getz and Oetzel, 2009).

Before delving further into the types of activities, it is important to note that conflicts present companies with challenges (i.e. increased costs, reputational risks) but also opportunities (increased legitimacy and comparative advantage once conflict is reduced). In view of increasing societal expectations to offer solutions to complex problems, recent calls have been made to extend the role of business in conflict transformation throughout the various conflict phases, and not only in the (post-)conflict or reconstruction stage (Forrer and Katsos, 2015). This is based on the idea that conflict and peace are processes comprising various stages that are not linear but fraught with setbacks and relapses into violence. Intra-state conflicts found in Central Africa, especially in the DRC, involve many rebel groups whose agenda evolves over time, which explains why many ceasefires have failed to bring about sustainable peace in the region. This pattern reduces the relevance of the conflict – post-conflict dichotomy (Forrer and Katsos, 2015). It also puts the literature on 'business for peace' (see further section 2.4) in the right context as attempts to promote peace are often directly linked to, or follow from, strategies undertaken by firms, either from an economic or ethical/social responsibility perspective, to help reduce violence.

It is therefore very interesting to consider a framework drawn up to analyze companies' responses in situations marked by violent conflict. Table 1 reprints the version included in Getz and Oetzel (2009), which evolved from the initial one by Oetzel et al. (2007) (there are a few differences in the items in some of the boxes). The two-by-two matrix distinguishes between direct and indirect action on the one hand, and unilateral and collaborative activities, on the

other, as will be explained further below. Although originating from responses to violent conflict, especially the unilateral-collaborative distinction is also suitable for examining business for peace activities, in the context of corporate social responsibility, and has been adopted to structure the research articles in this dissertation.

Table 1: Typology of firm responses to violent conflict

	Unilateral action	**Collaborative action**
Indirect action	Independent certifications Internal and supplier audits Sensitive human resource policies Lobbying belligerents' key stakeholders Philanthropy	General global multilateral agreements (e.g., Global Compact, Caux Principles)
Direct action	Arbitration or mediation Providing services to peacekeepers Public condemnation of conflict-related activities Withholding payments to those who facilitate conflict	Multitrack diplomacy Conflict-specific global multilateral agreements (e.g., Kimberley Process; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights)

Source: Getz and Oetzel, 2009, p. 379

Getz and Oetzel's (2009) framework illustrates innovative channels for companies to engage in peace promotion and reconciliation activities, expanding the scope of companies' social responsibilities. Drawing from the political risks and CSR literature which provide "strong rationales for intervening" (Oetzel et al., 2007, p. 340), Oetzel et al. (2007) and Getz and Oetzel (2009) conceptualize companies' activities in peace matters taking two levels into consideration. First, they look at the degree to which companies' interventions directly or indirectly contribute to solving the conflict, and, second, they examine whether companies adopt a collaborative or unilateral approach to helping solve the conflict. As Getz and Oetzel point out (2009, p. 378), "these response types are neither mutually exclusive nor dichotomous. Firms may engage in more than one type of intervention simultaneously".

Direct approaches have "the intention of stopping violence" (Oetzel and Getz, 2012, p. 3) and include lobbying governments (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), publicly condemning violence (Lieberfeld, 2002), and/or mediating or negotiating between warrying parties to stop hostilities (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2004; Berman, 2000; Gerson and Colletta, 2002). Indirect interventions tackle root causes of conflict such as adopting human resource policies including all ethnic groups to foster social cohesion within a company, adopting codes of conduct, or funding projects supporting victims of conflicts. Linking the two axes, companies' direct or indirect interventions in a conflict can be carried out with other actors or by companies alone, although collaborative interventions have become more common in the past decade (Haufler, 2002). Companies' choice

for unilateral or collaborative action is determined by the skills, knowledge or competencies offered by potential partners, including NGOs, local governments, international governmental organizations or other companies (Oetzel and Getz, 2012).

Besides the framework, the authors also discuss factors that influence companies' involvement in conflict reduction activities. They include conflict characteristics (Getz and Oetzel, 2009), firm characteristics (Oetzel et al., 2007) and stakeholder pressure (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). Regarding the first, conflict duration, its intensity, its scope and its disruptiveness have been identified (Getz and Oetzel, 2009). The authors propose that when conflicts become intense, companies are less likely to be involved given the complexities attached to their involvement when violence is at its peak. If companies decide to act, they will probably do so in an indirect and collaborative manner. Getz and Oetzel (2009) also suggest that the longer a conflict lasts (which points at a government's inability to effectively solve it) and the wider its scope (i.e. the conflict spreads throughout a country or region), the more likely companies will be involved indirectly and collaboratively.

Furthermore, drawing from the CSR, political risks and conflict reduction literature, Oetzel et al. (2007) identify four main factors impinging on the firm-stakeholder interaction: the interorganizational environment, the company's legitimacy, its size and experience. The interorganizational environment refers to the availability of suitable actors with which to partner in order to effectively tackle a conflict, and determines whether companies react collaboratively or unilaterally. Besides the availability of partners, the high-risk environment may also induce companies to partner in order to share those risks. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is a factor which will influence companies' direct involvement in a particular conflict, as companies must be seen as legitimate and relevant by other stakeholders before being directly involved. Company's legitimacy can be increased by funding community projects or hiring large numbers of local workers to show their commitment to the country of operation and the communities. Funding community projects will help companies obtain a social license to operate and increase their legitimacy, which might facilitate their involvement in conflict reduction activities (see section 2.5). Collaboration with legitimate actors (e.g. local NGOs with knowledge of the context and serving the interests of local communities) may also increase companies' legitimacy.

Referring back to the resource curse literature, companies in the extractive industry may have an incentive to be involved in a conflict in order to have access to the minerals. However, their involvement will probably not be direct due to the disruptions caused by the industry, which may have reduced their legitimacy. In that light, the industry type also plays a role in companies'

strategic choices regarding whether and how to be involved. Similarly, companies' size may increase their capability to act directly and unilaterally given their economic power and the influence that they can exert on warring parties. Finally, companies' experience in the country as well as their experience with solving issues related to the conflict may also affect their choice to be involved, due to the capacity and authority they may (be perceived to) have.

This brief overview suggests that the role assigned to companies in conflict matters is mostly indirect. Indirect interventions may be "more subtle than direct approaches and are aimed at influencing outcomes in a gradual and less overt fashion […] they may even been seen as part of general social responsibility" (Getz and Oetzel, 2009, p. 379). This suggests more attention to indirect approaches and how they relate to companies' CSR.

2.4. BUSINESS FOR PEACE

An extensive literature on business for peace, and peace through commerce (the two are often used interchangeably although differences exist as pointed out below), has emerged in the past decade. Special issues in the field of business (Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 2007; Journal of Business Ethics, 2009; Academy of Management Perspectives, November 2015; Business Horizons, 2016), in law (Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Laws, 2002, 2003; American Business Law Journal, 2007) as well as articles from political science (e.g. Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010; Haufler, 2015; Patey, 2007; Pegg and Wilson, 2003; Wolf et al., 2007) have been published on the topic. Within international business and management, scholars in business ethics/business & society (e.g. Fort and Schipani, 2004; Fort, 2007; Getz and Oetzel, 2009; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007; Oetzel et al., 2009) have paid attention to companies' potential contribution to peace from a deontological perspective, i.e. it is the moral thing to do; a utilitarian perspective, i.e. it is in their interest; or a teleological perspective, i.e. peace is a common good inherent to all human activities, including business (Oetzel et al., 2009). The political science discipline, especially the international relations stream, looks more at standard setting schemes such as codes of conduct and multistakeholder partnerships as venues through which business can contribute to peace (Bennett, 2002; Haufler, 2004; Hocking, 2008) although it is more skeptical about the role of business in peace matters (Haufler, 2015). The level of analysis is also quite different. International business studies tend to pay attention to the level of the firm (i.e. individual business behavior) while the political science literature is more interested in the macro, governance level (related to issues of authority, power and legitimacy) (Haufler, 2015).

Business for peace is part of peace through commerce, a broader interdisciplinary body of knowledge. The notion that commerce promotes peace is not new. Kant and Montesquieu suggested that trade has intrinsic qualities that are congruent with peaceful behavior (Fort, 2009). Commerce is viewed as a force resonating with basic human values providing individuals, organizations and states with incentives to engage positively with one another. Entities involved in interdependent economic activities inevitably share a common ground which will defuse violent behavior if conflicts arise (Humphreys, 2003). However, this notion was discredited when nations that had previously engaged in trade went to war, such as the USSR and Germany, or Japan and the USA during World War II, or more recently Irak and the USA (Oetzel et al., 2009). Other critics of this idea are Neo-Marxist and dependency theorists who posit that trade terms are not equal and mostly benefit powerful nations (Barbieri, 2002). The level of analysis of peace through commerce includes nation states and is thus broader than that of business for peace which focusses on companies.

Many authors have paid specific attention to the relationship between business ethics and business for peace. In an overview article, Oetzel et al. (2009, p. 352) argue that business for peace aims at exploring "the argument that ethical business behavior can contribute to peace". Fort (2009, p. 348) also contends that "it is not any business that fosters peace, but it is an ethical business that contributes to peace". At the heart of business for peace is the idea that business can lead by example. Business ethicists emphasize the moral dimension of business as organizational entity with an obligation and moral authority to produce and create good in all realms of society (Fort, 2007; Fort and Schipani, 2004). The related literature looks at how business can foster peaceful behavior as it "builds upon the social and communal nature of human beings" (Oetzel et al., 2009, p. 353). At the internal company level, leadership practices of business organizations, and specifically "participative organizational leadership and employee empowerment can create conditions within organizations that approximate the attributes found in peaceful societies" (Spreitzer, 2007, p. 1080). Business can also encourage a sense of community, within and outside of the company, by sustaining health, reducing stress, and improving the camaraderie in the workforce, which will trickle down to the community as a whole. For that matter, "stress reduction programs are consistent with both business ethics and peace building principles/theories" (Bishara and Schipani, 2010, p. 540) in that they "offer business an opportunity to act as a mediating institution for peace-building" (Bishara and Schipani, 2010, p. 549). Business offers face to face interactions, enables voices to be heard and

involves employees in decisions which contribute to developing a sense of community and turns companies into 'mediating' institutions (Fort and Schipani, 2004).

Adding to Getz and Oetzel's (2009) framework, which was introduced in section 2.3, the business for peace literature has identified five channels through which companies can foster a peaceful environment, namely promoting economic development, engaging in track-two diplomacy, adopting principles of external valuation (which will contribute to advancing the rule of law), contributing to a sense of community and conducting conflict risk assessments (Forrer and Katsos, 2015, Oetzel et al., 2009). *The first channel*, promoting economic development is considered "the most basic form of violence reduction that a business can engage in, yet also one of the most powerful" (Forrer and Katsos, 2015, p. 8). It typically deals with companies' core business of producing economic gains, such as value creation, provision of local employment or technology transfer (Friedman, 1962; Fort and Schipani, 2004; Spencer, 2008), which, in turn, contributes to stability and prosperity. It also builds on Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who established a link between poor economic growth, high dependence on a single commodity and violent conflict. By sticking to its core business, providing jobs, developing infrastructure, and stimulating economic linkages, companies co-create the necessary conditions for sustainable peace to take root (Fort and Schipani, 2004; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Nelson, 2000). Nevertheless, although research has demonstrated that economic growth is associated with development and conflict reduction (Steward, 2002), economic growth alone does not automatically result in poverty reduction as poverty is a multifaceted concept which has been linked to the deprivation of capabilities (Sen, 1999). Consequently, it is not economic growth or economic development per se which will reduce conflict, but the type of economic development. An economic development model that is inclusive, provides fair wages and meaningful employment, transfers skills and capabilities, and creates spillover effects on local businesses, is more likely to contribute to peace. The economic development channel is an indirect contribution to peace, where companies typically act unilaterally.

The second channel, track-two diplomacy, presents similarities with lobby or political advocacy mentioned in the practitioner literature (Nelson, 2000). Track-two diplomacy, or citizen diplomacy, refers to informal and unofficial conflict resolution efforts undertaken by non-state actors or citizen groups (Diamond and McDonald, 1996). It aims at nurturing positive relationships between all types of actors who have a stake in sustainable peace, provides a space for dialogue, and can be instrumental in legitimizing formal political settlements. Informal, citizen-led efforts are no substitute for official peace accords, but rather complementary (Galtung, 1996). In the

literature, this direct form of business activity is not common (Oetzel et al., 2007) although a few cases of companies acting as brokers between two parties exist, such as Anglo-American Mining Company in South Africa (Lieberfeld, 2002). Track-two diplomacy activities are among the few activities that companies can implement during armed conflicts, yet they are dependent on the willingness of the conflicting parties to engage in a dialogue (Lieberfeld, 2002). Such activities fall under the direct category, and have been (and can be) implemented unilaterally or collaboratively. In Northern Ireland, reconciliation activities were undertaken collaboratively by the Chamber of Commerce, while in South Africa, a single company (Anglo-American Mining Company) supported and facilitated negotiations between the ANC and the government. The company was concerned about the political risks linked to the government repression of township riots and the subsequent international capital embargo.

The third channel concerns the adoption of principles of external valuation which are similar to "third party standards such as international codes of conduct" (Forrer and Katsos, 2015, p. 440). In the literature, it is assumed that by adopting such international principles, standards, or codes of conduct, companies will "advance the rule of law within countries by binding themselves to more stable international norms" (Forrer and Katsos, 2015, p. 440). In this way, companies set standards for governments to follow and enable the creation of institutions supporting the rule of law, which will foster trust among trading parties and, thus, reduce conflict likelihood (Fort and Schipani, 2007). These international codes of conduct, which aim "at modifying corporate behavior" (Oetzel et al., 2009, p. 360), cover different issues, such as labor practices, transparency, environmental protection, health and safety, human rights or supply chain management, which can be relevant in conflict contexts. For instance, companies that help fight corruption by adhering to transparency norms contribute to reducing the risk of violent conflict given its correlation with corrupt governments (Fort, 2007; Fort and Schipani, 2004). However, the absence of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms reduces the success of this peace promotion channel. Activities falling under this channel are typically indirect (i.e. they reduce the cause of conflict) and collaborative (i.e. they involve different types of actors) given their intention to address issues related to an industry (such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, or EITI) or a product (the Kimberley Process for diamonds).

The fourth channel is the contribution of business to a sense of community (Fort and Schipani, 2004; Spreitzer, 2007). It assumes that companies may foster a sense of 'togetherness' among employees by offering contact and providing a venue to voice their concerns. Companies can also indirectly contribute to a peaceful environment by promoting equal treatment for men

and women in the workplace as gender equity has been associated with peace (Dworkin and Schipani, 2007). Beyond the internal company level, and as illustrated in the CSR literature, by considering all stakeholders, and not only shareholders, companies may build closer ties with the communities in which they operate, through funding community projects such as schools and hospitals. Companies well embedded in their respective communities are more likely to obtain a social license to operate, which in turn, will reinforce their legitimacy. Companies fostering a sense of community "are essentially building real trust between themselves and their stakeholders" (Oetzel et al., 2009, p. 365). Activities within this channel contribute indirectly to peace and can be implemented unilaterally or collaboratively, mostly with regards to community project funding.

Finally, regarding the *fifth channel*, companies can undertake conflict risk assessments (Anderson, 2008). Given the complexities of investing in conflict-affected regions, companies' operations can unintentionally exacerbate existing tensions through their procurement or human resources policies (e.g. by unwillingly hiring staff from or doing business with certain groups or communities). Some groups or villages may feel that they do not benefit from the company's presence as much as others, which may fuel resentment and create conflicts between the company and the community and/or among other communities. Guidelines and tools have been developed to minimize companies' negative impact. International Alert (2005), for instance, offers guidance to business on how to avoid unintentional and indirect involvement in a conflict through its Conflict Sensitive Business Practices (CSBP), a guide originally geared towards the extractive industry. The United Nations (2010b) also have a similar tool, the Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

These guidelines and tools are part of the practitioner literature that looks at practical ways for business to become an agent of peace rather than fueling conflicts, sometimes related to or stemming from a more activist/campaign perspective (International Alert, 2005; Nelson, 2000; Zandvliet, 2005). This points at a relatively strong normative and applied component to business for peace. The practitioner stream also distinguishes other categories such as compliance with national regulations, do no harm, and proactive contribution to peace building (Banfield et al., 2005; Nelson, 2000). Activist groups have not only waged campaigns against certain business practices in conflict countries, but have also offered companies tools and incentives to contribute to peace, often in collaboration with NGOs (International Alert, 2005). For instance, International Alert's CSBP was tested through a pilot project with companies and a local NGO, opening the door for further cooperation.

2.5. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The literature on CSR has reached an impressive volume since interest started to become serious halfway the previous century. For the purpose of this dissertation, the focus is on the international dimensions of CSR, with specific attention for non-Western settings, including Africa, and to possible ways in which companies might potentially play a role, either individually or collectively, in furthering peace and reconciliation. International business in society issues have been studied academically especially through special issues (International Business Review, 2010; Journal of International Management, 2008; Journal of International Business Studies, 2006; Business Ethics: A European Review, 2016) as well as a recent overview article (Kolk, 2016). Developing countries were the subject of special issues in the Journal of Corporate Citizenship (Winter 2006) and the Journal of Business Ethics (2007), and the Journal of Corporate Citizenship specifically on Asia, Africa and Latin America (respectively Spring 2004, Summer 2005 and Spring 2006); most recent is the forthcoming one in Business & Society on Africa. More broadly, insights on Africa have been deepened in a more 'mainstream' journal (Academy of Management Perspectives, February 2015) which includes an emerging stream on social entrepreneurship on the continent.

However, despite increasing interest in CSR in developing countries in the past decade, overall most research has looked at business operations in Western or Northern settings, and, when covering developing countries, it has usually focused on stable middle income countries in Latin America (i.e. Mexico) or Asia, and hardly on Africa, let alone Central African (conflict-affected) settings (Egri and Ralston, 2008; Kolk and Van Tulder, 2010). As a result, there is relatively limited insight into whether and how companies address the challenges that they face when they operate in conflict countries in Africa, how they shape their social responsibility in such complex environments and whether they perceive it as their responsibility to contribute to solving conflicts. Although attempts to broaden the CSR agenda to include themes found in conflict countries suffering from institutional gaps have been made in the literature (Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010), the precise nature (i.e. what activity to undertake), and scope of business responsibility (i.e. firm, community, country) in complex environments marked by poor governance in Africa remains largely unclear and deserves further attention.

Studies have contended that the focus of CSR in Africa should be on economic development given high levels of unemployment (Visser, 2006b) and specific problems such as HIV-Aids, especially in South Africa (Hamann, 2003). However, CSR may not contribute sufficiently to solving the problems that the African continent is facing as it is viewed by some as too generic

with too little local adaptation, thus falling short of delivering on its developmental promise (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Frynas, 2005), or reproducing skewed patterns of dependency and power abuses (Gilberthorpe, 2013; Rajak, 2008, 2012). Critics also suggest that CSR is ill-suited to cater for community needs (Blowfield and Frynas 2005; Jenkins, 2005; Newell and Frynas, 2007), is being overly focused on technical, less essential issues (Lund-Thomsen, 2004; Prieto-Carron et al., 2006), relatively isolated from broader development plans (Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite 2004) and not benefiting major stakeholders (Adanhounme, 2011). Part of the literature on CSR in Africa touches upon companies' interactions with communities (Idemudia 2007; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Kemp, 2010; Muthuri et al., 2009), paying special attention to their expectations, especially in contexts of government failure to provide basic services (Eweje, 2006). Developing healthy relationships with local communities helps avoid costly and unnecessary conflicts (Kemp, 2010; Muthuri et al., 2009). Besides local communities, the range of stakeholders that companies can engage with is quite large.

Within the business for peace literature, Oetzel and Getz (2012, p. 2) have indicated that "when addressing complex issues such as violent conflict, firms must increasingly respond to, engage with, and try to influence a broader set of actors". This is due to the complexity of conflicts which presents companies with the opportunity to design different engagement strategies on how to deal with the multitude of stakeholders that play a role in or are affected by the conflict. For that matter, a few models exist to help companies identify and design tailor-made engagement strategies. Dunham et al. (2006) for instance have developed a stakeholder ranking system based on two dimensions, cooperation (those stakeholders affected by the business, such as communities) and collaboration (those stakeholders on which companies depend to function, such as suppliers). Mitchell et al. (1997) have also developed a typology of stakeholders predicated on three dimensions, i.e. power, legitimacy, and urgency. Building on Mitchell et al. (1997), Oetzel and Getz (2012) propose that stakeholder pressure determines the type of business engagement in a specific conflict, as part of their societal responsibility. Doing so, they made a distinction between local and international stakeholders as "stakeholder salience may vary, based on stakeholder location" (Oetzel and Getz, 2012, p. 2). Local stakeholders, i.e. belligerents, local governments or NGOs, may be highly salient in conflict areas given "their expected levels of power, legitimacy, and urgency" (Oetzel and Getz, 2012, p. 4). Belligerents can indeed destroy assets, kidnap staff and disrupt business operations. International stakeholders may exert influence on business decisions due to their power, but they often lack legitimacy or urgency to be as influential as local stakeholders (Oetzel and Getz, 2012). Adding to Getz and

Oetzel's (2009) framework, Oetzel and Getz (2012, p. 5) posit that "local stakeholder pressure is positively associated with the likelihood that firms will adopt tactics that respond directly to violent conflict, and will do so in collaboration with other firms or organizations".

This observation brings to the fore the relevance of the literature on partnerships and NGO-business interactions. In the business realm, Business and Society (2010) has dedicated a special issue on NGO-business-government relationships looking at various analytical levels, from global regulatory arrangements (Vogel, 2010) to NGO-company interactions from an institutional perspective (Le Ber and Branzei, 2010). The Journal of Business Ethics (2009) has dedicated a special issue to the scope of the relationship between NGOs and business, and, more recently (2016), has published another issue related to enhancing the impact of multistakeholder partnerships. The literature on partnerships covers many topics among which the emergence of the phenomenon as a resultant of various failures (Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Van Huijstee et al., 2007), actors' motivation to collaborate (Elkington and Fennell, 1998; Rondinelli and London, 2003), partnerships' functions (Beisheim, 2012; Pattberg et al., 2012), and partnership outcomes and/or impact (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012a, 2012b; Van Tulder and Maas, 2012; Van Tulder et al., 2016).

Various literature streams have examined partnerships, from development studies (Barnes and Brown, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Fowler, 2000), marketing (Berger et al., 2004; Vock et al., 2013), management (Kolk et al., 2010; Vogel, 2010) and political science (Bennett, 2002; Haufler, 2001a, 2002), each with their specific focus and interest. Development studies and political science have mostly paid attention to international-local NGO partnerships, NGO-government partnerships, or global multistakeholder collaboration, sometimes involving companies, to either promote development (Brinkerhoff, 2002b) or stimulate the creation and/or adoption of norms, codes or standards (Haufler, 2001a). In such cases, "regulatory authority [is] being assumed to a greater extent by NGOs and multistakeholder institutions or public-private partnerships" (Utting, 2005, p. 1). Within the business literature, different partnership constellations have been researched with business-NGO collaborations being studied most often (e.g. Berger et al., 2004; Dahan et al., 2010; Den Hond et al., 2015; Kourula and Laasonen, 2010; Seitanidi and Crane, 2009; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Management scholars have also studied the rise of NGOs and their growing influence in the public domain as well as the impact they can have on companies' operations (Doh and Teegen, 2002; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Yaziji, 2004). A few studies suggest that companies should consider NGOs as serious stakeholders with which to partner (Guay et al., 2004; Yaziji, 2004), while others are more skeptical about the legitimacy of

NGOs (Munilla and Miles, 2005) or point to the disrupting influence NGOs can have on CSR activities by encouraging business to adopt practices that are not necessarily in line with developing countries' priorities (Schepers, 2006). Nevertheless, NGO scrutiny plays an important role in improved business practice (Pegg and Wilson, 2003), although some argue that such activism tends to focus on major companies with well-known brand names, and much less on smaller and less visible ones (Shankleman, 2007).

A shift in engagement strategy between business and NGOs has been observed (Doh and Teegen, 2003; Yaziji, 2004; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Quite some NGOs have become more inclined to adopt collaborative tactics, or apply a mix of confrontational strategies with collaborative tactics, often within networks or alliances. NGO typologies have been designed to capture their ideology and their engagement patterns with business (Ählström and Sjöström, 2005; Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007; Van Tulder and Zwart, 2006). While NGO engagement patterns with business may be shifting towards collaboration, conflictual relationships may also have a positive role (Laasonen et al., 2012). This has to do with the fact that collaboration does not follow a linear route and, building upon the collaboration continuum (Austin, 2001), different paths to collaboration exist, including confrontational engagement as a step before engaging in a more positive relationship (Arenas et al., 2013). Conflict between civil society and business is not necessarily negative, but can be seen "as an opportunity to begin a more productive interaction" (Arenas et al., 2013, p. 724), which confirms the "messiness of partnership practice" (Selsky and Parker, 2005, p. 866).

Most collaborative activities proposed in the business for peace literature are multistakeholder in nature, and not only bilateral (e.g. between business and NGOs). In their framework, Getz and Oetzel (2009) mention multilateral agreements (such as the Global Compact) as indirect collaborative action, and conflict-specific agreements (such as the Kimberley process, or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights) as direct collaborative action. The collaborative activities they propose do not necessarily involve different types of actors. Companies can very well join forces with each other to leverage their power and attempt to broker a deal between warring parties without NGO (or government) interference. On the other hand, other studies have specifically emphasized the value accrued to companies when collaborating with different types of (non-business) actors in order to effectively tackle conflict-related issues (Bais and Huijser, 2005; Haufler, 2002). Bringing together a variety of actors implies joining different resources, skills, expertise, competencies and a wide commitment to share risks and responsibilities (Nelson and Zadek, 2000).

Specifically, partnerships between NGOs and the private sector are said to “combine the complementary strengths associated with their sectoral identities, e.g. the productive capacity of business and the social organizing capacity of civil society” (Ashman, 2001, p. 1098). By participating in such partnerships, “companies benefit from NGO resources such as credibility, cognitive capacities, connections, and capacity of confrontation” (Berlie, 2010, p. 24). NGOs can increase companies’ legitimacy and provide contacts and access to communities (Oetzel and Doh, 2009), while companies can provide NGOs with management skills and access to funds. In addition, beyond benefiting each other’s capabilities and skills sets, other partnership advantages accruing to companies when collaborating with other types of actors in conflict areas are “to share the blame in case of failure […] to spread cost and risk and to assemble complementary capacities around the challenge (Oetzel et al., 2007, p. 342)”. Finally, when participating in collaborative arrangements with other actors, such as NGOs and government authorities, companies are "facilitating the development of institutional capacity and ensuring the sustainability of their CSR initiatives" (Idemudia, 2007, p. 400).

Linked to the literature on corporate-community relations, it has been assumed that responding to the needs and aspirations of local communities and addressing issues commonly found in conflict countries in Africa may best happen through multistakeholder partnerships (Idemudia, 2007). Effective partnerships with local communities can serve as platforms for an open dialogue in which community expectations and perceptions are discussed in a transparent manner and taken into account by companies (Calvano, 2008). In volatile contexts, such as those found in Central Africa, companies need to "seek innovative ways to improve corporate-community communication, and seek ways of fostering a sense of belongingness among host communities" (Idemudia, 2007, p. 400). Gaining a better understanding of power inequalities, perception gaps and of the overall cultural context will help companies reduce conflict with local communities (Calvano, 2008). Through partnering with local organizations, companies will have access to their “greater expertise with the issues related to the conflict or with cultural issues of relevance. In addition, they may have valuable relationships with key stakeholders to the conflict” (Oetzel et al., 2007, p. 342).

Finally, and referring back to the five peace promoting channels identified by the business for peace literature (and discussed in the previous section), business can learn from NGOs how to conduct conflict impact assessments through multistakeholder partnerships (Forrer, 2009). More generally, NGOs can also assist companies with integrating peace and conflict-related themes into their CSR agenda in order to help alleviate conflict and contribute to peace (Hamann and Kapelus,

2004; Idahosa, 2002; Idemudia, 2009). The ways in which companies operating in Central Africa address the issues that they face, how they collaborate with other actors, and which peace promoting channel, if any, is the most used by those companies, either unilaterally or collaboratively, will be explored further in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 3. MNC REPORTING ON CSR AND CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AFRICA[1]

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Interest has grown for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in developing countries in recent years, in recognition of the fact that context matters. This has been reflected in a number of recent special issues, such as those in Journal of Corporate Citizenship (Winter 2006) and Journal of Business Ethics (2007) that dealt with the topic more generally, and three special issues of Journal of Corporate Citizenship on Asia, Africa and Latin America (respectively Spring 2004, Summer 2005 and Spring 2006). The role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) has received specific attention, as these have been confronted most with the rather different peculiarities of their home countries, usually in Europe or North America, and the host countries in which they have operations as well. At the same time, MNCs' prominence also means that their impact on these host economies and their CSR activities in foreign countries have received attention, in line with higher societal expectations and reputational issues.

While publications have helped to obtain more insight into CSR in developing regions, a closer look shows that Africa is much less well researched than other regions. Empirical studies that cover African countries usually involve South Africa and Nigeria (cf. Baskin, 2006; Phillips, 2006), as documented by Visser (2006a) for the period 1995-2005 and confirmed by an additional electronic search we carried out for subsequent years up to and including 2008. Publications on Nigeria focus on the relation between local communities, such as the Ogoni people, and oil MNCs such as Shell (Boele et al., 2001; Eweje, 2006; Ite, 2007a, 2007b; Wheeler et al., 2002), while in South Africa, most attention is paid to business ethics as well as the emergence of CSR in the post-apartheid setting (Hamann et al., 2005; Visser, 2006a). This paper responds to Visser's (2006a) call for more studies on Africa, and particularly on other topics and other countries than those that have received attention so far.

In a sense, it is not surprising that the available literature on MNCs and CSR in Africa has concentrated on South Africa and Nigeria as this reflects foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns and thus the presence of MNCs in Africa. This also explains why Africa has been underrepresented compared to Latin America and Asia. It must be noted, however, that the past few years have seen a shift in investment patterns, and increasing FDI inflows to Africa (UNCTAD, 2007). Although still being very unequally spread geographically over the continent, the importance of FDI in some

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non-traditional recipient countries is growing rapidly, frequently due to the availability of natural resources: 48% of FDI in Africa in 2005 took place in the oil, mining and gas industries of six African countries (UNCTAD, 2006). However, this has not yet been reflected in CSR research on these other countries. This appears to be related to the difficulty of doing research in countries where governance and institutional structures are in flux, and where violent conflicts are prevalent, with different groups fighting for scarce resources and/or government power, with factors involving ethnicity or religion playing a role as well at times. However, it is in such settings with their peculiarities, that CSR dilemmas, which are particularly sensitive for MNCs as well, come to the fore most prominently.

Thus, more attention to MNCs and CSR in Africa seems timely, particularly in those countries where research has been largely absent so far but where the presence of some MNCs is nevertheless notable. Settings largely unexplored include conflict-ridden areas in Central Africa where a limited number of usually large MNCs can potentially have a large impact on the local situation. This also means that they may play a role in addressing the huge problems faced by Africa in general and these countries in particular, including human rights violations, inequality, poverty and human suffering. In recent years, MNCs' positive, 'leading-edge' involvement, as 'good corporate citizens', has received more attention (Andriof and McIntosh, 2001; Fortanier and Kolk, 2007a; Kolk et al., 2006; Sullivan, 2003; UNCTAD, 2007).

In addition, the MNCs themselves face large CSR dilemmas, related to the contribution they can (or cannot) make in these countries given the different foreign setting (cf. Visser et al., 2006) and their attitude vis-à-vis ongoing conflicts (Banfield, 2003; Handelsman, 2003; MacDonald and McLaughlin, 2003; Oetzel et al., 2007). In the more generic, emergent literature on MNCs and conflict, several questions have been raised (Bais and Huijser, 2005; Banfield et al., 2005; Bennett, 2002; Haufler, 2004; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007; Sullivan, 2003), also as input for further research (Oetzel et al., 2007; UNCTAD, 2007). These include how MNCs deal with conflicts when investing in such regions, or when conflicts (re)emerge while being present in the country already; and whether they (intend to) play a particular role to exert influence and help reduce conflict. The issues faced by MNCs, both generally and in relation to CSR specifically, are more complex than in other countries so it is worth exploring to what extent they show awareness of these peculiarities.

To help shed some light on these issues, this paper explores how MNCs report on CSR and conflict in three African countries (Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Republic of the Congo). We chose these countries in the heart of Africa because they have gone through prolonged periods of violent conflict, possess considerable natural resources that offer economic

opportunities for MNCs, and have hardly been covered in research, and certainly not from this perspective. Taking a broad societal view, it might be said that everything that can contribute to a reduction of conflict, including a potential role of MNCs, would be very welcome, not only from the perspective of human suffering but also because of the economic cost of conflicts. A 2007 report noted that, for Africa as a whole, this amounted to $18 billion per year, with an average African economy shrinking by 15% as a result of armed conflicts (Hillier, 2007, p. 3); for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the cost of armed conflict in the period 1996-2005 was estimated to have been 29% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (Hillier, 2007, p. 10).

Despite this dire situation and the assumed role of MNCs, not much research has been done on MNCs in conflict countries, due to lack of data and the complexities of collecting further information on the ground. Given these limitations, this study uses reports by MNCs to obtain insight into their perceived CSR dilemmas and opportunities in three countries marked by a history of conflict. Before moving to the set-up of the exploratory analysis and the findings, we first briefly discuss some perspectives on CSR in Africa.

3.2. CSR IN AFRICA

The definition of CSR in the African context has been the subject of academic attention (Egels, 2005; Hamann et al., 2005; Hamann and Kapelus, 2004; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ojo, 2008; Visser, 2006b). Most scholars agree that the specific context matters because CSR is locally rooted (Hamann et al., 2005), and the product of historical and cultural factors (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). Africa is specific in a sense because it is a continent marked by conflicts, environmental degradation, and dire poverty, thus presenting MNCs with the ethical dilemma of prioritizing their overall social responsibilities (De Jongh and Prinsloo, 2005) in line with local needs.

To shed some light on this issue, Visser (2006b) revisited Carroll's CSR pyramid from an African perspective, and given Africa's low levels of development and high unemployment rates. Visser (2006b) argued that the economic responsibilities of MNCs in Africa should be at the core of their CSR priorities, followed by philanthropic, legal and ethical responsibilities. The second place attributed to philanthropy is somewhat surprising given the criticism directed at MNCs' CSR activities based on the philanthropic model (Boele et al., 2001; Wheeler et al., 2002; Ite, 2004; Ite, 2005; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Idemudia, 2009). As much of FDI in Africa is in the extractive industries with well-documented negative environmental and social impacts, it may be more

important to know how these implications are taken into account than pure philanthropic efforts (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004; Ite, 2005; Newell and Frynas, 2007).

In that light, it must be noted that CSR activities undertaken by MNCs in developing countries in general and Africa in particular have been criticised, for not addressing the root causes of (under)development (Idahosa, 2002; Hamann and Kapelus, 2004; Idemudia, 2009) and/or failing to improve relationships with local communities (Idemudia, 2009; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Omeje, 2006). Another point of critique has been the asymmetry between African governments (especially in the case of small, relatively poor countries) and huge oil MNCs, sometimes exemplified by comparing company's (local) tax contributions to total government budget of a particular country, or company's profits to an economy's gross domestic product (cf. UNCTAD, 2007). Whether exaggerated or not, MNCs can use their clout to leverage favourable deals when considering investments, for example, which has been criticised in relation to 'irresponsible business' and tax deals (cf. Reed, 2002; SustainAbility, 2006). Systematic evidence has been lacking here, however (UNCTAD, 2007). In some cases, and presumably in response, companies outline, in their CSR reports, the large contribution made to a national/local economy using such figures (Fortanier and Kolk, 2007b).

If we consider existing studies on CSR in Africa against the background of Visser's (2006b) priorities, the following can be concluded – obviously looking at Nigeria and South Africa as these are the countries on which research has focused (see the introduction). A recent study on MNCs in Nigeria found that CSR activities concentrated on the locations where companies had operations, with a variety of themes being covered, such as health care, manpower development, capacity building, sports and education, and infrastructure development (Ojo, 2008). Also interesting was the conclusion that CSR activities undertaken by companies in Nigeria follow a rather philanthropic model which corroborates other studies' findings on Shell community investment projects (Boele et al., 2001; Idemudia and Ite 2006; Idemudia, 2009; Ite, 2004; Ite, 2005; Wheeler et al., 2002).

In South Africa, the historical roots of CSR are that it started as local charity, reflecting mining companies' culture of giving (Kapelus, 2002), before starting to incorporate governance aspects linked to the apartheid regime (Malone and Goodin, 1997). When apartheid ended, the focus of CSR in South Africa shifted to socio-economic issues, such as unemployment and affirmative action through Black Empowerment, and health issues, particularly HIV Aids (Kapelus, 2002; Hamann, 2003; Visser, 2005). The broadening of the definition of CSR in the South African context, from pure philanthropy to corporate citizenship and health, the inclusion of core

business practices, as well as the integration of context-sensitive issues such as black empowerment and concomitant wealth redistribution confirms the notion that CSR is not static (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004) and reflects developments in the local setting.

The notion that context matters raises the question of what CSR should entail in fragile and conflict-prone environments typically found in (Central) Africa, characterized by a governance vacuum and the absence of rule of law, and lack of societal and regulatory pressure on companies. Specifically in relation to conflict resolution, it has been emphasised that MNCs can be important, by taking individual actions or by supplementing those undertaken by others (Bennett, 2002; Oetzel et al., 2007). Looking at types of activities, companies can play a role to address conflict directly (for example, via security arrangements, negotiations or withholding payments) or indirect approaches focused on conflict diminution, such as lobbying governments or others, or philanthropy (Oetzel et al., 2007). The type of conflict as well as its intensity obviously affects the room for manoeuvre for MNCs in this regard. In (post-)conflict situations, a company's role is seen as helping with reconstruction activities (for example, in infrastructure) and investments, but also by engaging in core business activities that will have positive implications for the host economies in general, and by social investments and partnerships that help address the main drivers of conflict, particularly corruption, poverty and social inequality (Bennett, 2002; Nelson, 2000).

Thus, seen from this perspective, the role of MNCs in conflict zones also includes the more generic economic and social aspects that are considered to be part of CSR, particularly when it comes to MNCs operating in developing countries (Fortanier and Kolk, 2007b; Meyer, 2004). These include economic impacts originating from the size of MNCs' investments (jobs, taxes) and spillovers (to local firms and through transfer of skills and technologies), and social consequences, for employees (working conditions and rights), local communities and society more broadly by demonstrating good practices (consideration for human and ethnic rights, poverty alleviation and ethical behavior regarding corruption and transparency) (Andriof and McIntosh, 2001; Kolk et al., 2006; Meyer, 2004; Sullivan, 2003; UNCTAD, 2007). With these more generic economic and social aspects, it can be asked to what extent these reflect the conflict context or are specifically designed to address some of the issues related to the conflict. In other words, do MNCs with operations in conflict countries in Central Africa focus on local context-specific (conflict) issues or is their approach comparable to that applicable in other African settings? Here, particularly South Africa may serve as comparison to some extent as this is the country for which CSR reporting has been investigated (Dawkins and Ngunjiri, 2008; Hamann and Kapelus, 2004; Reichardt and

Reichardt 2005; Visser, 2002), likely due to the fact that reporting has really taken off there (KPMG, 2005).

We will now turn to the range of responses, as well as perceptions of conflicts, opportunities and dilemmas of large foreign companies active in three Central African countries, considering the issues raised above.

3.3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

To explore the issues set out above, we selected three countries in Central Africa (Angola; the Democratic Republic of the Congo – DRC; and the Republic of the Congo) marked by prolonged periods of violent conflicts, considerable presence of MNCs related to the presence of natural resources, and an absence of systematic research in relation to the subject of this paper. Table 2 gives some basic information about the three countries, for which we will investigate how MNCs report on CSR and conflict.

Table 2: Some basic information about Angola, DRC and the Republic of the Congo

	Angola	**DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo)**	**Republic of the Congo**
Conflict period	1970-2002	1997-	1995-1999
Area	1.246,700 square kilometres	2.345,000 square kilometres	342,000 square kilometres
GDP	$ 53.9 billion	$ 5.6 billion	$5.1 billion
GDP/capita	$ 3.400	$ 120	$ 700
Natural resources	Oil, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, bauxite, uranium, gold, granite, copper, feldspar	Copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, other minerals; oil; wood; hydroelectric potential	Oil, wood, potash, lead, zinc, uranium, phosphates, natural gas, hydropower
Main export	Oil (95%); diamonds	Diamonds (45%); copper; cobalt	Oil (90%); timber
Population	15.5 million	58 million	3.8 million
Ethnic groups	Ovimbundu 37%, Kimbundu 25%, Bakongo 13%, mixed racial 2%, European 1%	More than 200 African ethnic groups; the Luba, Kongo, and Anamongo are some of the larger groupings of tribes	5 principal Bantu groups; more than 70 subgroups. Largest groups are Bacongo, Vili, Bateke, M'Bochi, and Sangha

Source: basic country information (except for first row) derived from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2825.htm; accessed on 13 September 2007; IMF, 2007; World Bank, 2007.

Since comprehensive data on MNCs in Angola, DRC and the Republic of the Congo is not easily available, we proceeded as follows. To obtain an overall view of the major investors in the three countries, we first consulted the latest reports by UNCTAD (2006a; 2006b) available at the start of the study (July 2007). For the purpose of being as inclusive as possible, other lists and reports that contained potentially valuable information on companies investing in the three countries were also consulted.[2] A quick search of the websites of all companies found in this way

[2] This included, for example, lists published by investment promotion agencies (such as http://www.izf.net/izf/), sectoral lists (such as mining in Angola, http://www.infomine.com/, http://www.mbendi.co.za/orgs) or NGO lists.

was subsequently carried out to ensure that those identified were still operating in the three countries. These steps led to an overall list containing a large number of large and small companies that had to be narrowed down to a more manageable list that would enable a more in-depth manual search of the largest foreign players in those countries on the topics under investigation.

This selection was initially done by taking those companies that appeared in the 2007 largest 500 lists (Fortune Global 500, FT Global 500, FT Europe 500 and FT US 500; rankings based on turnover). Given that mining is such an important sector in all three countries, and that the number of mining companies included by this criterion was relatively limited (only four companies, with by comparison many more oil MNCs), we took a closer look at this sector and added those firms that had net assets higher than $200 million.[3] This criterion was used to include companies that made large investments the past year(s) but had not yet been able to see these investments translate into high sales' numbers. They were assumed to have potential economic and social significance relevant for the purpose of this paper. In addition, when the 2007 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2007) was published in the course of our study, we did an additional check on the companies listed there and added one (Inpex, with operations in the DRC through its subsidiary Teikoku oil).

This resulted in a sample of 54 companies, of which 64% operated in the extractive industries (oil and gas; mining; oil and equipment services) and the remainder spread over a variety of sectors (see Appendix 1 for a full list and some details of the companies). It must be noted that most non-extractive companies do not have major operations in the countries under study (and in Africa more generally). Almost half of the MNCs originates from Europe (44%, of which 30% are French) followed by North America (31%, of which 76% are from the US); there are seven companies from emerging markets (2 from Brazil, 5 from South Africa). 41% of the MNCs are active in Angola only, 19% only in the DRC and 9% only in the Republic of the Congo; the other companies operate in more than one country – for only three MNCs there is clear evidence that they are active in all three countries. In Angola, BP, Chevron, Exxon and Total seem most

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http://www.transnationale.org as well as reports/sites by NGOs on economic activities in the three countries http://www.niza.nl/; http://www.miningwatch.ca/updir/DRC_unanswered_questions.pdf; http://www.ipisresearch.be; http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angola0104/; http://www.business-humanrights.org; http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/conflict_diamonds.html; http://www.natural-resources.org/minerals/CD/docs/other/N0262179.pdf; http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/hria/full%20report_may_2007.pdf).

[3] In addition to the sources mentioned in the preceding note, additional sites checked included http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/hria/full%20report_may_2007.pdf; http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2005/aomyb05.pdf; ttp://www.eitransparency.org; http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/africa.html#ao; http://www.11.be/downloads/EN_Memo_DRC.pdf.

prominent in extractives, for the Republic of the Congo this applies to ENI and Total, in the DRC the situation is less clear – this may be one of the countries where Chinese companies could start to play a role, but in our dataset this was not yet the case.

For all these companies, we collected, in the period September-October 2007, the latest available financial and non-financial reports as well as company websites. In all but one case (which concerned a report over 2005), the annual and CSR reports covered the year 2006. This information was analyzed in detail on the aspects discussed in the preceding section. This encompassed what MNCs noted about economic opportunities in the African context, about their economic and social impacts (cf. Fortanier and Kolk, 2007a, 2007b; UNCTAD, 2007) and about their cooperation with other parties, governmental and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders; whether they reported on the (post-)conflict situation they may have been involved in, whether they addressed issues related to the impact of the conflict on their operations, their potential role in addressing conflicts (cf. Oetzel et al., 2007) and/or how they dealt with the limitations inherent to investing in conflict areas. While relying on corporate information has limitations in view of the fact that it involves self-representations, it has been widely used, particularly for purposes such as the one in this paper, where legitimacy, insight in corporate values and policies, and communication to stakeholders of companies' perceptions is important (see e.g. Baskin, 2006; Dawkins and Ngunjiri, 2008; Fortanier and Kolk, 2007a, 2007b).

3.4. MNC REPORTING ON OPPORTUNITIES, IMPACTS AND DILEMMAS

3.4.1. Investment opportunities and the African context

When looking at the information that companies provide, we note that a large majority (61%) mentions reasons for investing in Africa. A vast majority refers to growth as major factor, either directly using this word (e.g. AngloGoldshanti, BASF, BHP, Halliburton, Petrobras, SGS) and/or other terms such as penetrating new emerging markets, consolidating their presence (examples in these categories include Alrosa, Ashanti, PPR, Schneider, Shell), being closer to customers (particularly in the case of non-extractive companies such as Heineken, Nestle and Schneider), the quality of mining products (Alrosa, BHP), the opportunity to extract at low cost (Anvil, BHP, Nikanor), high margins/returns on investment (Camec), strategic advantage by extracting untapped rich resources (Nikanor) or as part of an approach to spread risks across sectors and countries (Energem). We thus see a mix of motivations, but with predominance for natural-resource seeking, efficiency seeking but also market seeking, although the latter seems to be less important (cf. Dunning and Lundan, 2008; UNCTAD, 2007).

As far as the local economic context is concerned, the favourable investment climate is mentioned by only three companies (Anvil, Haliburton, Heineken). Heineken (2007, p. 38) states, for example, that "since the economic situation in Central Africa has been stabilising, we have clearly benefited from the potential provided by this attractive region. We were able to increase volumes and to boost profitability". While a general statement, the conflict settings apparently have not negatively affected the company's perception of the region. It should be noted, however, that only BHP, Norsk Hydro and Statoil give specific information per country of operations. Most of the information on, for instance, economic value generated and retained is at best regional (often covering cross continental regions) or global, rarely national. The main examples where specific information is given will be included below.

With regard to the political context in Angola, Halliburton (2007, p. 13) refers to the government's "determination to make sure that the country's citizens are beneficiaries of the revenues from this valuable natural resource. The government has imposed sustainability and local content stipulations on foreign companies, requiring a minimum 10% of local content". The company mentions to support the government's plans, and is taking measures to accommodate the new legislation. Statoil, ENI, Chevron and Total are the only other companies openly supporting the local-content principle as a positive development for the country.

Concerning more politically sensitive issues that are highly pertinent in Central African conflict settings, only two MNCs mention the 'resource curse', which refers to the link between abundance of natural resources on the one hand, and higher chances of violent conflict and relatively poor performance on other social, economic and political indicators in developing countries on the other hand (cf. Mehlum et al., 2006; Sachs and Warner, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007). These two MNCs are Chevron and Statoil (2007, p. 7, 48). The latter company gives a clear explanation of the difficult situation in which countries find themselves regarding the resource-conflict link:

> "good resource management can encourage growth and reduce poverty on a large scale in such nations, but big revenue flows can also lead to corruption and the concentration of resources on unproductive activities. The result could be a one-sided economy with poor competitiveness and great vulnerability to fluctuations in oil and gas prices." "Host governments have raised licence fees and taxes, set high targets for local content in procurement and employment, and made social contributions part of bid evaluations. Natural resource abundance may crowd out non-resource exports and foreign investments, or tempt governments to under-invest in education and other long-term

measures. The result could be non-competitive and undiversified economies which leave their populations vulnerable when prices decline or resources dry up. Large and concentrated revenue streams may encourage corruption and unproductive use of resources in both public and private sectors. In the worst case, competition over access to resources could end in violent conflict. Experience shows that none of these risks are unavoidable, and that resource wealth is a strong driver for growth and sustainable development when managed well."

Interestingly, transparency, an issue linked to good governance and thus relevant in conflict-prone countries, is high on oil companies' agenda: 73% of the oil companies in our sample are part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In addition, two oil companies (BP and Exxon Mobil) are not only transparent about their transfers, but also engage the Angolan government on good governance and accountable oil revenue management. Exxon Mobil (2007, p. 38) mentions to be "in dialogue with the Angolan government to encourage them to move toward more open and transparent processes in managing their oil and gas interests".

3.4.2. Economic and social impacts

The majority of companies in our sample (58%) reports on taxes and royalties paid, be it per (major) country, per region or in total. Companies that provide information on the countries studied here include Statoil (2007, p. 62, 65), which paid $53 million in signature bonuses and 3.2 billion Norwegian Krones as income taxes to the Angolan government and (Norsk) Hydro (2007, p. 112) with 1.9 billion Norwegian Krones, also to the Angolan government. A few smaller mining companies in our sample are not profitable yet because their investments are fairly recent (Nikanor, Katanga Mining Limited, Tenke, Phelpes Dodge). The economic impact they report is not actual but estimated. For example, Nikanor mentions that 45% of pre-tax earnings will accrue to the DRC state, while Katanga Mining Limited states that more than $1 million per month is injected in the local economy as of now through salary payments and suppliers contracts, and that an estimated $2.18 billion in taxes, royalties, wages and other spending will be allocated to the Congolese economy over their 20 year lease.[4]

The majority of companies (57%) refers to the fact that they purchase from local suppliers to stimulate the local economy although more exact details about the contribution is usually lacking. Four companies stand out in providing detailed information: Chevron (2007, p. 21), which

[4] (http://www.nikanor.co.uk/ir/files/factsheets/nikanor_factsheet_jul07.pdf) and (http://www.katangamining.com/sr/benefits.html), consulted 10 October 2007.

purchased $30 billion globally on goods and services from suppliers and contractors in 2006 as well as $347 million in goods and services from 196 Angolan-owned businesses in 2005;[5] TotalFinaElf (which also applied the local content spending principle illustrating how many equipment goods and services are bought locally to stimulate the local economy through regular business operations); Statoil (2007, p. 65) that gives an overview, per country of operations, of purchased goods and services; and BHP (2007, p. 301), which is one of the few mining companies providing a very detailed breakdown of the economic value retained in Africa ($2.5 billion) as well as payments made to African suppliers ($3.4 billion).

Figures on employment in Africa are provided by 54% of the companies, though here again usually for supranational levels. Looking at the specific countries, employment figures in Angola range, for example, from 820 people (BP) to 10,200 people (Odebrecht). Mining companies in the DRC have employment figures ranging from 1,000 people (Tenke) to 3,000 people (Camec). The largest employer in Africa in our sample is AngloGoldAshanti with 53,125 employees out of a global workforce of 61,453. TotalFinaElf employs 8,556 people in Africa, of whom about 1,200 in the Republic of the Congo. Chevron is Angola's largest foreign oil-industry employer, employing 3,000 Angolan nationals, who count for 88% of the total workforce, of which 72% are professionals and play supervisory roles. A focus on hiring local employees is cited by 61% of MNCs (Anvil strives for 93% local employees, Odebrecht 92%, Haliburton 70%). MNCs do not break down their employment figures in age or ethnic composition, two aspects which are often related to conflict issues. Capacity building or human resource development, and employee health and safety are also mentioned by a majority of MNCs (58%), regardless of their sector of activity.

While a large percentage of MNCs (78%) mention financing community development projects, only 57% give specific information about project funding. Amounts vary tremendously, from $300,000 USD (First Quantum) to $103 million (BHP Billiton) and $544 million (Johnson and Johnson). Comparisons of generosity would be an arduous task since a considerable proportion of the community development initiatives are not only made in cash, but also through in-kind support and employee time, and (comparative) specifications per country are impossible to make. It is important to note that MNCs such as Johnson and Johnson finance NGOs and other organizations in the DRC despite a small presence; BASF even finances projects there without having direct operations in the country – this illustrates the impact MNCs can have more

[5] http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/angolabrochureenglish.pdf; and http://www.chevron.com/countries/angola/?view=6; consulted 5 November 2007.

generally. Nevertheless, only three MNCs (BHP, TotalFinaElf and Phelpes Dodge) are explicit about how they engage local communities. This involves references to taking communities' concerns into account, or being transparent about what communities can expect from MNCs' interventions.

Areas of funding are diverse and are sometimes linked to the core business of the MNC, for example, in health/nutrition (Nestle). Oil companies mostly fund health (including HIV Aids), small enterprise development and micro finance, while mining companies often focus on infrastructure related projects, such as roads and electricity. 35% of our sample have foundations through which funding to social projects is channeled. More than half (59%) mention their commitment to contributing to the development of the country in which they invest. Nestle (2005, p. 6) contends that the greatest contribution to poverty alleviation is "through the impact of our core business, with responsible, sustainable operations that create jobs and catalyse entrepreneurship". This seems to answer CSR critique according to which MNCs should focus on their core business rather than fund community activities.

The majority (57%) of MNCs engaging in community activities do so in cooperation with NGOs. Interestingly, four MNCs do not only fund NGOs as implementing agents of CSR-related projects, but also engage in partnerships with them to have a better understanding on, for example, how to measure one's economic impact (Heineken) or to get assistance in designing or implementing a Human Rights Assessment Tool (Chevron, Norsk Hydro, Shell). It seems to indicate that MNCs (and NGOs) are aware of the fact that they cannot tackle global issues such as corruption, bad governance, human rights abuses and conflict unilaterally. For that matter, it is also interesting to note that the language used by MNCs in their CSR reporting appears to resemble those of NGOs in some respect: references to poverty alleviation (TotalFinaElf, De Beer, BAT); meeting basic needs (Chevron); contributing to development (ITM), social justice, corporate efforts against poverty and hunger (Petrobras); help the poor fight out of poverty (Citigroup); reducing the causes of poverty and social vulnerability (Sodexho), improving the lives of planet inhabitants (Coca Cola); and furthering the UN Millennium Development Goals (BHP, Shell, Nestle, Exxon, De Beer, Heineken, Odebrecht) are more the norm than the exception.

3.4.3. Conflict issues

The conflict dimension is specifically mentioned by one third of the MNCs involved in the three countries under study. Some companies prefer using terms such as instability (Petrobras) or challenging, difficult environments (BHP, Halliburton, ITM, First Quantum). AIR Liquide and Tenke

are among the few mentioning having to suspend operations in the Republic of the Congo and in the DRC respectively because of conflicts. Tenke sustained salary payments and benefits to the families throughout the suspension. Overall, however, it is noteworthy that companies reported more on the economic and social impacts of their activities and that consideration of the conflict dimension – so prominent in some of the countries in which they operate – is much less often revealed, and if so, usually via one generic, rather vague reference. Table 3 gives an overview of the MNCs in the sample, indicating – on one axis – whether they engage in CSR reporting or not (using criteria followed in earlier studies, cf. Kolk, 2005; KPMG, 2005) and – on the other – whether they report on conflict (distinguishing between no information, a generic reference or more detailed information).

Table 3: Overview of companies categorized by disclosure (n=54)

	Do companies engage in CSR reporting?	
	Yes	*No*
Reporting on conflict?		
No information	35%	30%
Only a generic reference	9%	2%
More detailed information	24%	0%

The table shows that CSR reporting is not fully integrated into MNCs' reporting. Almost one third of our sample does not provide information on CSR. Among this group of MNCs with poor CSR reporting, five are involved in oil equipment and services (BakerHughes, Cameron, Transocean, CGG Veritas, and Weatherford), four in mining (Katanga Mining Limited, Energem, Alrosa, and ITM), three in industrial transportation (Kuhene, and Nagel, Bollore and AP Moller) and another three in the oil industry (Galp, Lukoil, Teikoku). These companies can be typified as MNCs with low profile – no consumer brands – with a relatively low turnover usually. This finding confirms the results of other studies which show that less visible, smaller companies are less inclined to report on CSR (Kolk, 2005).

In our sample, two thirds of the companies do report on CSR, which shows that not only South Africa is characterized by CSR reporting as other studies found (Dawkins and Ngunjiri, 2008; Visser, 2002). Different from overall CSR disclosure, however, information about conflicts in host countries is scarce. Companies that give considerable information are typically those that have major operations in conflict countries combined with a long history of involvement in that country (Total in the Republic of the Congo, Chevron in Angola), or major mining companies (De Beer, AngloGoldAshanti, and BHP). Direct exposure to conflict through

large in (conflict) country operations, and/or strong consumer brands (in the case of Coca Cola and Heineken) seem characteristics of MNCs that report on conflict issues.

Despite a conflict context where human rights are often violated, only 39% of the MNCs make a reference to human rights in their reporting. Interestingly, the relative lack of interest for human rights issues in CSR reporting (compared to other CSR topics) was also found in recent research on South Africa, where the environment (81%) and community (83%) were mentioned most, while only 29% of the companies reported on human rights (Dawkins and Ngunjiri, 2008). In a study on MNC CSR reporting generally, the provision of some specific information on human rights was even less prevalent (11%), although more companies vaguely referred to or only mentioned the term (Fortanier and Kolk, 2007b). It thus seems that human rights have not been 'mainstreamed' yet in CSR, but that there appears to be somewhat more attention for it by companies that operate in conflict settings – the difference between South Africa and Central African conflict countries is smaller though.

MNCs' primary response to conflict and the amount as well as specificity of information disclosed varies considerably. Some reports focus exclusively on being victims of attacks that lead to the suspension of their operations (Air Liquide, ITM), others focus on the negative impact that conflicts and political unrest has on their profitability (Halliburton, Energem) or state their interest in playing a positive role in reconstructing the country in a (post-)conflict setting (Petrobras, Anvil). A few even touch upon possible strategies to prevent conflict (Total, De Beer).

Focusing on the contents of companies' reporting on conflict, most often this involves the risks they are confronted with. This includes aspects related to complicity in human rights abuses through direct or indirect association with security forces, perpetuation of conflict through the payment of resource rents and an association with generally poor governance and/or regulatory regimes. Particularly large extractive MNCs from OECD countries seem conscious of such risks. BHP Billiton (2007, p. 257), for example notes that:

> "With much of our exploration and development occurring in developing countries, some of our greatest human rights risk occurs in the areas where our employees and contractors are working in conflict and (post-)conflict zones. Corruption and security issues also remain a concern in some regions. We manage this risk by undertaking thorough country due diligence, coordinating security processes, maintaining dialogue and community engagement with key stakeholders and ensuring project teams are trained on our associated operating protocols."

Other companies (ABB, AngloAshanti, Anvil, Shell) also refer to the adoption of risk management tools. Interestingly, ABB mentions a common framework agreed upon by a variety of stakeholders as the best route to address human rights issues. AngloGoldAshanti, one of the largest mining companies, openly refers to the challenge they face in developing (multistakeholder) strategies that allow for the coexistence of small-scale artisanal miners with host governments and communities. The company does not, however, reveal its own approach regarding small-scale miners (for example, does it integrate them in its mines, buy from them, involve them in training/recycling programmes?).

BAT mentions human rights as a concern for businesses involved in countries where human rights are violated, providing interesting food for thought:[6]

> "Is it 'collusion' simply to do business there? If a business pulls out of a country, does it add to pressure for change, or simply remove fair employment opportunities and an example of good practice? Should businesses attempt to influence governments on human rights? We believe that multinational companies can lead by example and use their influence where they can, such as in employment standards, business practice, environmental management and community support. But if a government is thought to be failing in its duties to its citizens, we do not believe that business can, or should, take on the role of international diplomacy or direct countries on how they should be governed. The capacity of business to lobby on human rights is generally limited to human rights in the workplace, although business has legitimate cause to express concern if human rights violations hamper its ability to operate effectively and responsibly. We recognise that we have a role in addressing human rights issues that are within our sphere of influence in the countries where we operate. We expect our companies to respect the universally recognised fundamental human rights of all their employees and we support the United Nations Global Compact's guiding principles on human rights."

BAT makes a strong statement as to the dilemma of where the role of MNCs ends and where that of governments begins. It is interesting to note that the sphere of influence is also hailed by other MNCs (ABB, DHL) as a limitation to the power they have in enforcing human rights outside their operations.

[6] http://www.bat.co.uk/group/sites/uk__3mnfen.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO52AQH8?opendocument&SKN=1&TMP=1), consulted 20 October 2007.

3.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper aimed to shed some light on MNC reporting on CSR and conflict in three countries in Central Africa, thus responding to a call for more research on themes and countries largely unexplored in the literature (Visser, 2006a). Our study shows that, on average, large Western oil companies with a historical presence in African countries, especially Angola and DRC, tend to report more extensively on the significance of their social and economic impact on the host countries' economies, than their smaller, non-extractive counterparts. Furthermore, they are more often positively engaged with national governments and NGOs, particularly in the case of Angola, in a dialogue to improve revenue transparency as to break the resource curse. It looks as if those larger MNCs that were at the centre of international publicity in a recent past (TotalFinaElf, Shell, BP) have adopted more far-reaching policies than others. However, large non-extractive companies also report on their economic and social impact, although in general not as specific as their extractive counterparts. Our findings corroborate Visser's (2006b) indication as to the prominence of firms' economic responsibilities above other areas. Interestingly, MNC attention to the economic and social benefits resulting from their core activities, as we found in their CSR reporting, seems to answer (some of the) criticisms that MNCs' CSR has mainly focused on positive duties (i.e. project funding with little value for host communities) rather than on their core activities where most impact is to be gained (Hamann and Kapelus, 2004; Idemudia and Ite, 2006).

Nevertheless, it looks as if the conflict setting has little bearing on how CSR is communicated. References to the (conflict) context in relation to the type of CSR activities carried out are often lacking. For that matter, the CSR activities on which MNCs report in Central Africa are fairly generic and can be found in most non-conflict, and also non-African settings; only a limited number of exceptions can be found. The majority of MNCs is rather silent about conflict issues, which are presumably difficult to understand, let alone 'solve', and tricky to communicate about because political sensitivities, ethical dilemmas and dangerous situations abound. MNCs' reporting on their reactions to conflict is not extensive, especially when compared to more traditional CSR reporting areas such as health and safety. MNCs' disclosure on the role that they can play in addressing conflict issues is more limited than on the impact that conflict has on their operations. However, MNCs are starting to report on human rights and corruption issues not only as a problem that they face, but also in terms of actions they can undertake to address these dilemmas. It might be, given growing interest in the role of MNCs in conflict areas, also in relation

to CSR aspects, that these examples will be followed in the coming years, but that remains to be seen.

Compared to CSR reporting, the conflict dimension receives much less attention, although companies show awareness, most notably in relation to the risks. Moreover, some of them clearly outline the limitations of their power and the dilemmas inherent to their presence in conflict countries. Leaving aside the few companies that are present in all three countries and all report on conflict, 20% of the MNCs in the Republic of the Congo, 27% of those in Angola and 40% of those in the DRC also show transparency on this issue. The fact that the DRC conflict is the only one that is still ongoing, leading to larger exposure, may explain the greater corporate attention paid to conflict in that country. MNCs active in the Republic of the Congo are the least transparent more generally, also with regard to social and economic aspects. Follow-up research on country and sector specificity in terms of corporate awareness and activities might be interesting.

Overall, our exploratory analysis shows that a considerable number of MNCs is conscious of the risks involved in being present in (post-)conflict regions where human rights are not upheld. Many of the activities that companies can undertake as mentioned by Bennett (2002), Nelson (2000) and Oetzel et al. (2007) could be found in our sample. In view of the fact that we only relied on publicly available information as disclosed by MNCs themselves, it is not possible to give an overview of the extent to which companies actually use the whole range of actions: they might well do more and not report that because of the sensitivity of the issues, or they may not have lived up to what they put down in writing. An in-depth study of particular cases using triangulation (and a variety of respondents) would be worthwhile as follow-up. This would also allow for specific analyses of company's home versus host contexts, and how conflict issues are coordinated internally and across borders. It should be noted, though, that doing research in and about conflict settings is extremely difficult, which is why we have taken this approach in the current paper as a first attempt to obtain some more insight into this emerging issue.

If the data and research complexities can be addressed, other things found in this exploratory study are worth a further investigation as well. MNCs showed awareness of the issues and the dilemmas, sometimes formulated in a discourse comparable to NGOs, and willingness to cooperate with others. Adherence to transparency mechanisms and engaging in multistakeholder schemes with governments and NGOs as to address difficult issues are promising developments. Hence, the potential and momentum for MNCs' involvement in (co)creating a sustainable and peaceful environment seem present. It is not clear, however, whether and how MNCs really (can) reckon with such issues in their strategies and operations, and with which sort of interactions

with other stakeholders. This is an area that needs more detailed study, with a focus on particular conflicts, considering the role of a range of actors. In addition to MNCs, it would be good to also include local and Chinese companies – which could not be covered in this paper, but are likely to grow in importance – as they deserve attention as well.

Appendix 1: Basic information on MNCs in the sample

(listed in alphabetical order, with country of origin, sector, turnover and activity in the three countries)

Active in Angola, Rep. of Congo and/or DRC	Name of MNC	Turnover (US$ mln)	Nationality	Industry
ANG	A.P. Moller Maersk	37,358	DEN	Industrial transportation
ANG	ABB Asea Brown Boveri ltd	24,412	SWI	Electronic equipment
CON	Air Liquide	14,599	FRA	Chemicals
ANG	Alrosa	2,900	RUS	Mining
DRC	AngloGoldAshanti	2,964	SAF	Mining
DRC	Anvil mining	175	CAN	Mining
ANG	BakerHughes	9,027	US	Oil equipment
ANG / DRC	BHP Biliton	32,153	AUST-UK	Mining
ANG / DRC	Bollore	5,608	FRA	Transport
ANG	BP	265,906	UK	Oil and gas
ANG / DRC	British American Tobacco	19,158	UK	Tobacco
ANG / DRC	Camec	136	UK	Mining
CON	Cameron International	3,742	US	Oil and gas
ANG	CGG Veritas	1,773	FRA	Oil equipment
ANG / DRC / CON	Chevron Texaco	204,892	US	Oil and gas
DRC	Citigroup	146,777	US	Finance
ANG / DRC	Coca cola	24,088	US	Food and beverages
ANG / DRC	De Beer	6,150	SAF	Mining
ANG / DRC / CON	DHL / Deutsche post	80,734	GER	Transport
ANG / DRC	Energem	577	SAF	Mining
ANG / CON	ENI	114,818	ITA	Oil and gas
ANG	EXXON Mobil	365,467	US	Oil and gas
ANG / DRC	First Quantum	1,094	CAN	Mining
ANG	Galp Energia	16,281	POR	Oil and gas
ANG	Halliburton	22,504	US	Oil equipment
DRC	Heineken	15,773	NL	Food and beverages
ANG	ITM mining limited	n/a	BAH	Mining
ANG	Johnson and Johnson	53,324	US	Orthopedic
DRC	Katanga Ltd	n/a	CAN	Mining
ANG	Kuehne and Nagel	12,230	GER	Industrial transportation
CON	Lukoil Holding	55,774	RUS	Oil and gas
ANG	Marathon oil	64,896	US	Oil and gas
DRC	Metorex	199	SAF	Mining
CON	MTN Group / Libertis telecom	3,726	SAF	Telecom
ANG / CON	Nestle	80,888	SWI	Food and beverages
DRC	Nikanor	n/a	UK	Mining
ANG	Norsk Hydro	32,226	SWE	Oil and gas
ANG	Odebrecht	9,083	BRA	Construction / Mining
ANG / DRC	Petrobras International, Braspetro	76,852	BRA	Oil and gas
DRC	Phelps Dodge (Freeport)	5,790	US	Mining
CON / DRC	Pinault Printemps Redoute	23,910	FRA	Trade
ANG	Repsol	73,447	SPA	Oil and gas
ANG	Royal Dutch / Shell Group	318,845	NL/UK	Oil and gas
ANG	Schlumberger	19,230	US	Oil equipment
ANG	Schneider Electric	18,308	FRA	Electricity
CON	SGS Group	3,139	SWI	Inspection – certification

ANG / CON	Sodexho alliance	15,683	FRA	Food services and facilities
ANG	Statoil	69,553	NOR	Oil and gas
DRC	Teikoku oil / Inpex Japan	5,977	JAP	Oil and gas
DRC	Tenke - Lundin	539	CAN	Mining
ANG / DRC / CON	TotalFinaElf	176,936	FRA	Oil and gas
ANG	Toyota	178,530	JAP	Automobile
ANG	Transocean	19,230	US	Oil equipment
ANG / CON	Weatherford international	6,578	US	Oil equipment

Source: annual reports of companies, 2007; 2007 largest 500 lists (Fortune Global, FT Global, FT Europe, FT US)

CHAPTER 4. HYBRID BUSINESS MODELS FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION[7]

4.1. INTRODUCTION: ON HYBRID ORGANIZING FOR PEACE

With growing attention for the role of business in peace, many challenges have emerged as to how to best combine efforts and reconcile the social and economic objectives of the organizations involved. In recent years, publications have provided insight into multi-stakeholder partnerships, in which firms, non-governmental and governmental organizations collaborate to promote peace and reconciliation, and reduce conflict (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; 2015a; 2015b). However, we know much less about how organizations that show sensitivity to the conflict context integrate such 'hybridity' into their business models. There are quite some studies on so-called 'hybrid organizations' that seek to pursue both for-profit and non-profit activities more generally and are specifically set up with this mission (e.g. Boyd, 2012; Haigh et al., 2015; Lee and Jay, 2015), but this is not the case for 'traditional', already existing organizations that aim for mixed forms of economic and social value creation (cf. Battilana et al., 2012). Moreover, while the rise of the hybrid is placed in the context of decreasing state influence and the need for other actors to take up (parts) of this role, this aspect has not received much attention. Examples originate predominantly from Western countries, particularly those with legally-enabled hybrids (such as benefit corporations), and thus do not contribute to knowledge on how different organizational forms may address peace and reconciliation in highly complex situations. To help fill these gaps, our article sheds light on different degrees of hybridity of a range of organizations operating in (post-)conflict regions. Such settings, where the state has been under siege of even fully absent and other actors take up public responsibilities, most clearly expose how roles are being reshaped and boundaries have become blurred.

Our study makes several contributions in the realm of 'business and peace' as well as the field of management more broadly. It illuminates how more than 50 organizations active in the coffee sector in a conflict-affected region in Central Africa pursue different combinations of social and economic goals, maintain and develop relationships with stakeholders, and interact 'progressively' with markets and institutions. These dimensions of hybridity were conceptually identified by Haigh and Hoffman (2012), and we specified

[7] This chapter is co-authored with Ans Kolk and was published in *Business Horizons*, 2016, *59*(5), 503-524.

and applied them empirically to many different organizations in the broad spectrum between the two extremes of non-profit (socially-oriented), on the one hand, and profit (financially-oriented), on the other. This research approach allowed us to present a 'hybridization continuum', inspired by observations by Battilana and colleagues (2012) about a hybridization movement towards more integrated/mixed business models, and the adoption of social elements by traditionally financially-driven organizations, and vice versa. Examining organizations in one sector and with activities in a specific geographical region allowed us to obtain an overview of all possible categories and their characteristics. Perhaps more importantly, the difficult context, characterized by human suffering and social tensions, may exemplify a future scenario of hybridity, as it affects all organizations, including traditional, 'mainstream' ones: we found that they had also taken on some hybrid elements in their objectives, perspectives and relationships. In this way, their business models help to further peace and reconciliation, which is highly relevant given the many organizations that are active in 'fragile' states, a term covering almost 50 countries worldwide that face serious instability and human rights violations (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015a; OECD, 2012).

The structure of this article is as follows. We will first explain the broader setting of the study, its set-up and present the hybridization continuum (using Table 4 and Figure 2). This is followed by the explanation of the three dimensions of hybridity (and the sub-questions in Table 4 being discussed consecutively), with illustrative quotes and examples. They shed light on business models for peace and reconciliation and may be helpful for managers in search of the best approaches for their organization, also considering the broader implications for management that we discuss. The final section, with Table 5, offers conclusions and recommendations for researchers and practitioners. We point, inter alia, at changes that may be required in terms of specific staff capacities, and concomitant training and selection processes; patience and willingness to invest in longer-term relationships, also locally; and the need to carefully balance organizational and societal objectives, especially considering the (decreasing or absent) role of the state. These relate directly to theoretical contributions in the realm of business and peace as well as management and organizations studies more broadly.

4.2. HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR CONTEXT

In the past decade, new organizational forms at the cross-roads of business and non-profit sectors have emerged in a context of state withdrawal and new governance modalities, clearly exposing blurring boundaries. This phenomenon has mostly been examined within a broader corporate responsibility framework in which business helps to address societal issues such as poverty or environmental degradation, and is increasingly playing a public role. Particularly in developing countries characterized by institutional voids or gaps, the potential contribution of market actors to alleviate poverty has been studied in different literatures. Examples include bodies of work on subsistence marketplaces, bottom of the pyramid, cross-sector partnerships for sustainable development, and social entrepreneurship (Bacq and Janssen, 2011; Kolk, 2014a; Kolk et al., 2014; McKague and Oliver, 2012; Valente and Crane, 2010).

Hybrid organizations, mostly studied in the Western context, nicely fit in between partnerships, which involve collaborations between different types of organizations, and social entrepreneurs as individuals pursuing social and economic objectives. This means that the hybrid concept offers potential for contributing insights to what is currently known by further clarifying the components and peculiarities of hybridity, also beyond new ventures which are set up specifically to combine social and financial goals and which have received most attention in the literature thus far. Moreover, the business and peace literature has distinguished peace entrepreneurs (who include peace in their work), corporate foreign policy (focused on how larger firms more instrumentally address peace and conflict issues) and 'ethical' firms whose business model or strategies are not meant to promote peace yet have an (indirect) impact (Fort, 2007, 2016; Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2015). Our study adds to the literature by illustrating how hybrid organizational forms address peace and development related issues, such as reconciliation and reconstruction, while balancing their economic and social purposes. It also presents elements from which more traditional firms can learn when structuring their business activities in or related to (post-)conflict countries.

To generate insights on these topics, we specifically selected organizations operating in contexts with blurring boundaries resulting from difficult social circumstances, including poverty and (post-)conflict conditions, in a region characterized by extreme volatility (see next paragraph for more details). Publications on partnerships, and (social) business and entrepreneurial activities in such settings have underlined the importance of explicitly considering the influence of the institutional environment (Anderson et al., 2010; Rivera-

Santos et al., 2012; 2015). As organizations respond to specific local needs, particularly to help relatively powerless people, situations of poverty, inequality and human suffering will most clearly expose components of a hybrid business model which seem specifically relevant in such contexts, and the existence of a hybridization continuum. In that sense, it may represent a look into the future, and enable generalization from this 'extreme' case, or 'unconventional' research context, as some management scholars have labelled it (Bamberger and Pratt, 2010). Our focus also helps to extend insights on hybrid organizations beyond prevailing Western (home-country) settings in which they have been studied most often, and beyond the more common individual case examples illuminating newly-created hybrid ventures.

This article examines organizations that pursue different combinations of social and economic goals and are involved in the coffee sector in the Kivu region, located in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Western part of Rwanda. This region is extremely volatile and has seen regular skirmishes taking place at or around the border. The FDLR, a Hutu extremist group which fled to the Congolese side after the 1994 genocide, is still undertaking guerrilla activities on both sides of the border despite attempts to disarm them initiated by the Congolese army and UN troops; the M23, another armed group, dismantled recently thanks to the UN-led international Brigade. While Eastern DRC has suffered heavily from violent conflicts with concomitant human suffering for almost two decades, in Rwanda the genocide in the mid-1990s had a huge impact, creating a climate of insecurity especially in the region next to the lake Kivu bordering DRC. Although Rwanda has been doing well economically in recent years, the high population density coupled with a dependence on agriculture and soil erosion due to land exhaustion created an explosive social situation. Coffee has played a critical role in Rwanda's rehabilitation and reconciliation activities (Elder et al., 2011; Tobias and Boudreaux, 2011; Tobias et al., 2013), and is seen as having a large comparable potential in Eastern DRC. The region's fertile soils offer exceptional opportunities for the production of high-quality Arabica coffee, and for improving the economic situation of the inhabitants as well as breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, hostility and social tensions by joint cultivation and harvesting (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015b; Schluter, 2010).

We focused on organizations with international linkages as these are vital for the economic and social development of local farmers, their families and communities (Kolk, 2014a; Mutandwa et al., 2009); they also generate the most interesting insights for

practitioners outside the specific context of our study. To obtain insight into the range and type of actors involved in the coffee sector in the Kivu region, we first made an inventory of all organizations present (firms, cooperatives and non-governmental organizations – NGOs) through various databases (from organizations such as Fair Trade and the International Coffee Organization), the internet and NGO contacts (facilitated by the fact that the second author has long worked for an NGO and has ample experience in the region). We then selected the organizations active in the Kivu region with clear international links (i.e. we did not include local coffee processing companies that only work with the government, or cooperatives that only sell to local retailers). Information on dimensions of hybridity (see the next section and Appendix 2) was collected from a questionnaire sent to all organizations, to which 35% responded, from corporate reports and websites, and from secondary sources. Furthermore, structured interviews were held with 25 staff members of organizations sampled and a field visit was made to the Kivus (both Eastern DRC and Rwanda) to obtain additional information, and to cross-check and triangulate the (self-)reported data where possible[8].

4.3. A HYBRIDIZATION CONTINUUM

To obtain insight into the degree to which organizations exhibited hybrid characteristics, three key aspects from the literature were used (Haigh and Hoffman, 2012), as included in the first column of Table 4, and specified for the empirical context of our study (second column). *First*, we examined the role of social change in stated organizational objectives, considering the mission, longer-term horizons and (positive) leadership. To these generic dimensions, a coffee-specific 'flavor' was added through Raynolds's distinction between mission-driven, quality-driven and market-driven companies (Raynolds, 2009). The mission-driven category, most relevant for our purposes, consists of socially and ecologically concerned buyers that aim to establish long-term ties, show patience when producers face problems, and help them to improve quality by providing market information and access to relevant actors, networks and knowledge. *Second*, we analyzed organizations on the extent to which they reported mutually beneficial relationships with stakeholders, particularly coffee farmers. The *third* component encompasses "progressive interactions with markets and institutions", which for the context of this study involves attempts to change market

[8] This field trip also encompassed research for another article on partnerships, see chapter 7 (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015b).

requirements and wider (development) activities undertaken in the region/country, as well as peace and reconciliation considerations.


Table 4: Degrees of hybridity: key sub-dimensions and questions guiding the article

'Relational areas'	Key sub-dimensions used for categorization	Questions addressed in second half of paper
Positive social change as organizational objective	• Social dimensions addressed in mission and outlook (consideration of longer term) • Indication of positive leadership aspects	• How are social dimensions addressed in organizational objectives (mission/outlook)? • How important is the 'human element', including positive leadership?
Mutually beneficial relationships with stakeholders	• Organizations' consideration of mutual relationships with stakeholders, especially coffee farmers (in this case)	• How do organizations perceive mutual benefits? • What is the scope of the relationships?
Progressive interactions with markets and institutions	• Orientation on changing market requirements in terms of fair trade/prices, and consideration of related institutions • Contribution to peace/development	• How do organizations perceive 'progressive' interactions? • How do organizations perceive development work? • Do organizations contribute to peace and reconstruction?

Note: Relational areas in the first column are derived from Haigh and Hoffmann (2012); translated to coffee dimensions following Raynolds (2009).

We analyzed the 53 organizations (35 firms, 14 NGOs and 4 cooperatives) on the dimensions included in Table 4, using the second column in particular. The details and specific information concerning the 'scores' on the various aspects for the organizations in the study and their resulting categorization can be found in Appendix 2 and the accompanying notes. The organizations were classified in different categories in the broad continuum between 'social only' on the one hand, and 'financial only', on the other, and with hybrid in the middle. Figure 2 gives an overview of the six types that emerged and that will be discussed further below. Our continuum differs from earlier literature that focused on typifying and defining the social enterprise phenomenon (e.g. Alter, 2007; Bacq and Janssen, 2011; Dacin et al., 2010; Mair and Martí, 2006; Zahra et al., 2009), as it covers the whole range of organizations and their hybridity characteristics as they develop, and relies on an empirical basis as indicated above. It should be noted that the categorizations are not meant to give a normative judgment in terms of 'good' or 'bad', but only to illustrate the continuum of degrees of hybridity, and that the study obviously has its limitations, as indicated in the second note to Appendix 2.

Figure 2: A hybridization continuum



Category 1 includes hybrid organizations: those that classify themselves as social enterprises (Growers First, Schluter, CoffeeRwanda, and Equal World Coffee), one certified B (benefit) corporation (Sustainable Harvest), and three others scoring high on the three sub-dimensions specified in the second column of Table 4 (see Appendix 2 for more details). Cafédirect is an interesting example in the latter group as it was founded by NGOs (Oxfam, Traidcraft, Equal Exchange and Twin). Hybrids are typically mission-driven as described above, have a long-term horizon, exhibit positive leadership, engage in mutual relationship with farmers, with whom they have direct interactions (i.e. they do not work with middle men), and actively work to help change markets and institutions. *Category 2* consists of (semi-)hybrid firms that also have a very prominent social agenda but are less outspoken on some of the other dimensions. The (semi-)hybrid firms are overall typically proud of being artisanal, often operate independently, and emphasize product quality and care for communities as important drivers. Almost all are involved in the niche market of specialty coffee and display high levels of transparency by making trip reports available and disclosing valuable information on how they engage with coffee communities.

To the left in Figure 2 are the (semi-)hybrid non-profits (*category 5*), NGOs and cooperatives that have developed a profit-orientation as to (re)invest it in their social programs. These nine organizations include Twin, an NGO that owns a trading company, three cooperatives that have created a processing or exporting company to better serve their constituents, and UGEAFI, a (local) NGO. It decided to engage in economic activities (even exploring to turn one of its branches into a cooperative) when realizing that the NGOs traditional peace education and reconciliation programs were "necessary but not sufficient to address conflict issues in the region". At the 'extreme' to the left is *category 6*, classic non-profits with an economic program mostly geared towards empowering producers, yet with a fully subsidy-based modus operandi. Here, PEARL is an interesting organizational form: it started as a multi-stakeholder partnership (of local government authorities, academic institutions, NGOs and business), and gradually turned into an NGO. Such evolving patterns and changes (see also the examples of Cafédirect and UGEAFI mentioned above) are not uncommon, and have been reported in the African context more generally (e.g. Hearn, 2007; Kolk and Lenfant, 2013).

The two final categories, not yet mentioned, are found on the right side of the (semi-) hybrid firms, and involve the mainstream (social) firms. Amongst the 'mainstream', generally larger firms, some have a clearly articulated social mission (Starbucks, GreenMountain), while others are much less outspoken (category 4 in Figure 2; n=8). The mainstream social firms

(*category 3*) are profit-oriented yet score medium on some of the dimensions. They usually have some kind of social (sub-)objective, and/or have direct ties with farmers, while mostly operating as a traditional firm. Finally, *category 4* consists of mainstream firms with relatively low hybridity scores, meaning they operate from a clear profit motive but generally relate to just one aspect of hybridity and a relatively modest way.

In our elaboration of the key dimensions in the sections below, quotes and practical examples will be given to clarify notions and nuances of hybridity. They also serve to draw implications and offer suggestions for a broader management audience. Most attention will be paid to firms, but sometimes references will be made to non-profit organizations given the blurring boundaries that we observed, also considering that NGOs and firms increasingly use terminology that traditionally belonged to the other realm (e.g. firms referring to social justice, empowerment, and capacity building; NGOs mentioning business case and business proposition). We will address the three components discussed above (organizational objectives; relationships; interactions with markets and institutions) consecutively in different sections, guided by key questions as included in the last column in Table 4.

4.4. ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES

4.4.1. How are social dimensions addressed in organizational objectives?

The (semi-)hybrid organizations in our study have clear built-in social missions in their organizational objectives. Dean's Beans, for example, considers itself "a fair trade pioneer in the coffee industry with an unyielding commitment to peaceful social change" and "unwavering commitment to sustainable development". Stumptown states that it "was started with the goal of doing things differently". Some explicitly seek the combination of humanitarian values with economic benefits. For example, Schluter's vision is to "transform lives in Africa through commerce in a mutually profitable way". It explicitly states to show patience if farmers experience problems and to assist them in multiple ways, such as providing market information, offering opportunities for interaction and establishing links with market and non-market partners.

Interestingly, quite a few mainstream (social) firms (category 3) refer to partly comparable aspects. Starbucks' mission is to "inspire and nurture the human spirit – one person, one cup and one neighbourhood at a time". GreenMountain states that "our passion extends beyond creating great coffee. We believe in the significance of the world around us, and the impact we have on everything we do". Peet's Coffee notes to be interested in "creating self-

sufficiency and connecting small-scale farmers with their potential market and thereby afford them a decent livelihood". For Café Liégeois, the confrontation with the local situation has played a role, considering the statement that it is impossible to "trade with them [coffee farmers] and remain insensitive to their difficulties. The return on their work is so low – when exchange rate fluctuations don't reduce it to nothing – that they can't invest in the equipment that would enable them to make better use of their plantation. It isn't even a matter of heavy equipment, sometimes just shovels, spades, fencing, etc. It is no longer acceptable that people should sometimes be unable to provide for their own subsistence due to traders negotiating rates downwards for a product they may never even smell".

Different from the organizations mentioned above (in categories 1, 2 and 3), mainstream firms (category 4) are much less outspoken about their social mission.

4.4.2. How important is the human element?

The conflict context and its human implications were exclusively mentioned by (semi-)hybrid firms. Silverback Coffee of Rwanda states to be "committed to participating in the rebuilding of Rwanda and its wildlife and giving back to the people who were affected in the genocide of 1994 by providing the world with the highest quality coffee and tea". Thousand Hills mentions that it "is proud to contribute to justice, reconciliation and hope in the coffee farming communities". Its founder visited Rwanda in 2005 and saw that the genocide "left so many innocent people either dead, orphaned, or widowed". He "recognized a simple and tangible opportunity to make a difference in the reconciliation of the Rwandan people" and decided to "to start a coffee company that pays a fair wage to the farmers of Rwanda, helps them with their basic needs, and brings a quality product to coffee lovers". We came across such personal stories as inspiration in other cases as well. Dean's Beans states that "it all started when Dean founded the company and was looking for intelligent ways to preserve natural resources and give back to coffee communities across the globe". And the founder of Growers First "witnessed first-hand the economic and social injustices that fell upon small coffee growers".

Personal leadership and commitment were found in different forms, especially in (semi-)hybrid organizations that are often relatively small, with limited numbers of employees, and sometimes family-owned". Roger's Family notes that "the word 'Family' extends to the farmers around the world that supply our coffee and tea, to our employees and our valued customers". Considering employees and farmers as a kind of family often translates into space offered to farmers to present their products on organizations' websites, frequently accompanied by

photos and personal stories, thereby creating a direct relationship between producers and consumers, and to employees to highlight their commitment and empathy. The 'personal side' was also mentioned by Atlas in its mission to "operate a business that is financially successful and personally fulfilling". And Allegro notes that "giving back not only makes us feel good, it's part of why we exist". (Semi-)hybrid organizations make 'giving back' explicit by channeling their profits (fully or partly) towards social projects. Most far-reaching are Coffee Rwanda, which "ensures that all profits, after expenses, can be donated for the reconstruction and development of Rwanda", and Dean's Beans, which reallocates all returns into development projects.

4.4.3. Broader implications for management

Having a clearly embedded social mission within organizational objectives seems to enable (semi-)hybrid organizations to carry out social activities more naturally than traditionally operating firms. Most if not all activities undertaken by (semi-)hybrids have a clear social dimension. This is all the more important in contexts where the social fabric has been distorted and formal institutions are weak or missing. Activities with a social purpose are more likely to be relevant and effective if they are integrated in firms' core business and the context is taken into account. The latter is crucial in complex environments in order to mitigate the many risks inherent to conducting business there. Consideration of the human element, especially when coupled with personal commitment and leadership, is a common factor, which also comes to the fore in the relationship developed with various stakeholders (see the next section).

Managers of organizations that intend to invest in conflict prone areas should be aware of the challenging socio-economic and political context to not only ensure that they do no harm, but also to maximize the chances of "doing good". By having a social goal embedded in their core business and by demonstrating personal commitment and leadership, hybrids appear to minimize the social risks of their activities. Although there are tools available for business to help manage risks, they do not capture all risks that firms will face when operating in challenging contexts, and the elements discussed here seem to provide a further mitigating mechanism. And while the specifics are likely to differ per sector, the overall approach may offer inspiration for managers more broadly and increase awareness of possible issues. Managerial sensitivity might not come 'naturally', however, which points at a possible need to include attention to these aspects in training and selection trajectories (see the concluding section).

4.5. MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIPS

4.5.1. How do organizations perceive mutual benefits?

According to the literature, a second key element of hybrid organizations is their engagement with various stakeholders in such a way that mutual benefits can be reaped. This aspect has also been mentioned as crucial for business activities in developing countries more generally, in order to move "beyond the often superficial relationships that typically persist in these situations" (Valente and Crane, 2010, p. 63), for example by visiting local communities and leaders. All (semi-)hybrid organizations in our study undertake trips to the Kivu region to develop a proper understanding of their suppliers and other stakeholders. Such trips to remote areas, especially in Eastern DRC, can be challenging. A Twin Trading field report mentioned that "the roads are almost impassable and there are no other services and infrastructure whatsoever. Most of the people have only recently re-settled the land, after years living in the forests or in refugee camps in Tanzania. The region remains tense, with the Congolese army only partially in control".

Mutually beneficial relationships are often noted as essential by (semi-)hybrid organizations. For example, CounterCulture Coffee mentions as goal "to build long-term, durable, mutually beneficial relationships with our producer partners. The duration of these relationships is a good indication of their sustainability". Growers First states to be "committed to developing relationships with our farmers. We know who we are buying from, and they know us and our roasters". This relationship enables coffee growers "to receive the maximum value for their crop". Or, as Cafédirect puts it, "for over 20 years we've built real relationships with smallholder growers because the big thing smallholders have is pride and passion…and that's what goes into every single one of our delicious hot drinks. In return we pay growers what they deserve, instead of paying middlemen". And according to Rogers Family: "we visit the farms personally, set up long-term contracts and develop long-term relationships with these farmers and coops". As mentioned in the literature, building trust, showing flexibility and gaining credibility among communities are crucial in fragile regions marked by governance voids and a distortion of the social fabric (Abramov, 2009; Kolk and Lenfant, 2015b).

The benefits for (semi-)hybrid organizations are also noted. Schluter views relationship building as a way to ensure product quality and "alleviate the enormous risks we take especially through the pre-financing of the contracts". But relationships are seen to encompass more than purchasing coffee: "we do not just buy coffees; we actually develop them while working

alongside our growers" (Intelligentsia Coffee). And Stumptown describes its (direct trade) approach of "improving coffee quality through our relationships at origin, and in turn, offering incentive based rewards to the farmer, with complete financial transparency of the supply chain along the way", which has enabled the firm "to not only source the best coffee grown in the world, but to also make financial and incrementally sustainable improvements in the growing communities". Sustainable Harvest seems to take it a step further in describing its "Relationship Coffee Model" as "a business model, infused into every aspect of how we operate. We invest into our supply chain at every step, bringing innovative technology, training, and infrastructure to our partners. We link coffee growers to markets while building systems that bring high quality coffee to roasters. We operate with ultimate transparency, making sure all stakeholders are included in the conversation".

The importance of relationships was also mentioned by a few firms in categories 3 and 4. Interestingly, and like the (semi-)hybrid organizations described above, Starbucks' CEO paid many visits to coffee communities in the Kivu region, learning from coffee growers and showing interest in their farming techniques.

4.5.2. What is the scope of the relationships?

In terms of relationships with stakeholders more broadly, it can be said that while farmers receive most attention, roasters and suppliers in the value chain from bean to cup, and incidentally consumers, are also mentioned. Growers First explains the linkages when stating that "our farmers and roasters are able to increase profits when they are connected via relationship. Roasters and suppliers receive a higher value for the final product when they can provide a direct connection to the farmers that grew their coffee and can demonstrate that their product is substantially benefiting those farmers. This premium is passed on to the farmers, as the increased demand for their coffee in the United States is able to attenuate the volatility of the international coffee market. Regardless of how high or low the market sets the price of coffee, farmers know that they have a direct connection to consumers and can negotiate a fair price that still benefits roasters and suppliers in the States". At the same time, this also requires that farmers "are able to learn about the demands and desires of the market they are selling to. Growing coffee in isolation, many farmers are unaware of how their coffee is processed, roasted, and consumed. With a basic understanding of these factors, farmers are able to adjust their growing practices to improve the quality and marketability of their crop".

Interestingly, some organizations also refer to attempts at 'educating' customers in their markets, explaining price levels, in the hope to change the way in which coffee is being bought. They are thus committed to not only buying coffee from producers at a good price but also informing customers about Rwandan or Congolese coffee (i.e. organizing marketing campaigns to raise awareness about coffee from the region). Ancora mentions, for example, that "they had a vision to create a company together that would enrich lives with a new and exciting product but also would educate people with the story behind the coffee". Some (semi-)hybrids develop (joint) strategies to link farmers to European and US markets, working closely with producers to design consumer mobilization strategies in order to increase demand for their coffees. Educating consumers seems to be a long trajectory, however, and that also applies to interactions with markets and institutions for social change more generally (see the next section).

Still, there is recognition of the potential to "be a force for positive action – bringing together our partners, customers and the community to contribute every day", as Starbucks (in the social mainstream category) puts it. And although more mainstream firms generally do have less direct relationships with farmers than (semi-)hybrid organizations given that they most often purchase from traders, a few express awareness of the linkages. Sainsbury (category 4), for example, notes that, in addition to improving access to markets or "expanding consumer demand for African produce", it strives to "promote the DRC coffee to encourage customers to recognize the Congo as origins of gourmet coffee in their own right".

4.5.3. Broader implications for management

Building relationships is very relevant for all organizations that plan to invest in fragile (African) countries. Managers can learn from the way in which (semi-)hybrids establish longstanding mutually beneficial relationships with local communities. In a context of governmental inability to provide for their citizens, local communities often place high expectations on firms investing in their region (Eweje, 2006, 2007; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). Dealing with these expectations, and being open about what the firm can and cannot do, and how it intends to proceed is a recommendation that applies to all organizations. Mutually beneficial relationships are crucial for both social and economic value creation for firms active in fragile regions as well as local communities and (in this case) farmers.

If a 'societal license to operate' and concomitant broad support from local communities are missing, organizations may be harmed economically, often due to delays resulting from

controversies. A global study on oil multinationals, for example, showed that the time taken for projects to actually start almost doubled in a period of a decade, resulting in substantial cost increases (Goldman Sachs, 2008). Research on the extractive industry and the costs of conflict with local communities found that lost productivity due to delayed production could amount to losses of up to US $20 million per week (Davis and Franks, 2011). The highest costs stemmed from opportunity costs linked to the inability to pursue future projects and the staff time needed when dealing with conflicts with communities.

4.6. INTERACTIONS WITH MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS

4.6.1. How do organizations perceive “progressive” interactions?

Many organizations along the broad hybridization continuum have been involved in ‘progressive interactions with markets and institutions’ as identified in the literature (see Table 4). A characteristic of (semi-)hybrids is their explicit acknowledgement of unequal relationships between producers and buyers. To illustrate the difficulties, Groundwork notes that “coffee has a long and sorry history of giving the farmers the short end of the stick when it comes to who gets paid and how much. Even when coffee prices go up, it is oftentimes a vast network of brokers, traders and shippers who profit even before the coffee reaches the roaster”. To shift this balance to the benefit of poor producers, it is necessary to structurally adjust the situation in economic terms (through, for example, increased productivity and market access) and in social terms (by supporting farmers to increase their capabilities, knowledge and power). In addition to the relations with farmers, roasters and customers, (semi-)hybrid organizations pay attention to the more generic pricing system.

Although most (semi-)hybrid organizations have adopted Fair Trade (and/or sometimes other forms of certification, such as Utz, Rainforest Alliance or organic), several state to go beyond it, in two respects. These aspects refer to (semi-)hybrids’ ambition to realize broader changes, beyond the current system with its limitations, which extends to certification in general, not just Fair Trade (Haight, 2011; Kolk, 2013; Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005). First, they pay a higher price than the minimum one offered by Fair Trade. This is stated explicitly by Counter Culture Coffee, Equal World Coffee, Fratello, Union Hand Roasted and Rogers Family. Cafédirect considers a fair price for the crop to be a “minimal starting point, not the end goal”. Second, flaws of the Fair Trade system are acknowledged. Groundwork mentions that “concerns have been raised that although the fair trade system provides farmers with a guaranteed floor price for their coffee, it does little to promote a rise in quality of the coffee or sustainable

growing practices". Furthermore, Fair Trade as such does not exclude the involvement of middlemen, allows for a very limited scale only, and benefits may not accrue to the most disadvantaged. As Rogers Family notes, "a label is ONLY a label. Poverty is especially acute in the communities of landless, farm-workers that have settled around large coffee farms. Some people believe Fair Trade Certified helps workers. In fact, the Fair Trade Certified price is for a pound of coffee – it is not a wage. So it's only available to farmers in cooperatives growing coffee on one or two acres. Workers with no land cannot benefit from the Fair Trade scheme since they do not own any coffee trees. These workers and their families often live in dire poverty with little hope to end their suffering". Mainstream firms (categories 3 and 4) are not as outspoken about issues surrounding fair trade and the pricing system in general as their (semi-)hybrid counterparts.

4.6.2. How do organizations engage in development work?

Linked to blurring boundaries are the innovative ways in which (semi-)hybrid firms engage in 'development work', in addition to the consideration of social aspects in their core business. Dean's Beans for instance embraces the people-centered development philosophy, "an approach to international development that focuses on the real needs of local communities for the necessities of life (clean water, health care, income generation) that are often disrupted by conventional development assistance. Conventional development includes military aid, large dams, free trade zones and export economies that bring lots of money to the contractors and aid organizations, but often result in massive deforestation, resettlement of communities, introduction of pollutants and diseases." Sustainable Harvest is also involved in development work by partnering "with coffee communities that we source from, as well as coffee roasters, NGOs, and development organizations, to implement programs that improve farmer livelihoods and conserve the biodiverse environments where coffee is grown". Union Handroasted funds "projects to improve capacity building and strengthen governance and leadership within the co-operative, creating a genuine sense of community where once there was only grinding poverty and despair" in addition to more traditional community development projects.

While mainstream firms also support development work through funding for community projects, they mostly do so in a rather philanthropic manner (building of a school, or a well) without much connection to their core business. Incidentally, they do have partnerships with NGOs or more direct engagement with farmers and support activities related to their core

business. The main example in our study is Starbucks, which created a Farmer Support Center in Rwanda to train coffee growers how to improve the quality of their produce.

4.6.3. Do organizations contribute to peace and reconciliation?

Finally, we could note a few "progressive interactions with institutions" with organizations directly establishing a linkage to peace and reconciliation issues. Some were already mentioned in a previous section when discussing the social mission. Considering the institutional implications for peace, PEARL (a (semi-)hybrid non-profit) concentrated its efforts on building capacities through strengthening the agricultural and educational sectors and implementing an active policy of reconciliation. Hutus and Tutsi were working together in cooperatives, earning money, and thinking of themselves as Rwandans rather than members of a particular ethnic group. Growers who were once enemies are now working side by side at the local washing stations. The hybrid Thousand Hills found that "the introduction of specialty coffee to the healing fields of Rwanda proved to be an uncommon opportunity for once warring countrymen to not only rebuild their homesteads, but to work together toward lasting peace". It notes to be "proud to contribute to justice, reconciliation and hope in the coffee farming communities".

Coffee Rwanda also states that coffee serves "as a vehicle for nation building in the aftermath of genocide. By helping to combat poverty among its 2198 member farmers, COOPAC [cooperative] greatly improves their health as well. Another amazing thing about COOPAC is that it literally serves to help heal the wounds of the 1994 genocide. Women sort the beans by hand and as they do, they talk – building relationships between the genocide killers and the surviving victims – a meaningful and sustainable avenue for reconciliation". We observed the same reconciliation pattern in the DRC during interviews (cf. Kolk and Lenfant, 2015b). When young men, ex-militia members, were asked whether they would take up the arms again if their commanders would pay them more than the coffee revenues, they replied to be not interested in returning to the militias because they were "tired of the war" and had "finally found a sense of purpose". The efforts to rehabilitate the coffee sector in the DRC had facilitated their reinsertion in the social life of the villages and reunited them with their families.

Interestingly, the peculiarities of the (post-)conflict setting were also mentioned by the CEO of Thanksgiving Coffee, although in a different manner: "we work closely with farmers. Though the cooperative certainly exists in a (post-)conflict context, it is not the nature of our work nor our focus to analyze that legacy per se. While we are well aware of what happened in Rwanda in 1994, we are more concerned with the immediate economic reality, the opportunity

for mutually beneficial business partnerships, and the ongoing procurement of high quality coffee at prices that make coffee production viable for the farmers". The only mainstream firm that explicitly referred to the (post-)conflict context was Sainsbury, which saw it as an incentive to "help gain exposure of our work through press and PR to improve sales and returns to farmers".

4.6.4. Broader implications for management

The way in which organizations can maintain progressive interactions with markets is to some extent shaped by the sector in which they operate, and the aspects discussed above apply to (agricultural) commodities or situations in which there are small producers or producer-buyer relationships for negotiating prices. However, there is also broader relevance considering the role of workers, 'liveable' wages and 'fairness' more generally, often highlighted by corporate involvement in global value and supply chains. The fate of (local) suppliers and workers then becomes an issue that firms investing in (post-)conflict and/or developing countries need to consider, sometimes as a result of global or industry standards to which they have committed themselves.

In the extractive industries, for example, firms are usually bound to adhere to certification mechanisms and guidelines, some of which have a fair wage component, but only few tackle the issue of artisanal mining which plagues hundreds of thousands of informal miners who are left unprotected and work in very precarious conditions. A more 'progressive' interaction would imply consideration of these problems in either community-oriented activities, or through broader market or industry initiatives. Different than some of the (semi-)hybrid organizations analyzed in this article, however, mining companies in the area are most often involved in rather philanthropic activities following a donor-recipient model without addressing issues directly related to the conflict, such as artisanal mining, poor governance, or violence against women (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; 2015b). Funding for service delivery prevails, as well as building physical infrastructure rather than strengthening capacities.

Managers operating in volatile environments need to be fully aware of the challenges they will face while doing development work, and lessons can be learnt from the way (semi-)hybrids engage in such activities. Besides strengthening capacities and supporting empowerment programs, most (semi-)hybrids also fund community development by, for example, building schools, wells or health posts, looking at the cause of the problem at stake and providing structural and sustainable solutions. This requires acquiring specific expertise that

is traditionally found in the non-profit sector, and has implications in terms of human resource management. The examples given above for the coffee sector may thus give food for thought for other organizations, as will also be discussed in the final section.

4.7. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After exploring the peculiarities of more than 50 organizations operating in (post-)conflict contexts, this article suggests the existence of a hybridization continuum (Figure 2). A range of organizations (for-profit and non-profit) appear to have hybrid elements in their business models that help to promote peace and reconciliation. Existing, more traditional firms and non-profit organizations are found to also adopt socially-oriented respectively financially-oriented aspects in their objectives, perspectives, relationships, and in terminology. At least, that is the picture that emerges when considering all organizations with international linkages that operate in a difficult setting characterized by (post-)conflict and poverty conditions. This specific context thus already exposed clear signs of the "hybridization movement", as observed by Battilana and colleagues (2012, p. 55), who noted its essential characteristics to be "a fundamental convergence and reconfiguration of the social and commercial sectors, from completely separate fields to a common space". They assumed it would take quite some time to materialize given path dependencies and difficulties of changing course in the short term, and not necessarily cover all organizations. However, our study suggests that in fragile settings this gradual transformation may go faster given the broad need to reduce conflict and further peace.

Table 5 contains key elements covered in this article, the hybridity elements relevant for management, and related practical challenges and recommendations, which we will discuss below, subsequent to the theoretical contributions. In describing the peculiarities of the various organizations along the hybridization continuum, with (semi-)hybrid organizations (both firms and non-profits) co-existing with the hybrid ('ideal') organization and with mainstream (social) firms and classic non-profits, the article included many quotes and practical examples. These may serve as inspiration for managers, even if the context of this study is different from the one in which they are active. Still, as many organizations interested in adopting at least some hybrid elements in their business models are likely to be confronted with situations of social need, in their current or future activities, our specific setting also offers more direct lessons. They relate to the three preceding sub-sections in our article on 'the broader implications for management'.

Table 5: Hybridity dimensions and their relevance to management

'Relational areas'	Key sub-dimensions	Hybridity aspects relevant to management	Challenges	Recommendations
Positive social change as organizational objective	• Social dimensions addressed in mission and outlook • Importance of 'human element', including positive leadership	• Consideration of social concerns and the longer term increases resilience in difficult and different circumstances • Personal commitment and leadership may attract/retain employees and customers	Requires specific staff capabilities, and concomitant training and selection	• Hire staff with social and empathy skills • Focus on 'inspirational' managers and management styles • Ensure staff has knowledge of the context
Mutually beneficial relationships with stakeholders	• Organizations' perceptions of mutual benefits • Scope of relationships	• (For the organization): Costs of doing business and risks are likely to be lower • (In this case): Higher quality of inputs and outreach to supply chain from bean to cup	Requires patience and willingness to invest longer-term in relationships	• Train staff on how to engage with communities / NGOs • Encourage staff to travel, learn from and 'live' with local (farming) communities
Progressive interactions with markets and institutions	• Organizations' perceptions of 'progressive' interactions • Broader dimensions of markets and institutions, including development/peace	• Undertaking development activities and improving market conditions for suppliers can increase societal licence to operate • Encouraging reconciliation may be a powerful marketing tool (coffee for peace)	Requires balancing act vis-à-vis the state and view on organizational role in this regard	• Move beyond a business as usual approach as that does not suffice • Delineate the right balance between organizational goals and societal contributions/role

Note: Relational areas in the first column are derived from Haigh and Hoffmann (2012). Other columns are directly related to the analysis in the article.

From a theoretical perspective, and in addition to contributing insights on the variety of hybridity and the hybridization continuum and an emerging "common space", the study indicates that (semi-)hybrid forms of organization appear very appropriate in unconventional contexts in which states have been absent or under siege. In this way, we shed light on a further aspect that has been suggested but not examined in much detail in the literature thus far, i.e., the rise of the hybrid due to decreasing state influence and the consequent need for other actors to take (part of) this role. As research has mostly focused on Western settings with legally-enabled hybrid organizations, there has been limited attention to how this may work out more specifically in a sector/country context with a weak or largely lacking state, and where boundaries between public and private spheres have become most blurred. Furthermore, we concretely illustrate how hybrid organizational forms may work in situations characterized by market and government failures, as proposed by McKague and Oliver (2012, p. 123), who envisaged them to be "especially serviceable in low-income markets". As suggested, such

market-based solutions to poverty as part of hybrid business models include responsiveness to specific livelihood needs and to redressing power differentials often found in value chains.

Hybridity often translates in a broad set of, even mutually beneficial, relationships with a variety of stakeholders, both internally and externally, and a mission that reckons with social change in a longer-term perspective. The context that we studied clearly showed how particularly (semi-)hybrid organizations aimed at wider changes in markets and institutions. We took these 'relational areas' of hybridity from earlier studies in which they were mostly conceptually explained, with a few illustrative examples, and specified them into key sub-dimensions and questions that guided the article (Table 4). This approach may be helpful for researchers working on hybrid organizations. We found that hybrids and (semi-)hybrids have a clear social agenda embedded in their organizational objectives, and are more keen to engage with all stakeholders than their non-hybrid counterparts. In addition, (semi-)hybrids are directly involved in capacity building and development work at community levels, taking over tasks traditionally attributed to the public and social sectors. This raises challenges as to where the role of private and non-profit organizations ends, and where that of the public sector begins, an issue relevant for both researchers and practitioners.

In addition to the aspects already mentioned above, this article pointed at the possible role of positive leadership, when translated in genuine care and in broad support for communities that also served to further coffee excellence. Earlier studies have suggested that certain types of organizational leadership (focused on employee empowerment and participatory decision making, i.e. providing a voice) may contribute to peace (Fort and Schipani, 2004; Spreitzer, 2007), to which we added further dimensions concerning communities and other stakeholders, as well as interactions with markets and institutions. Positive leadership in such complex environments seems predicated on the notion that communities are at the heart of a business model focused on both economic and social value creation. This applies to all organizations, not only those in the coffee sector; in mining, for example, reckoning with artisanal miners in the official mining process would demonstrate positive leadership that is likely to pay off. Such an approach is not only good for communities but also for firms given lower costs of doing business and reputational benefits.

Referring back to the literature on business for peace, hybrid organizational forms share characteristics with peace entrepreneurs and ethical firms mentioned in that body of work. They result from an entrepreneurial mindset, as evidenced by the resilience exhibited to do business in extreme circumstances, adding to the challenge of balancing organizations' economic and

social purposes. In addition, they show similarities with ethical firms in that the way they operate and the type of relationships they build, creates a climate conducive to peace and reconciliation. While ethical business offers opportunities for human interactions that can sow the seeds of unity and reconciliation (Fort, 2007; Frederick, 1995), this space is usually located at the level of the firm. Hybrid organizations add a broader reconciliation component by strengthening ties with the communities with which they work and by promoting a sense of togetherness. Seen in that light, the hybrid forms that we found add to current insights by presenting distinctive structures from which many organizations can learn when operating in (post-)conflict and fragile settings.

Interestingly, our study suggests the importance of 'the human element' more broadly, as relationships are not merely based on business transactions. We came across clear expressions of interest in coffee farmers and their personal histories during business trips, in a few cases inspiring and/or forming the basis for newly-created (semi-)hybrid organizations. Managers often made conscious efforts by traveling through challenging circumstances in order to meet farmers and their families in remote areas, contributing to a climate of trust. In addition, (semi-)hybrids and traditional firms with some kind of hybridity in their business models showed dedication to spreading the story behind the coffee present on retailers' shelves. Numerous accounts of such personal stories were documented in trip reports and on (semi-)hybrids' websites.

In Rwanda, where the genocide left profound wounds within the population, (semi-)hybrids have been involved in activities aimed at bringing about reconciliation and fostering trust; in the DRC, coffee activities appear to have a comparable effect. This is essentially done by stimulating young (ex-)rebels to (help) grow coffee for a cooperative that will sell to a (semi-)hybrid for a fair price, and by instilling a sense of community and 'togetherness' which seems to attract former combatants to reintegrate and return to their villages. Central to conflict transformation, a term coined by John Paul Lederach (2003, p. 43), is a process that "provides adaptive responses to the immediate and future iterations of conflict episodes, and addresses the deeper and longer-term relational and systemic patterns that produce violent, destructive expressions of conflict". By offering such adaptive responses to a challenging setting, (semi-)hybrid types of organizations seem to bring elements of answers to the problems commonly found in a context of protracted violence and missing institutions. Obviously, the possibilities offered by the hybridization movement in fragile regions need further study, preferably covering

multiple organizations, also in other contexts, and with additional data sources to address the limitations that we faced.

At the same time, our study already suggested the importance of the human and emotional aspects of doing business, in which other types of attitudes, behaviors and inspirational leadership based on empathy and genuine compassion came to the fore. These lessons extend beyond the specific case setting, as already indicated in earlier sections. The ability to lead, communicate and understand human needs in very different circumstances seems necessary in managing organizations, and thus requires attention in training and recruitment activities (see Table 5). Interestingly, the crucial role of the individual level in driving organizations' social behavior has recently received more attention, although mostly conceptually, leading to calls for more in-depth research on employees and consumers (Aguinas and Glavas, 2012; Kolk et al., 2015). Human needs outside organizations can evoke emotional reactions and arouse empathy on the part of individuals in organizations, and result in strong feelings to help others. This behavior can be driven by altruistic or so-called 'warm-glow' motives, with the latter meaning that "people help others in order to feel good about themselves", an effect seen to fit in between egoism and altruism (Allison et al., 2013).

While we could only touch upon these aspects, the organizations in our study appear to have a clear human focus, which may help managers to choose amongst the options to their avail in seeking to address social needs (cf. Table 5). We found that such organizations (strive to) adopt (elements of) a different business model that aims to balance care for the product and the producers with (in)tangible benefits for communities, consumers and the organization. Educating customers to pay a higher price for coffee is good for the communities involved, and may pay off for organizations as well, although the precise impact needs a more detailed assessment. Still, this combination of aspects is likely to appeal to individuals who find it particularly attractive to work for organizations with higher degrees of hybridity. Concurrently, as hybrid business models imply that organizations enter partly uncharted terrains (undertaking activities traditionally belonging to public and/or non-profit sectors), they need to seek staff that already has or can develop these capabilities. Building a company culture where 'social' work is rewarded and community concerns are included in the organization's mission would help. Finally, although managers are likely to face challenges when engaging in social/development work, it will also offer opportunities for both organizations and society more broadly, especially in helping to promote peace and reconciliation.

Appendix 2

	Type (firm, NGO, cooperative or combination)	Country of activity (DRC or Rwanda)	Country of origin	Type/degree hybridization	Organizational objective			Mutual Relationships	Interaction with markets and institutions	
					Socially/ environmentally embedded mission	Longer- time horizon	Positive leadership		Coffee market orientation	Contribution to development / peace
Cafédirect	Firm	RWA	UK	1	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / speciality coffee	Strong
Coffee Rwanda	Firm	RWA	USA	1	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Equal World	Firm	RWA	USA	1	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Growers First Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	1	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Rogers Family Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	1	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Schluter	Firm	DRC / RWA	SWI	1	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Sustainable Harvest	Firm	RWA	USA	1	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Thanksgiving Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	1	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Thousand Hills	Firm	RWA	USA	1	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Allegro Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	2	strong	medium	medium	Strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Ancora Coffee Roasters	Firm	RWA	USA	2	strong	medium	medium	Strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Atlas Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	2	medium	strong	strong	Strong	niche/ specialty coffee	Strong
Bull Run Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	2	medium	medium	strong	Strong	niche/ specialty coffee	na
Counter Culture Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	2	strong	strong	medium/strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Dean's Beans	Firm	RWA	USA	2	strong	strong	medium/strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Fratello Coffee Roasters	Firm	RWA	CAN	2	medium	strong	medium/strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Groundwork Coffee Company	Firm	RWA	USA	2	strong	strong	medium/strong	medium	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Intelligentsia Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	2	medium	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	na
Silverback Coffee of Rwanda	Firm	RWA	USA	2	medium	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Stumptown Coffee Roaster	Firm	RWA	USA	2	strong	strong	medium	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Georges Howell Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	2	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	na
Union Hand-Roasted Coffee	Firm	RWA	UK	2	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Café Liégeois	Firm	RWA	BEL	3	medium	low	na	strong	mainstream plus Fair Trade / specialty	Medium
GreenMountain	Firm	RWA	USA	3	medium/strong	medium	na	strong	mainstream plus Fair Trade / specialty	Strong
Peet's coffee (JAB)	Firm	RWA	USA	3	medium	low	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Rombouts	Firm	RWA	BEL	3	medium	low	na	medium	niche / specialty coffee	Low
Starbucks	Firm	RWA	USA	3	medium/strong	low	na	strong	mainstream plus Fair Trade	Medium
Canterbury	Firm	RWA	CAN	4	low	low	low	low	niche / specialty coffee	Na

	Type (firm, NGO, cooperative or combination)	Country of activity (DRC or Rwanda)	Country of origin	Type/degree hybridization	Organizational objective			Mutual Relationships	Interaction with markets and institutions	
					Socially/ environmentally embedded mission	Longer- time horizon	Positive leadership		Coffee market orientation	Contribution to development / peace
Community Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	4	low	low	low	low	mainstream plus green	Na
InterAmerican Coffee (Neumann)	Firm	DRC / RWA	USA	4	low	low	na	low	niche / specialty coffee	Low
Marks & Spencer	Firm	RWA	UK	4	low	low	na	medium	mainstream plus Fair Trade	Low
Paramount Coffee	Firm	RWA	USA	4	low	low	na	medium	mainstream plus Fair Trade	na
Rwacof / Sucafina	Firm	RWA	SWI	4	low	low	na	medium	niche / specialty coffee	Low
Sainsbury's	Firm	DRC / RWA	UK	4	low	low	na	medium	mainstream plus Fair Trade	Medium
Volcafe (ED&F Man)	Firm	RWA	SWI	4	low	low	na	low	mainstream	Low
Coopac	Cooperative /firm	RWA	RWA	5	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Misozi Coffee Company	Cooperative /firm	RWA	RWA	5	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Medium
Rwashosco	Cooperative /firm	RWA	RWA	5	medium/strong	strong	medium	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Medium
Sopacdi	Cooperative	DRC	DRC	5	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
PEARL	NGO	RWA	USA	5	strong	strong	medium	strong	niche/ specialty coffee	Strong
Technoserve	NGO	RWA	USA	5	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche/ specialty coffee	Strong
The Well Coffeehouse	NGO	RWA	USA	5	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche/ specialty coffee	Strong
Twin	NGO /firm	DRC / RWA	UK	5	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / accompanier	Strong
UGEAFI	NGO /cooperative	DRC	DRC	5	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
ACDI-VOCA	NGO	RWA	USA	6	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Café Africa	NGO	DRC	SWI	6	strong	strong	na	strong	na	Strong
CCFD-Terre Solidaire	NGO	DRC/RWA	FR	6	strong	strong	na	strong	na	Strong
COMEQUI	NGO	DRC	BEL	6	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Fair Trade USA	NGO	RWA	USA	6	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
ICCO	NGO	DRC	NL	6	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Oxfam Novib	NGO	DRC	NL	6	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
SNV	NGO	RWA	NL	6	strong	strong	na	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong
Solidaridad	NGO	DRC	NL	6	strong	strong	strong	strong	niche / specialty coffee	Strong

Note [1]: To avoid simplistic yes/no answers that fail to do justice to hybridization as a process whereby some elements can be present yet with different degrees of prominence, we chose to differentiate for most aspects in strong, medium, or low, as follows. An organization with "strong" gives specific and detailed information (often in a verifiable manner) about a particular dimension; with "medium" some information, yet less specific; and "low" little or no information. Organizations scoring high ("strong") on all the dimensions (or that identified themselves as social enterprises or B corporations) were considered as hybrid, those scoring strong on 3 (of the 4) dimensions as (semi-)hybrid. As noted in the article, 'scores' are not meant to give a normative judgment in terms of 'good' or 'bad', but to provide insight and thus illustrate hybridity; we also acknowledge that the 'scores' stem from a specific moment in time.

Note [2]: Caution is needed because our findings are to a considerable extent based on self-reported information, although we have checked the information and triangulated where possible. For example, during our field trip we asked for confirmation of firms' statements by NGOs, cooperatives and/or external experts. Furthermore, and as shown in earlier research, the more extensive (and sometimes externally-verified) the information is, the greater the likelihood that statements are correct. Still, the (partial) reliance on self-reporting at a specific time of study are caveats. Furthermore, assessments of qualitative information always imply some degree of interpretation, with which we have dealt as good as possible.

CHAPTER 5. MULTINATIONALS, CSR AND PARTNERSHIPS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES[9]

5.1. INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, attention has increased for the societal role of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), also when it comes to taking responsibility in countries characterized by poverty, conflict and limited statehood. In such contexts, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have waged numerous campaigns to highlight the impact and potential contribution of MNEs (such as Publish What You Pay, or Blood Diamonds). MNEs have become more active in promulgating corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies, and are said to increasingly reckon with cultural, environmental, economic and cultural concerns (Eweje, 2011), leading to different approaches across sectors and countries. At the same time, however, implementation on the ground shows large variety. For example, issues such as anti-corruption, gender equality, child labour, community giving and the formal representation of workers are not included in the CSR practice of companies in Bangladesh and Pakistan (Naeem and Welford, 2009). CSR strategies in Nigeria failed to address the oil spills caused by MNEs operations (Edoho, 2008). In Uganda, public awareness may be high, but the content and scope of CSR are not yet clear (Amooti Bagire et al., 2011).

Moreover, corporate awareness of how to operate in conflict settings has been rather limited. MNEs active in conflict countries in Central Africa typically report on their economic and social impact while paying little attention to the conflict dimension and the broader context in which their (rather generic) CSR activities take place (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010). In this context, the question how CSR in conflict countries in Central Africa is constructed becomes highly relevant. Interestingly, CSR in Africa has been underexposed in research compared to other regions, as shown by Visser (2006a) in an overview chapter that covered the 1995-2005 period. In addition, while the number of publications has increased in subsequent years, the main focus has continued to be on Nigeria and South Africa, and conflict countries remain underexposed (notable for, for example, the Congos). The lack of attention for Africa (and other poor, 'difficult' settings) in research on MNEs and CSR has been shown in overview articles published in international business journals (Egri and Ralston, 2008; Kolk and Van Tulder, 2010).

Hence, while the role of business in conflict areas has received growing interest in

[9] This chapter is co-authored with Ans Kolk and was published in *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 2013, *20*(1), 43-54.

general (e.g. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Bennett, 2002; Gerson, 2001; Haufler, 2004; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007), including the issues faced by MNEs when operating in such a context and their positive, possibly 'leading-edge' involvement, we lack empirical evidence, noteworthy for Central Africa in particular. It is highly relevant for the Central African context, also because in quite some countries with conflict (histories) the number of MNEs is limited with thus a concomitant (potential) large impact on the local situation. Important questions in this regard are how MNEs deal with conflicts when investing in such regions, or when conflicts (re)emerge while already being present in the country; and whether they (intend to) play a particular role to exert influence and help reduce conflict. It should be noted that everything that can contribute to reducing conflict would be very welcome, not only from the perspective of human suffering but also because of the economic cost of conflicts. For Africa, this amounted to $18 billion per year, with an average African economy shrinking by 15% as a result of armed conflicts (Hillier, 2007, p. 3). For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the cost of armed conflict in the period 1996-2005 was estimated to have been 29% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (Hillier, 2007, p. 10).

This article presents some findings of our ongoing research project on MNEs and conflict in Africa.[10] We first discuss some of the issues related to MNEs and conflict, with specific attention to the pressures exerted by NGOs in Central Africa, considering their various roles and foci. This includes, for example, watchdog functions but also engagement and partnership activities. Subsequently, we discuss partnerships in the context of MNEs and CSR in Africa. The following section highlights cases of MNE collaboration with non-business partners in Central African (post-)conflict countries to shed light on possible MNE contributions through partnerships. Implications of such activities for the role of the state in fragile contexts are also discussed.

5.2. MULTINATIONALS AND CONFLICT

When considering MNEs in conflict areas, the questions outlined above as to vulnerability, presence, and their role/contribution come to the fore in various ways, in relation to the impact of MNEs on conflict dynamics and/or how conflicts affect their operations. NGOs have typically focused on the disruptive effects of MNEs, particularly in the extractive sector.

[10] This is part of a longer-term project in which both primary and secondary information has been collected from and about NGOs, MNEs and other relevant governmental and non-governmental actors (this has included systematic analyses of all publications and websites of MNEs and NGOs as well as surveys and interviews carried out by the second author). This article, which is relatively short reflecting the nature of the outlet in its focus on innovative examples and policy relevance, builds on and extends other research reported in our earlier publications, see chapter 3 (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010).

One of the issues to be reckoned with by MNEs when investing (or being present) in conflict-prone regions is that they, as visible and usually large economic actors, can easily become subjects of rebel attacks. The direct impact of conflict on MNEs includes threats to personnel, installations and supply lines. MNEs are thus potential victims of plundering, asset damage or extortion, which sometimes leads to the suspension of operations. This can be temporarily or definitely (divestments), both situations have been documented, generally based on anecdotal evidence, as systematic, more large-scale studies of strategic decisions by MNEs in conflict countries have been lacking (cf. UNCTAD, 2007) and more research has been called for (Oetzel et al., 2007). Various strategies of MNEs in conflict areas have been distinguished, including 'business as usual', 'engagement promoting peace', or disengagement (Westermann-Behaylo, 2009), and several factors influencing firm decision-making have been considered, such as political and institutional environments in both home and host countries, and characteristics of both the firm itself and the specific conflict (Patey, 2007; Getz and Oetzel, 2009).

What has been observed is that oil MNEs in Africa rarely leave, which may be due to the often large and long-term nature of their investments that makes it particularly costly to fully abandon their operations. Natural resources, especially oil, in which many MNEs in Africa are involved, are location bound and simply cannot be moved to a more secure part of the country (Swanson, 2002). It should also be noted that, for example in the case of Angola and the Republic of the Congo, assets of large oil MNEs (TotalFinaElf, ENI, Chevron, BP) were 'protected' by their offshore nature. Interestingly, as Swanson (2002) observes, rebel groups are not necessarily inclined to damage assets of oil MNEs for fear of losing revenues if they expect to come to power (the Republic of the Congo is a case in point). For these MNEs, the fact that they frequently remain in conflict areas might be part of an economic calculus in which expected future profits from extraction (or the risk of losing a market position) outweigh the costs traditionally associated with conflicts. Moreover, for both the company and recipient-country stakeholders, the potentially positive corporate contributions through MNE presence may also be a factor (see below).

This role of MNEs has been contested as well though, which brings us to another dimension, in addition to the 'physical' vulnerability just mentioned. MNEs have been the subject of scrutiny by NGOs (such as Human Rights Watch and Global Witness) and the press, exposing MNEs to bad publicity and the concomitant reputational effects. Aspects mentioned in this regard include MNEs' (alleged) detrimental impact on the environment and local communities (Boele et al., 2001; Reed, 2002), and (in)direct support to non-democratic regimes

that are characterized by violations of human rights, corruption and weak governance more generally (Idahosa, 2002; Reed, 2002; Watts, 2005; cf. UN, 2006). In recent years, particularly oil and mining (diamond) companies have received much attention and condemnation (cf. UNCTAD, 2007). In the case of the diamond sector, this has also originated from the United Nations – a UN Security Council embargo related to Angola, and a critical UN expert panel report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (UN, 2001).

NGO attention for MNEs and conflict settings has been large, as shown in an exploratory study in which we focused on 13 leading NGOs that had been working in or on Angola and/or DRC (see Table 6). For the period 1998-2009 alone, we found over 92 publications, most of which (80) written by NGOs engaged in lobbying and advocacy activities, often as part of campaigns targeted at specific MNEs and/or sectors, but also at governments in a quest for more/better regulation and transparency. Almost half were reports specifically oriented at MNEs, predominantly those active in the DRC (34). MNEs in Angola were targeted to a much lesser extent in the period covered (8), as the NGO focus shifted from the private sector to the government after the conflict had ended in 2002.

Table 6 summarizes the peculiarities of the NGOs studied, based on various sources of evidence, considering their main focus, whether they accept funding from MNEs or not, their strategy to influence MNEs, their engagement orientation and local presence. For the characterization we relied on Bendell (2000), who classified NGO activities to influence corporate behavior based on two major variables, the style of the activity being used by the NGO (confrontational or collaborative) and its place in relation to the market economy (whether NGO depends on the market to raise revenues). Moreover, we also used Winston's (2002) distinction between NGOs that engage (seek dialogue) and those that are more confrontational (see also the differentiation made by Den Hond and De Bakker (2007), based on NGO ideology). While some of the precise characterizations may be subject to debate and require further research in other contexts as well, Table 6 shows that service delivery NGOs with in-country field operations, with a clear focus on peace and with a learning approach are, probably as a result of their orientation and mandate, more inclined to collaborate with companies than NGOs that operate as watchdogs. Still, the latter category can also be involved in multistakeholder dialogues in which companies, NGOs and/or government authorities exchange ideas and perspectives on how to tackle a particular issue. This collaboration type will be explored in more detail in the remainder of this paper.

Table 6: Engagement type per NGO studied in Angola/DRC

NGO	Thematic focus	Presence on the ground	Funding from MNC	Strategy	Engagement type
Amnesty International	Human Rights	No	No	Research and advocacy	Monitoring Dialogue
Broederlijke Delen	Development	No	No (incidental)	Hybrid	Monitoring Dialogue
CEP	Development Community engagement	No	Yes - assessment	Learning	Assessment
Global Witness	Development	No	No	Research and advocacy	Monitoring Dialogue
Human Rights Watch	Human Rights	No*	No	Research and advocacy	Monitoring Dialogue
International Alert	Peace	Yes	Yes - assessment	Learning	Partnership Assessment Learning
IPIS	Research	No	No	Research and advocacy	Monitoring
PACT	Development	Yes	Yes - project	Service Delivery	Partnership Project
Oxfam	Development	Yes	Yes - project	Service Delivery**	Partnership Project
Pole Institute	Development	Yes	No	Research and advocacy	Dialogue
RAID	Development	No	No	Research and advocacy	Monitoring Dialogue
Save the Children	Development	Yes	Yes - project	Service Delivery**	Partnership Project
Search For Common Ground	Peace	Yes	Yes - project	Learning	Partnership Assessment Learning

* makes use of researchers, may have some small operational facilities, but no field office

** service delivery is the main strategy in the country; however, the network with which these NGOs are affiliated also make use of research, lobby and advocacy activities.

5.3. MULTINATIONALS, PARTNERSHIPS AND CSR IN AFRICA

When MNEs pay attention to conflict issues in their partnership endeavours, it is often in relation to and as part of their CSR activities; this is especially the case in Central Africa (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010). Several bodies of literature seem therefore relevant, including 'MNEs and conflict' and 'CSR in Africa'. While CSR in Africa, and in developing countries more generally, has been less studied than those in the developed countries, a question that has clearly emerged is whether companies are able to tackle CSR issues considering the respective cultural contexts (Dobers and Halme, 2009). In studies on CSR in Africa (Egels, 2005; Ite, 2004, 2007a, 2007b; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Okafor, 2003), different issues have come to the fore. One is linked to the definition of CSR in the African context, or the contextualisation of CSR. CSR, as a locally rooted notion (Hamann et al., 2005), should reflect 'African' realities, and take specific historical and cultural factors into account (Idemudia and Ite, 2006), including

environmental degradation, ongoing conflicts and extreme poverty. In this regard, Carroll's pyramid has been revisited (Visser, 2006b) to account for Africa's high unemployment and low development levels, in a plea to give priority to the economic responsibilities of MNEs, followed by philanthropy, legal or ethical responsibilities.

Furthermore, CSR orientation, nature and focus are co-shaped by MNEs' interaction with stakeholders (Egels, 2005) and global institutional pressures (Muthuri and Gilbert, 2010). It has been noted that MNEs' commitment to not abuse a governance void and concomitant opportunities to earn legal yet immoral profits should be part of CSR (Dobers and Halme, 2009). In the context of (Central) Africa, where governance is low and the rule of law is absent (especially in the DRC), pressure on companies often comes from local communities, as well as local and international civil society actors. MNEs' community involvement or community relations practices in Africa have thus received attention (Muthuri et al., 2009). Although MNEs' community involvement has been criticized because of power differentials between the firm and the community, and patron-client type of relationships (Idahosa, 2002), meaningful involvement through participatory decision making process will help MNEs bridge the gap between their perspective and local community expectations (Kemp, 2010) and to build effective relationships based on trust and avoid costly conflicts (Muthuri et al., 2009).

How the conflict context influences MNEs' CSR activities and how partnerships can best be embedded in MNEs' strategies and practices is a nascent area of study. Although partnerships have been hailed as potentially significant ways to tackle conflict-related issues, particularly corruption, poverty and social inequality (Bennett, 2002; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007), empirical evidence is still relatively limited. Interestingly, studies that looked at partnerships in African conflict settings concluded that collaborative activities follow a rather philanthropic model (Boele et al., 2001; Idemudia and Ite 2006; Idemudia, 2009; Ite, 2004; Ite, 2005; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Wheeler et al., 2002). The full potential of partnerships as effective and innovative collaborative modalities with an eye to tackling pressing governance issues typically found in conflict countries has not been realised yet.

Most partnerships by MNEs in conflict and low-governance areas focus on NGOs. NGOs with a presence on the ground and positive engagement strategies may help MNEs to build effective community relations, to shape their partnership portfolio and focus, and even assist them in integrating a conflict lens in their core business. NGOs are usually knowledgeable about the local context and have longstanding relationships with local actors, which could be used by MNEs as entry points in their community endeavours. Some NGOs have been involved in peace-

building activities (such as early warning, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, service provision and intermediation between various parties) (World Bank, 2006), which could be useful for MNEs. Furthermore, in areas where governments have failed to provide local populations with basic services, it seems all the more relevant for MNEs to learn from NGOs how to operate and how to engage with communities so as to meet their expectations. MNEs often struggle to articulate their community engagement objectives (Tsang et al., 2009). In that light, partnering with NGOs provide MNEs with the possibility to take local needs into account and address conflict relevant issues (cf. Nwankwo et al., 2007).

Given the particularities of each conflict setting, CSR and corporate community relation strategies deployed by MNEs need to take the context into account. Understanding and integrating community perceptions into CSR activities, with assistance from those NGOs with extensive knowledge and experience on the topic, can be instrumental in building more harmonious relationships with local communities. However, while community-MNE relations are a crucial CSR component, the broader context also has a considerable influence on the actual practice. In Nigeria, for example, the absence of a conducive environment was an impediment for the oil industry to engage positively with communities (Ite, 2004). Therefore, community relations efforts undertaken by MNEs failed to reduce the incidence of violent conflict (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). In that context, tripartite partnerships, which include governments, NGOs and the private sector, have been called for to ensure that collaborative CSR activities are embedded into a broader development agenda, thus increasing chances that conflicts can be reduced and/or avoided (Idemudia and Ite, 2006).

Generally speaking, however, (post-)conflict countries provide a context that is less conducive to partnerships given that antagonism, fear and hostilities are still present, looming and/or lingering. Some business-NGO partnerships can be found in African conflict countries, but only a very small number deals with aspects directly related to the conflict with a wider community focus that may thus contribute to peace and reconciliation (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). Besides a predominance of 'traditional' philanthropic activities and an underrepresentation of so-called engagement and particularly transformative partnerships (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012), the government is seldom included as partner. While understandable given governance failures and sometimes even the (in)direct involvement of government representatives (e.g. the army) in conflict issues, leaving them out may also further undermine the legitimacy and capacity of the state (Ite, 2005).

CSR activities, amongst which partnerships, that take place in weak institutional settings cannot be oblivious to governance problems such as tax evasion and corruption, as these reinforce poor governance and further undermine state capacities (Dobers and Halme, 2009). Collaboration efforts between companies, NGOs and governments may help to increase the abilities of the state to more effectively tackle tax fraud and corruption which are both cause and result of fragility (Dobers and Halme, 2009). Tripartite partnerships therefore seem to hold most potential for addressing conflict as well as furthering reconciliation and institution building (Ite, 2007a). In fragile states, cross-sector collaboration and public-private partnerships that make use of inclusive and flexible engagement strategies are key for building trust and gaining credibility among communities (Abramov, 2009). Effective partnerships should be based on an assessment of needs, ensure that expectations are properly managed through dialogue and engagement, and create a structure that fosters ownership and capacity-building (Abramov, 2009).

Below we will briefly highlight diverse cases of engagement by four MNEs with non-business partners in Central African (post-)conflict countries, in which attention is paid as well to the NGOs and their perspectives. The partnerships, with rather different peculiarities, illustrate how MNEs can play a constructive role, sometimes after having being accused of impacting the conflict context in a negative way. While the literature has distinguished several venues through which MNEs can help address conflict (e.g. Bennett, 2002; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007), collaborative arrangements can be seen as rather innovative, but they may also be more difficult to realise than individual corporate activities. At the same time, such arrangements can have a much wider influence, with both direct and indirect effects on the local situation and constituents, as well as on the institutions of fragile states, through the promotion of dialogue, trust and capacity-building, prerequisites for peace and reconciliation.

5.4. PARTNERSHIPS IN CONFLICT SETTINGS

5.4.1. AngloGoldAshanti collaboration with Pole Institute

The first example concerns AngloGoldAshanti (AGA) which was subject of NGO scrutiny as part of a campaign led by Human Rights Watch, and yet became eventually involved in broader engagement with a variety of stakeholders, including an NGO, Pole Institute. AGA was targeted for having provided financial and logistical support to a rebel group, FNI, in return for promises of staff and asset security. Subsequently, grave human rights violations were committed by the FNI, and AGA was blamed for not acknowledging its responsibility as ‘accomplice’. The company

criticized the NGO campaign for being unfair, contending that no formal relationships were forged with the rebel group. Nevertheless, the CEO admitted that an extortion payment of $8,000 had been made, not to gain any favour, but to protect his staff (Kosich, 2005). By doing so, he admitted that AGA had not been cautious in engaging the FNI although he added that distinguishing between rebels, government forces and community members was not an easy task. Still, the company stood out in the DRC as one of the few mining companies that had welcomed the renegotiation of contracts after the Luyindula commission had expressed the need for the DRC to regain control over its resources (Cafod, 2006). Following these issues, AGA strengthened its partnerships with various stakeholders such as international donors, and also with local NGOs, Pole Institute in particular.

In 2008, AGA participated in a multistakeholder forum with local civil society actors (amongst which Pole Institute), government officials, and academics where various themes related to governance in Eastern Congo were debated, such as how to improve commerce and the banking systems, how to deal with the informal (mining) sector and how to break the troubled relationships between private operators and public authorities. Pole had invited AGA representatives to join this multistakeholder forum based on the understanding that all actors that matter to tackle governance-related issues needed to be included at the table. The NGO noted to be satisfied with the contribution of the company to the debates.[11] The goal was not only to influence practice, but also to discuss the issue of resource extraction, community participation and come up with solutions to governance issues. Pole stresses that their engagement with all actors, private sector and government alike, is primarily constructive and aimed at inclusion, learning and improving practices. With regards to funds, it refuses private sector funding for fear of being co-opted; interestingly, this is not for lack of trust, or due to sheer ideology, as it also refuses funds from the DRC government. Maintaining neutrality in a challenging environment seems the major reason accounting for Pole's refusal to accept private and public sector financing.

5.4.2. De Beer and DDI

The second brief case relates to a multistakeholder initiative that De Beer helped establish – the Diamond Development Initiative (DDI) – which is thus a much broader and rather different collaboration with a wide range of partners. DDI is an important complement to the Kimberley Process, a system for the certification of the source of uncut diamonds to prevent the trade in

[11] Interview with Pole Institute staff, November 2008.

conflict diamonds. Other founding partners of DDI are NGOs such as Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada, the World Bank hosted Communities and Small Scale Mining Initiative, and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association. All partners share the same vision on artisanal mining. While the Kimberley Process was supposed to lead to the eradication of conflict diamonds through incorporating the diamond industry and governments of producing countries in a certification system, the issue of artisanal, informal mining was left unaddressed. The focus was on legal and procedural aspects rather on improving livelihoods of poor small-scale artisanal miners. This has left a real gap given the fact that more than a million African artisanal diamond diggers (including an estimated more than 800,000 in the DRC alone) and their families live and work in poverty, outside the formal economy (DDI, 2010).

Therefore, DDI was set up to help address poverty affected artisanal diamond diggers by converting diamonds into an engine for development through the formalization of the economies surrounding artisanal diamond mines. It focuses on the following areas: action research, education, policy dialogue and project implementation. The DDI seeks projects and initiatives that have a direct impact on the communities involved and create a constructive dialogue among all stakeholders involved with the goal of improving the socio-economic conditions of artisanal miners and their families. It supports micro-projects to improve the situation of artisanal miners while also addressing the wider socio-economic impacts of informal digging. Through DDI, De Beer is also actively involved in public policy dialogue and action to tackle poverty issues related to artisanal miners and improve their livelihoods with a specific focus on developing an effective engagement framework in Angola or DRC in the future, were De Beer to develop a mine Angola or in the DRC (De Beer is currently in an exploration phase).

5.4.3. Anvil's CEP and PACT collaboration

The third, somewhat more extensive, case involves a company that was also targeted by NGOs, and that evolved to different collaboration modalities with interesting broader implications for interactions with communities and government. Anvil was accused (in a campaign led by RAID) of being complicit in human rights abuses committed by official Congolese army forces through the provision of assets that were confiscated by the army. The company contested the allegations and mentioned having been 'forced' to surrender some of their assets prior to the massacres. There was a controversy that lasted several years, a period in which Anvil took several steps.

Emeritus Professor Freedman was asked to review the company's practices against OECD standards, for which a compliance score of 86% was obtained. He also commented upon the human rights abuses by stating that other mining firms have far worse records than Anvil, which scored "relatively well" in comparison. Furthermore, Freedman (2006, p. 3) noted that "hardly anyone in Katanga holds Anvil accountable for these incidents in spite of the international media attention these events have received or the reports of human rights activists from the DRC and abroad. Other mining firms, international NGOs and senior government officials believe Anvil was a victim of Katanga's volatile political atmosphere in which a myriad of groups and a few powerful politicians oppose one another and compete for controlling the precious mineral trade. The general view is that Anvil was caught unaware..."

In addition, the company also took steps towards community engagement. This included a request to Corporate Engagement Project (CEP) in 2005 to conduct an assessment of Anvil operations. While CEP carefully assessed whether they would have enough room to carry out an independent study, it specifically mentions in its report not to have explored details of the incident "as other organizations are more qualified to do so" (CEP, 2006, 7). The NGO visited Anvil operations in the Katanga province in November 2005, interviewed more than 200 stakeholders, ranging from staff to community and religious leaders to army officials. CEP's report raised the issue of Anvil's failure to manage community expectations. Given the poor social track record of government-owned mining operations in the region, communities expected Anvil, a private operator, to better cater for them by building schools or health facilities.

Anvil started a multistakeholder process to clearly define what the "roles and responsibilities are of the company, civil society, government and community members" (CEP 2006, 3) and decided to invite PACT, a US-based NGO with offices throughout Africa, for collaboration. The company approached PACT to assist them in setting up a community fund program as part of a profit sharing mechanism to ensure that local communities would profit from the mining operations. After careful consideration and active involvement of both PACT's board in the US and its Africa regional office, and a period in which negotiations were suspended because of the human rights violations noted above, PACT decided to enter the partnership because "not engaging is worse than engaging".[12] Partnership through the community fund is a strategy for PACT DRC to encourage responsible business behavior, improve transparency, strengthen community capacity and provide economic opportunity.

[12] Interview with PACT staff, November 2008.

The engagement takes place at two levels: at the community project level (e.g. how to involve communities in project design and management) and at the business level (integration of a Human Rights lens into operations, consideration of how to use security forces and how to engage with government forces and rebels). PACT staff interviewed stated that companies in general and Anvil in particular complained about the lack of information about how to deal with, for example, rebels, and had difficulty making sense of all international guidelines and codes drawn up in recent years. Hence, while the main goal of the partnership is to build good company-community relationships through the creation and the management of a trust fund and a social investment program, the partnership creates space for engaging local government on transparency and livelihood issues, and for providing assistance in complying with international global voluntary standards (Voluntary Principles, Global Compact, OECD guidelines).

PACT staff acknowledged that accepting funds from Anvil was a challenge and exposed them to criticism from other NGOs, but the organization partnered with Anvil in full consciousness of the damage it could inflict on its reputation. In addition, PACT saw the management of the community program as an entry point to starting a dialogue with Anvil on a wider range of issues related to its core business, such as mining practices or how to deal with artisanal miners. PACT staff interviewed mentioned the artisanal mining issue as a success: PACT was able to change Anvil's unsafe mining techniques and assisted Anvil, with local government authorities and civil society organizations, in designing and managing a comprehensive plan of training artisanal miners and providing them with an alternative income.

Like other NGOs (such as CEP and Search for Common Ground), PACT recognizes the work conducted by watchdog NGOs in raising governance and accountability issues related to business operations in conflict areas and attempting (from a distance) to improve corporate behavior. However, their local presence motivates them to adopt another attitude. Engaging, dialoguing, entering partnerships is seen as more beneficial than naming and shaming, although PACT staff understand that without the threat of being named and shamed, MNEs may lack incentives to enter into partnerships with NGOs. Watchdog NGOs, by playing their role, may be pushing MNEs towards collaboration with other more engagement-oriented NGOs.

5.4.4. Chevron with Search for Common Ground and the Angola Partnership Initiative

The final case, Chevron, bears some resemblance to the Anvil case in that it also established multiple lines of collaboration and partnered with an NGO with a rather similar orientation as

PACT. Via its partnerships, Chevron reached out to a range of other partners as well. This case, however, focused on Angola based on experiences the company had in Nigeria. Hence, we see transfer of knowledge across locations as well as corporate learning, with a large multistakeholder initiative (Angola Partnership Initiative) that seems to embody a real innovative approach that may perhaps be (partly) replicated and extended elsewhere.

In 2006, Chevron began working with Search for Common Ground (SCG) to strengthen local capacity to address conflicts constructively. SCG had been active in Angola since 1996 to support the reconciliation and reconstruction process. Although Chevron was already involved in development projects in Angola, they did so in a fairly traditional manner, focusing on infrastructure, e.g., building schools. The main objective of the SCG engagement with Chevron was to create a more peaceful environment and to change potential conflict dynamics by building connections between the company and local communities, in which SCG acted as a social buffer. The partnership consisted of a six-phase community engagement process which included training, problem identification, priority setting, development and implementation of infrastructure project and assessment.

SCG's approach with regard to engaging businesses is similar to that of PACT. It emphasizes dialogue, open communication, capacity building and community engagement. Before engaging in a partnership, SCG carefully assesses MNEs' track records, and the organization accepts to collaborate with companies with lower social track records only if a company shows willingness to change through dialogue. SCG would only work with MNEs with a bad reputation if it is confident that through their engagement, further damage could be avoided. SCG also welcomes the tactics used by watchdog NGOs claiming it paves the way for them to engage with MNEs. As with PACT, SCG engagement is a mix of community delivery project and change in practice at core business level. Like in the Anvil-PACT case, SCG's engagement with Chevron was the result of years of negotiating; funding opened the door for engaging about other issues related to the company's core business, and not engaging was not seen as an option.

Chevron has also been involved in broader tripartite efforts in Angola, similar to what it did in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the company signed Global Memoranda of Understanding with eight clusters of communities and their state governments in the Niger Delta, an approach that was evaluated fairly positively by three external organizations, among which Search for Common Ground, in 2008 (Research Triangle Institute International et al. 2008). The overall goal of the Angola Partnership Initiative (API), launched in 2002, was to promote peace and stability,

improve health and education through building upon Angola's human capacity to realize greater economic stability and an improved standard of living for many communities in the country. By doing so, it helped build the capacity of Angolan NGOs and government development agencies. Chevron initially invested $25 million and managed to leverage $31 million from other sources (Chevron, 2010a, 7). In 2009, more than 2 million people and 70 organizations benefited from API; about $14.3 million has been invested in community social projects in Angola. Community engagement projects covered 16 of the 18 provinces of Angola (Chevron, 2010b, 3). After a positive evaluation, Chevron decided to commit $2,85 million per year to API through 2012 (Chevron, 2010a, 7).

The success of the API is seen to result from two major characteristics: its inclusion of context characteristics and awareness of the challenges and dilemmas of going through a 'triple' transition phase: from war to peace, from state controlled to market based economy, and from devastated country to developed country. The peace that was reached in 2002 needed to be consolidated, the economy was fragmented, the infrastructure was devastated, there was a lack of confidence from the international community, a huge population at risk and weak civil society representation. API actually meant a paradigm shift: from donor based development to sustainable development, from project-based to sector-based development, from a single donor to a partnership, from foreign-driven priorities to national priorities, and from a regional to a national focus. The socio-economic development process consisted in conducting needs assessment (at sector, community and government levels) to identify priorities, select areas of interventions, and design, develop, execute, monitor and evaluate programs. Sectors prioritized were: small enterprise development (with special emphasis on micro finance, vocational training, business development, and creating an enabling environment), education, agriculture, and selected infrastructure projects. The other success factor of the partnership lies in the holistic approach to community development, from improving access to basic human needs and education to supporting sustainable income sources such as agriculture, fisheries and small enterprise development.

As Jane Nelson, director of the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, put it in Chevron's 2008 CSR report (Chevron, 2009, 32): "The more holistic and systemic approach to community engagement that Chevron is developing through programs such as the Angola Partnership Initiative offers some valuable lessons, both for other corporate responsibility initiatives and the development community more broadly. Many corporate community engagement programs are focused on individual projects and issues

and tend to be transactional rather than transformative in nature. Implementing a more systems-based approach requires a variety of different but integrated projects; a challenging combination of diverse partners, from national governments and donor agencies to other companies, NGOs and community-based organizations; and a focus on both short-term outputs and long-term local capacity building and institution strengthening."

5.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This article has helped to shed light on multinationals and partnerships in Central African conflict countries by discussing engagement patterns of NGOs and highlighting four companies and their range of collaborative activities with a variety of non-business partners. In settings where partnerships are not common given lack of trust and reigning antagonism, collaboration that addresses conflict reduction, peace and rehabilitation is relatively scarce. The cases presented in this article thus embody innovative approaches that may be (partly) replicated or extended elsewhere, or serve as inspiration by providing insight into the dynamics of and motivations for engagement. Main partners in the initiatives are usually MNEs and NGOs (cf. Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). The article suggests that engagement patterns between these two types of actors in conflict countries are shifting from confrontation to more positive types of collaboration; this evolution has also been observed in non-conflict settings (Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Regardless of the goal of the partnership, issues directly related to the conflict (broader governance issues, but also ethnic divides, community-government relations, artisanal mining, transparency) will influence the collaboration. Therefore, taking the conflict context into account in partnership design and implementation is key. Alleviating existing tensions, promoting dialogue and fostering a climate of trust should, if not the main goal, be an important element of all partnerships in conflict settings.

It seems that service delivery NGOs with a broad development focus and a presence on the ground are more likely to engage with MNEs through (formal) partnerships involving funds than research and advocacy NGOs. Other NGOs with a clear focus on peace and conflict matters, such as Search for Common Ground and International Alert, that have learning as engagement strategy, are also likely to interact positively with business through partnerships. These partnerships enable MNEs operating in conflict areas to adopt practices that are more responsive to the context in which they operate. The examples presented in this study also indicate that MNEs, in response to calls from practitioners and academics, are able to carry out CSR activities which go beyond philanthropy, and to gear their CSR activities better to the

conflict context. The article also shows that service delivery and peace NGOs can play an important role to assist MNEs to integrate conflict-related issues, such as livelihoods, artisanal mining, and transparency in their CSR activities and partnership endeavours. A recommendation to companies with operations in conflict countries is to look for assistance from NGOs on how to shape and articulate their community relations and CSR strategy in such a specific context by tapping on NGOs' vast experience on that matter. This may not always be easy, as some NGOs are less inclined to collaborate with companies for fear of being co-opted. Still, our article indicates that such (non-financial) cooperation that involves learning and exchange is possible and can be beneficial for all parties.

However, partnerships between MNEs and NGOs are not the panacea in tackling conflicts reigning in Central Africa. In the CSR in Africa literature (Ite, 2004, 2007a, 2007b; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Okafor, 2003) attention has been paid to the potentially disruptive aspects of social investment activities undertaken by MNEs, also in partnerships with NGOs. Such interventions in the social domain can create a culture of dependency (Boele et al., 2001; Ite, 2004; Okafor, 2003) with the potential of weakening the role of government. It also raises the issue whether MNEs are supposed to (partly) take over government functions with corporate social responsibility substituting the responsibility of the state (Ite, 2004). When non-state actors, individually or jointly, carry out tasks or provide services, such as health or education, that are normally seen as belonging to the domain of the state, this cannot only undermine state capacity but also lead to questions about its legitimacy and credibility (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). Even if these non-state actors undertake these activities in an efficient, effective, accountable and participatory manner, i.e. taking the needs and views of the communities they are serving into account, the state may then lack an incentive to care for its own citizens. Other side effects of business-NGO partnerships are dwindling citizen trust and confidence in public authorities, which will hinder state efforts or intentions to levy taxes, which, in turn, makes fragile states even more dependent on external donors.

Often, local community expectations vis-à-vis MNEs are large in a context in which states fail to adequately provide services to its citizens (Eweje, 2006). As a result, MNEs feel tremendous pressure to proceed to social investments in the communities in which they operate in order to earn their societal license to operate. At the same time, their intervention may weaken or even 'crowd out' the state. The way out of this dilemma may be tripartite partnerships that thus involve government (agencies) and that focus on capacity and institution building. Still, tripartite partnerships seem problematic in countries characterized by fragile or

even largely absent states. Some of the cases highlighted in this article appear to be a step in between as the MNEs and NGOs involved take innovative approaches by engaging in dialogue with a large number of actors, including government representatives, taking steps to improve understanding of and compliance with standards and regulations, and undertaking concrete activities to further reconciliation, reconstruction and development more broadly.

In this respect, it is interesting, as a final note, to quote the view of the Katanga Mining company to the 'crowding out' dilemma (Katanga, 2010): "We believe that private industry cannot, and should not, replace the legitimate role of government in the development, funding and rebuilding of infrastructure and social services. By running an efficient and profitable mining operation we will generate taxes and royalties that will help fund this process. However, the balance between government responsibility and good corporate citizenship is a fine one, particularly in a (post-)conflict environment. The majority of government capacity within the DRC has been dedicated to high-level reconstruction efforts, leaving few resources to focus on meaningful social development initiatives on a local level. As a socially responsible company, Katanga will continue to provide support for rebuilding the country's social infrastructure in key areas of mutual need such as healthcare, infrastructure, economic diversification and education."

This statement underlines the complexity of operating in (post-)conflict countries and the balancing act faced by public, private and non-profit actors in such settings. This article has aimed to provide more details about emerging innovative approaches as input for further research, for management practice and policy-making, and for those involved in advocacy, and local community and capacity building.

CHAPTER 6. BUSINESS-NGO COLLABORATION IN A CONFLICT SETTING: PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO[13]

6.1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the potential of cross-sectoral collaboration in tackling societal issues has received considerable attention, from the perspective of both academics (e.g. Austin, 2000; Bäckstrand, 2006; Kolk et al., 2010; Selsky and Parker, 2005, Van Huijstee et al., 2007) and practitioners (recent examples include Horton et al., 2009; Hudson, 2009). Partnerships are increasingly considered as having the potential to address global problems that one single actor cannot solve, including poverty, development and climate change (e.g. Bäckstrand, 2008; Forsyth, 2007; Kolk et al., 2008; Reed and Reed, 2009). However, despite the broad interest, it is noteworthy that this literature is generally situated in relatively stable countries, i.e. conflict settings do not receive specific consideration. While lack of good governance has been related to the emergence of partnerships, given that governments, companies and NGOs are unable to unilaterally achieve desired public objectives (Andonova et al., 2009; Braithwaite and Dahos, 2000; Dahan et al., 2010; Kolk et al., 2008), the need to fill regulatory gaps is often not placed in the context of (violent) conflict.

On the one hand, a conflict setting further complicates the formation and implementation of partnerships as activities take place in a highly complex and volatile environment, thus requiring an even greater degree of understanding of the specific backgrounds of each partner, as well as their perceptions and expectations, than in more stable countries. On the other hand, it can be argued that in the context of an institutional void, with governance structures in flux, and different groups fighting for scarce resources and/or government power, the role of companies and NGOs, individually but particularly jointly, can be very important to help address issues related to instability and/or conflict. Collaboration can build trust and local capacity, enable learning and exchange, and encourage community involvement, thus creating conditions for peace and rehabilitation. Such a perspective extends recent attention to the role of business in conflict resolution to pay specific attention to their collaborative activities in this regard (cf. Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007).

[13] This chapter is co-authored with Ans Kolk and was published in *Business & Society,* 2012, *51*(3), 478–511.

The contribution of the private sector to fostering a sense of community (Fort and Schipani, 2004) and creating conditions for peace is all the more important in fragile societies, such as in the DRC, where peace agreements in the past were often crafted by the United Nations or other (inter)national governmental bodies behind closed doors and missed a grass-roots or community dimension. For that matter, partnering with civil society organizations with a longstanding presence in conflict regions, and with extensive networks at grass-roots levels and accurate knowledge of the local context can strengthen businesses' positive involvement with communities. Business-NGO collaboration in fragile and conflict prone regions with an eye to restoring the social fabric of communities at local levels is an innovative governance modality that business can promote as part of a corporate innovation strategy. This article examines business-NGO collaboration in the context of sustainable community development in a conflict setting, exploring partnership activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for a sample of 59 international companies active in this country.

The DRC, situated in the heart of Central Africa, has been ravaged by conflicts in the past decade. Despite formal peace agreements in 2006 and 2008, bouts of violence have continued to occur regularly, especially in the Eastern provinces of Katanga, North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which has had a devastating impact on the economy. The conflict that began in August 1998 drastically reduced national output and government income, also due to informal activities and illegal exploitation of the country's resources by various local, regional and international economic actors (UN, 2001). The DRC's enormous wealth of natural resources has been seen as a burden rather than a blessing throughout its history (Hochschild, 1998). Abundance of valuable resources has benefited a few powerful individuals rather than contributing to the development of many, as poverty is widespread. This is illustrated by figures concerning life expectancy (48 years), mortality of children under 5 (199 per 1,000) and DRC's ranking in the Human Development Index (176 out of the 182 countries) (UN, 2010a; World Bank, 2010a). The number of deaths resulting from violence, famine and diseases from August 1998 until April 2007 has been estimated at more than 3.9 million, with over 100,000 people being displaced as a results of fighting since mid-2005 alone, and sexual violence is highly prevalent in the North-eastern part of the country (IRC, 2007, p. ii; MSF, 2005). The DRC is a clear example of a fragile country trapped in a vicious cycle of conflict, poverty and poor governance, with a very negative impact on local communities, especially in the Eastern provinces.

By exploring collaborative activities with an eye to their potential for contributing to a diminution of conflict and a restoration of trust, this study contributes to the literature on

partnerships by adding a different context and (societal) purpose. Moreover, it can help shed some light on debates regarding the (potential) role of business in conflict resolution, and how business can be involved in community development beyond philanthropy (e.g. Bowen et al., 2008; Muthuri, 2008; Muthuri et al., 2009), where empirical evidence, especially from 'difficult research' settings, has been limited. The next section will pay some attention to existing insights, and how they are approached in this study to create a framework for analysis. This is followed by an explanation of the sample and methodology, a presentation and discussion of findings, and conclusions and implications.

6.2. BUSINESS, CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION

In the past decade, attention has increased for the role of business in conflict areas, including the issues that multinational companies (MNCs) face when operating in such contexts, sometimes also highlighting their positive, possibly 'leading-edge' involvement (e.g. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Bennett, 2002; Gerson, 2001; Haufler, 2004; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007). MNCs can take individual actions or supplement those undertaken by others (Bennett, 2002; Oetzel et al., 2007). Looking at types of activities, companies can play a role to address conflict directly (for example, via security arrangements, negotiations or withholding payments) or indirectly via lobbying governments or other relevant actors, or by supporting philanthropic activities (Oetzel et al., 2007).

How companies react to conflict situations is part of a broader literature on business for peace that has increased in attention in the past decade, as shown by a 2010 issue of Journal of Business Ethics fully dedicated to Peace Through Commerce, and other publications by both academics and practitioners (Fort and Schipani, 2004; International Alert, 2005; Wengler and Mockly, 2003). 'Business for peace' covers the more generic contributions of business to further the cause of peace regardless of whether they are directly involved in a conflict zone. The business-peace nexus has been examined through various lenses. One has concentrated on business in conflict zones, with a clear emphasis on embracing 'do no harm policies' or implementing codes of conduct or multistakeholder schemes to certify 'conflict' commodities. Another has focused on the role of the private sector in contributing to economic development as a prerequisite for stability and peace, or through studying the role of a particular industry (such as tourism, sports, or mining). Business for peace has been looked at from different disciplines, particularly political science and international relations (Bennett, 2002; Haufler, 2002, 2004; Wolf et al., 2007), and management, including business ethics and business and

society perspectives (e.g. Fort and Schipani, 2004; Nelson, 2000; Warhurst, 2005). Typically, MNCs' reactions to conflict are determined by a variety of factors such as conflict intensity, geographical location, investment structure, firm size, firm experience, industry, firm type/ownership and stakeholder pressure (Berman, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007), but very few empirical studies have been carried out to examine the exact drivers of companies' reaction in a given conflict context. However, while hard evidence and empirical research is lacking, there seems to be consensus about the fact that not all business fosters peace, but that ethical business does (Fort, 2009).

Strategies that ethical companies can deploy to promote peace can be divided into five main categories (Fort and Schipani, 2004; Oetzel et al., 2009): promoting economic development, enhancing the rule of law, contributing to a sense of community, engaging in track-two diplomacy, or engaging in conflict sensitive practices. Similar models developed in the practitioner-oriented literature (International Alert, 2005; Nelson, 2000) categorized activities that business can carry out to promote peace according to the following channels: *core business*, i.e. maintain operations to generate wealth and provide jobs (cf. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Fort and Schipani, 2004); *social investment*, i.e. support humanitarian efforts (Gerson and Colletta, 2002) or engage in partnerships that help address the main drivers of conflict, particularly corruption, poverty and social inequality (Bennett, 2002; Nelson, 2000); or *policy dialogue*, i.e. engage in track-two diplomacy or provide incentives to warring parties to engage in peace talks (Zandvliet, 2005). A distinction is also made between three strategies: compliance, do no harm and peace building (Nelson, 2000). Other frameworks have been designed that categorize possible business strategies into direct or indirect influences on the conflict on the one hand, and unilateral or collaborative interventions on the other hand (Oetzel et al., 2007). These interventions can take place at micro, meso or macro levels, and before, during or after a conflict (International Alert, 2005; Zandvliet, 2005*)*.

The role of collaborative activities is mentioned very often in relation to conflict, also in co-creating a more sustainable peaceful society. Several publications emphasise the added value for business to engage in partnerships with other actors in (post-)conflict settings (e.g. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Haufler, 2002; Haufler and Ballentine, 2005; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010), but evidence on such collaboration is very limited. This is partly due to the fact that governments and NGOs have traditionally been seen as quintessential actors with a 'mandate' or responsibility for dealing with peace and conflict issues (Barnes, 2005). This is in a sense comparable with the broader area of partnerships for development, where public-non-profit

collaboration has had a much longer history than those involving business (Kolk et al., 2008). Another factor that may explain the lack of studies is the absence of data about business activities in conflict countries due to the difficult setting and the sensitivities surrounding it, as well as the complexities of collecting information on the ground. Hence, while partnerships have received increasing research attention overall, as outlined in the introduction, this does not apply to partnerships in conflict countries, and even less those in Africa, a region underexposed in research on business and corporate social responsibility more generally, except for Nigeria and South Africa (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Kolk and Van Tulder, 2010; Visser, 2006a). The relevance of partnerships involving business in conflict countries in Africa seems high, however, particularly given the often large corporate presence, and their potential impact on creating conditions for a (more) peaceful situation, a likely prerequisite for development, in the context of a governance vacuum and the absence of a clear and reliable regulatory framework. This article focuses on business-NGO collaboration, in which NGOs often link to or represent broader constituencies, including local communities, a linkage that will be explored as well.

In conflict countries, MNCs can learn from NGOs how to operate in conflict prone zones or how to engage with communities in areas where governments have failed to provide them with basis services. NGOs have extensive knowledge of the local context, and engage in a variety of activities with regard to peace building (for example, those that involve early warning, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, service provision and intermediation between various parties) (World Bank, 2006). Despite criticism on NGOs concerning (in)effectiveness or lack of accountability (e.g. Goodhand, 2006; Uvin, 1998), their track record in fragile settings is widely recognised (Barnes, 2005). Typically, publications on business-NGO partnerships in conflict countries emphasise that they should involve more than a provision of funds (Haufler and Ballentine, 2005; World Bank, 1998) and move beyond a restricted humanitarian response to a more strategic involvement (Ward, 2004) in order to achieve a greater impact in promoting peace and development. Contributing to sustainable community development can be seen of part of such strategies, which is particularly relevant for MNCs (Ite, 2007a; Newell and Frynas, 2007), also in the context of corporate innovation.

Community-business interaction in Africa has received attention most notably in relation to Nigeria, with studies taking a critical look at oil companies' impact on and engagement strategy with local communities, especially Shell's relationship with the Ogoni communities (Eweje, 2006, 2007; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2007a; Wheeler et al., 2002). Studies that examined the usefulness, relevance and impact of MNCs' involvement in community

development initiatives revealed their inability to integrate community expectations (Eweje, 2006, 2007). Improving business-community communication (Idemudia, 2007) and managing community expectations in the context of dysfunctioning governments so as to avoid/diminish conflicts (Eweje, 2006; Garvin et al., 2009; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2002) is not only relevant in Nigeria, but also in the DRC, a country ranking among the world's weakest in terms of governance (Brookings Institution, 2008). In such contexts, corporate community engagement activities, such as philanthropy and corporate donations, have been criticized for failing to address the challenges faced by poor communities (Manteaw, 2008; Muthuri, 2008) or tackle the root causes of conflict (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). Business-led community development initiatives can then do more harm than good and be potentially disruptive (Akpan, 2006; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite 2004). In the DRC context, this is compounded by the fact that extractive activities have often had a negative impact due to dislocation, issues surrounding land and property rights, environment degradation and social disruption. In that light, partnerships give MNCs an opportunity to take local needs into account and address relevant issues, including how to reduce conflict and/or further peace and development (cf. Nwankwo et al., 2007). However, to what extent there is collaboration, what this entails in terms of types and focus on conflict is unclear; this is what will be explored below. Before moving to the empirical study, first the approach towards partnerships in a conflict setting will be explained.

In examining collaborative activities between firms and NGOs in the DRC, Austin (2000) was taken as starting point, especially his collaboration continuum, with philanthropic on one end, and integrative on the other. However, this model was shown to be difficult to apply even in 'normal or typical' CSR projects (Jamali and Keshishian, 2009), let alone in conflict settings, where partnerships' objectives often seem much broader, also in community terms, beyond the organizational realms. For the purpose of this study, Austin's continuum was thus adjusted to be more in line with the specific context, particularly with regard to the 'intermediate', transactional stage. Accordingly, *philanthropy* is considered similar as in Austin (2000), in that it is a charitable activity with a donor and a recipient, and "low levels of corporate-community interaction" (Muthuri, 2008, p. 185). This is comparable to the traditional approach towards community participation as noted by Muthuri et al. (2009), and the transactional type distinguished by Bowen et al. (2008).

Different from Austin (2000), but more in line with the developmental period of Muthuri et al. (2009), transactional was 'relabelled' to '*engagement*', in the sense that there is community-company or company-NGO interaction, exchange of knowledge and information,

often organized as a platform, but not necessarily involving transfer of funds. A distinction is made between engagement with funds (i.e. involving a service delivery element, with a learning component, yet no broad community impact) and engagement without funds, i.e. engagement exclusively based on an exchange of knowledge or skills. Such engagement includes multi-stakeholder dialogues, peace fora or company appraisals. Learning, exchanging information on issues salient in conflict settings, such as governance, revenue transparency, the elimination of conflict diamonds, artisanal mining, or violence against women, and getting to know one another seem to prevail above concrete activities funded by companies in a 'transaction' mode. This type of engagement seems more suitable in conflict settings in that it is meant to build trust and confidence and address issues directly related to conflict. A recent study examining cross-sector collaboration and public-private partnerships in fragile states designed a partnership framework in conflict zones which emphasized the importance of inclusive and flexible engagement for building trust and gaining credibility among communities (Abramov, 2009). This article does not follow the 'transitional' term used by Bowen et al. (2008) for this second type as it suggests that this is an 'in-between'.

The most intensive form of collaboration is what this study refers to as *transformation*, which in some respects resembles what both Austin (2000) and Muthuri et al. (2009) designated as 'integrative', and Bowen et al. (2008) as transformational. However, as the focus is here on the societal implications, i.e. possible effects on conflict and community interaction/involvement, and not so much on the impact on the organizations (i.e. whether or not it integrates or is integrated), transformation seems a better characterization than integration.[14] Austin (2000, p. 77) did mention, in relation to his collaboration value construct, that partners could also "come together out of a joint concern about addressing a particular social problem". It is on this approach that this article builds, with the 'value' to be derived from the collaboration relating to the (co-)creation of a peaceful context from which communities (and/or NGOs representing their interests or working with them) and business can profit. Transformative partnerships have a strong sustainable community development focus, address issues that are highly relevant in conflict settings, and are geared towards building or strengthening communities' capabilities.

It should be noted that this study did not aim to (and could not) assess community impact; in that sense it focuses on the intentions of the partners, not so much the outcome.

[14] Likewise, while using 'transformation' as a noun, the article does not use transformational as adjective but instead transformative, given that the focus is much more on the process rather than the direct outcomes.

Measuring the effectiveness of cross-sectoral partnerships is not an easy endeavour (Kolk et al., 2008; Lund-Thomsen, 2009) as monitoring and evaluation systems are rarely part of collaboration agreements (Rein and Stott, 2009), and baseline assessments and consensus about suitable criteria to measure effectiveness are usually lacking (Lund-Thomsen, 2009, Van Huijstee et al., 2007). This becomes even more difficult in complex settings, such as those characterized by weak governance and by conflicts, given the high degree of sensitivity of collaboration, the absence of standardized and reliable figures, the lack of formalization, and the different institutional norms (Kolk et al., 2008). Measuring the impact of partnerships is compounded by so-called attribution problems if partnerships address a web of complex interrelated issues in which other actors are 'intervening' as well, which makes it close to impossible to assess 'causal' relationships. To fully understand projects' (partial) success or failure, the analysis needs to go beyond the traditional input-output-outcome methodology and "incorporate the role of politics and power struggles between different actors in local settings" (Lund-Thomsen, 2009, p. 59). An examination of the impact of such collaboration is something for future work, but for now, given the dearth of research on this topic, it is worthwhile to first of all obtain some more insight into what collaborative activities may be found in a conflict setting and how they can be characterized. This is what will be done next. Reflections on impact will be offered in the final section of the article after the presentation and examination of the findings.

6.3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

In order to explore business-NGO collaboration in a conflict setting, a selection was made of companies operating in the DRC following the criteria used in other research (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010). As comprehensive data(bases) on companies in that context are not easily available, first a look was taken at those companies appearing in the 2010 largest lists and those mining companies with net assets higher than $200 million. This resulted in only 13 companies, too small a sample to draw conclusions regarding business-NGO collaboration. As smaller companies may also be influential in conflict resolution activities at a local level (cf. Johnson, 2010), the sample was enlarged by taking two extra criteria into consideration: first, relatively small ('junior') mining companies with minimum net assets of $5 million to account for this relatively important sector with emerging activities; second, companies from other sectors with a minimum annual turnover of $10 million to include those 'middle-range' companies that are not necessary global (such as Mwana Africa, BRC Diamond, African Metals, African Rainbow

Minerals, Africo Resources, JFPI Corp, MAG industries, Aden Services) but with a large regional presence, especially in Africa, and perhaps better local 'knowledge' as well.

This resulted in a sample of 59 companies, of which a majority (n=31 or 52%) operate in the extractive industries (n=6 in oil and gas; n=25 in mining). The remainder was spread over other sectors ranging from banking (n=4), food services (n=4) to telecommunication (n=6). A majority of the companies (64 %) originates from Western/OECD countries, of which 13 (22%) from Canada; all 13 are active in the extractive industries. Interestingly, a number of companies from emerging markets was found (seven from South Africa, three from China, one from India, two from the DRC, and one from Angola). This shows the importance of South-South economic and business linkages (including the emergence of Chinese companies) and a clear presence of South Africa in the African mining sector. For the 59 companies, the latest available reports and other company information was collected if available, and an extensive web search carried out, in the period January-June 2010. In addition, a questionnaire was sent in both English and French to obtain information on their collaborative activities, to which 15 responded. A more detailed list of companies and sources available is included in Table 7, which the next section will discuss.

Given that this article focuses on collaboration between business and NGOs and that obtaining information from the latter perspective would be helpful as well, a second step served to identify all international NGOs with a major presence in the DRC. To this end, web search, databases (Oxfam, Irin, Congo planet, Wango) and the extensive network of one of the authors (who has vast experience in working with NGOs in the region) were used to select those NGOs that were likely to be knowledgeable of partnership activities and/or active themselves: IRC, Oxfam NL, Cordaid, 11.11.11, IKV-Pax, Justice and Peace, Search for Common Ground, International Alert, Pact, Amnesty International, Merlin, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, Broederlijk Delen, Business Council for Peace, Business Humanitarian Forum, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed conflict, International Crisis Group, Life and Peace Institute, NIZA, Corporate Engagement Project, and RAID. An email was sent to representatives of these NGOs asking them whether they knew or were involved in partnership cases in the DRC, resulting in a response rate of 82%. Subsequently, contact was established with local NGOs - Pole Institute and 12 regional Congolese NGO platforms – to check the partnership activities already identified and possibly identify more cases. An e-mail was sent (yielding six responses) which confirmed earlier findings. Subsequently semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff involved in partnerships within Search for Common Ground, Pact, Pole, and the Corporate Engagement

Project; these NGOs were selected because of their strong orientation on conflict resolution. In addition, an analysis took place of other documentation from the NGOs, including annual plans and reports, and information from websites.

The company information was used to explore companies' approaches to conflict (building on Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007; Wolf et al., 2007). Furthermore, company information served, together with the data obtained from NGOs as just described, to analyze whether and in what type of partnership activities companies were involved (building on Austin, 2000; Muthuri et al., 2009).

6.4. FINDINGS

6.4.1. Overview of companies, their peculiarities and community orientation

Table 7 gives an overview of the 59 companies in the sample, and their details as to sector, size of turnover, and country of origin. Moreover, it also shows (in the last two columns) whether the companies have provided information in reports or websites in relation to conflict, and whether they responded to the questionnaire. The table is sorted according to the categories identified by building on existing literature on business and conflict (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007): 'avoidant', 'business as usual' and 'conflict resolution'. The first category, 'avoidant', includes companies that neither disclose much information nor answered the questionnaire. Second, 'business as usual' is used for those companies that provide some information, and usually discuss community aspects, but are not specific about the (DRC) conflict setting and keep it generic. Third, 'conflict resolution' involves those companies that communicate / respond and show awareness of the dilemmas of operating in a conflict setting and the possible role of business. Some more details and examples of companies' statements will be given below.

Table 7: Companies in the sample, sorted by 'conflict type', and peculiarities and sources of information

'Conflict' type	Company name	Turnover ($ million)	Country of origin	Industry	Report/site	Questionnaire returned
Avoidant	African metals	n/a	CAN	Mining	NO	NO
Avoidant	Avient limited	n/a	UK	Transport	NO	NO
Avoidant	Bollore	9,069	FRA	Transport	NO	NO
Avoidant	BRC Diamond - core	8	CAN	Mining	NO	NO
Avoidant	CHA Textile	n/a	CHI-HK	Textile	NO	NO
Avoidant	El nino ventures	n/a	CAN	Mining	NO	NO
Avoidant	Greenock resources inc	n/a	CAN	Mining	NO	NO
Avoidant	Groupe Blattner (GBE)	n/a	BE	Service and agro industries	NO	NO

'Conflict' type	Company name	Turnover ($ million)	Country of origin	Industry	Report/site	Questionnaire returned
Avoidant	Groupe Forrest International	n/a	BE	Mining and civil engineering	NO	NO
Avoidant	Hits Telecom	n/a	KUW	Telecommunications	NO	NO
Avoidant	Ics copper system	n/a	CAN	Mining	NO	NO
Avoidant	Rubamin	n/a	IND	Mining	NO	NO
Avoidant	Tiger Resources	1	AUS	Mining	NO	NO
Avoidant	ZTE Corporation	6,446	CHI	Telecommunications	NO	NO
Business as usual	Aden Services	10	CHI	Food services and facility	Yes Generic	Yes
Business as usual	African Rainbow Mineral	300	SAF	mining	Yes	No
Business as usual	Africo resources	n/a	CAN	Mining	Yes	No
Business as usual	Anglo American Plc	21,443	UK	Mining	Yes	Yes
Business as usual	BATA	n/a	SWI	manufacturing	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	British American Tobacco	22,953	UK	Tobacco	Yes	No
Business as usual	Citigroup	112,372	US	Banking	Yes	No
Business as usual	Danzer Group	410	GER	Wood and wood products	Yes	No
Business as usual	DHL -Deutsche Post	66,19	GER	Transport	Yes	No
Business as usual	Engen	8,18	SAF	Oil and gas	Yes	No
Business as usual	ENRC	3,831	KAZ	Mining	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	Finasucre	507	BE	Food and beverages	NO	Yes
Business as usual	First Quantum	1,903	CAN	Mining	Yes	No
Business as usual	Groupe Rawji	300	DRC	Food and soap	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	Heineken	21,061	NL	Food and beverages	Yes	Yes
Business as usual	Heritage Oil	3	CAN	Oil and gas	Yes	Yes
Business as usual	Inpex Japan (Teikoku oil)	11,052	JAP	Oil and gas	Yes	No
Business as usual	JFPI Corp	2,7	ANG	Trade	NO	Yes
Business as usual	Land Rover	n/a	UK	Car manufacturing/trading	Yes	No
Business as usual	Mag industries	29	CAN	Mining	Yes Generic	Yes
Business as usual	Millicom International Cellular sa	3,373	LUX	Telecommunications	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	Metorex	213	SAF	Mining	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	Mwana Africa	12	CAN	Mining	Yes	No
Business as usual	ONA group	4,097	MAR	Trade	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	Perenco oil	2,7	FRA	Oil and gas	Yes	No
Business as usual	PPR - CFAO Group	23,674	FRA	Trade	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	PriceWaterHouseCoopers	26,171	UK	Consulting	Yes	No
Business as usual	ProCredit Bank Holding	533	GER	Banking	Yes	No
Business as usual	Randgold resources	338	UK	Mining	Yes	Yes
Business as usual	Rio-tinto	41,825	AUS-UK	Mining	Yes	No
Business as usual	Standard Bank	1,86	SAF	Banking	Yes	Yes
Business as usual	TAIHAN	2,13	KOR	Telecommunications	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	Texaf	10	BE	Industrial investment/cotton	Yes Generic	Yes
Business as usual	Trust Merchant Bank	14.2	DRC	Banking	Yes Generic	No
Business as usual	Tullow Oil	940	UK	Oil and gas	Yes	Yes
Business as usual	Vodacom	7,3	SAF	Telecommunications	Yes	No
Business as usual	Celtel (Zain)	8,078	KUW	Telecommunications	Yes	No
Conflict resolution	AngloGoldAshanti	3,916	SAF	Mining	Yes	Yes
Conflict resolution	Anvil mining	49	CAN	Mining	Yes	Yes
Conflict resolution	Banro	n/a	CAN	Mining	Yes	No
Conflict resolution	BHP Biliton	54,661	AUS-UK	Mining	Yes	Yes
Conflict resolution	Chevron Texaco	159,387	US	Oil and gas	Yes	No

'Conflict' type	Company name	Turnover ($ million)	Country of origin	Industry	Report/site	Questionnaire returned
Conflict resolution	De Beer	3,84	SAF	Mining	Yes	No
Conflict resolution	Freeport /Tenke	15,04	US	Mining	Yes	Yes
Conflict resolution	Katanga Mining Ltd	140	CAN	Mining	Yes	No

Source (turnover, industry, nationalities): Company annual reports, 2009; 2010 largest 500 lists (FT Global, Fortune Global)

Before moving to that information, it is important to note that the three categories are not 'normative' labels, but are rather meant to assess the extent to which companies take a public position on conflict and their role in it, whether they show awareness of the setting in which they operate, or avoid communicating about it. What companies state publicly is not necessarily what they do in reality; companies can, for example, be active in lobbying or undertake activities that they do not report. However, the latter component, as far as partnering with NGOs is concerned, could have been captured by the fact that NGOs were approached as well. A final caveat is that, following Jamali and Mershak (2010), categories were used while a continuum might better portray the situation. Despite these limitations, it still seemed helpful to give some more insight into how much openness there is amongst companies active in a conflict setting, and to what extent they communicate on / show awareness of its peculiarities. This is a different approach than a purposeful sample amongst a small set of companies that have already shown to be leading in terms of recognition of their role in conflict, as done by, for example, Jamali and Mershak (2010).

As shown in Table 7, a large majority of the companies in the sample (n=37 or 63%) falls in the 'business-as-usual' category, 24% (n=14) can be characterised as 'avoidant', while very few (n=8 or 14%) are explicit about conflict resolution. In line with Kolk and Lenfant (2010), these findings point at companies' limited openness and recognition of conflict sensitivity in their operations. Looking at industry, country of origin or turnover of the companies in the 'avoidant' category, the majority did not disclose information about their turnover. There seems to be no direct relationship with industry or country of origin: 10 out of 14 (71%) come from Western/OECD countries (figure for total sample is 64%), and 8 out of 14 (57%) operate in the extractive industries (figure for the total sample is 52%). With regard to the business-as-usual group (n=37), 24 (65%) come from Western/OECD countries, while 15 (41%) are active in the extractive industry. Conflict resolution companies are typically extractive companies, with six (75%) from OECD countries and the other two from South Africa, suggesting that corporate social responsibility awareness in home countries might play a role, as does the industry.

However, these observations should be treated with caution in view of the limited sample size overall.

Considering what companies state on websites and in reports about their involvement in the communities in which they operate (not specifically in the DRC), this is mostly rather generic. A search for 'motivations' for their activities shows a diverse set of statements. These range from obtaining a social license to operate (De Beer, Metorex), to ensuring that communities are better off as a result of their presence (AngloGoldAshanti), to seeking to earn the consent and the support of the communities (Anglo American), to building strong supportive relations with local communities (Banro, MagIndustries, Randgold, De Beer, Engen). A relatively small percentage of companies (9%) considers community investments as a sustainable business strategy, indicating an alignment between business logics and social investments. Benefits that companies mention to derive from community development are "creating long term social value" (Standard Bank), "reputational enhancement, greater community goodwill and stronger, more stable and supportive communities" (BHP, Freeport), linking the "wellness of communities and the success of our business " (Standard Bank), "maintaining our lead position and ….. to better understand the nature of the competitive field and business environment" (Engen), and "community investment is most effective and lasting if it meets both business and social needs" (Katanga). Randgold states its commitment "to the integration of sustainable environmental and social impact management into its business activities" while Engen's community engagement efforts "provide the opportunity to build important relationships and to engage with people who have decision-making power over Engen", which seems in line with existing frameworks accounting for companies' reaction to stakeholder claims and demands based on power relationships (Calvano, 2008; Holzer, 2008).

Interestingly, only one company (Randgold) openly states that community development is "instrumental for allaying suspicions and conflicts". With regard to the dilemmas faced by extractive companies in terms of combining their core activity of mining finite resources with their commitment to sustainable community development, Anglo American is one of four companies (AGA, BHP Billiton and De Beer are the other three) that is open about the fact that there is a natural tension between "community expectations and the level of sustainable benefits which can be delivered by resource companies, but this can be mitigated through a healthy and transparent process of dialogue". More companies refer to consultation with communities and activities carried out in cooperation with community members. A community liaison committee (Randgold), community liaison forum (Engen), or community advisory panels

(Freeport) were typically mentioned as being used to share information openly with community constituents, gather input, address areas of mutual concerns and capture communities' priorities to translate them into concrete actions.

Only three companies (Engen, De Beer and Katanga) explicitly stated that their community investment strategies were in support of government priorities, thus addressing criticisms that private actors' intervention in social areas undermine government capacity and are therefore likely to be counterproductive (Ite, 2005). This issue is even more salient in the DRC context where government authorities, especially in the Eastern provinces, are either absent or not functioning, leaving non-state actors that have a genuine interest in providing social services with a dilemma: waiting for the government to be capable enough to formulate and execute a social plan, or provide services unilaterally or collaboratively, based on needs expressed by the communities themselves or by non-state units acting on their behalf. The type of collaborative activities that can be found in the DRC will be discussed next.

6.4.2. Partnership activities

On the basis of the data collected from and about companies and NGOs, partnerships' activities were classified in different categories, as explained above: philanthropy, engagement and transformation. Table 8 gives an overview, sorted by company. The second category, 'engagement', turned out to comprise business-NGO collaboration involving transfer of funds (in which NGOs were paid for service delivery with a learning component) and those without it, in which there is only exchange of knowledge and/or skills.

Table 8: Companies and partnerships, and peculiarities of these partnerships

Company name	Partner(s)	Activities	Domain	Type of collaboration	Response	Other/complementary information
Heineken	GTZ; Amo Congo; Ciel;	Rice development; HIV/ Aids testing;	Agriculture; Health	Philanthropic	Yes	Website
	Various local NGOs	Donations (medicine + food)	Health	Philanthropic	Yes	Website
Danzer Group	WWF	Tree conservation, planting, certification	Sustainable Forest Management	Engagement	No	Website + report
First Quantum	Pact	Literacy and farming	Community development	Engagement (1)	No	Website + report
AngloGoldAshanti	Pole, local government	Dialogue; consultation	Governance	Engagement	Yes	Website + various reports from company + NGO + interview NGO
	IKV Pax + HRW, CAFOD + local NGOs	Dialogue; consultation	Peace	Engagement	Yes	Website + various report from company

Company name	Partner(s)	Activities	Domain	Type of collaboration	Response	Other/complementary information
	Pact	Artisanal mining, capacity building, livelihood	Sustainable Community development	Transformative	Yes	Website + various report from company + NGO + interview NGO
	GTZ	Small business promotion	Economic development	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + various reports from company
	AAA	Road repair and maintenance	Infrastructure	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + various reports from company
Anvil Mining	CEP	Learning	Sustainable Community Development	Engagement	Yes	Website + various report from company + NGO + interview NGO
	Pact; USAID	Infrastructure, Health, Governance, Economic development, Water, capacity building	Sustainable Community development	Transformative	Yes	Website + various reports from company (Presentation) + NGO interview
Katanga	Pact	Infrastructure, Health, Governance, Economic Development, Water; education; capacity building	Sustainable Community development	Transformative	No	Website + report
	Cure	Medical shipment	Health	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
	PCI Rayon	Small business / literacy skills	Economic development	Engagement (1)	No	Website + report
	Gavi alliance	Community vaccination	Health	Engagement (1)	No	Website + report
	Arderi	Community farming	Agriculture	Engagement (1)	No	Website + report
Metorex	Direct assistance	School rehabilitation, water repair	Education; sanitation, infrastructure	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + report
Freeport – Tenke	Alba	School construction	Education	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + report
	Pact	Livelihood restauration; employment generation; capacity building	Sustainable Community development;	Transformative	Yes	Website + various report from company + NGO + interview NGO
	USAID; Pact; local NGO; Trust Merchant Bank	Loan fund guarantee	Economic development	Engagement (1)	Yes	Website + report
Africo Resources	Amocongo	HIV/Aids sensitization campaign	Health	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
	Arderi	Market gardening	Economic development	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
	Wheelchair for kids	Wheelchair donation	Health	Philanthropic	No	Website
Banro	BDD	Delivery Water supply	Sanitation	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
	Fondation Femme	HIV/Aids education	Health	Engagement (1)	No	Website + report
	Care International	Learning, needs assessment	Sustainable Community development	Engagement	No	Website + report(s)

Company name	Partner(s)	Activities	Domain	Type of collaboration	Response	Other/complementary information
	CRPL	Chimp rescue	Environment	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
	CAA	Protection of endangered primates	Environment	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
	David Smith Foundation	Medicine shipment	Health	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
	BDA Foundation	Development of commercial medicines + mobile health	Health	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
Perenco oil	Bunkete, Government	Pipe construction	Sanitation, waste management	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
Texaf	Don Bosco	Class construction, equipment provision	Education	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + presentation
	Chaine de l'Espoir	Surgeon mission	Health	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + presentation
Aden Services	Pact	Local business support	Economic development	Engagement (1)	Yes	Website
Celtel (Zain)	Nosha	Equipment donation	Sport; Education	Philanthropic	No	Website + report
JFPI	Various NGOs, UN agencies	Service delivery	Economic development	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + report
Anglo American	Care for Congolese Children	Donation	Education	Philanthropic	No (website referral)	Website + report
Vodacom	Cephephas	Purchase terrain	Health	Philanthropic	Yes	Website + report
	Cell life	Software development to provide info to patients	Health; HIV/Aids	Engagement (1)	Yes	Website + report

Note: Engagement: exchange of knowledge, skills, without funds; Engagement (1): service delivery project with learning / skills exchange component with funds

The study resulted in 39 partnerships in the DRC involving a company from the sample with one or more partners. Of these 39 partnerships, 22 are philanthropic, 13 engagement (of which 8 involved transfer of funds and 5 did not), and 4 transformative partnerships. They are undertaken by 17 companies (out of the 59, or 29%) in total; of these 17, 8 have just one partnership (generally philanthropic), 9 have multiple ones. Some restrict this set of activities to philanthropy only (Africo Resources, Heineken, Texaf); others combine philanthropy and engagement (Banro, Vodacom); or engage in all three main categories (AngloGoldAshanti, Katanga, Freeport-Tenke); Anvil combines engagement and transformation. The following paragraphs will first examine different types of partnerships and then pay some attention to the companies.

Philanthropic partnerships in the DRC are typically small scale, address societal issues such as health, safety, education, infrastructure, and HIV/Aids, and are based on a clear donor–recipient model. This involves the mere provision of funds for 'entertainment' purposes (funding

of a festival in the case of Heineken), for purchasing products (wheelchairs in the case of Africo Resources; medical equipment to hospitals or education material to schools in the case of Celtel) or for 'infrastructural'/logistic components such as repairing hospitals (Celtel, First Quantum). Frequent beneficiaries of philanthropic partnerships are children homes, orphanages, churches, and/or other charitable organizations. While these types of activities are highly important in a region devastated by decades of conflict and government dysfunction, they can only address part of the problem. In the case of the health sector, for example, it is also crucial that there is enough medical staff with sufficient skills who receive their salaries regularly. Philanthropic partnerships do not take a more comprehensive view and mostly tend to operate in isolation, not being part of a larger regional or national health or education planning.

Somewhat differently, partnerships classified as *engagement* go beyond resource transfer with some community involvement. First Quantum and Pact for example, address female literacy and village farming, Banro and Fondation Femme focus on HIV/Aids education for women, and Vodacom and Cell Life developed software to provide information for HIV/Aids patients. These collaborative activities do not have the same integrated, community-wide sustainable development approach as their transformative counterparts (see below), and miss a conflict lens in both partnership design and execution. It could be argued that engagement without the transfer of funds may have a transformative purpose, yet the transformation takes place at the organizational level, between the partners, building trust, enabling learning and exchange, instead of at the community level. Engagement in the form of partnerships thus resonates with other engagement forms, such as a multistakeholder forum, whereby NGOs involve companies to adhere to standards or improve their practices. This engagement form is highly relevant in a context of a governance vacuum, such as a conflict region, where guidelines for and habits of peaceful interaction are neither inherent to business practice nor fully integrated in existing codes such as the OECD guidelines for MNCs (how to operate properly in weak governance zones, including how to interact with rebels, for example).[15]

Not surprisingly, those engagement partnerships that involve transfer of funds encompass collaboration between companies and service delivery NGOs, while in those joint activities without funding, watchdog, lobby and research NGOs are mostly active. NGO partner type is thus related to the resource transfer mode. In the DRC, the private sector is under high scrutiny from lobby and advocacy NGOs such as Global Witness and Human Rights Watch, which

[15] <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/3/33760086.pdf>, last consulted 16 June 2010.

makes funding-based engagement virtually impossible due to the accusations that these NGOs would face of being co-opted were they to receive funds from companies. Quite some NGOs in this category have an explicit policy not to accept resources from the private sector.

Transformative partnerships have a sustainable development community focus, addressing issues that are relevant to conflict settings; they can play a role in helping diminish problems by building/strengthening local capabilities. While limited in number, they also stand out with regard to the position taken by companies. In the partnership between Katanga, Pact and local communities, for example, the company sees its role not only in terms of providing funds but also in taking "a leadership role in developing social development programmes, including facilitating and motivating partners and donors and leveraging third-party funds, fostering self-sufficiency, mobilising communities to take responsibility for their own futures". In the Anvil-Pact partnership, which aims at capacity building of village water committees, the transformative aspect originates precisely from the different roles played by both parties: Anvil provides technical training in pump repair and management, while Pact provides support in community mobilisation and ownership of the pumps.

In fragile conflict settings, companies appear to need the knowledge and expertise of NGOs for their community engagement endeavours. For that matter, NGOs often act as a buffer for community relations. Pact, for example, coordinates community relations of six mining companies in the DRC through the organization of village-based workshops during which communities assess their existing community development situation, set goals for change and develop plans to address their priorities in this respect. The Anvil-Pact partnership also seeks to enhance the company's understanding of what it takes to do business in the DRC by making sense of the existing, sometimes confusing standards such as the OECD guidelines on conducting business in developing countries. In another partnership, Care assists Banro in conducting needs assessments and baseline studies in order to identify and analyze communities' priorities in terms of infrastructure rehabilitation and livelihoods.

All companies involved in transformative partnerships are extractive companies and operate in Eastern Congo, where bouts of violence occur regularly. Two of the four companies have been exposed to NGO criticism: AngloGoldAshanti (campaign led by Human Rights Watch) for offering logistical and financial support to a rebel group, and Anvil (campaign led by RAID) for "letting" the army use the company's assets prior to perpetrating massacres. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the four companies' activities are in the development or production phase, i.e. they have been involved in the DRC for quite some time now and maintained

operations throughout the conflict. Some larger extractive companies with activities in the DRC (BHP, Anglo American and De Beer) are still in the exploration phase and do not have similar partnerships (only Anglo American reports a philanthropic one). This suggests that the stage/level of operational activity is also a factor that plays a role in the type of partnerships companies are engaged in. Companies such as Mag Industries and Tullow, for example, clearly indicated not to have large or advanced enough operations in the DRC to engage in partnerships with NGOs. Tullow has not begun its exploration activities, which explains why they do not have "formalized engagement programmes with local or international NGOs yet". De Beer and Chevron, for example, with a (still) limited presence in the DRC, but a large one in Angola, do have substantial transformative partnerships in the latter country.

6.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This article aimed to help shed more light on collaborative activities involving companies and NGOs in a conflict setting. While business-NGO partnerships have received much attention in recent years, insights have been obtained from research in 'stable' contexts, not from conflict-ridden countries where such collaboration may be even more crucial in building trust and capacity and in addressing governance problems given the absence of a reliable state. Data was collected from and about companies active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, using both primary and secondary sources (involving companies and NGOs). An analysis was done of the positions taken by companies vis-à-vis the conflict based on their communications and categorised business-NGO partnership activities. While many companies are not very open about their (potential) role in conflict resolution, others pay attention to community aspects, although frequently not in the specific DRC setting in which they operate. The most 'aware' companies seem to be those originating from Western countries as well as South Africa and active in the extractive industries, with high levels of operational activities. Contributing to economic development and fostering a sense of community are the most typical peace-related activities carried out by those 'aware' companies. There was no evidence of businesses engaging in track two diplomacy or policy dialogue, either unilaterally or collaboratively. In the findings, most companies are compliant, or at best adopt 'do no harm' strategies, while very few pro-actively engage in peace-building activities.

A majority of the partnerships found in this study are philanthropic, and deal with 'traditional' issues such as health, safety, and HIV/Aids in a donor-recipient mode with limited community involvement. There are only a few real transformative partnerships, which address

aspects directly related to the conflict, have a community-wide, sustainable community development focus and are characterised by a mix of mutual learning, project implementation, and capacity/institution building. In between these two types, so-called 'engagement' collaborations were found; these can be divided into activities including the transfer of funds, and those without it. While the former is mostly oriented at service delivery, the latter seems particularly relevant in the conflict context as well since it is based on knowledge exchange that furthers companies' awareness of conflict-sensitive issues into their operations (i.e. how to deal with rebels and with artisanal miners, how to reduce violence against women) and thus indirectly helps reduce conflict via the organizational route.

This is a type of community development innovation, also visible in transformative partnerships, that may have an impact on how companies deal with conflict. This is something that can be diffused within the organization as well, impinging on the micro level (internally, between managers and employees and possible other stakeholders (cf. Kolk et al., 2010); in the case of MNCs even across locations (Kolk and Van Tulder, 2010). While it relates to Austin's observation that companies are "seeking new strategies of engagement with their communities that will have greater corporate relevance and higher social impact" (Austin, 2000, p. 70) beyond philanthropy, the conflict dimension makes the engagement types somewhat specific and interesting to explore further for its broader existence and applicability. This article has sketched different collaboration venues for companies operating in conflict contexts to engage with local communities, in partnership with NGOs, to tackle poverty and conflict-related issues. In that light, it can be argued that transformative partnerships that (in)directly contribute to peace through reducing tensions and fostering a sense of togetherness among local communities are innovative forms of governance that business can promote, or participate in, as part of their corporate innovation strategy. It may also have its (trickle) effects within organizations and infuse new ways of thinking and behavior on the part of both internal and external stakeholders (Kolk et al., 2010).

Table 9 summarises peculiarities of the different partnership forms distinguished in this article, considering the type of NGOs that companies collaborate with, the degree to which conflict issues are addressed, the level of community involvement and the domain/focus of activity. As such, the classification in three main categories was inspired by Austin (2000) and Muthuri et al. (2009). Muthuri et al. (2009) observed a shift in corporate community involvement over time from traditional (prior to 2000), to developmental (between 2000 and 2002), and integrative (2003-2006) based on a case study. Austin's collaboration continuum also

suggests an evolution of partnerships according to three different stages from philanthropic to transactional and subsequently integrative, along seven dimensions. His model, which helps "understand what kinds of transformation would be required to move to a different point on the continuum" (Austin, 2000, p. 90), posits that cross-sector collaboration is meant to develop according to specific drivers and enablers. It should be noted, however, that the findings in a conflict setting seem different. This may be (partly) due to the different geographical peculiarities (US/Western in the case of Austin, DRC in this article), and political and organizational settings ('peace' and stability versus conflict and low governance).

Table 9: Some characteristics of the different types of partnerships

	Philanthropy	**Engagement**		**Transformation**
		with funds	without funds	
NGO type	Service Delivery	Service delivery	Watchdog	Service Delivery
Focus on conflict	Low	Low	Medium – High	High
Community involvement level	Low	Medium	Medium (indirect)*	High
Domain	Infrastructure / Health	Infrastructure / Health / Small business development	Learning / Assessment	Peace

Note: *via organizational impact (company learning leading to improved practice with regards to company impact on community)

In the sample, there is no evidence of time-bound evolution or a continuum from one collaboration type to another. While only the existing partnerships at one specific moment were considered (unlike what Austin did), some insight could be obtained into background and development of the various initiatives. On the basis of the results of this study, it looks as if in conflict settings, the range of collaboration modes is quite wide, and does not follow a linear path leading to an ultimate form (presumably the transformative partnership then). It should be noted, though, that Austin (2000, p. 72) also mentioned that "progression along the continuum is not automatic"; however, his addition that "regression can occur" appears more focused on a time-bound evolution than likely for a conflict setting such as the one analyzed in this article.

The study also found a relatively unique partnership type, engagement without funds, which is based on knowledge exchange or mutual learning among lobby/advocacy NGOs and companies. This collaboration form appears to be fairly recent, especially in conflict settings where the relationship was typically hostile and confrontational, as evidenced by the myriad of reports written and campaigns led by the former against the latter. More generally, there seems to be a general shift in engagement strategies from a sectoral point of view. Business and NGOs are more inclined nowadays to interact positively with one another in an African conflict setting,

which is a trend also observed in non-conflict settings (e.g. Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Learning via partnerships in conflict settings seems less related to the partnering process itself than to the issues and the context in which both companies and NGOs operate.

Still, this is something that deserves further research, given that this study and sample was limited, not only in numbers but also in its focus on just one conflict country. In this regard, it is notable that even though the findings indicate that engagement without funds is not necessarily suitable for evolving into a more integrated, or transformative partnership, one case (the Care-Banro partnership) developed from the engagement into the transformative type. In that specific instance, engagement served both the company (Banro) and the NGO (Care), which shared an interest in contributing to peaceful societies and sustainable community development, to get to know each other before committing to a transformative partnership. The community needs assessment conducted by Care led to the design of a community-based development programme for the next 10 years in partnership with the company.[16]

Hence, while this study helps to provide more insight into the role of business-NGO collaboration, follow-up research is necessary, also in other settings and with broader sets of companies and partners. Investigation of the actual impact on communities needs further attention as well, as this was beyond the scope of this article. In the cases examined, no evidence of objective, independent evaluations of the partnerships could be found. There was no systematic assessment of partnership benefits (and goals being attained) at company, NGO, community or issue levels. Whereas no specific request was made to review partnership contractual agreements where goal-setting and the definition of verifiable indicators on how to measure progress would typically be mentioned, evidence that these existed at all is lacking as well. In some cases, such as engagement without funds, it is very likely that no formal agreement has been set on paper with clear goals and indicators since this collaboration type is more akin to a process or a dialogue platform where learning takes place. While in most cases, partnership objectives or goals were formulated, very little data concerning indicators could be found (with the exception of the Anvil-Pact partnership).

At the company level, the following information was found. AngloAmerican and De Beer use a socio-economic impact assessment toolbox for all of their community supporting initiatives. Katanga's programs and investments have been developed through a data-driven, risk management framework. BHP-Billiton touches upon the necessity to monitor and evaluate

[16] <http://www.care.org/careswork/projects/ZAR040.asp>, last consulted 16 June 2010.

the effectiveness of their community investment programs and Metorex reports “continually improving community development and community investment programs through monitoring, measuring and managing our social and economic impacts”. Nevertheless, these companies did not provide much detailed information about their monitoring and evaluation methodologies. For those partnerships that were completed at the time of the writing, in most cases, some information was available on whether the immediate goals were attained or not: for example, 85 km of roads have been repaired (AAA-AGA), training sessions have been provided (Freeport-Pact), medicines have been distributed (Katanga-Cure), the conflict assessment has been done (CEP-Anvil), and consultations have been held (AGA-Pole). Typically, the information provided is at output level. Only in a handful of cases could information on outcome be found, such as villagers’ access to local markets to sell their products or buy inputs (AAA, AGA), which led to a cost reduction and an improvement in their economic situation. What is systematically missing however, is information on outcome and impact, especially at the issue level: medicines were distributed, but there is no information whether this had an impact on decrease in mortality rates.

In development policy circles, evaluation methodologies typically use efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability as criteria to assess program impact. In the cases analyzed in this article, with regard to efficiency, little cost information was provided, which makes it difficult to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Concerning effectiveness, goals were met at output level, regardless of the partnership type. The preference for transformative partnerships that emerges from this article is based on relevance and sustainability rather than on effectiveness. Relevance refers to the extent to which the (planned) effects of the activities carried out within the partnerships contribute to the realization of the broader (developmental) goal, or impact. Philanthropic partnerships can be highly effective in meeting their goals at output level, without having a broader positive impact or bringing about positive changes in the broader conflict context. Other partnership studies also recommend taking the broader (development) context into account (Ashman, 2001; Kolk et al., 2008).

What this article argues is that, despite its lack of verifiable indicators that would give an objective measurement of the effectiveness of the collaboration arrangements under scrutiny, in complex settings such as those in the DRC, transformative partnerships are best equipped to tackle root causes of conflict and bring about positive and sustainable change, thus ultimately serving the cause of peace. In the Central African context, collaboration agreements that do not take into account the conflict context, or do not address conflict-related issues such as ethnicity,

identity, land, power and natural resources are less likely to be relevant or sustainable. Transformative partnerships are not constructed in a vacuum and aim at finding lasting solutions to problems directly related to conflict, whereas philanthropic partnerships are often 'one off', generic activities with no or little link to the (broader) conflict context.

Despite the limitations of this exploratory study, it can be said that partnership activities appear to have a clear potential in contributing to conflict reduction or resolution in regions where governance and institutional structures are in flux, and trust is low. This adds another dimension to the role of business in conflict countries, which has received increasing attention in recent years (e.g. Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007), as it helps to extend and involve a broader set of actors, that may together leverage more 'resources' for peace. While just one of the many steps needed, it may be a valuable contribution.

CHAPTER 7. CROSS SECTOR COLLABORATION, INSTITUTIONAL GAPS AND FRAGILITY: PARTNERSHIPS IN A CONFLICT-AFFECTED REGION[17]

7.1. INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, poverty, development and subsistence in relation to marketing have received substantial attention, largely due to agenda-setting through a series of conferences and accompanying collections of publications, including comprehensive special issues in Journal of Business Research (Nakata and Viswanathan, 2012; Viswanathan and Rosa, 2010) and Journal of Macromarketing (Viswanathan et al., 2014). By emphasizing the importance of the micro-level in relation to meso and macro phenomena, this stream of research has provided a solid foundation to comparable concerns raised in business and management more broadly on the bottom of the pyramid (BOP) (Arnould and Mohr, 2005; Kolk et al., 2014; London et al., 2010; Prahalad and Hart, 1999). Still, the importance of pre-existing marketplaces and local traditions has been underexposed in the BOP approach compared to the subsistence literature (Kolk et al., 2014; Viswanathan and Sridharan, 2009).

Despite a decade of valuable research and publications on subsistence markets, however, Hill and Martin (2014) argue that marketing has overall insufficiently considered the fate of the poor and those people that are less well off, with negative effects for the field's (policy) relevance. This resonates with earlier calls to pay more attention in the marketing literature to issues pertaining to poverty and development (Achrol and Kotler, 2012; Hosley and Wee, 1988; Shultz et al. 2012; Wilkie and Moore, 2012), to peace and conflict, and institution-building (Layton and Grossbart, 2006; Shultz et al., 2005). This article directly relates to the important research themes identified by these authors and to specific topics mentioned in the call for papers. We aim to contribute to the special issue by exploring how social innovation alliances consisting of different actors may help address (post-)conflict tensions and development problems in a fragile institutional setting, and considering the implications for policy. Our empirical setting consists of multi-stakeholder coffee collaborations in Eastern Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC), linking micro-entrepreneurial activities of small farmers to the meso and macro levels, given that coffee requires inclusion in global marketing systems to also reach distant customers.

[17] This chapter is co-authored with Ans Kolk and was published in *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing*, 2015, *34*(2), 287-303.

We build on an emerging literature that examines the long-standing interest in marketing systems (e.g. Hunt, 1981; Layton, 2007, 2009) in developing countries (recent examples include Hounhouigan et al., 2014; Kolk, 2014), while explicitly considering the fragile context of a conflict-affected region. Our research thus also adds specific dimensions in answering repeated calls by marketing scholars to pay more attention to the institutional environment (e.g. Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002; Handelman and Arnold, 1999), particularly in emerging and developing countries where it "is arguably the most important aspect" of difference with developed countries (Burgess and Steenkamp, 2006, p. 339), in relation to wider debates about the existence of so-called institutional 'voids' or gaps (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kolk 2014a; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2015). In taking these starting points, we follow, as suggested by Ingenbleek (2014), a more 'top-down', macro-midrange approach that complements and connects to bottom-up studies as they have emerged in the subsistence markets literature (Viswanathan et al., 2014). Our exploratory study suggests that partnerships may offer a more systemic approach to addressing institutional gaps, which seems necessary in such 'extreme' contexts of fragility, with implications for research and policy.

While the analysis is exploratory in nature, and "stems from immersion in this phenomenon of interest" (MacInnes, 2011, p. 152), the findings from field work in a conflict-affected region illuminate research gaps little addressed in the bodies of literature mentioned above. Moreover, the study helps shed light on marketing "as constructive engagement" (Shultz, 2007) in general and related to collaborative innovations for subsistence in particular. Finally, it has direct relevance for public policy as the question of how to address peace, reconciliation and economic recovery (Shultz et al., 2005) is an area of concern amongst practitioners and policy-makers. This has, for example, come to the fore in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and its 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (e.g. Kolk and Lenfant, 2015a; OECD, 2012), which aim to improve the situation in (post-)conflict countries, emphasizing the potential role of partnerships.

The next section will first indicate current insights into social innovation partnerships, and explains how they may offer compensatory structures and help address institutional gaps, especially in contexts of fragility, based on the most recent literature. This is followed by an explanation of the research approach, and subsequently a presentation of the findings, and a discussion of research and public-policy implications and limitations of the exploratory study.

7.2. CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATION IN FRAGILE INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

7.2.1. The (potential) role of partnerships

Partnerships (or social alliances, as they are frequently called in the marketing literature) have received growing academic and practitioner interest as innovative arrangements to tackle complex social problems that a single actor cannot solve. To help address specific or conglomerates of sustainable development issues, collaboration between business and (non-)governmental organizations has been welcomed as the potentially most effective route. Publications have examined a range of dimensions of cross-sector partnerships in the past 15 years. In addition to early articles by Waddock (1991) and Austin (2000), especially overviews by Berger, Cunningham, and Drumwright (2004), Horton, Prain, and Thiele (2009), Selsky and Parker (2005), and, most recently, Gray and Stites (2013), Kolk and Lenfant (2015a), and Seitanidi and Crane (2014) provide a state of the art. Some coffee sector-specific analyses involving cooperation have also been published (e.g. Arnould et al., 2009; Bitzer et al., 2008; Linton, 2005).

A recent review of publications on partnerships in various (sub-)disciplines, including marketing, public policy, management and political science, shows that business scholars have focused on value creation for and within organizations, while those in other, non-business fields have usually looked at (external) governance processes and generic societal implications of collaborative arrangements (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015a). Viewed from a public policy and marketing angle, it may be concluded that partnership researchers have tended to underexpose the more external, societal consequences of social alliances and possible impacts at the different levels, from individuals to organizations and communities. There are opportunities here to explore linkages to more specific program evaluation and assessment studies done in the field of international development (e.g. Bamberger and White, 2007; OECD-DAC, 2002; Ravaillon, 2009; see the next section). Furthermore, most of the partnership literature has examined developed-country actors, frequently considering their activities in developing countries, but much less often the local (entrepreneurial) dimensions and connections with other actors, embedded in a marketing system. Likewise, they usually cover alliances with a limited number of partners, and not the ones encompassing innovative multi-faceted forms of collaboration, also characterized as tripartite or quadripartite, that seem essential in subsistence contexts (Rivera-Santos et al., 2012).


In addition, only a relatively small number of publications has focused on partnerships in the most complex institutional settings. As these settings are characterized by weak or missing formal institutions (cf. Khanna and Palepu 1997), partnerships may offer compensatory structures by helping shape new/different networks and/or intermediary entities (Kolk, 2014; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2015). These aspects directly relate to the call in the marketing literature, noted in the introduction, for more attention for institutions in developing countries. Multiple partners, usually from different backgrounds, are needed as no single type of actor(s) is likely to be able to provide the whole range of missing institutions. This is most notable in so-called fragile states, which are marked by a history of conflict, lack of trust and a weak government in addition to issues related to poverty, human rights violations and environmental degradation (Brück et al., 2011; Naudé et al., 2011). Innovative cross-sector social collaboration seems a precondition for helping address this confluence of issues and foster good governance, reconstruction and peace (e.g. Abramov, 2009; Fort and Schipani, 2004; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Oetzel et al., 2009; World Bank, 2011), but empirical research in these contexts have been limited thus far.

7.3. FRAGILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL GAPS

In conflict-affected regions and unstable countries with weak/missing institutions, collecting reliable data is very complex, which seems to explain the underexposure in empirical studies (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015a). In addition to situations of direct violent conflict, which lead to specific challenges (Getz and Oetzel, 2009), there are also 'in-between' situations in which bouts of violence, hostility and lack of trust intersect with formal cessation of fighting or even peace agreements. This has been the situation in which a country like the DRC has found itself in recent years, with fragile, weak and partly missing institutions. It should be noted that while such 'voids' (the term used very often) have sometimes been perceived to be 'empty' of institutions, reality is usually different as a plurality of rules and arrangements is likely to be in place. There may be a complex mix of formal and particularly locally-shaped informal institutions, with differences in recentness and degrees of centralization of (traditional) 'authority' structures (e.g. 'acephalous' communities without permanent leadership; simple and more complex chiefdoms, tribes or cast-clan systems; or centralized, hierarchical communities) (e.g. Grinin and Korotayev, 2011; Kaye and Béland, 2009). To account for local peculiarities, combinations/types of institutions, and varying degrees to which they are present, we use 'gaps' rather than voids (unless when used in the original).

In a very recent article on the more formal institutions, Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos (2015) elaborated upon the five types of voids as originally distinguished by Khanna and Palepu (1997) (see Figure 3). They focused on MNEs operating in subsistence markets in various stages of the supply chain (from procurement to production, distribution and sales), which is a rather different perspective from ours. Still, we can build on their insights to some extent, as their voids comprise contextual factors that are also relevant for our study. For example, gaps related to quality ascertainment of produce, shortages in technical and organizational skills and knowledge, and limited access to finance are pertinent to coffee (cf. Kolk, 2014). At the same time, the fragile, conflict-affected nature of the region adds other crucial characteristics. These especially relate to hostilities, lack of trust, security and good governance, (occasional) fighting and frequent human rights violations, and the broader informal, sometimes clan-based structures as (re)shaped during the conflict period.

Figure 3: Institutional gaps in fragile states



Sources: Khanna and Palepu (1997) and Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos (2015) have been used for the five 'inner' and formal, what they call, institutional voids, in the Figure (i.e. product market, labor market, capital market, contract enforcement, regulation). Country fragility dimensions added by the authors, inspired by key components in DIE/UNDP (2009); GTZ (2009); World Bank (2011).

Figure 3 indicates the formal voids derived from Khanna and Palepu (1997) and applied specifically to MNEs by Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos (2015), that we clustered somewhat differently, and embedded in the fragility context with which all actors are confronted. The different fragility elements that we included there have been inspired by recent work from international organizations, government agencies, societal actors and scholars, covering

academic and practitioner publications, and which paid attention to sub-dimensions relevant in such settings (DIE/UNEP, 2009; GTZ, 2009; OECD, 2012; World Bank, 2011; cf. Fort and Schipani, 2004; Naudé et al., 2011).

We argue that fragility puts the five gaps in a different context, in which gaps are likely to be more extreme while traditional mechanisms to help fill them likely to be less effective. Partnerships might offer a more systemic approach to address the specifics of the institutional environment and the social matrix. To do so, they would, for example, not only need to target the finance gap (via a micro-finance scheme) or the labor gap (via a training program) but also focus on the connections between the gaps by developing trust between communities and diminishing insecurity. Our study aims to consider how these factors come to the fore in the coffee partnerships set up in the Eastern DRC, as the findings section will pay specific attention to them where relevant. We explore the more generic relation with elements of marketing systems and more specifically interactions with the conflict-affected institutional environment. This is inspired by Layton's perspective on the mutual influence between marketing systems and their institutional environment, which we placed in a fragility context as a specification of his observation that each location or region is characterized by a "distinctive social matrix" (Layton, 2009, p. 354).

7.4. RESEARCH APPROACH

7.4.1. The case and its context

We adopted a case study methodology, focused on coffee partnerships in Eastern DRC (in the Kivu region), which have emerged in recent years to help rejuvenate agricultural activity and increase farmers' income. The case study approach enabled us to examine "a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context" (Yin 1984, p. 23), focusing on a limited number of partnerships as study objects in the specific geographical area selected for its fragility. In the DRC, where agricultural opportunities are strongly underexploited (with only 10% of arable land being farmed), there are several regions that (used to) produce coffee, mostly on old and small plantations (World Bank, 2010b). Rehabilitation efforts have been hampered by rampant insecurity, which has led to abandoned fields and lack of up-to-date trading, technical and agronomical facilities, resulting in low-quality input and output, and in low prices (Schluter, 2010). However, the Eastern provinces of DRC have fertile volcanic soils that do not require fertilizer and which offer exceptional conditions for the production of high-quality Arabica coffee (Schluter, 2010). At the same time, communities in this region have also suffered greatly

from the vicious cycle of conflict, poverty and poor governance, characteristics found in the DRC as fragile state (World Bank, 2011). While various formal peace agreements have been signed in the past few years (the last two in 2008 and 2009), bouts of violence continue to affect the population, especially in the Eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, which border Rwanda. As shown in Table 10, the DRC as a whole scores very high on the 'failed state index' and very low on international rankings that assess peace, democracy, governance, transparency, human development, and GDP/capita. The region selected for the study thus exemplifies an 'extreme' context suitable for 'unconventional research' that can help to shed new light on phenomena left unexplored, as recent articles have called for (Bamberger, 2008; Bamberger and Pratt, 2010; cf. Mair et al., 2012). It is also a truly 'natural laboratory', as Burgess and Steenkamp (2006) put it, for research on marketing and institutions.

Table 10: General information on DRC

Conflict period	Since 1996/1997
Area in km²	2.345,000
Population	66 million
Natural resources	Copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, other minerals; oil; wood; hydroelectric potential
Main export products	Diamonds (45%); copper; cobalt
GDP/capita	US$ 231 (ranked 212 out of 212 countries)
Ethnic groups	More than 200 African ethnic groups; the Luba, Kongo, and Anamongo are some of the larger groupings of tribes in the DRC; in the Kivus these are the Bafulero, Babembe, Banyamulenge, Bashi, Bahunde, Batembo, Banande and Banyanga
Rank in 'failed state index'	2 (for comparison, Somalia is on position 1): includes aspects related to governance, justice, security, de-legitimization of the state, public services, criminality, uneven development, human rights
Rank in world wide governance index	155 (out of 167); Includes voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law, corruption
Open budget index	83 (out of 94); transparency
Democracy index	155 (out of 167); functioning of government, electoral processes, political participation, political culture, civil liberties
Global Peace Index	154 (out of 158); human rights, military expenditures, security, safety, criminality
Human Development Index	187 (out of 187); human development

Sources: basic country information (upper half of table) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm, IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011, and GDP/capita: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. Failed states index: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive; World wide governance indicator: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 2011; Open budget index: http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/2010_Data_Tables.pdf 2010; Democracy index: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf 2010; Global peace index 2012: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdGVUUEE1UVpFX1dkLVgtZ2RLeVJzV3c#gid=1; or http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/jun/12/global-peace-index-2012#data 2012; Human development index: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/

Note: The Table above contains information relevant at the moment we started to design our study. Since then, there have been some, mostly minor changes – sometimes representing a slight improvement, sometimes a further deterioration. The latest information can be supplied by the authors upon request, but they do not change the overall picture and fundamentally fragile nature of the DRC.

7.4.2. Data collection

We collected information for the three partnerships through desk research, semi-structured interviews with experts and those directly or indirectly involved in the partnerships, both in the Eastern DRC region and outside it (for a full overview of contacts and interviews, see Appendix 3), a field trip that involved group discussions and observations (as explained below), through immersion in this phenomenon of interest. These latter aspects of data collection provided us with micro-level insights into ground-level realities. As doing research and obtaining reliable data are real challenges in a conflict-affected setting like this, the approach seemed well suited as it involved a range of approaches for engagement and data collection (cf. Shultz et al., 2005). We drew inspiration from earlier studies (e.g. Ingenbleek et al., 2013; Shultz et al., 2012) who called for different research methodologies that would suit a developing/emerging market context. To 'enter' the communities, we benefited from proper introduction by the cooperatives, NGOs and community leaders who were closely involved and trusted (Ingenbleek et al., 2013; Viswanathan et al., 2008) and with whom one of the researchers has close ties as he had conducted many field trips in the region the past decade while working for another NGO himself. Our 'immersion' took the form of engagement with partnership leaders through regular contacts, both in the country/region and through email.

The contacts existing before the start of the study were used to carry out an inventory and obtain information on all relevant coffee partnerships in the region from informants, supplemented with a thorough search in various databases and on the internet. This resulted in the identification of four larger-scale cross-sector collaborations in Eastern DRC, of which one was oriented at discussing issues affecting the coffee sector in the DRC broadly, and thus represented engagement and dialogue, not the more strategic, innovative type of activities pursued in this article (which encompass what has been called 'transformative' partnerships, see Kolk and Lenfant, 2015a). We therefore focused on the other three for further analysis (discussed in more detail in subsequent sections, and summarized in Table 11 there). We carried out additional checks through our contacts, also in the later stage of the empirical study (see below), which confirmed our assessment regarding these three partnerships. They are located in Butembo (North Kivu), with Soprocopiv (cooperative), Solidaridad (a non-governmental organization, NGO), Schluter (business) and DGIS (Netherlands) as international governmental donor; in Minova (on the border between North and South Kivu), with Sainsbury (business), Sopacdi (cooperative), Twin (an NGO which also owns a trading company), and DFID (UK) as international governmental donor; and in Lemera, Bikokoboko and Mutamabala (South Kivu),

with Twin (and Twin Trading, the NGOs' trading branch), UGEAFI as (non-profit) cooperative, and Oxfam Novib (NGO). While there are some differences between the partnerships, mostly concerning their set-up, origin and the ethnic composition of the communities, similarities prevail when considered from the perspective and focus of this study. In conformity with Eisenhardt (1989) the partnerships were thus grouped and analyzed as one phenomenon (case), focusing on cross-sector collaboration, involving a range of different actors, in the conflict-affected Kivu region in a fragile country characterized by institutional gaps.

To collect further information about the various dimensions of the partnerships, we took the following subsequent steps. We first approached 18 persons in our network (from 11 different organizations) by e-mail with questions about the partnerships and actors, the (post-)conflict context in which they operate and their impact (see Appendix 3). Their responses contained answers to the questions, or an invitation for an interview by telephone and/or a reference to other persons who could (also) be contacted in view of their specific expertise. This led to a series of semi-structured interviews (mostly by long-distance calls) with ten experts. They covered individuals involved in the three partnerships or with specific knowledge about the coffee sector and/or the region. Finally, the second author of this article made a field trip to the region to obtain more in-depth information about the partnerships, the institutional context and their effectiveness/impact. During the field research, 14 semi-structured interviews were held and ten group discussions with approximately 150 'beneficiaries' (coffee farmers and their families, who participated on a voluntary basis) in the three communities in Eastern DRC. NGO representatives and leaders of the cooperatives explained the purpose of the researcher's visit and asked interested farmers to give two hours of their time to answer a few questions in smaller groups of approximately 15 individuals. It was stressed that the research was not connected to (NGO) program funding, as development evaluations may suffer from a 'positive response' bias due to participants' interest in continuation of the program.

The group discussions took place in Swahili, the language spoken in Eastern Congo, which was translated into French (the native language of the researcher). The groups were mixed in gender and age, and the researcher ensured that both men and women,[18] young and old answered the questions raised. After each group discussion, preliminary findings were reviewed with cooperative staff, both men and women, to check whether answers seemed representative of the communities. The field visit also included a review of contracts to obtain

[18] In the specific Eastern DRC context, women are not only victims (of rape and plunder), they are also the primary income providers for their family which gives them status and confidence to speak in group meetings.

insight into quantities, prices and conditions, as well as the collection and subsequent analysis of external documentation (evaluations, field reports, annual reports, project reports).[19] In interviews, every opportunity was used to cross-check statements and facts as presented by other interviewees and verify the available data. The context obviously had limitations as ongoing tensions, occasional fighting, insecurity and bouts of violence were noticeable during the study, and became even more intense after the field trip (see the findings and conclusions/limitations sections).

7.4.3. Analysis

In our interviews and examination of primary and secondary materials, we paid specific attention to the aspects above. We categorized the answers per relevant dimension (partnership activities, effects and characteristics, marketing systems, institutional context), and the resulting Tables 11 and 12 were put together by both authors through close collaboration in the analysis of the materials. As discussed in more detail in the next section, both the direct objectives of the collaborative efforts and their wider institutional implications in relation to peace and reconciliation have been considered. This was inspired by policy assessment and evaluation studies in the field of international development (e.g. Bamberger and White, 2007; DCED, 2010; OECD-DAC, 2002; Ravaillon, 2009) that made a distinction between output, outcome and impact dimensions in order to judge "the merit or worth of an activity" (OECD-DAC, 2002, p. 21).

Output refers to the first, or immediate result of an intervention or activity; outcome to changes in behavior of those targeted or in the application/implementation of services, knowledge or standards; and impact to the most far-reaching of the three, which relates to bringing sustainable and structural solutions to the problem(s) at stake, reckoning with possible negative side effects (Liese and Beisheim, 2011; OECD-DAC, 2002; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). Applied to the DRC coffee partnerships, this resulted in the following categories. Output was approached as the equivalent of organizational achievements regarding the creation and strengthening of cooperatives for small farmers; outcome as effects on coffee prices, income and living conditions of these beneficiaries; and impact as broader institutional implications concerning a reduction of conflict or tensions, inter alia, due to increased inter-community and

[19] The initial field research was done in 2011. When finalizing the paper for submission, the second author checked and updated some of the data gathered at the time, especially on the local cooperatives. It should be noted that a more longitudinal study was not aimed for and was also not possible for reasons indicated in the paper. Rather the objective is to shed more light on the role of social innovation partnerships in conflict-affected regions characterized by institutional gaps, as explained in the main text.

village contacts through reconciliation programs and joint cultivation. It should be noted that changes are seen as part of the broader set of activities resulting from the collaboration, not as results in the sense of establishing (causal) links with marketing systems; this is difficult to assess in general, let alone in a (post-)conflict context (as acknowledged by, e.g., CARE, 2012a, 2012b; Gitsham, 2007; OECD, 2008).

7.5. FINDINGS

Table 11 gives an overview of the three coffee partnerships, already introduced above, the only ones in the region. The partnerships include multiple actors (local and international NGOs, farmer cooperatives, international companies, and government agencies as donors) from various geographical settings (local villages, African cities, European countries). These peculiarities partly stem from the specific nature of a coffee supply chain that covers the whole spectrum from an initial commodity in Africa to a product for other (generally Western) markets with thus, by nature, business participation. It is also in line with the literature which indicated that a multitude of partners from different backgrounds, both local and international, is needed to help fill institutional gaps, and for partnerships to serve as 'compensatory structures'. Below we will discuss some more details, following Layton's (2009) indication of elements of marketing systems, the actors, their roles and activities as summarized in Tables 2 and 3. After a more generic analysis of the partnerships on these aspects in the first sub-section, the next sub-section pays attention to some specifics from an institutional perspective, although the conflict-affected nature of the environment will 'filter through' throughout the analysis.

Table 11: Overview of the three coffee partnerships in the DRC

	Partnerships*		
Characteristics	Schluter (B) – Solidaridad (N) – Soprocopiv (C) – DGIS (G)	Sainsbury (B) – Twin (N/B) – Sopacdi (C) – DFID (G)	Twin (B/N) – Oxfam Novib (N) – UGEAFI (N/C)
Goal	Revitalize the coffee sector in the DRC	Rejuvenate the coffee sector by releasing, for Red Nose Day in the UK, a first limited edition of high-quality (Fair Trade) coffee from war-torn DRC in the mainstream market since 1960s	To improve farmers' livelihoods
Activities per partner	Schluter: buys coffee, builds relationships; Solidaridad: provides technical support, project management; DGIS: provides funding	Sainsbury: buys high-quality coffee, provides marketing support, staff, time; DFID: covers risks and provides funding; Twin: provides training, technical and marketing support, prepares for certification; Sopacdi: supervises daily activities	Twin: buys coffee, provides marketing support and training; UGEAFI: organizes, supports and accompanies farmers; Oxfam Novib: provides funding, creates linkages
Starting year of partnership	2007	2008	2011
Location	Butembo (North Kivu)	Minova (on the border between North and South Kivu)	Lemera, Bikokoboko and Mutambala (South Kivu)
*Membership of cooperative in first year / 2011/2014***	2007: 1,200 2011: 3,500 2014: 5,540	2008: 280 2011: 3,503 2014: 5,600	Newly created in 2011 2011: 2,473 2014: 2,037
Coffee trees in first year / 2011	2007/2008: 866,450 2011: 2,118,361	2008: n.a.*** 2011: 2,542,366	2007/2008: 280,000**** 2011: 2,542,366
Price in 2007-2009 / 2011 (in US$ per kg	2007/2009: 0.9 2011: 2.5	2007/2009: 0.5-0.7 2011: 2.5	2007/2009: 0.6-0.8 2011: 2*****
Price increase (%)	177	316	185
Change in inter-ethnic social cohesion	n.a.	Yes	Yes
Reintegration of soldiers	No	No	Yes
Alternative to mining	No	No	Yes

*B=business; N=NGO; C=Cooperative; G=Government (donor); in case multiple are mentioned, this refers to more 'hybrid' organizations in operations, links and/or ambitions

** see note 2 in the text

*** no information available for first year of partnership as cooperative was relatively weak, with too little capacity to collect and analyze data at the time. Number of trees is likely to have been very low given small membership base.

**** Estimated number of coffee trees owned by coffee farmers before UGEAFI (NGO) moved towards a more cooperative form in 2011 with farmers becoming members.

***** In 2014, the price was 1.08. Different from Sopacdi and Soprocopiv, UGEAFI was not able to acquire a certification (organic, UTZ, or Fair Trade) for the coffee produced by its members which led to overproduction of 'regular' coffee and a downward price pressure in recent years. The slight decrease in 'cooperative' members in UGEAFI in recent years is linked to the fact that its members were encourage to diversify their agricultural activities which resulted in less coffee farmers.

Table 12: Key activities and 'results' of the partnerships

Activities	• organizational-technical training (bookkeeping, financial skills) • organizational-governance training (collaboration, forming and participating in cooperatives) • organization sensitization sessions (on the importance of working together) • training of farmers on how to select, pick, cut, wash coffee in a sustainable and profitable way • training of farmers on organizational issues related to certification of coffee according to specific standards • exchange visits between farmers, and company visits to farmers and cooperatives
Output	• cooperatives are formed/improved, better positioned, better able to to attract funding, are growing • cooperatives have better governance (clear rules, democratic structures), can better serve their constituents • farmers have been trained, increased technical know-how and agricultural skills that are implemented • working methods of farmers/cooperatives Utz/Fair Trade compliant, (steps towards) obtaining certification • farmers/cooperatives directly linked to buyers, are in touch with those in other villages and with other views
Outcome	• higher production and productivity, higher quality of coffee • farmers benefit from pre-financing, have better access to markets, are in a better negotiation position • higher prices, incomes increase, livelihoods improve • farmers get more confidence from joining forces, contracts are negotiated fairly • farmers' views of other ethnic groups change
Impact	• alternatives to artisanal mining and rebellion are provided • security is improved (less smuggling across the lake) • local peace climate improved through intensified contacts, fostering culture of exchange, tensions decrease • relationships are (re-)established, social capital is built • overall governance climate (accountability, transparency) improved, trust increases

7.5.1. Partnerships' characteristics in relation to marketing systems

All actors expressed to see value in collaborating and in bringing in their own specific expertise and experiences. If we look at Table 11, two of the three partnerships were set up as part of broader framework agreements spurred by Northern governments to provide incentives to the private sector to invest in fragile countries: ranging from covering risks to providing matching funds to participants as part of an overall objective to rejuvenate the coffee sector. One interviewee indicated that "beyond risk sharing", the funding mechanism offered by Northern governments "facilitated the partnering process and had a snowball effect on other actors".

Another common feature is the involvement of 'hybrid' organizations: NGOs that also have a trading branch (Twin, with Twin Trading), aim to transform into a cooperative (UGEAFI) or engage in consultancy; cooperatives that may be partly commercial as well, in addition to the non-profit services offered to members; and companies that mention social and economic goals. Interestingly, the way in which most companies present themselves can be characterized as mission-driven (Raynolds, 2009). They frequently emphasize the importance of self-sufficiency and a decent livelihood for farmers, of improving the situation for communities and contributing to sustainable development via empowerment and higher incomes. This is not very different from social purposes mentioned by NGOs, which most often also operate in the economic realm (focused on providing sustained livelihoods). Although actors' strategic objectives exhibit

differences (commercial for companies; empowerment and/or capacity-building for NGOs), the overlap of perspectives, and the inclusion of 'hybrid' organizations facilitated partnering.

The case of Twin is interesting in this regard, as an NGO which owns a trading company (and involved in two of the three partnerships), and has a strong business sense combined with a social focus. Twin saw great potential in the DRC to improve livelihoods through coffee, and mentioned to be interested in "restoring supply chains in fragile environments". It clearly indicated economic aspects such as "the potential for high-quality Arabica coffee with Fair Trade and organic certification, as well as the prospects for linking the producers to Twin's high value long term market partners" as motivation to collaborate. Twin also stressed not to act as "gatekeeper" for the farmers but rather to be "eager to play a catalyst role" by assisting them in finding other buyers. In the coffee partnerships, NGOs basically aim to have an impact on the supply chain, to make it more responsive to farmers' needs, cut out middlemen and further sustainability broadly defined, in economic, environmental and social terms.

Moving to company roles, Sainsbury mentioned improving access to markets or "expanding consumer demand for African produce" as it strives to "promote the DRC coffee to encourage customers to recognize the Congo as origins of gourmet coffee in their own right". It sees clear value in collaboration: "By creating partnerships and sharing expertise, an NGO can empower a retailer to make a difference and vice versa. All parties can better understand each other's challenges and work together to find the most suitable and feasible solution". Schluter considers itself a hybrid organization as it seeks to combine profitability with humanitarian values: making a profit and contributing to economic development by ensuring that local farmers benefit from selling their product. It also sees partnerships in relation to market presence and competitiveness. The company admits not to be able to compete with larger coffee companies already operating in Kenya or Uganda; in this respect, the DRC is seen as a niche market where Schluter has a comparative advantage due to its long-standing presence, experience, network and track record. Concurrently, the company explicitly states to show patience if farmers experience problems and to assist them in multiple ways, such as providing market information, offering opportunities for interaction and establishing links with market and non-market partners. These are key business contributions to the partnerships, in addition to buying coffee.

Cooperatives see the value of partnerships in helping them to serve their members better. In order to be able to negotiate higher prices with companies on behalf of their members, they need organizational and bargaining skills, but also support for improving coffee

quality across the board. The 'hybrid' UGEAFI also mentioned that the decision to enter the partnership was made after its constituents realized that the NGOs traditional peace education and reconciliation programs were "necessary but not sufficient to address conflict issues in the region". Sopacdi's main motivation to partner with Twin was to improve coffee quality, improve producers' livelihoods and obtain certification to be able to obtain higher prices. The cooperative indicated that, while it always strives to obtain a higher price, contractual agreements were the result of "fair negotiations".

The key elements that characterize the three coffee partnerships are summarized in Table 12. The partnerships have a clear capacity-building component, and aim to help the development of skills, and the acquisition and application of knowledge, at the level of both individual farmers and cooperatives, covering the whole range from production to supply. This is combined with a strong focus on relationship building, organization and marketing, and opening up markets to coffee that is certified according to external standards. While NGOs are typically involved in capacity-building (financial, managerial, organizational and technical, specifically geared to cultivating, farming and producing high-quality/certified coffee), and cooperatives focus on implementation and giving services to their members, companies also engage in activities that, in other settings, may have been considered outside the realm of their core business: they visit farmers regularly from Europe, and in a few cases even organize trips for producers (Twin and Sainsbury). They are committed to not only buying coffee at a fair price but also spreading the story of the Congolese coffee (e.g. through targeted marketing campaigns to raise awareness). The partnerships thus link farmers directly to their potential market. As Schluter noted in relation to the (Utz) certification component of the partnership, this does "not only trace the coffee origin and establish a quality guarantee, it also helps get to know the farmer and establish strong links".

7.5.2. Interactions with the institutional environment

As explained above, and shown in Table 10, the DRC exemplifies a fragile state, characterized by institutional gaps (cf. Figure 3). Although national elections have taken place, governance structures remain largely dysfunctional. The Congolese state has very limited capacity to control its territory, enforce decisions, or even pay the police force. The situation in the Eastern provinces has been problematic for decades, with numerous conflicts, lawlessness and chronic poverty. There is a lack of enforcement of formal rules and respect for property rights, with transactions being hampered by a problematic financial system with little access to credit for

small farmers, and local markets that are difficult to penetrate. A Twin Trading field report alludes to the fact that "roads are almost impassable and there are no other services and infrastructure whatsoever. Most of the people have only recently re-settled the land, after years living in the forests or in refugee camps in Tanzania. The region remains tense, with the Congolese army only partially in control". Furthermore, while the M23 rebellion erupted after we carried out our empirical research, insecurity and bouts of violence also prevailed at the time. North and South Kivu are marked by extremely weak formal state structures; especially in rural areas, the state is basically absent. Changing alliances of various armed groups govern large parts of the Eastern provinces and control resources, with rebels exerting influence through patronage-based clientelistic networks. Traditional authorities, such as the Mwami (village chiefs), continue to play a significant role in the judicial system, as well as in other matters such as land redistribution and the construction of infrastructure.

The institutional context is thus characterized by a complex mix of 'formal' and 'informal', of 'legal' and 'illegal' spheres, in which customary, state as well as 'practical' norms may be applied. Taxes are, for example, levied by the state (usually one of the only tasks undertaken by the provincial governor); by the traditional authorities (the Mwami), often in kind; and by rebels groups (through illegal toll). The army as institution fails to protect the population in Eastern DRC, and is often the source of insecurity due to fragmentation between composing 'units' which often lack discipline. Although government authorities have tried to disarm or integrate ex rebel groups into the army, with support of the international community, these attempts have not been very successful. Cases of disobedience and/or plundering have been reported amongst those former rebels that were 'integrated'. These examples illustrate blurring boundaries between formal and informal, legal and illegal, in a setting marked by fragility.

At the same time, as noted by Vlassenroot (2008, p. 2), "withering state capacity did not lead to a governance void but has rather opened up some space for other actors, including traditional chiefs, civil society groups, churches and aid agencies, to assume services previously delivered by the state". While this "withering state capacity" also triggered criminality, corruption and arbitrariness, the Kivu case showed increasing opportunity for actors to intervene in the social sphere (e.g., health and education), although our findings indicated that partnerships also addressed governance and security issues. This confirms the observation by Trefon (2004, p. 2) in his book on the 'reinvention of order' in Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC, regarding the emergence of "dynamic new forms of social organization that are constantly

taking shape to compensate for the overwhelming failures of the post-colonial nation state". In the rural context of the Kivus, where there is even less order and more institutional gaps, partnerships seem to have supported similar processes.

For the three coffee partnerships that we studied, we found similarities in how they addressed fragility dimensions, although degrees of pre-existing inter-ethnic tensions differed somewhat (see Table 11). All the evidence pointed at the crucial importance of trust, mutual appreciation and respect. These relational dimensions are highly important in regions with a fragile social fabric, such as Eastern DRC, especially when embedded in longer-term strategic forms of collaboration. In all cases, relationships between companies, NGOs and farmers (organizations) were based on trust and a supportive mind-set, which was translated practically into the concern to provide a fair price, credit (pre-financing), and long-term buying agreements. Partnerships not only help to provide stability of income, they also contribute to the creation of a culture of democracy and trust, and foster social capital (cf. Elder et al., 2011). Farmers and cooperative and local NGO staff showed clear appreciation for the efforts made by company representatives to visit farmers despite difficult circumstances. Table 12 illustrates that quite some activities focused at organizational issues, both for farmers and cooperatives. Cooperatives provide important resources to small farmers not only in the form of technical assistance for crop and harvest improvement, but also in the realm of social services, such as health care and credit. Farmers benefited from pre-financing (of up to 60% of the value of the contract), a useful component in (post-)conflict areas where financial access is limited and most companies are reluctant to invest upfront because of the risks involved. From a governance standpoint, partnership members had to learn to work with a contract, to respect its terms, sit at the table, and to negotiate with companies on conditions in a context where recourse to violence is more the norm than the exception.

The three partnerships either strengthened (Soprocopiv, Sopacdi) or created (UGEAFI) democratic structures within the cooperatives to ensure accountability and transparency. Although Soprocopiv was a cooperative already registered at the beginning of the partnership, it benefited greatly from the expertise brought in by Solidaridad, particularly related to management, financial/bookkeeping skills and technical agronomical know-how concerning best ways to produce high-quality coffee (e.g. how to work the land; when to renew the orchard; how to avoid pesticide use to obtain organic certification and minimize environmental impact; how to select, wash, dry and sort coffee cherries). These improvements were also observed in the other two partnerships. Sopacdi systems and documentation improved to comply with the

requirements for Fair Trade certification (as the first and only cooperative in Eastern DRC at the time). The cooperative stated that Twin basically facilitated its professionalization. Twin, for example, assisted Sopacdi in securing funds for the rehabilitation of their Coffee Washing Station (the only one in Eastern DRC). UGEAFI, although not a formal cooperative, acts as an intermediary between its members and the buyer (Twin Trading). UGEAFI and Sopacdi also benefited from the technical expertise facilitated by Twin: experts are paid by the partnerships to visit both cooperatives to supervise progress and give on-the-job training.

The entire process of participating in the partnership and the collaboration led to a whole range of (new) skills that were (implicitly) learned. Interviewees also mentioned that transferring the passion for coffee back to children, thus perpetuating the tradition, "gives farmers a sense of purpose and togetherness" (UGEAFI). The culture of coffee was in the process of "disappearing due to low prices and the difficulty to work the fields in an unstable environment" (Sopacdi). In the Kivus, coffee is considered to be part of the ancestors' heritage, which they used to proudly cultivate as so-called 'green gold' (Sopacdi). As written in a story found in a Twin Trading field report "in Eastern Congo in the 1970s children were taught that there are four kinds of gold: yellow gold (the metal), brown gold (oil), white gold (cotton) and green gold (coffee); in the current situation in the Kivu green gold really does have the potential to let farmers start to rebuild lives and communities. Unlike the mineral wealth, coffee money can stay in the hands of the people". In addition, well-being also appeared to have improved, considering indicators such as an increase in marriages, better housing (verified through observation and comparison between villages where farmers produce coffee versus villages where farmers do not produce coffee), higher school enrolment, and better health. Female respondents mentioned that they would use the additional revenue to ensure that girls could (continue to) attend school.

Overall, it can be said that the partnerships helped to create 'rules of the game' in a legal vacuum, as they de facto represent new governance modalities in a fragile institutional setting. While none of the partnerships had as goal to rehabilitate the formal judicial system, they nonetheless contributed to reconciliation by bringing people from different ethnic groups together, who started to "walk hand in hand" (Sopacdi) by pursuing joint economic activities. As Sopacdi put it, referring to its membership: "we are more than 3.000 farmers from different ethnic groups, we speak Kirundi, Kihavo or Kinyarwanda, yet we are united in one vision: to improve our families' lives and our communities through coffee". The common purpose shared by coffee farmers was mentioned by all respondents. When it comes to negotiating prices or

terms of contract, “it does not matter if one is Banyamulenge or Babembe. What matters is the successful negotiation of a price, for which we need to be united” (UGEAFI). The partnerships also facilitated “visits between coffee producers from different communities, Babembe, Banyamulenge, and Bafulero, and other producers from other countries which created a culture of exchange. Coming back from the visits, it was common practice to have Banyamulenge share their experience in a Babembe village” (UGEAFI). Farmers from different villages gather to discuss issues directly related to their livelihoods, and therefore share a common interest (coffee) and a common purpose (producing high quality coffee at the best/highest possible price), fostering a greater sense of community.

Regarding violence and security, Sopacdi reported that the partnership resulted in less smuggling across the Kivu lake to Rwanda, and fewer losses of life. Before, “there was no market; we had to resort to smuggling our coffee across Lake Kivu to Rwanda at great risk”. In Eastern DRC, fewer cases of thefts and petty crime were reported in coffee producing villages since they started rehabilitating their coffee plantation. The partnerships have helped farmers who were marginalized as prevailing insecurity had prevented them from taking advantage of the fertile soils highly suitable for coffee production, while essential assets, infrastructure, inputs and institutions were missing. Cases of rebels dropping their arms to cultivate coffee were also reported. According to UGEAFI, in one community around 56 ex Mai Mai laid down arms to become coffee producers. In one discussion in Lemera (related to the same Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI partnership), 14 participants were relatively young men, ex-militia members, who had recently ceased fighting. When asked whether they would take up the arms again if their commanders would pay them more than the revenues gained from cultivating coffee, they replied having no interest in returning to the militias because they were “tired of the war” and had “finally found a sense of purpose”. The partnership, through its rehabilitation of the coffee sector, had facilitated their reinsertion in the social life of the villages and reunited them with their families, leading to increased social cohesion.

7.6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Responding to the special issue call for papers, we aimed to contribute to the literature on subsistence marketplaces and the marketing field more generally by exploring social innovation partnerships in a fragile country characterized by institutional gaps, specifically considering the role of cross-sector collaboration in a conflict-affected region. The specific empirical setting was Eastern Congo, comprising two provinces (North and South Kivu) bordering Rwanda, where

tensions have been palpable in the past decades and resulted in regular bouts of violence. This embodies a fragile context marked by lack of trust, of security, and of good governance, and situations of acute poverty. We analyzed partnerships' characteristics in relation to marketing systems, and the interactions with the institutional environment, inspired by Layton's work (e.g. Layton 2007, 2009), in this way providing more insight into the specific social matrix in this context. Table 13 explores how the partnerships address institutional gaps, considering various fragility dimensions. It illustrates that they not only help to fill 'traditional' formal voids identified in the literature (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2015), especially in relation to skills, quality of the produce, financing, and contractual arrangements, but also seem to do so in a more systematic way, by providing interconnections reckoning with the fragile context.

Table 13: The role of partnerships in fragile settings

Fragility dimensions	**Role of partnerships**
Lack of security	• help to improve human security • induce young rebels to drop arms and reintegrate into communities • lead to fewer smuggling activities
Lack of trust	• help to promote reconciliation through joint activities • promote sense of togetherness and trust between and within communities
Lack of good governance	• help to set 'rules of the game' for interactions between the partners • promote respect for legal and contractual (partnership) agreements
Acute poverty	• help improve skills of farmers (through training) • promote better access to finance (through pre-financing of contracts) • contribute to higher prices through quality checks and assurance practices • better livelihoods of farmers and communities

With the study, we also responded to repeated pleas for more attention to those suffering from poverty and to the role of marketing in contributing to reducing social problems including conflict, and promoting peace and stability (cf. Shultz et al., 2005), thus helping to further the relevance of the field (see also the sub-section on policy implications below). While marketing was crucial in shaping our research, we also used insights from other literatures, thus responding to the call from Ingenbleek (2014) for cross-fertilization. Partnerships have been studied from different perspectives, including management, public policy and development studies, and so have issues related to (post-)conflict, peace and reconciliation in relation to different actors, including business.

Through the partnerships, small farmers gained access to resources, not only in the form of technical assistance for improving crops and harvests, but also in the realm of social services, such as health care and credit, and learned about organizational forms that ensure accountability and transparency. Results were achieved at the organizational level (output) (build-up of managerial capacities and transfer of financial-administrative skills, and improved

functioning of cooperatives), at the farmer level (outcome) (better prices and livelihoods, increased revenues and access to markets) and more widely in (coffee) communities in terms of enhanced social cohesion (ethnic groups that were previously hostile are now working together for a common purpose) and the creation of new governance modalities in a fragile institution setting (impact). The coffee partnerships in this region seemed to have offered a window of opportunity to create relationships between different actors. Being able to 'lead by example and enhance the rule of law', in line with Fort and Schipani (2004), both non-profit organizations and companies have taken initiatives to help fill a governance void in a conflict context while also promoting sustainable development.

Our findings are in line with Shultz (2007, p. 298) who suggested that a new "macromarketing orientation toward constructive engagement can render adversarial relationships more cooperative, beneficial and sustainable". However, central to our approach is to allow micro-level insights to inform the macromarketing perspective, reflecting up the bottom-up nature of the subsistence marketplaces stream of literature. A view on marketing as a mechanism through which seeds of cooperative relationships are planted, is congruent with the peace through commerce literature where relationship building plays a central role as mutual benefits derived from trading deter potential conflicts (Abramov, 2009; Tobias and Boudreaux, 2011). Inter-community and inter-village contacts fostered by activities undertaken in the realm of the partnerships led to changed perceptions of different groups towards one another. One of the reasons accounting for this phenomenon is the high labor-intensity of coffee processing that requires many activities that no farmer can do on his/her own, thus 'forcing' collaboration.

The importance of trust and relationships in this study links to broader observations on the importance of social interactions in marketing and in marketing systems, especially in the context of subsistence (e.g. Ingenbleek et al., 2013). Our research offers insights in the development and conflict transformation/reconciliation potential of providing and improving access to markets through collaboration in a specific value chain. As Shultz et al. (2005, p. 29) already indicated, repairing value chains, such as in the coffee case in the Eastern DRC region, is not only important "for rebuilding communities" but also to help "provide a sense of normalcy". In their article, they contended that "market-oriented, integrative food-marketing systems indeed help mitigate and even transcend ethnic hostilities" (Shultz et al., 2005, p. 35), which is in line with our results.

In this way, marketing "can help entrepreneurs succeed in the marketplace" and be "part of the solution" instead of only of the problem (Ingenbleek, 2014, p. 199). Marketing can thus influence the behavior of actors by providing incentives (Hosley and Wee, 1988), which is a pattern we also observed from the support offered by Western governments. Our study augments that body of knowledge by examining changes induced by cross-sector collaboration arrangements in the relational sphere, among and between communities, and across organization types. This is relevant to a broad range of activities and sectors, although it also extends earlier research on coffee that have most often focused on individual-level effects, as resulting from fair trade in Latin America (Arnould et al., 2009; Geiger-Oneto and Arnould, 2011), or from post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda (Tobias and Boudreaux, 2011; Tobias et al., 2013).

In addition, considering the fact that most coffee farmers can be viewed as micro-entrepreneurs, our findings indicate that cross-sector collaboration schemes involving micro-enterprises provide more than income and employment, but also tackle issues such as lack of governance and security in extreme subsistence markets contexts marked by institutional gaps. A study looking at subsistence consumer merchants in India also identified relationship building with different sets of actors and "commitment to develop, preserve, and strengthen those relationships" (Viswanathan et al., 2010, p. 2) as an important theoretical insight on subsistence markets. Our research revealed the potential that partnerships, and the marketing activities they enabled, have in building relationships and creating new institutions, both normative (new organizational forms which induced different behavioral patterns through working together) and cognitive (new insights into how "the other" is perceived).

7.6.1. Implications for public policy

Our findings are relevant for public, non-profit and private actors involved in contexts characterized by institutional gaps, and also beyond the coffee sector. We provide case-study insights on how business activities, channeled through social innovation partnerships, help to lift farmers out of poverty in fragile, (post-)conflict contexts. By doing so, cross-sector collaboration has the potential to promote harmony among communities as tension and resentment are reduced, and former enemies are brought in contact through joint economic activities. Some of the rebels have dropped arms and switched to coffee production and processing, and we noticed a snowball effect as neighboring villages and communities express interest in moving in the same direction. In (post-)conflict situations, cross-sector collaboration may be even more

important for building trust, which in turn is crucial for creating a climate conducive to peace. We show in practice that setting up partnerships in such a context seems possible and can be fruitful, provided that the difficult context is explicitly taken into account in carefully building relationships. Our findings resonate with other research on subsistence marketplaces that encourage governments to engage the informal economy, and to contribute to building linkages with formal economies (Viswanathan et al., 2012), or to develop consumer and entrepreneurial literacy programs (Viswanathan et al., 2008). Coffee farmers often operate (partly) in the informal sector but do build relationships, via cooperatives and partnerships, with formal-economy actors; they could also benefit from entrepreneurial and marketplace literacy programs.

Another aspect that deserves attention is the role of the government, as its absence in collaborative arrangements in Eastern DRC is noteworthy. Scholars have discussed the danger that partnerships may 'crowd' out an already weak state even further if they do not involve domestic government agencies and instead rely on external/other actors (Eweje, 2006; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Kolk and Lenfant, 2015a). However, the DRC seems to be a special case as interviewees noted that it may take a generation or more before the government can take up its proper role again. They pointed at the absence of 'civic sense' in all segments of society, with institutions being 'rotten'. From that perspective, partnerships may not only fill a governance void but also form a response to an immense need for promoting civic action in a way that local/national government agencies cannot. This is a clear illustration of situations in which non-governmental and private actors jointly take roles and responsibilities that the government is unable to do, with support from multilateral donors and/or Northern governments.

At the same time, and as implied by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), which involves aid donor countries, international organizations and some conflict-affected states and NGOs, it is important to find ways to (gradually) involve local government agencies, and thus help (re)build local institutions. IDPS explicitly mentions partnerships in this regard. Multiple partners from a variety of backgrounds and expertise are helpful as they add their specific skills and resources to a 'messy' context that presents clear challenges. Our study provides information regarding the types of incentives that Northern governments may give to specific actors to promote the emergence of partnerships. Companies are more inclined to become active in fragile areas when governments are willing to share inherent risks of doing business in such settings, and when there are possibilities to partner with NGOs. NGOs often help companies to develop relationships with local communities in an

effective and accountable manner, and help firms to proceed cautiously, also in their marketing and communication about these activities. In the case of coffee, NGOs were also seen as credible actors knowledgeable about the communities from which companies wanted to buy the coffee.

Multilateral agencies involved in Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration programs, which often face difficulties in successfully implementing programs, may also learn from our findings as they point at the potential of market-based solutions. The DRC, for example, is marked by constant insecurity and experiences chronic problems with properly integrating ex-rebels in the army and finding sustainable livelihoods for those who do not join the regular army. In this regard, partnerships such as the ones discussed in our study are examples of inclusive venues offering economic opportunities for groups at risk, which include ex-rebels. There are signs that local authorities also find inspiration from these successes. During a recent trip to Eastern DRC, the second author met a provincial minister who, with self-financed micro-projects, stimulated young ex-rebels to cultivate coffee within their communities, comparable to the cases that we examined. She also indicated that girls who had been physically molested by rebels started regaining trust and were even considering having relationships with these ex-rebels. Thus far, however, it has apparently proven difficult to convince local and national authorities in the DRC to invest more in coffee, due to lack of funds and of 'interest', most likely in relation to poor governance. Northern governments and multilateral agencies might want to support such initiatives and help encourage the DRC government to invest more in its coffee fields together with business, NGOs and international donors.

7.6.2. Limitations and further research

It should be noted that this exploratory study has been just a first step to obtain more insight, and follow-up research is needed to assess impact in more detail. In view of the difficult context, including local (security) circumstances, and constraints of time and resources, we could not collect data more longitudinally to cover a longer period of time. Furthermore, while we relied on multiple respondents and sources of information, and thus were able to reconstruct processes and pathways of change from different perspectives, our approach also had clear limitations. This included the fact that almost all data came from those involved in the partnership or the specific (post-)conflict context, thus posing a risk to reliability (Gitsham, 2007).

More generally, ongoing tensions, occasional fighting, insecurity and bouts of violence were noticeable during the study, and became even more intense after the field trip. The limitations during data collection were thus more profound than discussed, for example, by Ingenbleek et al., (2013) in terms of biases faced by researchers in subsistence markets, due to the extreme context of our study. Concurrently, our approach may hopefully inspire future studies in conflict-affected regions as it shows that doing research under these circumstances is still possible, and can provide exploratory insights rarely encountered in publications precisely because of all the problems faced. Important enabling factors seem to have been pre-existing contacts, a cautious approach involving a careful build-up of communication, good introductions to communities and potential interviewees, and 'immersion' in the phenomenon of interest in such a way that respondents are convinced of true commitment without pre-conditions or relationships to further (program) funding.

In future studies, it might be worthwhile to also pay attention to potential side effects of (rapid) economic development. These may include disruption between and within communities as a result of higher purchasing power that can lead to envy or increased inequalities, or the (re)emergence of certain practices that may be seen as undesirable (in one of the group discussions, for example, we came across a man who expressed his happiness about a greater income as this would enable him to marry a second wife – even though forbidden by law and religion). Partnerships might also play a role in helping cope with such issues.

Moreover, follow-up research on partnerships in other fragile regions, in or outside Africa, to draw comparisons and assess to what extent they seem suitable and potentially effective in other contexts, would be valuable. This also applies to investigations of other value chains or economic activities to see whether similar dynamics could be found beyond our exploratory setting and specific context. Furthermore, there may be options to link insights from cross-sector collaboration, given the multi-actor involvement in partnerships, to the literature on stakeholders as it has developed in the management and marketing fields. Finally, in going from micro to macro, our work opens avenues for further research on the ways in which marketing helps to create new institutions and to further develop existing ones that are characterized by gaps, thus adding a rather different perspective to a more traditional approach in which institutions are needed to enable transactions.

Appendix 3. Overview of contacts and interviews

Organization	**Type***	**Name of persons contacted**	**E-mail sent on**	**Response received on**	**Remarks (if any)**	
DFID	G	Louise Horner** Lindsey Napier; Richard Mugabo	18 April 2011	6 May 2011		
Nathaneme***	B (G)	Mark Thomas	18 April 2011	19 April 2011		
Schluter	B	Joel Martin	4 April 2011	27 April 2011		
Sainsbury	B	Liz Jarman Eleanor Taylor	14 & 20 April 2011	6 May 2011		
Solidaridad	N	Karugu Macharia	14 April 2011	5 May 2011		
Twin	N/B	Ian Barney Andy Carlton Richard Hide Andrea Olivar Chris Penrose	14 & 20 April 2011	5 May 2011		
Sopacdi	C	Joachim Munganga	14 April 2011	18 May 2011	Initial contact in 2011, but pursued since then, with multiple interactions in 2012, 2013 and 2014	
Comequi	N	Michel Verwilghen	14 April 2011	19 April 2011		
Café Africa	N	John Schluter***	14 April 2011	18 April 2011		
Oxfam Novib	N	Rudolf Scheffer	14 April 2011	28 April 2011		
UGEAFI	N/C	Butoto Naum	26 April 2011	12 May 2011	Initial contact in 2011, but pursued since then, with multiple interactions in 2012, 2013 and 2014	
Organization	**Type***	**Interviewee**	**Function**	**Partnership**	**Place**	**Date**
Nathaneme***	B (G)	Mark Thomas	Director	Twin-Sainsbury-Sopacdi-DFID	Long-distance telephone call	19 April 2011
Twin	N/B	Andrea Olivar	Project manager	Twin-Sainsbury-Sopacdi-DFID	Long-distance telephone call	17 May 2011
Twin	N/B	Chris Penrose	Head of partnership programme	Twin-Sainsbury-Sopacdi-DFID	Long-distance telephone call	4 May 2011
Comequi	N	Michel Verwilghen	Director	Twin-Sainsbury-Sopacdi-DFID	Long-distance telephone call	22 April 2011
Café Africa	N	John Schluter****	Director	Schluter-Solidaridad-Soprocopiv-DGIS	Long-distance telephone call	20 April 2011
Schluter	B	Joel Martin	Director	Schluter-Solidaridad-Soprocopiv-DGIS	Long-distance telephone call	28 April 2011
Oxfam Novib	N	François van Lierde	DRC country representative	Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	The Hague, Netherlands	19 May 2011
Oxfam Novib	N	Rudolf Scheffer	Project manager coffee	Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	The Hague, Netherlands	19 May 2011
Oxfam Novib	N	Brigitte Obertop	DRC project manager	Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	The Hague, Netherlands	19 May 2011
International Alert	N	Marie Lange	Director	Overall situation in the region	Long-distance telephone call	18 May 2011
FLO-Twin	N/B	Pascasie Nyirandege	Consultant (capacity-building expert)	All partnerships	Kigali, Rwanda	2 June 2011
Twin	N/B	Jean Claude Muzima	Accountant/ Consultant	All partnerships	Kigali, Rwanda	2 June 2011
UGEAFI	N/C	Naum Butoto	Director	Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	Bukavu, DRC	30 May 2011
UGEAFI	N/C	Nyongolo Luwawa	Financial director	Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	Lemera, DRC	31 May 2011

UGEAFI	N/C	Djesse Samuel	Programme coordinator	Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	Bukavu, DRC	30 May 2011
UGEAFI	N/C	Kalimba Kangeta	Agronomist	Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	Lemera, DRC	31 May 2011
Soprocopiv	C	Denis Kasereka Katsomibwa	Director	Schluter-Solidaridad-Soprocopiv-DGIS	Butembo, DRC	24 May 2011
Solidaridad	N	Tony Saiba	Consultant	Schluter-Solidaridad-Soprocopiv-DGIS	Butembo, DRC	24 May 2011
Solidaridad	N	Charles Sabuni	Consultant	Schluter-Solidaridad-Soprocopiv-DGIS	Butembo, DRC	25 May 2011
Solidaridad	N	Palata Adelard	Consultant	Schluter-Solidaridad-Soprocopiv-DGIS	Butembo, DRC	25 May 2011
Sopacdi	C	Joel Bahati Fazila	Accountant	Twin-Sainsbury-Sopacdi-DFID	Minova, DRC	26 May 2011
Sopacdi	C	Joachim Munganga	Director	Twin-Sainsbury-Sopacdi-DFID	Minova, DRC	27 May 2011
Provincial government	G	Marie Shematsi Baeni	Minister	All partnerships / overall situation	Goma, DRC	2013, 2014
Pearl*****	P	Jean-Claude Kayisinga	Manager	All partnerships	Kigali, Rwanda	1 June 2011
Schluter-Solidaridad-Soprocopiv-DGIS	P	46 participants (divided into three groups)	Coffee producers	own coffee activities that are part of partnership	Kiruba, DRC	25 May 2011
Twin-Oxfam Novib-UGEAFI	P	Approximately 60 participants (divided into four groups)	Coffee producers	own coffee activities part of partnership	Lemera, DRC	31 May 2011
Twin-Sainsbury-Sopacdi-DFID	P	44 participants (divided into three groups)	Coffee producers	own coffee activities part of partnership	In and around Minova, DRC	28 May 2011

*B=business; N=NGO; C=Cooperative; G=Government (donor); P=partnership; in case multiple are mentioned, this refers to more 'hybrid' organizations in operations, links and/or ambitions
**FRICH (Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund of the UK government's department of International Development)
***private contractor managing projects of FRICH (the Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund of the UK government's department of International Development)
****son of the founder of Schluter company
*****is itself a partnership consisting of multiple companies, NGOs and cooperatives that helped to boost the coffee sector in Rwanda

CHAPTER 8. PARTNERSHIPS FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN FRAGILE STATES: IDENTIFYING MISSING LINKS[20]

8.1. INTRODUCTION

How to bring peace and reconciliation closer has been a major issue in the context of so-called "fragile states." The notion of fragile states is closely linked to conflict (potential) in combination with poverty, lawlessness, and lack of government authority and legitimacy, affecting citizens and firms alike (Brück et al., 2011; Naudé et al., 2011). Fragile states are often characterized by situations in which formal cease-fires or even peace agreements are interspersed with bouts of violence, hostility, and lack of trust. Fragility is typically accompanied by weak and/or missing institutions, particularly the formal (legally enforceable) institutions that exist alongside the informal (implicit, self-imposed, tradition-based) ones (North, 1994). These so-called institutional voids have received attention in the business literature, mostly in conceptual work (e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Tracey and Phillips, 2011) and in a few exploratory qualitative studies (Kolk, 2014a; Mair and Martí, 2009; Mair et al., 2012).Fragile states, which exemplify an extreme, unconventional, and under-researched context (Bamberger, 2008; Bamberger and Pratt, 2010) deserve further attention. However, empirical research in such settings characterized by institutional voids has been difficult and sometimes dangerous, however, which may explain the paucity of available studies.

Partnerships between business and (non-)governmental actors have increasingly been presented as important for helping to fill institutional gaps, as traditional single-actor approaches have fallen short of providing the whole range of missing institutions. A generic interest in partnerships in different bodies of literature (e.g., Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Selsky and Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee et al., 2007) has, in recent years, led to some academic studies of collaboration in poor countries and weak institutional contexts, again usually in conceptual articles (Rivera-Santos et al., 2012; Rufín and Rivera-Santos, 2014; Webb et al., 2010) and only a small number of empirical, qualitative explorations (Mair et al., 2012; Reffico and Márquez, 2012). However, here too the (post-)conflict context in fragile states has been mostly missing, although several publications have emphasized the value of strategic collaboration to further

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peace and reconciliation (e.g., Abramov, 2009; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Oetzel et al., 2009; Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2015).

We seek to contribute to this literature by providing an overview of the relatively limited research insights on partnerships for peace and reconciliation in fragile states from different disciplinary fields of study. We then present a typology that focuses on the different geographical levels (local, national, and international) at which collaboration takes place and considers various types of partnerships (philanthropic, transactional, engagement, and transformative). This is subsequently illustrated with particular attention to Africa, where most fragile states are found, and to partnerships with transformative potential. Specifically, we collected empirical material, particularly concerning Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, that exemplifies different types of local and national partnerships and their peculiarities. Our analysis points to conceptual adjustments that may need to be made for partnerships in the context of fragile states, and has implications relevant to a broad spectrum of scholars and thought leaders.

8.2. RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF PARTNERSHIPS

Multistakeholder partnerships have received growing academic interest as innovative ways to further both corporate social responsibility and societal objectives. Partnerships differ in size, foci, and types of participants and issues tackled, but principally stem from a "win-win" philosophy (Waddell, 2000) to merge divergent interests and create value for society, organizations, and individuals. The idea is that partners from different sectors (business, government, and civil society) bring complementary resources, skills, and competences and share risks and responsibilities to help address complex societal problems (e.g., poverty alleviation, climate change, social equity, economic development) that a single actor cannot solve. Partnerships have been studied from different disciplinary perspectives that can be distinguished in two broad streams of literature: one from business areas (management and, to a lesser extent, marketing), the other focused on (sustainable) development (including public policy, political science, and international relations). The past decade in particular has seen a range of review and overview articles in journals in various fields of study (see especially Austin, 2000; Austin and Seitanidi, 2012a, 2012b; Bowen et al., 2010; Kourula and Laasonen, 2010; Reed and Reed, 2009; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Selsky and Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee et al., 2007) and in books and reports (Gray and Stites, 2013; Kolk, 2014b; Pattberg et al., 2012; Seitanidi and Crane, 2014).

Across specific disciplines, the partnership literature has addressed a variety of topics. Some studies have dealt with the generic drivers for partnerships and the context in which they emerged—that is, they pay attention to the agreed-upon need for new governance approaches arising out of the various failures of single-sector initiatives by governmental, business, and non-profit actors (Kolk, 2014b; Schäferhoff et al., 2009; Van Huijstee et al., 2007). Other publications have focused more on the actors and their specific motivations (e.g., Elkington and Fennell, 1998; Rondinelli and London, 2003); the peculiarities of the interactions, disadvantages, and strategic and operational matters (e.g., Berger et al., 2004; Selsky and Parker, 2005); or the outcomes for business and/or society (e.g., Austin and Seitanidi, 2012b; Bäckstrand, 2006; Kolk et al., 2008). Most partnerships reported on in this literature originate from and involve developed-country actors, but many target their activities on developing countries. Not surprisingly, the business literature, encompassing both management and marketing, has predominantly focused on the collaborative activities of firms originating from developed countries. Those interested in the (sustainable) development implications have usually taken a broader view. We will discuss both streams below with an eye to their relevance for peace and development in fragile states.

8.2.1. Approaches to partnerships in the business literature

Several approaches have been taken in the fields of management and marketing. Traditionally, most attention has been paid to the actor types involved—firms (private/for-profit), governments (public), and NGOs (non-profit)—and to the various combinations in which they collaborate. Scholars interested in firms and their managers/marketers have largely concentrated on private–non-profit, public–private, and tripartite partnerships and not on the public–non-profit partnership, the fourth arena of cross-sector collaboration (Selsky and Parker, 2005). Of these four types, private–non-profit partnerships, between firms and NGOs, have predominated in both management and marketing studies, as illustrated in a range of publications over the years (e.g., Berger et al., 2004; Dahan et al., 2010; Den Hond et al., 2015; Elkington and Fennell, 1998; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Kourula and Laasonen, 2010; Le Ber and Branzei, 2010; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Seitanidi and Crane, 2009; Webb et al., 2010; Yaziji and Doh, 2009) and in recent overview articles (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012a, 2012b). Several aspects, however, have remained somewhat underexposed in this body of work. These include the "blurring boundaries" (Crane, 2010) between different sectors, the hybrid nature of actors (exemplified by NGOs undertaking for-profit activities), and the fact that in international

development partnerships, developing-country actors may have roles, views, and interests that are different from those of their counterparts from developed countries (Kolk, 2014b; Rivera-Santos et al., 2012).

Austin (2000) was the first to identify different stages of business–NGO collaboration seen from the perspective of the organization: philanthropic, transactional, and integrative. Particularly in the latter, most intensive stage, the so-called locus of value creation has received attention. A distinction has been made between micro, meso, and macro levels, considering the individual, organizational, and societal dimensions of partnerships, respectively (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012b; Kolk et al., 2010) (see Table 14 below, vertical axis). Levels can potentially affect one another and even strengthen the overall impact of partnerships through so-called trickle effects. As noted above, the business literature has thus far concentrated on the meso level, on firm–NGO partnerships, and the implications for firms in particular. In recent years, a few studies have built on organizational psychology and consumer behavior research and shed light on the role of individuals (the micro level), especially employees and consumers, in partnerships (or social alliances, the term used in marketing research) (Berger et al., 2006; Kolk et al., 2015; Vock et al., 2014). Austin and Seitanidi (2012b) noted that this micro level deserves more attention in research on partnerships, comparable to broader calls concerning the microfoundations of management (see Felin and Foss, 2005, and the AMP special issue of May 2013). The societal implications of partnerships have been said to be the "least thoroughly dealt with" (Austin and Seitanidi, 2012b, p. 952). However, this observation reflects limited consideration of other fields (political science, international relations, and development studies) where scholars have ventured to address at least some macro-level aspects.

In addition to these three levels—micro (individual), meso (organizational), and macro (society)—the literature has also considered internal and external dimensions of partnerships (cf. Austin and Seitanidi, 2012b). This distinction helps to address the fact that the social good (macro) can also be furthered by realizing benefits for individuals and/or groups outside the partner organizations. An example would be a partnership that supports an individual farmer and his or her family and community. Internal value creation covers benefits for partnering organizations and related individual constituents (micro and meso), which has typically been the focus of management research. Table 14 gives an overview of the partnership aspects that can potentially be studied. In contrast to earlier overview articles (e.g., Austin and Seitanidi, 2012b), we split the internal dimension into two: the partnering organization (usually a firm, as the normal focus of business research) and the partnership, which considers the other

organization(s) involved in the collaboration. Management publications have concentrated mainly on box 2 and to a much lesser extent on box 1, paying only limited attention to boxes 3 and 4 and hardly any to the other aspects included in the table. A few recent marketing studies have considered box 5 and the interactions with box 1, as well as the implications for the focal firm (box 2). Some of the external components, which relate to society, institutions, systems, organizations, groups, and individuals outside the partnering organizations, have been addressed by other, nonbusiness disciplines. Linkages between the external- and internal-oriented literatures have been relatively limited. The external, societal (i.e., macro) aspects are most relevant for the subject of this article, and will be addressed next, in relation to partnerships for development and/or peace.

Table 14: Overview of partnerships dimensions

	Internal		**External to partnering organizations**
	Within one organization	**Within the partnership**	
Locus of value creation			
Micro (individual)	Employees/managers and internal interactions [1]	Employees/managers of partner organization(s) [3]	External stakeholders: e.g., consumer, farmer, citizen [5]
Meso (organization)	Focus on the organization (firm) [2]	Partner organization(s): NGO, government, firm [4]	Organizations outside partnership: e.g., government, NGO, cooperative [6]
Macro (society)	n.a.	n.a.	Impact or processes within economy and/or society [7]

8.2.2. Partnerships for development and/or peace

The literature on partnerships for development partly consists of analyses of specific collaborative activities undertaken by firms in developing countries, including their fit with core business (e.g., Kolk et al., 2008; Reed and Reed, 2009). In some cases this concerns business–community interaction that is not exclusively tied to partnership arrangements but is part of a wider corporate involvement or engagement strategy. This may occur in developing countries (e.g., Muthuri, 2008; Muthuri et al., 2009) but is more often the case in developed-country settings (Bowen et al., 2010). More extensive partnership-focused attention has been paid to the (policy) governance implications regarding global (agrifood) chains (e.g., Bitzer, 2012) and sustainable development generally (e.g., Pattberg et al., 2012; Van Huijstee et al., 2007). Publications have most often covered aspects related to box 7 of Table 14, and sometimes to boxes 5 or 6.

Studies from the political science, public policy, and international relations disciplines have considered power relations, inclusiveness, accountability, transparency, and legitimacy

issues of partnerships, often derived from an analysis of formal structures, and they have noted serious concerns (Bäckstrand, 2006; Beisheim, 2012; Liese and Beisheim, 2011; Pattberg et al., 2012; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). This research, focused on box 7 of Table 14, has concentrated more on processes of collaboration and their societal consequences than on concrete outputs. In terms of the types of partners, partnerships for sustainable development turn out to be most often implemented by international organizations (often in the United Nations context), OECD governments, or Northern-based (often donor-funded) NGOs in areas where there are already many activities—not in those where the problems and needs are greatest (Kolk, 2014b). In other words, partnerships are missing in the least-developed countries, local communities tend to be excluded, and affected stakeholders are often underrepresented (Idemudia, 2009). Existing partnership publications also reflect this focus.

In addition to this peculiar geographical/actor coverage, the partnership literature has paid only limited empirical attention to the peace/conflict dimension, whether as the goal of the collaboration (i.e., promoting peace and reconciliation) or as the context in which it takes place (i.e., a (post-)conflict, fragile setting). At the same time, the importance of collaboration in such contexts has been conceptually acknowledged from various sides. From a business–community perspective, collaboration may help companies to operate in areas of low governance by improving relations and communication with communities and furthering local capacity-building (cf. Idemudia, 2007; Muthuri et al., 2009). The business and peace literature has stressed the value that companies can derive from involving other actors in effectively tackling conflict-related issues (Bais and Huijser, 2005; Haufler, 2002; Haufler and Ballentine, 2005; Oetzel et al., 2009) and the role that partnerships can play in fostering good governance, trust, and peace (Abramov, 2009). Scholars focused on (post-)conflict reconstruction and prevention of violence have emphasized the importance of supporting initiatives such as partnerships. They assume that cross-sector collaboration is most likely to be successful when it links security, justice, governance, and economic development (World Bank, 2011) and when it can help increase the capacity of state authorities to care for their citizens, thus furthering reconciliation and institution building (Dobers and Halme, 2009; Ite, 2007a). This points to the importance of integrating locally implemented efforts with activities at the national and international levels.

However, whether partnerships for development in fragile regions address these issues remains largely unknown. The lack of insight seems due, at least in part, to the difficulties and sensitivities of doing empirical research and collecting reliable data in (post-)conflict settings. In addition, many of the activities undertaken and studied are—even in fragile countries—most

often geared toward philanthropy, with a donor–recipient mode, and thus have limited interaction with local communities beyond specific product or service transactions (Idemudia, 2007; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite, 2005; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012, 2013; Muthuri, 2008; Muthuri et al., 2009; Wheeler et al., 2002). They thus lack a consideration of the broader societal context and its key problems. Indeed, only occasionally do these studies focus on issues directly related to the conflict or those with a wider community focus with a potential to further peace and reconciliation efforts. Beyond the geographical dimensions discussed above, this transformative potential, considered crucial in fragile, (post-)conflict areas, is a second dimension that needs to be taken into account.

8.2.3. A typology for considering partnerships in fragile states

Table 15 provides a preliminary typology that consists of the two dimensions mentioned above. The *y*-axis consists of three geographical levels: *local, national,* and *international*. Given that conflicts are usually embedded in broader national/regional settings with multiple dimensions related to security, justice, governance, and economic development, partnerships can contribute to peace in a sustainable way only if they are not just local but also link to these higher-level phenomena. Such linkages often result from the involvement of national or international actors, or they may be brought about by relating local collaborative efforts to those taking place at national or international levels. Below we present some illustrative examples from the relatively limited number of earlier studies and ongoing research of collaboration at the different geographical levels with specific attention to Africa, where most fragile states can be found, in both the least-developed and middle-income economy categories (OECD, 2012).[21]

Table 15: A typology for considering partnerships in fragile states

Type *Level*	**Philanthropy**	**Transaction**	**Engagement**	**Transformation**
Local				
National				
International				

[21] The second author has carried out field research in Central African countries, gathering evidence on the coffee partnerships highlighted in the section on local partnerships reported in chapter 7 (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015b). Furthermore, he has been involved in international-level IDPS developments from the civil society perspective and was a participant observer at the 2012 IDPS steering committee in Nairobi and the g7+ meeting that took place alongside the United Nations General Assembly in New York that same year.

The *x*-axis relates to the partnership categories, distinguishing four types based on their key focus: *philanthropy*, *transaction*, *engagement,* and *transformation*. In an earlier section we mentioned Austin's (2000) initial continuum that suggests an evolution of three stages from philanthropic to transactional and, subsequently, integrative partnerships that are more strategic. As this categorization stemmed from advanced developed-country settings, we have also taken other classifications into account that seem more relevant for developing countries in general and (post-)conflict countries in particular. Key publications include Bowen et al. (2008) and Muthuri et al. (2009), which focused on community involvement more generally, and Kolk and Lenfant (2012), who studied partnerships in a conflict setting. Together, these authors have identified the importance of considering communities and/or organizations beyond a transaction mode with a mere commercial focus. Both philanthropic and transaction-oriented partnerships are found to be ill-suited to contributing to a more peaceful environment, as indicated above. The potential for conflict reduction and peace promotion is rather different for partnerships that are more strategic in nature or focus on engagement in the local context. They include multistakeholder dialogues/platforms and joint activities to help build trust, display strong community involvement, and address issues directly related to the conflict.

In the discussion of the three geographical levels in the next section, we therefore concentrate on these latter two types of partnerships—that is, those focused on engagement and, most notably, transformation (see Table 15). Engagement goes beyond resource transfer; it shows a certain degree of community involvement (directly by firms with communities or via NGOs) and implies an exchange of knowledge and information (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; cf. Kourula and Laasonen, 2010). Transformative partnerships contain integrative elements (as they relate to organizations' core activities; cf. Austin, 2000; Muthuri et al., 2009) but also involve concrete learning and capacity-building activities and interactions to reduce community tensions (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). In terms of linkages between different levels, the benefits of, for example, an international learning platform with the aim of disseminating knowledge from a particular issue found in conflict areas (such as artisanal mining or conflict commodities) are more likely to trickle down to the local level if they can be concretely delivered through partnership with organizations that have been involved in the process.

8.3. PARTNERSHIPS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS

8.3.1. Local level

To tease out relevant issues from the local level, we focused on Central African countries characterized by (post-)conflict situations, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as an extreme case in point. The DRC ranks very highly on the Fragile States Index and is among the lowest on underlying indicators such as governance, transparency, peace, human development, and gross domestic product per capita.[22] Recent research has covered international firms operating in the DRC and shown that most partnerships are found in the extractive industries (Kolk and Lenfant, 2012). This is not surprising given that the country is the most mineral-dependent fragile state globally, with this activity accounting for almost 80% of exports (OECD, 2012). As in Angola, an almost fully fuel-dependent fragile state, there are only a few partnerships with transformative potential in terms of peace and reconciliation, and they have often emerged out of earlier NGO campaigns against foreign firms for their (assumed) indirect involvement in conflict and exploitation.

Collaboration by multinationals in the DRC yielded 39 partnerships, of which four were transformative and 13 engagement-oriented, with some extractive firms having more than one type of partnership (more generally, only two engagement partnerships were undertaken by non-extractive firms). Collaborative activities usually imply higher levels of corporate transparency regarding their role in society, engagement with stakeholders (including local communities, a national and/or international NGO, and occasionally local government officials), and sometimes support for finding (alternative) employment opportunities (e.g. for artisanal miners) and for building capacity (Kolk and Lenfant, 2013). Key aspects of these activities have been knowledge exchange, improvement of institutions, and adherence to international standards for good business conduct, thereby furthering trust with and among communities. Overall, engagement and dialogue have prevailed in these partnerships and appear to be precursors for more extensive implementation on the ground. The few transformative partnerships found in the DRC mining sector are marked by strengthening capacity at the community level and address issues directly linked to conflict (e.g., violence against women, artisanal mining alternatives). Interestingly, none of these partnerships included government authorities, a notable missing link which may be due to their lack of capacity.

[22] See, e.g., http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interactive_map; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD; http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators; http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/human_development_low.htm.

If one moves away from the foreign firm perspective to focus more on local economic opportunities, agricultural activities come to the fore, as they are often seen as crucial for promoting economic development in fragile states. In the same DRC setting, for example, coffee has emerged in recent years, specifically in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu bordering Rwanda, an area characterized by a vicious cycle of conflict and violence, poverty, and poor governance (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015b). Coffee projects for small farmers have been shown in other countries to help fill institutional gaps by creating compensatory structures, including new/different networks, intermediary entities, and partnerships, while also generating positive outcomes for farmers and their communities (Kolk, 2014a). Our research in eastern DRC and Rwanda showed that transformative partnerships are more common in the local coffee sector than among the predominantly mining multinationals active in the DRC. We found 28 partnerships at the local level, half of which were either philanthropic or transactional (seven each), while three focused on engagement and 11 on transformation. Of the four coffee partnerships in the DRC three were transformative; in Rwanda this applied to eight out of their 24 (in Rwanda there is also a national-level transformative partnership; see the next sub-section).

Through the partnerships, small farmers gained access to resources, not only in the form of technical assistance for improving crops and harvests but also in the realm of social services, such as health care and credit, and they learned about organizational structures and procedures that ensure accountability and transparency. The transformative coffee partnerships created a window of opportunity to establish and improve relationships among actors. They were found to have a wider impact in communities in terms of enhanced social cohesion (ethnic groups that were previously hostile started to work together for a common purpose; some rebels dropped arms and switched to coffee production/processing) and the creation of new governance modalities in a fragile setting. The partnerships contributed to building informal institutions, capacities, and a climate of trust conducive to more peaceful behavior. Local business and non-profit organizations started to collaborate with international firms and NGOs, and sometimes also with Northern donor government agencies, which provided incentives (e.g., covering risks, matching funds, offering networks) as part of broader framework agreements designed to stimulate private-sector investment in fragile states.

The specific composition of the coffee partnerships focuses attention on the absence of local/national state authorities. In the literature, several authors have expressed concern about the implications of such a configuration crowding out the state, and thus further undermining

credibility and citizen trust in its abilities and increasing dependence on external donors (Eweje, 2006; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Kolk and Lenfant, 2013). Remarkably, however, all interviewees from the DRC who participated in our study (Kolk and Lenfant, 2015b) expressed the wish not to have government authorities involved for fear of being harassed with heavy taxation or even bribes, and noted that it may take a generation or more before government can take up its proper role again. The DRC appears to be a case in which business and NGOs take a leading role in the absence of government and actually help to create the rules of the game; this is different from Rwanda, as we show below. While the argument that business–NGO partnerships can undermine the state seems valid in many countries, the DRC may be an exception at present in view of lasting hostilities, proven corruption, and incapability on the part of government. At the same time, this perhaps extreme case clearly illustrates blurring boundaries as well as the possible role of partnerships in fragile states, with other actors jointly assuming responsibilities that the local/national government has apparently been unable to take on.

8.3.2. National level

At the national level, there are cases in which national governments in fragile states have gradually become involved as part of broader multistakeholder partnerships. Such partnerships are focused on either engagement or transformation, with the specific type depending on the degree to which concrete activities are being implemented on the ground. These partnerships commonly include government authorities and emphasize institution/capacity building and the creation of a favorable policy environment at the national level, meant to trickle down to the local level eventually. Below, we give two key examples of transformative partnerships at the national level, one originating from coffee in Rwanda and the other from the extractive sector in Angola.

Rwanda, like the DRC, is classified as a least-developed fragile state. However, it clearly differs in that the national government has full authority over its territory (even being accused of interfering militarily across the border with eastern DRC) and has spearheaded economic reforms aimed at stimulating specific sectors, including coffee, where the PEARL/SPREAD multistakeholder partnership has been notable. PEARL (Partnership for Enhancing Agriculture in Rwanda through Linkages) began in 2000 as a six-year project designed to rejuvenate the potential of Rwandan coffee after it had been decimated during the genocide in 1994. PEARL placed emphasis on institution building (through agricultural outreach centers, for example) and training local farming cooperatives to improve the production and marketing of their coffee. In

2006, it merged with another project (Agribusiness Development Assistance Project in Rwanda, or ADAR) to form SPREAD (Sustaining Partnership to Enhance Rural Enterprises and Agribusiness Development). SPREAD focused on strengthening the whole value chain through the creation of links between producers and buyers and thus extended the partnership to coffee companies, with a current involvement of more than 30 companies, 12 NGOs, six cooperatives, and a university (see Table 16). There are some international partners, but their contribution consists only of technical and/or financial support and access to coffee markets.

An impact assessment study showed the collaboration to be instrumental in boosting the Rwandan coffee sector; it also found a range of other positive effects at the organizational and farmer levels as well as at the institutional level in terms of markets and structures in which the national coffee authority was involved (cf. Murekezi and Loveridge, 2009; SPREAD, 2011). Considering the implications for peace, PEARL/SPREAD concentrated its efforts on capacity building by strengthening the agricultural and educational sectors and implementing an active policy to promote reconciliation. Hutus and Tutsis collaborated in cooperatives, jointly earning money, and were encouraged to think of themselves as Rwandans rather than members of a particular ethnic group. The cooperatives helped drive reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi as farmers who were once enemies started to work side by side at local washing stations, for example (Boudreaux, 2007, 2010). This is a clear example of a partnership for peace and development that links the national (policy-setting) level, communities, and farmers locally, a very different scenario from the DRC coffee cases discussed in the previous section.

Table 16: Key characteristics of national and international partnerships included in this chapter

	Geographical focus	NGOs	Government (agencies)	Companies/industry	Starting year
PEARL/ SPREAD	Rwanda	The Borlaug Institute, Technoserve, Alliance of Coffee Excellence, ADF, Project Rwanda, Transfair	Rwanda (OCIR), local Rwandan government authorities, US (USAID)	31 companies, e.g., Starbucks, Trobocca Trading, Songer and Associates, Rwanda Smallholder Specialty Coffee Company, Karengera Coffee, SOCOR, PROMAGRI	2000
API	Angola	Search for Common Ground, Save the Children, local NGOs/ community-based organizations	Angola government, USAID, UNDP, German technical cooperation	Chevron	2002
KPCS*	Countries in Africa:** Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Zimbabwe	Partnership Africa Canada, Centre du Commerce International pour le Développement (Guinea), Green Advocates (Liberia), Network Movement for Justice and Development (Sierra Leone), Réseau de Lutte contre la Faim (Cameroon), Centre National d'Appui au Développement et à la Participation Populaire (DRC), Groupe d'Appui aux Exploitants des Ressources Naturelles (DRC), Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (Zimbabwe), Center for Natural Resource Governance (Zimbabwe), Bonn International Centre for Conversion (Germany)	EU, US, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, Venezuela, Vietnam	World Diamond Council	Process: 2000 Scheme: 2003
DDI***	Angola, Central African Republic, DRC, , Sierra Leone	Partnership Africa Canada, Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability, Global Witness	World Bank, Angola, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Sweden, UK	De Beers, International Diamond Manufacturers' Association (IDMA), the Rapaport Group	2005
IDPS****	g7+ countries in Africa: Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Togo	A coalition that includes Saferworld, GPPAC, Cordaid, InterPeace, ACP (Kenya), Alliance for Peacebuilding (US), CDA (US), Conciliation Resources (UK), FECCIWA (Togo), NSI (Canada), Pregesco (DRC /Central Africa), REPAOC (Senegal/West Africa), Tiri (UK), WANEP (West Africa), World Vision (US/global)	World Bank, UN, OECD, IMF, EU, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, African Development Bank, African Union, Asian Development Bank	n/a	2008

* Comprises in total 54 countries, 11 NGOs, industry, and the DDI – African countries mentioned in the table only.
** CAR has been temporarily suspended, and Côte d'Ivoire is under sanctions and not allowed to trade rough diamonds.
*** Only founding members are included in this table.
****Comprises in total 18 fragile countries (so-called g7+, of which 13 in Africa), 23 donor countries (mostly OECD members), three middle-income countries (Brazil, Chile, and China), eight multilateral institutions, and a coalition of NGOs.

The second example of transformative partnerships at the national level began from an initiative taken in the extractive industry of Angola, categorized as an upper-middle-income fragile state by the OECD (2012): the Angola Partnership Initiative (API), launched in 2002 by Chevron in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the national government. Chevron initially invested $25 million, with donor agencies later adding another $31 million; after a positive evaluation the firm committed further resources (Chevron, 2010c; Garrigo, 2011; Kolk and Lenfant, 2013). While the original goal was to build up capacity to realize greater economic stability and improve standards of living, it evolved into a broad-based national partnership for peace and development with clear national–local links. Activities ranged from providing basic human needs to supporting sustainable income sources from agriculture, fisheries, and small business development more generally. Search for Common Ground (SCG), an international NGO that joined API in 2006, contributed to integrating a peace and reconciliation lens in the projects. Together with SCG, Chevron also provides local knowledge and networks given its long-standing presence in the country. The partnership has been repeatedly praised, particularly for Chevron's initiating role (e.g., Cooley, 2006; Nelson, 2004; Wise and Shtylla, 2007).

Two factors are seen as accounting for API's success: the explicit consideration of local, (post-)conflict peculiarities and the awareness of the challenges and dilemmas of going through such a major transition from war to peace. The peace reached in 2002 needed to be consolidated: The economy was fragmented and the infrastructure devastated; there was a lack of confidence from the international community, a huge population at risk, and weak civil society representation. Failure to comprehensively address those challenges would have undermined the peace consolidation process. API assisted Angola in making the transition, and its comprehensive collaborative approach with explicit local involvement represented a change in the way development work was conducted in the country. Projects were funded only after proper engagement with local communities, which identified priorities based on an assessment of needs. Besides funding traditional (health and education) projects, the partnership strengthened local capacity in conflict resolution in communities with a history of conflict. These projects resulted in behavioral changes, a culture of dialogue, stronger civil society, and local leadership while establishing good links between different levels, that is, between local (community), national (Angolan government) and international (foreign governments and UN agencies).

Despite the relative success of both cases, with different degrees of foreign involvement, they seem to be relatively isolated examples among the almost 50 fragile states identified globally. Furthermore, while conflicts can be confined within a national territory, they very often have a cross-border dimension through population displacement, humanitarian camps in border towns, cross-border illegal trade (especially weapons and/or trafficking), or the temporary involvement of other countries. In the specific case of the DRC conflict, for example, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe have at some point been involved. Moreover, common issues such as lack of transparency, violation of human rights, or corruption—sometimes associated with specific industries—can be found in multiple countries. This means that mere national or local projects are not sufficient to address the problems faced by fragile states, but that higher-level, more comprehensive partnerships that target relevant cross-border activities within conflict arenas are needed.

8.3.3. International level

8.3.3.1. Partnerships targeting specific products or fragility dimensions

Since 2000, two international initiatives have emerged that target the extractive industry, more specifically the diamond industry, in relation to conflict issues: the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and, as a complement, the Diamond Development Initiative (DDI). Arising from campaigns against blood diamonds (also known as conflict diamonds), the KPCS is a multistakeholder process to eradicate conflict diamonds through a certification mechanism covering the entire global chain and with sanctions to diminish opportunities for funding war with their sale. It has been characterized as an innovative global governance scheme and conflict prevention initiative that has encouraged more ethical and transparent business behavior in conflict zones (cf. Hale, 2011; Haufler, 2009). As shown in Table 16 (above), the KPCS comprises 54 participating countries and 11 NGOs (observers) from both developed and developing countries, the World Diamond Council (which represents the industry), and the DDI. Despite shortcomings, such as the absence of independent monitoring and enforcement capacity, governments' unwillingness to uphold their commitments to control export and import flows, and lack of integration of social and environmental concerns, the KPCS is still considered a valuable multistakeholder initiative for conflict prevention (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005; Haufler, 2009; Smillie, 2005; Wright, 2004).

There have been criticisms of the KPCS, but one of them has been addressed through

the DDI (Hale, 2011). As the KPCS focuses on the more macro-level regulatory and legal aspects, it pays less attention to the issue of small-scale artisanal mining, and the fate of those involved in it, outside the formal economy. Numbers are substantial, particularly in Africa: The DDI cites 800,000 diggers in the DRC, 120,000 in Sierra Leone, and many tens of thousands in several other countries, including Angola and Liberia, who are overlooked by KPCS.[23] With De Beers as one of the founding members, in collaboration with several NGOs, governments, and the industry manufacturing association (see Table 16, above), the DDI focuses on issues specific to small-scale artisanal mining, helping to formalize economies surrounding artisanal diamond mines and turn blood diamonds into "development diamonds" for the communities involved. In addition to creating projects to improve the socio-economic conditions of artisanal miners and their families, the DDI has stimulated a dialogue among relevant stakeholders. It is technically active in all countries where artisanal miners are found, but in recent years it has initiated a particular number of projects in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Central African Republic. For example, the DDI has collaborated with NGOs, mining firms, and the Congolese government to implement a registration system by which artisanal diamond miners track their production through to the point of export as required by the KPCS; their inclusion aims to ensure that diggers work in conflict-free zones and have a more steady income.

There are other international multistakeholder initiatives that have relevance for the extractive industry in a broader sense. A case in point is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, designed to improve business transparency and accountability to help bring an end to the corruption often found in conflict areas. More focused on conflict prevention, but generic in nature, are the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which provide guidelines for business on how to respect human rights while operating in locations characterized by conflict and violence. They include the need to conduct risk assessments, provisions as to security arrangements, adequate responses to human rights abuses, and proper stakeholder dialogues. Initiatives such as these are not concrete partnerships in terms of implementation but rather guidelines for firms on operating principles that have emerged from discussions among different types of business and NGOs. They thus provide a useful context to raise firms' awareness and generate consensus on relevant issues, particularly in difficult business settings, but they do not encompass specific collaboration for peace and development activities with links to the national and/or local levels in fragile states.

[23] See www.ddiglobal.org.

8.3.3.2. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding involves donor countries from the OECD, 18 conflict-affected and fragile states (the so-called g7+), and international organizations, with a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from both North and South. Although relatively abstract thus far in terms of implementation, the IDPS's 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States has specifically focused on collaboration to address multiple dimensions of fragility—improving security, justice, employment, living conditions, legitimacy of politics, and functioning of public services. The New Deal "provides a new framework within which to better align resources and support to the peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities of countries in fragile situations and for *more effective partnerships* and support to enable *country-led transitions* out of fragility" (OECD, 2012, p. 15; emphasis added). The IDPS started as a typical multilateral, intergovernmental initiative addressing concerns about aid effectiveness in fragile states. Specifically, it was initiated to discuss constraints on delivering effective international assistance, identify a realistic set of objectives for peace-building and state-building that could guide national and international partners, and build trust between participating countries and organizations.

The quote above refers to two interesting aspects of the New Deal. First, the emphasis on country-led transitions reflects a change in approach, presumably resulting from the long-standing debate about aid effectiveness in general and fragile states in particular. The IDPS co-chair addressed this shift in approach, from resolutely working outside of government to greater involvement with local structures and institutions:

> I have been engaged in international development discussions for 25 years. If you had asked me 10 years ago what to do in fragile states I would have said: Work outside the government because it is too weak and vulnerable, use civil society and the UN instead. I would have said: Keep security efforts and development efforts totally apart, because mixing them is dangerous. Today my reply would be almost exactly the opposite. Work with and through local structures and institutions and engage in statebuilding BECAUSE the states are weak. And combine statebuilding and peacebuilding, BECAUSE without peace we will never see progress, without progress peace cannot be sustained.[24]

[24] Speech by Christian Friis Bach, Danish Minister for Development Cooperation, at the high-level side event New Deal: g7+ Perspectives and Experience, held September 26, 2012, at the United Nations in New York. Capital letter emphasis included in original text.

Second, much attention is given to more effective partnerships. The IDPS documents and declarations mention "capacity building," "institution building," and the need for "raising the level of confidence between state and citizens" in relation to the formation of partnerships predicated on these principles, to address structural issues found in fragile states. While the initiative envisions partnerships with a transformative agenda at the national level, it has thus far entailed international engagement only. As the group of 18 fragile states (united under the g7+ label) within the IDPS notes, "the g7+ was formed to work in concert with international actors, the private sector, civil society, the media and the people across countries, borders and regions to reform and reinvent a new paradigm for international engagement".[25] Numerous meetings, platforms, and working groups were set up to move the peace- and state-building agenda forward and enrich it with local and national perspectives, but very few concrete activities with a transformative lens have been implemented. One could argue that the IDPS consists of international engagement with transformative potential that has not yet been fully exploited.

The IDPS's strength and added value stem from being the only partnership at the international level that establishes clear links between different conflict dimensions through the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs): legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenues, and services. The IDPS stresses the need to tackle all these issues in order to bring about peace. A further notable aspect is related to the connection made between the rather generic PSGs and their specification for the national context through fragility assessments. These are conducted at the country level to help stimulate dialogue among stakeholders and discuss implementation issues and priorities. For example, the assessments for the DRC, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan contain many references to the need for a national regulatory framework for proper, effective, and accountable natural resource management; public–private partnerships are also mentioned by the DRC and Sierra Leone in the context of economic improvement.[26] However, as noted above, these statements have yet to result in concrete implementation on the ground.

What has been clearly missing thus far within the IDPS is the private sector. Most documents and fragility assessments we reviewed emphasize the role of the private sector and the need for collaboration with different parties, because "achieving peace is a

[25] http://www.g7plus.org/en/introduction.

[26] See, http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/documents/search/?freetext=fragility+assessments&lang=en&cat=0 which also contains a PowerPoint summary for Timor Leste, in addition to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan <last accessed September 26, 2013>. We considered the full documents for the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan.

multidimensional endeavour" requiring "shared efforts, with states, civil society, the private sector and multilateral institutions."[27] However, firms and business organizations have not yet been structurally engaged at either the international or the national level. Predominantly international organizations, national governments, and to some extent NGOs—thus far, more international than local ones—have participated in IDPS-related activities. The absence of the private sector is all the more remarkable given the existence of multiple multistakeholder partnerships with business participation in fragile contexts, as the examples in this article have shown.

8.4. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The situation in fragile and conflict-affected states is receiving increasing attention in international policy-making, and the importance of strategic collaboration to promote peace and reconciliation has been emphasized conceptually but not really studied empirically. Fragile, (post-)conflict states represent an extreme, unconventional research context in need of more study from the perspective of management and organization (Bamberger, 2008; Bamberger and Pratt, 2010; cf. Forrer and Katsos, 2015). In this article we have aimed to improve the understanding of how partnerships with business could help promote peace and development in fragile, low-governance areas, and thus move the research agenda beyond the generic statements made thus far about the potential added value of collaboration without consideration of this issue or the difficult institutional setting in more detail. To this end, we first discussed the partnership literature across different disciplines, which has generally paid most attention to internal dimensions within firms and to the external, societal dimension (see Table 14, boxes 1, 2, and 7). We then introduced a preliminary typology that included different levels at which collaboration can take place and considered various partnership types (see Table 15).

Subsequently, we gave examples of partnerships with transformative potential from the African context, where most fragile states can be found, in both the least-developed and middle-income economy categories (cf. Rivera-Santos et al., 2014). These examples provide more in-depth insight into the issues at stake. For example, the lowest-level (local) partnerships found in the DRC—perhaps the most extreme case of instability—tend to exclude the national government and are often philanthropic, especially in the extractive industries. Some

[27] Liberia Fragility Assessment: <http://www.lr.undp.org/content/dam/liberia/docs/docs/Conflict%20and%20Fragility%20Liberia_Report.pdf, p. 1 and 12>.

partnerships focus on engagement with potential for more extensive implementation on the ground, but these are less common. The few transformative local partnerships are generally business–non-profit in composition, sometimes supported by foreign donor agencies.

Interestingly, the latest international, multilaterally driven collaboration in the context of the New Deal, put forward by the IDPS, has not yet included business, despite its stated aim to be truly multistakeholder in nature. The IDPS partnership is the only partnership included in Table 16 that has been lacking in implementation and therefore involves engagement rather than transformation; it has transformative potential, though, given its ambitions. The national-level cases in the table are most comprehensive in types of actors covered but are also rather incidental thus far, and at this stage they have not been leveraged beyond national boundaries. Furthermore, and despite the interconnected nature of conflict and fragility issues, there are few linkages between partnerships at different levels, a phenomenon that offers potential for further development by a broad range of scholars and thought leaders. Building links between levels is likely to facilitate the transformative potential of partnerships.

For thought leaders concerned with issues of peace- and state-building, for example in the context of the post-2015 global development priorities, two further aspects might be worth exploring: (1) how effective local and national multistakeholder collaboration, including a positive contribution by firms, might be elevated to the international level, and (2) how experiences from successful local partnerships—which created new governance modalities without the national state—might be transferred to help build government agencies and gradually involve them locally. Regarding the latter, interestingly, in recent years there has been a reevaluation of government, which used to be seen as a rather problematic actor in fragile states. This is illustrated by the statement of the IPDS co-chair (see the quote in the previous section) and the New Deal's emphasis on state-building and inclusive institutions. With regarding to the first aspect, firms are often "linking pins" in view of their international operations and networks. Scholars may therefore not just want to follow such policy developments to obtain insight into the dynamics of filling institutional voids, but also to study the role of business in the state-building process and in the creation of inclusive institutions. What's more, insights obtained from such relatively extreme settings may lead to a better understanding of international firms and relevant management phenomena in other contexts as well.

Regarding the partnership literature, management and marketing scholars have focused on the meso level within organizations (box 2 in Table 14), with some recent interest in the

behavioral microfoundations of partnerships for employees and customers (especially boxes 1 and 5, and to a much lesser extent 3). Other disciplines have paid attention to the macro, societal dimensions, especially through work on partnerships for sustainable development that considered international organizations, mostly Northern-based NGOs and donor countries in particular (box 7). By explicitly exposing the business actors involved, alongside others, we have aimed to help bridge the gap between these different bodies of knowledge and contribute to a greater understanding of the external dimensions of partnerships. The implications for organizations other than firms, and for individuals, both within and outside the partnerships (boxes 4 and 6, respectively) also need further study (especially in box 5, in relation to boxes 1 and 3). Detailed follow-up studies into both the meso and micro aspects of partnerships in fragile states would be helpful to identify the dynamic interactions between and within organizations and individuals, and the linkages between the external and internal dimensions.

As indicated in some of the concrete partnership examples in this article, building relationships over a longer period of time to create trust between previously antagonistic parties requires patience and careful interactions, and specific capabilities on the part of the organizations and individuals involved. Intensive and difficult forms of collaboration with an eye to diminishing conflict, furthering peace and reconciliation, and creating opportunities for more social and economic stability expose crucial elements relevant to management and organization in the broadest sense. These range from individual-level factors, in terms of leadership and human resource management, to wider aspects including social capital, trust, stakeholder relations, and corporate innovation that might be inspired by new forms of interactions. It would also be useful to study the potential trickle-down effects of partnerships (cf. Kolk et al., 2010) to explore to what extent such new types of conciliatory relationships encourage different ways of thinking and behavioral patterns on the part of both internal and external actors, including, for example, employees, customers, and shareholders.

While the evidence presented in this article has been limited, partly due to the difficulty of doing research in these challenging contexts, it has illustrated partnerships from a societal perspective. In contrast to categorizations that focus on internal value creation (e.g., Austin and Seitanidi, 2012a) from the firm's point of view and on strategic integration with organizations' core activities or on transactional or philanthropic resource transfer modes, our classification (see Table 15) concentrates on the interaction with communities and a wide range of other organizations—businesses, NGOs, and governments. It adds engagement and transformation as distinct foci of partnerships that are highly relevant, but not limited, to fragile states.

Engagement in peaceful settings may, however, be less protracted and take the form of a policy dialogue; it might also be specifically suitable for contested issues. Furthermore, the business–community literature has, interestingly, emphasized that transformation-oriented partnerships generally entail only a few participants, as intense interaction is needed (e.g., Bowen et al., 2010). By contrast, in the (post-)conflict contexts covered in this article, many parties were, and needed to be, involved given the difficult nature of the problems and the need to build trust and reduce hostility across the board. From this perspective, not only firms and/or communities may benefit from the collaboration but also a much wider set of constituents in society. Follow-up research into more partnerships in different countries, with greater and lesser degrees of fragility, would be helpful to obtain more understanding of the conditions under which such a development can take place.

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS

9.1. DISSERTATION FOCUS AND CONTRIBUTION

This dissertation aimed to shed light on international companies' perceptions of the challenges that they face while operating in conflict countries, and how they helped address peace and reconciliation issues. Answering calls from the business for peace literature to provide more "context based research" (Forrer and Katsos, 2015, p. 453), this dissertation provided empirical evidence from and about foreign companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, the Republic of the Congo and Angola. After introducing the dissertation in the first chapter, chapter 2 gave an overview of the main themes and debates linked to the dissertation, namely business and conflict, business for peace and corporate social responsibility. In the past few decades, companies operating in conflict areas have been under intense scrutiny from activists who highlighted instances whereby companies fuel, directly or indirectly, particular conflicts. This perspective left underexposed the potential contribution of business to peace, given the increasing societal expectations to solve problems as illustrated in the more recent so-called 'business for peace' literature. Chapter 2 linked this emerging body of work to the overall discussion on companies' social responsibilities in conflict countries, considering five different channels identified in the literature through which companies may, unilaterally or collaboratively, and directly or indirectly, contribute to peace and reconciliation. These five channels are fostering economic development, engaging in track-two diplomacy, adopting principles of external valuation and promoting the rule of law, contributing to a sense of community, and engaging in conflict risk assessments (Forrer and Katsos, 2015, Oetzel et al., 2009).

Subsequent chapters were structured around the two sub-questions identified in chapter 1. Chapters 3 and 4 explored how companies reported on the challenges and opportunities of doing business in conflict-affected areas, as part of their social responsibility and peace and reconciliation activities. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 examined multistakeholder collaboration activities involving companies, exploring their peace promotion and reconciliation potential. The current, concluding chapter reflects on the findings in relation to the two research sub-questions, and how they add to different existing bodies of literature presented in chapter 2. It also discusses limitations of this dissertation and offers suggestions for further research. Table 17 gives an overview of chapters 3-8 in relation to the two sub-questions and, per chapter, the types of organizations examined, the geographical setting, the key literature themes addressed as well as

the approach adopted. They will be further discussed below, starting with the first sub-question and the two related chapters.

Table 17: Overview of chapters 3-8

Chapter	3	4	5	6	7	8
Research Sub–Questions	How do different types of international companies perceive the opportunities and the challenges of doing business in conflict-affected areas in Central Africa, as part of their corporate social responsibility and peace and reconciliation activities?		In what ways do international companies participate in multistakeholder partnerships to help further peace and reconciliation?			
Organizations Examined	Large companies	Companies, mostly small, involved in the coffee sector,	Large companies, NGOs, multilateral institutions	Wide range of companies, NGOs	Wide range of companies, NGOs, government, cooperatives	Wide range of companies, NGOs, government, cooperatives, multilateral organizations
Geographical Setting	DRC, Angola, Republic of the Congo	Eastern DRC, Rwanda	Eastern DRC, Angola	DRC	Eastern DRC	International context (with examples from Eastern DRC, Angola, Rwanda)
Key themes From the Literature	CSR in Africa	Business for peace,	Business and conflict, partnership, and CSR in Africa	Partnership, business for peace	Partnership	Partnership
Contribution	Empirical exploration of companies' reporting on CSR and conflict	Empirical and conceptual exploration of a hybrid continuum in the coffee sector and of the ways in which hybrid organizations further peace and reconciliation	Case studies of innovative multistakeholder partnerships and exploration of their potential contribution to further peace and reconciliation.	Empirical illustration of partnerships adding a different context and (societal) purpose to the literature and explores ways in which collaborative activities further peace and reconciliation.	Case studies of multistakeholder partnerships in the coffee sector and the ways in which they address institutional gaps and help further peace and reconciliation.	Overview of research insights and empirical and conceptual exploration of partnerships for peace and reconciliation in fragile states from different disciplinary fields of study.

Sub-question a: How do different types of international companies perceive the opportunities and the challenges of doing business in conflict-affected areas in Central Africa, as part of their corporate social responsibility and peace and reconciliation activities?

Drawing from the CSR in Africa literature, chapter 3 explored how relatively large international companies operating in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo reported on the challenges and the dilemmas that they faced, on their social responsibility and on the conflict context. Given the limited research conducted on the topic, partially due to the difficulties of obtaining reliable data, chapter 3 used company reports to gather company insights. The chapter demonstrated that large Western companies operating in the extractive sector reported more on their socio-economic impact than smaller companies involved in the non-extractive sector. It also illustrated that companies with a longstanding presence in the

country tended to provide specific information about the challenges and the dilemmas that they faced and how they addressed them. This finding corroborates the proposition made by Oetzel et al. (2007), according to which the longer a company has been operating in a country, the more interested it will be in the "the long-term political and economic stability of the country" (Oetzel et al., 2007, p. 349), but no evidence was found that these companies carried out activities to address conflict-related issues or to promote peace. This could be due to the fact that this chapter relied on self-reported, publicly available information and that companies might have actually undertaken more activities than what they officially communicated. This is obviously a limitation of the study, as will be further discussed below.

Overall, very few companies reported on the conflict context or on conflict-related issues, such as transparency or the resource curse. Only two companies mentioned the resource curse, although the extractive industry is subjected to high scrutiny and stakeholder pressure which could provide an incentive for companies to address it, by, for example, promoting transparency and good governance with governments. Furthermore, only a few companies alluded to human rights and corruption in an attempt to clarify the scope of their responsibility. Regarding the contribution of the chapter to the CSR (in Africa) literature, most activities on which companies reported were rather generic and not adapted to the local context. In addition, companies were more inclined to report on their economic responsibilities, which confirms Visser's (2006b) findings. The chapter also added to the literature on business for peace as companies considered the promotion of economic development, one of the five peace promotion channels, as their primary social responsibility. It showed that many companies were aware of the risks inherent to investing in fragile regions with poor governance and possible human rights violations, although most companies considered conflict as a risk to their operations, instead of looking at the risk that their activities may exacerbate or ignite a conflict. The fact that only a few companies carried out conflict risk assessments – one of the other channels mentioned in the literature – seems to illustrate this observation. At the same time, there was the interesting finding that companies were open to cooperating with other actors, among which NGOs, which inspired further in-depth research on the partnership theme (see sub-question b below).

Different from chapter 3, chapter 4 looked at 53 organizations operating in the coffee sector in Rwanda and Eastern DRC, mostly small companies, and examined their level of hybridity along three dimensions identified in the literature, namely the role of social change in companies' objectives, the degree to which they engaged in mutually beneficial relationships with other stakeholders, and the way in which companies interacted with markets and

institutions (Haigh and Hoffman, 2012). Adding to the business for peace literature, this exploratory chapter suggested that (semi-)hybrid business models were more likely to contribute to peace and reconciliation because of the embeddedness of the social mission in their core business (which increased the relevance and potential impact of their activities), the type of mutually beneficial relationships that they built with all stakeholders, but especially with communities, and the way in which they carried out development work and interacted with markets and other institutions.

This chapter contributed to the business for peace as well as the CSR literature, as it illustrated the levels at which hybrid organizational forms contributed to a peaceful environment, namely at the company and at the community level. Adding to existing research that pointed at the peace promotion potential of leadership practices geared towards employee empowerment and participatory decision-making (Fort and Schipani, 2004; Spreitzer, 2007), chapter 4 explored how hybrid forms of organizations promoted social cohesion by giving a voice to their employees and (almost) considering them as 'family'. Beyond the organizational level, it showed how mutually beneficial relationships (between companies on the one hand, and coffee growers and their communities on the other), based on understanding and support through community development project funding and regular company visits despite difficult circumstances, helped stimulate a peaceful environment. The chapter shed light on how certain business practices, both internal (i.e. care for employees) and external (i.e. establishing positive relationships with communities, paying 'salaries' to coffee growers beyond fair trade standards) were conducive to peace. In regions that have been ravaged by conflicts, some of which are still lingering, the study suggested that the more hybrid forms of organization placed the human element at the heart of their business model, showed compassion and were willing to 'walk the extra mile' to support communities. Finally, insights on the way in which hybrid forms of organizations carried out development work in the communities, by focusing on capacity building, and effectively addressing community needs, also added to the literature on CSR in Africa.

Sub-question b: In what ways do international companies participate in multistakeholder partnerships to help further peace and reconciliation?

Taking Getz and Oetzel's (2009) and Oetzel et al.'s (2007) framework of companies' reaction to conflict as starting point, chapters 5, 6,7 and 8 looked at a variety of collaborative endeavors in which companies participated and examined their peace and reconciliation potential. Chapter 5 explored different engagement patterns involving large international companies, NGOs and/or

multilateral/government actors in Angola and the DRC. It presented examples of collaborative activities similar to those identified by Getz and Oetzel (2009) such as multilateral partnerships involving many actors (i.e. DDI, or API) but also highlighted other types of, smaller, partnerships involving (only) one company and one NGO. It contributed to the CSR and business for peace literature by illustrating how some of the partnerships identified helped companies to adopt conflict-sensitive practices, and implement CSR activities that were adapted to the conflict context by tackling issues such as livelihoods, artisanal mining, governance, human rights and transparency. The chapter also added specifically to the literature on business-NGO partnerships by showing how NGOs and companies could combine their respective strengths to help solve conflicts and by exploring how NGO characteristics may have influenced their engagement pattern vis-à-vis companies, taking existing NGO classifications into account (e.g. Bendell, 2000; Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007; Winston, 2002). While some NGOs (i.e. human rights, advocacy type) still wage campaigns against companies, chapter 5 illustrated that another type of NGOs (service delivery and peace building, which are more pragmatic and less ideologically motivated) were more inclined to collaborate with companies than human rights, research and advocacy NGOs. The trend towards a more positive engagement pattern between NGOs and companies reported on in non-conflict settings (Yaziji and Doh, 2009), was thus also observed in conflict countries in Central Africa. In a few cases, collaboration took place after a naming-and-shaming campaign was waged, which indicated, in line with Arenas et al. (2013), that NGO-company relationships were not static and evolved over time.

Different from chapter 5 that looked at different types of collaborative agreements, among which partnerships including a wide variety of actors, chapter 6 shed light on collaboration forms involving only two actor types, companies and NGOs, and explored their peace promotion potential. It examined a larger number of international companies and classified them according to categories identified in the business for peace literature, namely 'avoidant,' 'business as usual,' and 'conflict resolution' (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007). Most companies fell in the 'business as usual' category. Subsequently, and taking Austin's (2000) collaboration continuum as starting point, the chapter identified 39 partnerships and classified them in four collaboration types. The first one, philanthropic, was predicated on a donor-recipient model, was rather generic, did not have much community involvement and did not tackle conflict-related issues. The second type, referred to as engagement, was divided into two categories, engagement with funds, and without funds. 'Engagement with funds' related to those partnerships with some community involvement and some service provision, but that did

not address root causes of conflicts. 'Engagement without funds' partnerships were similar to multistakeholder platforms where companies and NGOs engage in a dialogue, and therefore resembled multilateral agreements or policy dialogues identified by Getz and Oetzel (2009) and Haufler (2002) respectively, although they differ in size and actor composition ('engagement without funds' partnerships contained a more limited number of participants and did not include government authorities). The similarities lie in the fact that 'engagement without funds' partnerships enabled companies and NGOs to debate a variety of issues often linked to the conflict to find common solutions, and offered a venue for NGOs to help companies become conflict sensitive. The final type of partnership identified, transformative, addressed conflict-related issues, had a strong capacity-building focus and a wide community involvement and therefore seemed to be better suited to further peace and reconciliation. The partnerships identified in chapter 6 were mostly philanthropic, tackled rather generic issues and operated in a donor-recipient mode. Similar to chapter 3, companies involved in the few transformative partnerships operated in the extractive sector and came from Western countries. This chapter added to the partnership literature by presenting an underexposed context (a conflict country in Central Africa) and a distinctive purpose (partnerships for peace and reconciliation). It also contributed to the business for peace literature by illustrating how companies' collaborative activities may help further peace and reconciliation by fostering trust and reducing tension between companies and communities, strengthening communities' capacities, and addressing governance issues.

Drawing from insights from the marketing field related to subsistence markets and marketing systems, chapter 7 examined how multistakeholder partnerships in a specific sector seemed to help fill institutional gaps in a fragile setting and reduce (post-)conflict tensions. Using assessment frameworks from the international development field (Bamberger and White, 2007; OECD-DAC, 2002; Ravaillon, 2009) the chapter made a distinction between output, outcome and impact to analyze 'results' of the partnerships. At the output level, i.e. organizational level, managerial capacities improved, and financial-administrative skills were transferred; at the outcome level, i.e. farmers' level, prices increased, access to markets and livelihoods improved which led to revenue increases for farmers and their families. Regarding impact, i.e. the community-wide level, tensions were reduced, alternatives to rebellion were provided, security improved and partnerships offered space for collaboration between formerly antagonistic groups. The findings added to the business for peace literature, as companies' collaborative activities contributed to the fostering of a sense of 'togetherness' between the actors within the

partnership, as well as at the broader community level, resulting in increased social cohesion. Furthermore, they seemed to serve as 'rule-setting' mechanisms (i.e. the signing of formal contracts accessible to all parties) which fostered transparency. Besides these two peace promoting channels identified in the business for peace literature (providing a sense of community, and promoting the rule of law through enhancing transparency), the chapter also provided insights into the economic development potential of partnerships through improving access to markets. Adding to the partnership literature, the partnerships did not only stimulate economic development through the provision of income and employment, but they also contributed to the creation of new institutions, both normative (organizational forms) and cognitive (perceptions of other groups), thereby helping address institutional gaps.

Finally, chapter 8 contributed to the literature by bridging the gaps between different (sub-)disciplinary academic debates and by offering insights on partnerships for peace and development in fragile states. It presented the state of research on partnerships considering two literature streams, business, including marketing and management (e.g. Austin and Seitanidi, 2012a, 2012b; Berger et al., 2004), and development, including public policy, political science and international relations (e.g. Bäckstrand, 2006; Liese and Beisheim, 2011; Pattberg et al., 2012; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). This chapter thus explicated the fact that different bodies of knowledge approach partnerships from different levels. Business research has focused on individual and/or organizational implications. Political science, international relations and development studies have considered the macro-societal level while looking at partnerships for sustainable development, yet these rarely involve business actors. Given this gap and the limited insights into the peace/conflict dimension of partnerships, as goal (i.e., promoting peace and reconciliation) or as context (i.e., a (post-)conflict setting), this study contributed to the literature by exposing business actors and shedding light on the external dimensions of partnerships, taking local communities into account. It classified the partnerships considering the different geographical levels at which the partnerships took place (local, national, international), as well as the various partnership types (philanthropic, transactional, engagement, and transformative). Findings indicated that governments were mostly absent from local partnerships, that national partnerships were the most transformative, that companies did not participate in recent international multilateral collaborative efforts, and that linkages between partnerships and partners at different levels were missing. Given the interrelatedness of issues in conflict areas, the research suggested the development of linkages between partnerships, partners and levels in order to leverage their transformative potential.

Considering the second sub-question, this dissertation illustrated that transformative partnerships appear to be the most promising collaboration type in conflict areas. By adopting a community-wide approach, engaging in community capacity building and addressing issues directly linked to the conflict context (such as violence against women and artisanal mining), transformative partnerships represent a different model for corporate community involvement and seem to be better suited to further peace and reconciliation. In addition, by participating in transformative partnerships, companies addressed some of the issues raised in the literature concerning corporate community relations, such as the lack of consideration for local priorities (Idemudia, 2011).The dissertation also showed that transformative partnerships could include many participants, contrary to observations made by other scholars (e.g. Bowen et al., 2010) who argued that transformative partnerships entailed few participants due to the intensity of the collaboration. Given the protracted nature of conflicts and the high number of stakeholders involved, this dissertation contended that in the specific challenging settings found in conflict countries in Central Africa, those transformative partnerships including different stakeholders and linking issues addressed at different levels were more likely to be effective. However, this dissertation explored the potential of such collaboration types, yet did not intend to measure their actual impact, which is a limitation that will be discussed in more detail below.

9.2. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEBATES ON BUSINESS FOR PEACE AND CSR

This dissertation added to the Getz and Oetzel (2009) framework by providing empirical insights into how multistakeholder partnerships including companies could contribute to peace and reconciliation. Different from Getz and Oetzel (2009), however, it did not consider collaborative activities between companies only, but identified and examined different partnership constellations, thus illustrating the value that each type of actor may bring to the collaboration. Those NGOs participating in partnership endeavors (typically service delivery or peace building NGOs with a presence on the ground and a pragmatic approach) brought their knowledge of the context and of the conflict, their experience and embeddedness within communities; companies their managerial skills and funds; and (Northern) government agencies predictability of funding and coverage of risks. The role (and absence) of Southern governments in many of these partnerships, especially in the case of the DRC, has been a topic of discussion in the literature. When operating in contexts of dysfunctioning governments that fail to provide public goods for their citizens, companies may face pressure to assume (some) governmental functions, which calls for a redefinition of their role and responsibility in society. Critics have argued that when

companies and/or NGOs take over such functions, they crowd out governments and undermine their authority (Ite, 2005). They have also contended that the engagement of non-state actors (including companies and NGOs) in the public domain should therefore include the national and/or local government and entail capacity-building components in order to prepare government authorities for the fulfilment of their public task (Ite, 2007). However, despite 'blurring boundaries' (Crane, 2010), the capabilities of companies to build government capacities are being questioned. Strengthening the capacities of a local partner or a cooperative to better service its constituents is of a radically and fundamentally different nature than building capacities of post-colonial state institutions that have never properly functioned. In the same line of thought, scholars question whether companies are "knowledgeable and capable ... of resolving endemic postcolonial developmental problems, or of navigating local social, ethnic, and political fault lines" (Ford, 2015, p. 456). More broadly, the dissertation highlighted the evolving role of companies vis-à-vis poorly functioning government and state institutions, and it illustrated that business-NGO partnerships can coexist next to other types of tripartite partnerships involving government authorities.

The dissertation also added concrete cases of how a few channels (out of the five channels identified in the business for peace literature) were more used by companies than others. For instance, companies were mostly engaged in promoting economic development and contributing to a sense of community. The findings also pointed at the importance of the 'type' of economic development being promoted to increase its peace promotion potential, namely one that is perceived as fair and inclusive. This dissertation found some instances of companies adopting principles of external valuation and enhancing the rule of law, and, although more limited, of companies conducting conflict risk assessments, both within collaborative arrangements. However, very few instances of companies' involvement in track-two diplomacy were observed. It does not automatically mean that companies do not actually engage in such activities, but it could indicate that they do not disclose such information, for fear of being accused of entering the public domain. Yet, in the course of conducting this research, one case of a company (Heineken in Burundi) using its leverage to influence the government to engage in peace talks with the main rebel group was encountered (Homé, 2010). This information was disclosed by a former regional manager, yet not confirmed at Heineken's headquarters when I raised the question while conducting semi-structured interviews, which illustrated the complexity of obtaining accurate data on companies' involvement in peace matters because of the sensitivities linked to the topic.

Although calls have been made to extend the social responsibilities of companies to include conflict issues into their CSR (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010), the findings indicated that this call has yet to be answered by companies operating in Central Africa. Despite failures of UN institutions, Northern and local governments and NGOs to bring about sustainable peace, as in the case of the DRC, companies may start to show awareness of the challenges of doing business in such settings, and a few may even indicate an openness to extend the scope of their responsibility. However, this dissertation exposed the limited role that companies see for themselves in contributing directly to peace and reconciliation, a domain that they consider to pertain to governments. In extreme cases, such as the Eastern provinces of the DRC, it can be argued that it is not the type of actor that matters (UN agencies, governments, companies or NGOs), but its legitimacy, willingness and capacity to bring about a positive changes in the lives of those suffering from conflicts. As mentioned by Ford (2015, p. 252), "space exists for firms to go beyond making their operations more conflict-sensitive and to actively attempt to shape peaceful societal conditions (without necessarily waiting for public-sector actors to lead)", because peace building "is heavily, unavoidably infused with governmental and political actors and concepts".

The discussion about companies' roles in areas with dysfunctioning state authorities and governance gaps resonates with the literature on political CSR (e.g. Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Scherer et al., 2016) as "CSR scholarship has enlightened us about how regulatory voids have led to a political role for business" (Reinecke and Ansari, 2016, p. 300). CSR has already evolved from a notion focusing on safety and health to a concept including sustainable development and human rights, although the latter had not figured prominently in the debate until recently (Cragg et al., 2012; Wettstein, 2012). In the past few years, calls have been made to not only incorporate conflict-related issues within CSR but to confer a more political role to companies in these matters as they are considered "highly political actors and have long been so" (Ford, 2015, p. 457). In this regard, a very recent publication on the DRC used a model of company 'political responsibilization for a wicked problem', which refers to the process through which companies become less resistant and start assuming responsibilities for major problems traditionally considered as 'public'. The authors, Reinecke and Ansari (2016, p. 301), observed an evolution that led companies "to shift from denial to acquiescence, and finally to assume a political role in conflict resolution". Major companies involved in the electronic industry pledged "to work together to eliminate the link between violence and human rights abuses and the mineral trade in the DRC" (Reinecke and Ansari, 2016, p. 315). This suggests a potential momentum for companies to embrace a more political version of CSR in order to solve the

'wicked problems' with which the DRC, and other countries in Africa, have been confronted in the past decades.

9.3. LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This final section of the dissertation reflects upon its limitations and, relatedly, areas for further research, from a somewhat broader perspective than taken in the various chapters and, where appropriate, in connection with some very recent publications on the themes. First, it is important to recall the limitation that the data used by this dissertation was not longitudinal in nature, which would have enabled me to monitor the evolution of companies' activities, direct and/or indirect, collaborative and/or unilateral, in relation to their implications for peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, the qualitative (case-based) research methods proved useful to capture and provide specific insights into partnerships characteristics and explore the phenomena, and were highly suitable in complex environments. However, this methodology restricted the ability to generalize outside of the geographical setting. In addition, the company sample was also rather limited.

This dissertation provided some evidence that (semi-)hybrid companies seem well suited to respond to the challenges found in (post-)conflict contexts, yet more research is needed to assess whether other organizational forms, or certain management practices are associated with peace (Fort, 2007; Ford, 2015). Similarly, research into the capabilities required by companies to effectively tackle peace and conflict issues, the type of human resources needed and the best leadership approach may be topics for further investigation. In addition, more studies on companies from non-Western countries should be carried out, especially from Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC countries), as their influence is growing and changing the power dynamics between host governments, home governments and Western companies. Further research is also needed in different conflict settings in and outside of Africa, preferably covering multiple sectors, in order to assess whether the particular Central African and/or industry contexts account for the findings.

Another limitation was the self-reported nature of the information collected in some of the empirical chapters. While other research exploring companies' impact and/or CSR has used self-reported data (Chapple and Moon, 2005) and this dissertation triangulated as much as possible using a combination of data collection techniques, there is always a risk that such data is not sufficiently objective and depicts companies' policies and activities in an overly positive manner. At the same time, however, a considerable number of self-critical analyses of companies

were found, which shows that some companies are becoming more transparent and open about certain issues and dilemmas. This also increased the tendency to attach more value to other statements they make. It should also be noted that most data gathered linked to the partnerships originated from individuals involved in these partnerships, which may have affected the reliability of the information provided (Gitsham, 2007).

Research in this area also faces the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness or impact of companies' collaborative and unilateral peace promotion activities. This dissertation explored the effectiveness of companies' activities by looking at their potential, rather than actual, impact, given the paucity of data. Regarding companies' collaborative activities, partnership agreements were often absent, indicators rarely formulated, and baseline studies and control groups were not utilized. Using multiple data sources, the dissertation attempted to reconstruct pathways of change, also looking at the coherence and the relevance of the activities, and considering the characteristics of the context. The difficulty of measuring the impact of partnerships has been documented more broadly in practitioner publications (e.g. Chigas and Woodrow, 2008; Lenfant and Rutten, 2013; Spurk, 2008) as well as in the academic literature (Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Kolk et al., 2008; Lund-Thomsen, 2009; Van Tulder et al., 2016). Some of the main issues include the complexity and diversity of such collaborative arrangements, the different levels at which partnerships need to be measured, the absence of appropriate tools and methodologies, and the attribution problem (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Van Tulder et al., 2016). The latter is all the more challenging with partnerships aiming at promoting peace, due to the difficulty of isolating which particular activity contributed, or not, to furthering peace efforts (Bailey et al., 2015).

Although there is a growing reliance on experimental methods with randomized control trials (whereby the participants of a study, or an evaluation, are randomly assigned and control groups are used), especially in the development field, they are not exempt from critique. While such methods may be "particularly effective at providing robust evidence on what works and what does not within less complex partnerships with a limited focus" (Van Tulder et al., 2016, p. 6), they may not produce valuable results in complex, conflict-affected areas, due to the inappropriateness of the design and their lack of adaptability to a changing and volatile context (Lenfant and Rutten, 2013). Using control groups and treatment groups has also been questioned when the distinction between the two is almost impossible to make because of spillover effects, i.e. the members of control groups may also be affected by the partnership, or similar activities implemented within other partnerships (Ravaillon, 2009).

A recent publication that takes stock of existing impact evaluation methodologies and frameworks suggests to use a Partnering Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (Van Tulder et al., 2016). Although it does not pretend to tackle all issued identified previously, the framework specifies the level (or impact loop) at which 'impact' can be achieved, i.e. individual, organizational, partnership or society, each with its own benchmark. This framework, that has yet to be tested in conflict countries, shows promise because of its comprehensiveness and consideration of the different pathways revealing impact at different levels (including societal) which is extremely relevant for collaborative activities whose purpose is to further peace.

Finally, further research should also be cross-disciplinary in order to not only "acknowledge the perspectives of various disciplines in a broad, evolving field" (Ford, 2015, p. 452), but also enrich these perspectives. Haufler (2015, p. 465) argues that political scientists should pay more attention to the firm level, while business scholars need to also "examine a wide array of both formal and informal relationships, looking at issues of structure, influence, and identity as they affect conflict and peace". In addition, political scientists have called for more accurate definitions of peace to make a proper "distinction between peace and stability" (Ford, 2015, p.459). A country with a (stable) government involved in human rights violation may be qualified as peaceful in the sense that it is not marked by direct violence. Such environments may also be attractive for companies although their characteristics are associated with 'negative peace', a term traditionally coined in peace and conflict studies (Galtung, 1996), rather than with 'positive peace'.

Similarly, existing frameworks may also be enriched and/or extended. For instance, adding to Getz and Oetzel's (2009) framework, scholars have advocated to incorporate other dimensions, i.e. whether companies' activities promoting peace are explicit and/or unintended, and the geographical level at which they take place (local, national or international) (Ford, 2015). Such distinctions will deepen our understanding of how companies can further peace and may also help international organizations and intergovernmental initiatives such as the IDPS (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding), to better integrate business in truly multistakeholder fora. Based on this dissertation, I would recommend a more explicit consideration of companies in attempts at promoting peace and reconciliation in countries plagued by recurrent conflicts.

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English Summary

This dissertation explores business interaction with peace and conflict in Central Africa. In the past few decades, the role of business in fueling conflict has received a great deal of attention from academics and practitioners. More recently, studies from academic fields such as international business and political science have started to examine business potential contribution to peace. Business for Peace, a multi-disciplinary body of knowledge, has also looked at the peace-business nexus and called for more in-depth country based research on how business can contribute to peace.

To help shed light on this topic, this dissertation explores how different types of international companies perceive the opportunities and the challenges of doing business in conflict-affected areas in Central Africa, as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR). It also examines whether and how companies participate in multistakeholder partnerships to help further peace and reconciliation. Multistakeholder partnerships are collaborative activities whereby organizations from different sectors combine their resources and competencies to achieve a common goal. The geographical setting of this dissertation is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic of the Congo, Angola, and Rwanda.

This dissertation comprises 9 chapters. After introducing the dissertation in the first chapter, chapter 2 gives an overview of the main themes and debates linked to the dissertation, namely business and conflict, business for peace and CSR. Chapter 3 and 4 address how companies view their responsibilities when operating in conflict countries in Central Africa and whether they see a role for themselves in furthering peace. Chapter 5, 6, 7, and 8 examine a wide range of companies' collaboration activities as well as their peculiarities, classify them into categories and explore their peace promotion and reconciliation potential. Chapter 9 presents the conclusion and the limitations of this dissertation and identifies areas for further research.

Chapter 2 starts by presenting existing research on the destabilizing impact of companies in conflict countries by being involved in selling or smuggling arms, being complicit in human rights abuses or by funding rebel movements as to gain security over future deals. The interaction between business and conflict has mostly been studied from the resource curse perspective. The resource curse is a phenomenon through which countries well-endowed with natural resources display poor economic and governance track records. The resource curse literature examines the role played by companies involved in the extractive sector in sustaining conflict through providing revenues to corrupt and human rights violating governments and/or

rebel groups. More recently, the debate on the role of business in conflict has broadened to include attention for the costs of conflicts for companies as well as for the ways in which they can help reduce conflict and contribute to peace. The latter was discussed in the business for peace and the CSR literature. In a context of rising societal expectations, chapter 2 then investigates companies' social responsibilities in conflict countries, considering five channels identified in the business for peace literature through which companies can, unilaterally or collaboratively, and directly or indirectly, contribute to peace and reconciliation. These five channels are: fostering economic development, engaging in track-two diplomacy, adopting principles of external valuation and promoting the rule of law, contributing to a sense of community, and engaging in conflict risk assessments. Chapter 2 then explores partnerships as venues through which companies can shape their CSR and help address peace and reconciliation issues.

Chapter 3 looks at how 54 large international companies operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo and Angola report on CSR and conflict in these countries. More specifically, the study examines how companies from different sectors, ranging from the extractive to the beverage industry, perceive the opportunities, challenges and dilemmas of doing business in conflict countries and highlights how they report on their socio-economic impacts and on conflict-related issues. Concerning companies' socio-economic impacts, the chapter makes a distinction between tax and royalties, procurement, employment, and community development projects. Regarding conflict, the chapter examines whether companies provide information on conflict-related issues, such as the resource curse, and whether they respond to these issues. The findings indicate that companies are more inclined to report on their economic and social impacts than on conflict-related issues and that CSR activities in Central Africa are rather generic, i.e. they do not take into account the specific contextual characteristics.

Chapter 4 explores how 53 organizations, mostly small companies working in Rwanda and Eastern DRC in the coffee sector, combine economic and social goals in their business models. Drawing from the literature on hybrid organizations, organizations that combine a social mission with commercial activities, chapter 4 identifies three dimensions along which the degree of hybridity of the organizations is analyzed. These three dimensions are: the role of social change in the companies' objectives, the degree to which the companies engage in mutually beneficial relationships with other stakeholders, and the way in which companies interact with markets and institutions. The chapter suggests that hybrid organizational forms seem well suited to tackle issues found in (post-)conflict settings because they have a clear social agenda embedded in their

organizational objectives (which enhances the impact of their activities), they are keen to engage positively with all stakeholders, especially coffee communities with which they work, they promote a sense of togetherness, and they are directly involved in capacity building and development work at community level.

Chapter 5 investigates four cases of multistakeholder partnerships found in Angola and in the DRC, their characteristics as well as their potential to help addressing conflict-related issues. Chapter 5 suggests that in areas marked by antagonism, absence of functioning government and lack of trust, multistakeholder partnerships involving business have the potential to promote peace and further reconciliation when they take into consideration issues directly related to the conflict such as broader governance issues, ethnic divides, community-government relations, artisanal mining, and transparency. The findings also indicate that by fostering trust, encouraging dialogue and building capacities, companies' collaborative endeavors contribute to peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, adding to the literature on business-NGO partnership, chapter 5 observes an evolution in NGO-company engagement from confrontation to collaboration. It illustrates that service delivery and peace building NGOs, which are pragmatic and not ideologically motivated, are more inclined to collaborate with companies than human rights, research and advocacy NGOs.

Chapter 6 focuses on 59 international companies and their partnerships with NGOs in one country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. First, the study classifies those companies into three categories identified in the business and conflict literature, i.e. 'avoidant,' 'business as usual,' and 'conflict resolution'. Then, chapter 6 examines 39 business – NGO partnerships in which those companies participate, taking into consideration the type of NGOs, whether the partnerships address conflict-related issues, the degree to which communities are involved in the partnership and the focus of the activities carried out within the partnerships. Subsequently, chapter 6 classifies the partnerships into four types (philanthropic, engagement with funds, engagement without funds, and transformative), and explores their peace promotion potential. Most of the partnerships examined are philanthropic: they address traditional issues, follow a donor-recipient model and show limited community involvement. On the other side, transformative partnerships tackle root causes of conflict, have a high level of community participation as well as a strong sustainable community development focus, are geared towards building or strengthening communities' capabilities, and address issues that are highly relevant in conflict settings. In that light, they are more suitable to further peace and reconciliation.

Chapter 7 investigates the potential impact of 3 multistakeholder partnerships in the coffee sector in Eastern DRC. These partnerships involve companies, NGOs, cooperatives and Northern governments. Specifically, the chapter establishes a distinction between three types of potential effects of partnerships. Output (the result of an activity at organizational level), outcome (changes in capacities, and/or living conditions at the level of the stakeholders targeted by the activities), and impact, which aims at bringing structural solutions to the issues at stake (i.e. broader peace and governance climate, mostly at community level). Chapter 7 illustrates that results were achieved at the organizational/output level (build-up of managerial capacities and transfer of financial-administrative skills, and improved functioning of cooperatives), at the farmer/outcome level (better prices and livelihoods, increased revenues and access to markets), and more widely in communities considering reduced tensions and collaboration between previously hostile groups. As those partnerships are located in a fragile setting marked by institutional gaps, e.g. unpredictable rules, difficulties of formalizing agreements, lack of security, absence of trust and of good governance, as well as acute poverty, chapter 7 explores the ways in which they help address those gaps. By contributing to human security, by inducing young rebels to drop their arms and reintegrate their communities, by helping to promote reconciliation through joint activities, by promoting a sense of togetherness and trust between and within communities, by promoting respect for legal and contractual (partnership) agreements and by improving livelihoods of farmers, the three partnerships help address institutional gaps commonly found in (post-)conflict settings.

Chapter 8 provides an overview of the limited research insights on partnerships for peace and reconciliation in fragile states from different disciplinary fields of study. It presents the state of research on partnerships considering two literature streams, business, including marketing and management, and development, including public policy, political science and international relations. It highlights the fact that each stream approaches partnerships from different levels. Business has paid attention to the individual and/or organizational implications of partnerships while political science, international relations and development studies have considered the macro-societal level, mostly through partnerships for sustainable development which rarely involve business actors. Chapter 8 contributes to the literature by exposing business actors and shedding light on the external dimensions of partnerships, taking local communities into account. Building on the various partnership types presented in chapter 6, chapter 8 introduces a new typology considering different geographical levels at which partnerships take place (local, national, and international). The findings indicate that governments are mostly absent from local

partnerships, that national partnerships are the most transformative, that companies do not participate in recent international multilateral collaborative efforts, and that linkages between partnerships and partners at different levels are missing. Chapter 8 contends that, given the interconnected nature of conflict and fragility issues, building links between levels, partnerships and partners is likely to leverage the transformative potential of partnerships.

Finally, Chapter 9 presents the conclusion of this dissertation and provides an overview of its main contribution to the business for peace, CSR and partnership literature streams. Chapter 9 also discusses the limitations of the dissertation and points at the need for further research, i.e. broadening the company sample, identifying specific capabilities required by companies to successfully address peace and conflict issues, and covering companies from non-Western countries.

Nederlandse Samenvatting

In dit proefschrift wordt de interactie tussen bedrijven en vrede en conflict in Centraal-Afrika onderzocht. In de afgelopen decennia hebben academici en mensen in de praktijk veel aandacht besteed aan de rol van bedrijven bij het voeden van conflicten. Meer recent zijn academische studies op het gebied van international business en politieke wetenschappen geïnitieerd, die onderzoeken wat de potentiele bijdrage is van bedrijven aan vrede. Ook 'Business for Peace', een multidisciplinaire verzameling van kennis, heeft gekeken naar het verband tussen vrede en bedrijven en opgeroepen tot een diepgaander onderzoek per land naar hoe bedrijven kunnen bijdragen aan vrede.

Om meer licht op dit onderwerp te laten schijnen, wordt in dit proefschrift onderzocht hoe verschillende soorten internationale bedrijven kijken naar de mogelijkheden en uitdagingen voor bedrijven in gebieden in Centraal-Afrika die zijn getroffen door conflicten, als onderdeel van hun maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (MVO). Daarnaast wordt onderzocht of en hoe bedrijven participeren in partnerschappen met meerdere belanghebbenden, om vrede en verzoening te bevorderen. Partnerschappen met meerdere belanghebbenden zijn samenwerkingsactiviteiten waarbij organisaties uit diverse sectoren hun middelen en competenties samenvoegen om een gemeenschappelijk doel te bereiken. De geografische setting van dit proefschrift is de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC), de Republiek Congo, Angola en Rwanda.

Dit proefschrift bevat 9 hoofdstukken. Na een introductie in hoofdstuk 1, geeft hoofdstuk 2 een overzicht van de hoofdthema's en discussies die zijn verbonden aan het proefschrift, namelijk bedrijven en conflict, 'Business for Peace' en MVO. In hoofdstuk 3 en 4 wordt beschreven hoe bedrijven die actief zijn in conflictlanden in Centraal-Afrika hun verantwoordelijkheden beschouwen, en of zij een rol voor zichzelf zien weggelegd bij het bevorderen van vrede. Hoofdstuk 5, 6, 7 en 8 onderzoeken een breed scala aan samenwerkingsactiviteiten van bedrijven en ook de bijbehorende bijzonderheden, classificeren deze in categorieën en onderzoeken hun mogelijkheden voor de bevordering van vrede en verzoening. Hoofdstuk 9 bevat de conclusie en de beperkingen van dit proefschrift; ook worden gebieden voor verder onderzoek geïdentificeerd.

Hoofdstuk 2 begint met de presentatie van bestaand onderzoek naar de destabiliserende impact van bedrijven in conflictlanden, door betrokkenheid bij de verkoop of het smokkelen van wapens, medeplichtigheid aan mensenrechtenschendingen of financiering van

rebellenbewegingen om toekomstige deals zeker te stellen. De interactie tussen bedrijven en conflict is hoofdzakelijk bestudeerd vanuit het perspectief van de 'resource curse' of vloek van de hulpbronnen. Deze vloek van de hulpbronnen is een fenomeen waardoor landen die rijkelijk zijn voorzien van natuurlijke hulpbronnen magere track records op het gebied van economie en bestuur laten zien. Literatuur over de vloek van de hulpbronnen onderzoekt de rol van bedrijven in de winningssector die conflicten laten voortbestaan door corrupte en mensenrechtenschendende regeringen of rebellenbewegingen van inkomsten te voorzien. Meer recent is het debat over de rol van bedrijven in conflicten verbreed door ook te kijken naar de kosten van conflicten voor bedrijven en naar de manieren waarop zij kunnen helpen conflicten te verminderen en bij te dragen aan vrede. Dat laatste kwam al aan bod in de literatuur over 'Business for Peace' en MVO. In de context van opkomende maatschappelijke verwachtingen onderzoekt hoofdstuk 2 vervolgens de maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven in conflictlanden, waarbij vijf kanalen in aanmerking worden genomen die in de literatuur over 'Business for Peace' zijn geïdentificeerd en waarmee bedrijven, eenzijdig of in samenwerking, direct of indirect, bijdragen aan vrede en verzoening. Deze vijf kanalen zijn de bevordering van economische ontwikkeling, het bijdragen aan 'track-two diplomacy', het aannemen van externe waarderingsgrondslagen en het bevorderen van de rechtsstaat, het bijdragen aan het gemeenschapsgevoel en het uitvoeren van conflictrisicobeoordeling. Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt vervolgens samenwerkingsverbanden als platform waarmee bedrijven hun MVO-beleid kunnen vormgeven en vredes- en verzoeningskwesties kunnen aanpakken.

Hoofdstuk 3 bekijkt hoe 54 grote internationale bedrijven die actief zijn in de DRC, de Republiek Congo en Angola rapporteren over MVO en conflicten in deze landen. Meer specifiek onderzoekt de studie hoe bedrijven in verschillende sectoren, variërend van de winningsindustrie tot de drankindustrie, de mogelijkheden, uitdagingen en dilemma's van het zakendoen in conflictlanden zien. Ook benadrukt de studie hoe deze bedrijven rapporteren over hun sociaal-economische impact en over conflictgerelateerde kwesties. Wat de sociaal-economische impact van bedrijven aangaat, maakt de studie onderscheid tussen belasting en royalty's, aanbestedingen, werkgelegenheid en projecten ter ontwikkeling van de gemeenschap. Op het gebied van conflicten, onderzoekt het hoofdstuk of bedrijven informatie verschaffen over conflictgerelateerde kwesties, zoals de vloek van de hulpbronnen, en of zij gehoor geven aan deze kwesties. De bevindingen geven aan dat bedrijven meer geneigd zijn te rapporteren over hun economische en sociale impact dan over conflictgerelateerde kwesties, en dat MVO-

activiteiten in Centraal-Afrika tamelijk algemeen zijn, dat wil zeggen dat zij geen rekening houden met de specifieke contextuele eigenschappen.

In hoofdstuk 4 wordt onderzocht hoe 53 organisaties, meestal kleine bedrijven die in Rwanda en het oosten van de DRC actief zijn in de koffiesector, economische en sociale doelen combineren in hun businessmodellen. Op basis van de literatuur over hybride organisaties, zijnde organisaties die een sociale missie combineren met commerciële activiteiten, worden in hoofdstuk 4 drie dimensies geïdentificeerd waarmee de mate van hybriditeit wordt geanalyseerd. Deze drie dimensies zijn de rol van sociale verandering in de bedrijfsdoelen, de mate waarin de bedrijven deelnemen aan wederzijds voordelige relaties met andere belanghebbenden, en de manier waarop bedrijven omgaan met markten en instituten. Het hoofdstuk geeft aan dat hybride organisatievormen geschikt lijken te zijn om kwesties aan te pakken die zich voordoen in (post-)conflictsituaties, omdat ze een duidelijke sociale agenda hebben opgenomen in hun organisatiedoelen (wat de impact van hun activiteiten vergroot), gemotiveerd zijn zich op een positieve manier met alle belanghebbenden bezig te houden, vooral met koffiegemeenschappen waarmee ze werken, een gevoel van saamhorigheid bevorderen, en direct betrokken zijn bij capaciteitsopbouw en ontwikkelingsactiviteiten op het niveau van de gemeenschap.

Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt vier voorbeelden van partnerschappen met meerdere belanghebbenden in Angola en de DRC, zowel hun eigenschappen als hun potentie om conflictgerelateerde kwesties aan te pakken. Hoofdstuk 5 geeft aan dat in gebieden die worden gekenmerkt door vijandschap, de afwezigheid van een functionerende overheid en een gebrek aan vertrouwen, partnerschappen met meerdere belanghebbenden de potentie hebben vrede en verzoening te bevorderen als zij rekening houden met kwesties die direct gerelateerd zijn aan het conflict, zoals algemene bestuurskwesties, etnische verdeeldheid, relaties tussen gemeenschap en regering, ambachtelijke mijnbouw en transparantie. De bevindingen geven ook aan dat door vertrouwen te bevorderen, de dialoog te stimuleren en capaciteit op te bouwen, de inspanningen van bedrijven die zijn gericht op samenwerking, bijdragen aan vrede en verzoening. In aanvulling op de literatuur over samenwerkingsverbanden tussen bedrijven en non-gouvernementele organisaties (NGO's) wordt in hoofdstuk 5 een ontwikkeling waargenomen van confrontatie naar samenwerking. Dienstverlenende en op vredesopbouw gerichte NGO's, die pragmatisch zijn en niet ideologisch gemotiveerd, zijn meer geneigd samen te werken met bedrijven dan NGO's die zich richten op mensenrechten, onderzoek en lobby.

In hoofdstuk 6 ligt de focus op 59 internationale bedrijven en hun partnerschappen met NGO's in een bepaald land, de DRC. Eerst worden deze bedrijven in drie categorieën ingedeeld die in de literatuur op het gebied van bedrijven en conflict worden geïdentificeerd, namelijk 'vermijdend', 'business as usual' en 'conflictoplossend'. Vervolgens worden 39 samenwerkingsverbanden onderzocht van bedrijven en NGO's waarin deze bedrijven participeren. Hierbij wordt in aanmerking genomen het type NGO, of het samenwerkingsverband conflictgerelateerde kwesties aanpakt, de mate waarin gemeenschappen zijn betrokken bij het samenwerkingsverband en de focus van de activiteiten die worden verricht binnen de samenwerkingsverbanden. Vervolgens worden de samenwerkingsverbanden in vier types ingedeeld (filantropisch, 'engagement with funds', 'engagement without funds' en transformatief), en wordt hun potentie om vrede te bevorderen onderzocht. De meeste voorkomende samenwerkingsverbanden zijn filantropisch; zij richten zich op traditionele kwesties, volgen een donor-ontvangermodel en vertonen slechts een beperkte betrokkenheid van de gemeenschap. Aan de andere kant van het spectrum pakken transformatieve samenwerkingsverbanden de hoofdoorzaken van het conflict aan, kennen een hoog niveau van participatie van de gemeenschap, en hebben een sterke focus op duurzame gemeenschapsontwikkeling; ze zijn gericht op capaciteitsversterking van gemeenschappen en richten zich op kwesties die zeer relevant zijn in conflictsituaties. In dat licht bezien zijn zij geschikter om vrede en verzoening te bevorderen.

Hoofdstuk 7 onderzoekt de potentiële impact van drie partnerschappen met meerdere belanghebbenden in de koffiesector in het oosten van de DRC. Bij deze samenwerkingsverbanden zijn bedrijven, NGO's, coöperaties en 'Northern' overheden betrokken. Dit hoofdstuk stelt met name het onderscheid vast tussen drie types van mogelijke effecten van samenwerkingsverbanden. Output (het resultaat van een activiteit op organisatorisch niveau), outcome (verandering in capaciteit, en/of levensomstandigheden op het niveau van de belanghebbenden op wie de activiteiten zich richten), en impact, dat is gericht op het bewerkstelligen van structurele oplossingen voor de betreffende kwesties (dat wil zeggen een breder vredes- en bestuursklimaat, meestal op het niveau van de gemeenschap). Hoofdstuk 7 toont aan dat resultaten werden behaald op het niveau van de organisatie/output (opbouw van leidinggevende capaciteiten en overdracht van financieel-administratieve vaardigheden, en een verbeterd functioneren van coöperaties), op het niveau van de boer/outcome (betere prijzen en levensonderhoud, toegenomen opbrengsten en toegang tot markten) en in bredere zin in gemeenschappen, in aanmerking nemende verminderde spanningen en samenwerking tussen

groepen die voorheen vijandig tegenover elkaar stonden. Aangezien deze samenwerkingsverbanden voorkomen in een broze setting die wordt gekenmerkt door institutionele leemtes, zoals onvoorspelbare regels, problemen bij het formaliseren van overeenkomsten, gebrek aan veiligheid, afwezigheid van vertrouwen en van goed bestuur, en daarnaast acute armoede, worden in hoofdstuk 7 de manieren onderzocht waarop deze leemtes kunnen worden aangepakt. Door bij te dragen aan menselijke veiligheid, door jonge opstandelingen ertoe te bewegen de wapens neer te leggen en weer in hun gemeenschappen te integreren, door hulp te bieden bij de bevordering van verzoening door gezamenlijke activiteiten, door een gevoel van verbondenheid en vertrouwen te bevorderen tussen en binnen gemeenschappen, door het respect voor wettelijke en contractuele (samenwerkings)overeenkomsten te bevorderen en door het levensonderhoud van boeren te verbeteren, helpen de drie samenwerkingsverbanden de institutionele leemtes aan te pakken die gewoonlijk worden aangetroffen in (post-)conflictgebieden.

Hoofdstuk 8 biedt een overzicht van de beperkte onderzoeksinzichten in samenwerkingsverbanden voor vrede en verzoening in kwetsbare staten vanuit verschillende disciplinaire vakgebieden. Het presenteert de staat van onderzoek van samenwerkingsverbanden, waarbij twee literatuurstromingen in aanmerking worden genomen: business, waaronder begrepen marketing en management, en ontwikkeling, waaronder begrepen openbaar beleid, politieke wetenschap en internationale betrekkingen. Het benadrukt het feit dat iedere stroming samenwerkingsverbanden vanuit verschillende niveaus benadert. Business heeft aandacht besteed aan het individu en/of de organisatorische implicaties van samenwerkingsverbanden, terwijl politieke wetenschappen, internationale betrekkingen en ontwikkelingsstudies het macro-maatschappelijke niveau in aanmerking hebben genomen, meestal via samenwerkingsverbanden voor duurzame ontwikkeling die zelden bedrijven betreffen. Hoofdstuk 8 draagt bij aan de literatuur door bedrijven te belichten en een nieuw licht te werpen op de externe dimensies van samenwerkingsverbanden, waarbij rekening wordt gehouden met lokale gemeenschappen. Verder bouwend op de verschillende soorten samenwerkingsverbanden die in hoofdstuk 6 werden gepresenteerd, wordt in hoofdstuk 8 een nieuwe typologie geïntroduceerd die de verschillende geografische niveaus in aanmerking neemt waarop samenwerkingsverbanden plaatsvinden (lokaal, nationaal en internationaal). De bevindingen wijzen erop dat overheden meestal afwezig zijn in lokale samenwerkingsverbanden, dat nationale samenwerkingsverbanden het meest transformatief zijn, dat bedrijven niet participeren in recente internationale multilaterale gezamenlijke inspanningen, en dat

verbindingen tussen samenwerkingsverbanden en partners op verschillende niveaus ontbreken. Hoofdstuk 8 betoogt dat, gelet op de onderlinge verwevenheid van conflict en fragiliteitkwesties, het opbouwen van banden tussen de niveaus, samenwerkingsverbanden en partners waarschijnlijk het transformatieve potentieel van partnerships zal vergroten.

Ten slotte wordt in hoofdstuk 9 de conclusie van dit proefschrift gepresenteerd en wordt een overzicht gegeven van zijn belangrijkste bijdrage aan de literatuur over 'Business for Peace', MVO en samenwerkingsverbanden. Hoofdstuk 9 bespreekt ook de beperkingen van dit proefschrift en de punten waarvoor verder onderzoek vereist is, zijnde de verbreding van de steekproef van bedrijven, de identificatie van de specifieke capaciteiten die bedrijven nodig hebben om succesvol vredes- en conflictkwesties te kunnen aanpakken, en het onderzoeken van bedrijven uit niet-westerse landen.

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Amani ni biashara yetu. Peace is our business.